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1
Introduction: why cultural memory 
and heritage?
Veysel Apaydin
The last several decades have witnessed a marked increase in research in 
relation to cultural heritage, memory and change, and to transformation 
and destruction within the field of heritage studies. This increase in the 
number of studies has exposed how cultural heritage and the memory 
it embodies is vital for individuals, groups and communities in form-
ing collective identities. Such an exposure has also highlighted how the 
elimination of individual and group memory is an important underlying 
cause of cultural heritage destruction. The destruction of cultural mem-
ory through destruction of the material culture of the past and present 
has been used to oppress individuals, groups and communities in order 
to maintain power. This has been a common tool in many undemocratic 
nation-states that aim to establish hegemony over minority groups; it is 
frequently seen during conflicts between ethnic and religious groups, 
during genocides, sectarian conflict and in wartime. In many parts of the 
world, cultural heritage has also been destroyed or transformed through 
large-scale construction projects such as dams, railways, etc., in order to 
develop resources and create profit. In the post capitalist-era heritage, 
and therefore memory, has become a selling point and nostalgia some-
thing to be consumed, which further contributes to vanishing heritage 
and memory.
Scholars have widely discussed the importance of cultural heritage 
for individuals, groups and communities. It has been considered in rela-
tion to cultural heritage, memory and ethnic wars (Bevan 2016; Herscher 
2010; Walasek 2015); cultural heritage, war and terrorism (Stone 2011; 
Holtorf 2006; Stone and Bajjaly 2008); the interlinkage between cultural 
heritage and memory (Hodgkin and Radstone 2003; Smith 2006; Erll 
and Nunning 2008; Berliner 2005; Benton 2010; Butler 2006, 2007; 
Winter 2004); cultural heritage and local and Indigenous groups (Atalay 
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2012; Nicholas and Bannister 2004; Smith and Jackson 2008; Apaydin 
2018; Smith et al. 2018); cultural heritage and capitalism (Hamilakis 
and Duke 2007; Meskell 2015; Resco 2016). These research programmes 
and publications (and many more besides) have analysed and exposed 
the destruction of memory through the destruction of cultural heritage, 
as well as the complex interactions between heritage, memory and com-
munity formation.
In recent years several scholars in heritage studies (for example, 
Holtorf 2015, 2018; Harrison 2013; DeSilvey 2017) have developed 
new, provocative but helpful discussion about heritage process from a 
different perspective. They have argued that destruction and transforma-
tion of heritage are also a part of the heritage process that is necessary 
and can even be a positive change, developing new heritage and mem-
ories. However, as this is a very new discussion within heritage studies, 
there is still a lack of attention paid to the ethical side of destruction and 
transformation of heritage.
This book exposes the relationship between heritage and memory, 
discourses and the impact of construction, transformation or destruction 
of heritage; it emphasises the significance of such processes for groups 
and communities. Critical Perspectives on Cultural Memory and Heritage 
also brings new insights to the discussion of destruction and transforma-
tion from an ethical perspective by focusing on the question: how can this 
process be ethical? It further argues that even if destruction and transfor-
mation of heritage is necessary and inevitable, this process should be led 
at grassroots level by those communities and groups who develop and 
attach values and meanings to heritage and memory.
Heritage, memory and destruction
Heritage is a vehicle of communication, a means of transmission of ideas, 
values and knowledge, which includes the tangibles and intangibles of 
both cultural and natural heritage (Ashworth 2007). These ‘ideas, val-
ues and knowledge’ have been constructed through the relationships of 
individuals and groups. The ideas and values of local, ethnic, religious or 
other communities, and their knowledge, have been ascribed or devel-
oped over time, although these meanings and values may – and do – 
change (Hall 1997, 61). Specific aspects of cultural heritage can become 
insignificant (Harrison 2013) through the process by which heritage is 
shaped and managed in the present and used as a resource in the future 
(Ashworth et al. 2007): through memories developed and transferred 
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from one generation to another. Cultural heritage generally keeps its 
importance, however – particularly tangible heritage, because it provides 
both grounds and resources for constructing collective identity.
The definition of memory is a very complex concept as it has been 
interpreted from different perspectives. While many scholars have asso-
ciated memory with past material culture, and have argued that it devel-
ops out of the active engagement of individuals’ and groups’ experiences 
in the past (Ricoeur 1999; 2004), it has also been emphasised that mem-
ory is a performance and involves active engagement with the present 
(Nora 1989). The concept of memory is often used in a very ambiguous 
and vague way in social sciences. In contrast, the interlinkage of memory 
with cultural heritage is not so abstract: tangible heritage (such as mon-
uments, sites, objects and museums) provides strong representations of 
the knowledge and experience of people in the past and present. This 
relationship is plural and developed over multiple social experiences. 
These experiences can keep group collective identity alive through com-
memorative events or memories. Cultural memory and heritage are 
strongly linked to one another, as heritage is itself a cultural production 
that further develops values and meanings for individuals and groups.
Because of this cultural production, the meanings and values 
ascribed to heritage and the memories that are developed from it become 
a significant symbol for collective identity; they can thus serve to keep 
groups and communities together. The destruction of this important 
component through war, terror, sectarian conflict and top-down eco-
nomic policies also means the destruction of memory and identity for 
individuals, groups and communities. The material culture of the past 
and present has a significant value for the future of groups and commu-
nities – which is why it is frequently targeted by powers interested in con-
trolling land, resources and social or political relations.
As outlined above, the concept of heritage and memory, together 
with its importance for groups and communities, results in plural mean-
ings. Yet these two concepts are integral resources for people who are 
connected to each other through them. These are groups of people who 
share similar values and develop tangible and intangible heritage and 
associated memory; ascribing meanings and values to cultural heritage 
helps them to come together and create a sense of belonging. This in turn 
provides a critical resource for survival in a complex world.
Heritage and memory are significant for people who are searching 
for descriptions of themselves (Crooke 2007) and for terms that rep-
resent their identity. The destruction of cultural memory and heritage 
can therefore be painful for people whose collective identity is attached 
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(Ricoeur 1999). It is necessary to identify, discuss and analyse exam-
ples of memory and heritage destruction through war, terror, sectarian 
conflict, capitalism, natural disasters and economic downturns in those 
spheres that affect the preservation of cultural heritage – namely in aca-
demia, in public and in everyday life. Bringing these aspects of cultural 
heritage together is essential to a cogent discussion.
This volume focuses on the interlinkage and importance of heritage 
and memory for group and community identity, and for the construction 
of a sense of belonging. Additionally, this volume aims to expose embed-
ded motives and discourses in the destruction of memory and heritage. It 
argues that it is necessary to identify, discuss and analyse these to under-
stand the causes of destruction of heritage and memory: a highly sig-
nificant issue at the level of the individual, the group and wider society. 
Destruction of, and violence towards, heritage (and therefore memory) 
is common during war, terror, conflict, natural disasters and under cap-
italist policies. These polices also underlie climatic changes that impact 
on natural and cultural heritage.
It is in these affected spheres of cultural heritage that groups and 
communities ascribe values, develop memories and shape their collective 
identity. To illustrate this point, this volume offers a range of case studies 
that analyse and reveal the importance of cultural heritage and mem-
ory for people. It examines the destructive and violent actions that can 
impact heritage and memory through a variety of different approaches 
and methods on a uniquely global scale, in order to answer the following 
questions: what is the interlinkage between cultural memory and her-
itage? To what extent are cultural heritage and memory significant for 
group and community identity? What are the embedded discourses for 
destruction of heritage and therefore memory through war, terror, con-
flict, development and natural disasters? What are the ethical ways in 
which heritage and memory can be transformed? What should be the 
role of heritage studies as a discipline within the paradox of destruction, 
change and transformation?
In his epilogue to this volume, Cornelius Holtorf emphasises that 
as professionals of heritage studies we need to be careful about ‘overt 
political motivation’. The thrust of this volume is in total agreement with 
his point that undertaking critical research, and the practice of being 
a critical academic, does not mean rejecting every instance of heritage 
destruction and every decision to change or transform heritage. Social 
circumstances are never black and white: they have many dynamics in 
both cause and consequence. We need to take a constructivist approach 
to respond to those social and political paradoxes. However, as critical 
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heritage scholars, we should also remember the fact that heritage studies 
is integrally linked to actual people; most of our data is collected in the 
field, from human participants in different natural and cultural settings. 
The link between people and heritage is itself very political and encom-
passes many aspects, for example, values, meanings, a sense of belong-
ing and identity, as well as social and economic issues. Therefore critical 
heritage studies cannot avoid interacting with the social, economic and 
political structures and settings in which people live. To give an example, 
when we research the links between climate change and heritage, how 
is it possible to avoid investigating the political and economic decisions 
that lead to climate change? In affirming these points, Holtorf empha-
sises that any form of sectarianism must be avoided within the discipline, 
even while heritage studies should be as inclusive – and give voice to as 
many people – as possible.
Chapters in this volume answer the questions posed from different 
perspectives and contexts. For this reason, the chapters are arranged 
under certain themes in six different parts. In Part I of the book, I attempt 
to expose the relationship between cultural memory and heritage. I con-
centrate on their importance for collective identity and the construction 
of a sense of belonging for groups and communities, and the conse-
quences of these significant components of heritage. I deal with different 
case studies to demonstrate this fact, embedding discourses of heritage 
and memory destruction alongside the ethical issues of heritage destruc-
tion and transformation. I argue that transformation of heritage can be 
very beneficial for producing new heritage, while maintaining that the 
ethical side of this process must be that it is led and decided upon at 
grassroots level, by communities who are in interaction with the cultural 
heritage.
Part II of the book focuses on the effect of urban development and 
large infrastructure on heritage. In particular, this section deals with 
the issues of regeneration and large development projects. These have a 
huge impact on heritage and communities, as well as an additional role 
encompassing archaeology, archaeologists, heritage specialists and man-
agement of these affected cultural assets. Part II considers case studies 
from several different parts of the world to demonstrate and discuss the 
impact of urban development on heritage, heritage change and trans-
formation, and the ethics involved in this process. In this section King 
focuses on the effect of large developments in sub-Saharan Africa from 
a different perspective. She explores the African literature to reveal how 
‘slow violence’ through large developments impacts on heritage, land-
scape and the environment as a whole. Gardner brings a case study of a 
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‘mega event’, in this instance the construction of the site for the London 
2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games; he considers its effect on herit-
age resources including archaeological materials, historic buildings and 
the impact on communities who interacted with the site in their daily 
and social lives. Sterling deals with the issue of urban development lead-
ing to the erasure of heritage, as well as issues around changing and 
transforming heritage by focusing on London. In my own contribution 
I concentrate on issues of changing, transforming and eliminating pub-
lic space/heritage through top-down decisions, and the significance for 
collective identity and the sense of belonging of communities in a case 
study of Gezi Park in Istanbul. Grima deals with a similar case study, but 
one that encompasses the whole of Malta. He discusses issues around 
urban development that bring consequences for the historic environment 
and explores the ways in which these issues are managed at policy level. 
Almansa-Sánchez and Corpas-Cívicos focus on issues around managing 
archaeological assets during urban development in Madrid.
Part III of this book deals with issues of destruction of Indigenous 
heritage. It includes case studies on Indigenous communities and her-
itage, ranging from Australia to North and South America. Nicholas 
and Smith deal with the issue of an Indigenous heritage that has been 
neglected, ‘denigrated’ and destroyed. They point out the importance 
of tangible and intangible heritage for those Indigenous peoples whose 
identity and values are attached. They also flag up the issue of exclusion 
of Indigenous people from their own heritage by discussing the arti-
cles of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Kearney takes 
Indigenous Australian cultural heritage as a case study. She examines the 
engagement of Australian Indigenous peoples with heritage, acknowl-
edging its vital significance for them. While exploring the significance of 
heritage from an Indigenous perspective with case studies, she also dis-
cusses colonial attitudes to Indigenous heritage. Montgomery Ramírez 
focuses on Central America to discuss issues around Indigenous heritage, 
placed under threat by environmental and development-led destruction 
processes that also endanger the Indigenous population. Rocha brings 
another interesting case study from the Brazilian Amazon, where large 
dams have been built on the lands of Indigenous people. She points out 
the impact that construction has had when implemented with no consul-
tation of Indigenous people. Rocha also discusses the ethical aspects of 
conducting archaeological rescue excavations alongside the destructive 
process of dam building that destroys forests, landscapes and people.
Part IV of the book exposes the destruction of heritage in relation to 
erasing memory that occurs during sectarian violence, conflict and war. 
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Such events are the most destructive processes in which heritage and 
memory are involved; they impact painfully on communities and their 
effects last for generations. Over the last several decades the world has 
witnessed some very violent destruction of heritage, including archae-
ological assets, historic and religious buildings, homes and landscapes. 
This has included destruction during ethnic and religious conflicts, 
civil wars and sectarian attacks on heritage and communities. Loosley 
Leeming brings the case study of the destruction of a monastery in Syria, 
a country where civil war and unrest has been going on for several years. 
While she focuses on the importance of heritage that has great signifi-
cance for communities who are emotionally attached, she also discusses 
narratives that lead to the development of memories through her case 
study. The Bosnian War of the 1990s cost many lives and led to consid-
erable population displacement. During the conflict, deliberate destruc-
tion of cultural property was very visible. Walasek focuses on this and 
discusses the importance of cultural heritage and identity for commu-
nities. She further explores the process of post-conflict restoration and 
reconstruction in Bosnia in the years immediately after the war. Pollard 
explores the accidental bombing of Pompeii in 1943 by Allied forces. 
He achieves this through archival research, particularly focusing on the 
media coverage of the time and on the memoirs of individuals involved.
Part V of the book focuses on the impact of decision- and 
 policy-making on cultural heritage assets, which is closely interlinked 
to the collective identity and memory of groups and communities. Linn-
Tynen focuses on the lack of representation in African American herit-
age, and discusses how this leads to the erasure of identity in relation to 
heritage. She deals with the issues of ‘authorized heritage discourse’ in 
the United States and explores how decisions at policy level have created 
inequality, particularly for African American and non-white communi-
ties. Zorzin concentrates on Taiwanese identity in relation to heritage in 
terms of construction, annihilation and reconfiguration through the anal-
ysis of different powers acting in Taiwan over different periods. While 
Zorzin analyses heritage legislation in Taiwan over time, he also exposes 
the impact of the ‘neoliberal paradigm’ on the heritage and identity of 
Taiwanese people. In the last paper of this section Dries and Schreurs 
focus on heritage management policy and practice in in the Netherlands. 
They deal with the issue of the decision-making process on what to pre-
serve, and the ways in which these decisions were made, which have a 
significant influence on memory and identity.
Part VI of the book is allocated to an epilogue by Cornelius Holtorf, 
an archaeologist and Chair of Heritage Futures at UNESCO. Drawing 
8 CRIT ICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURAL MEMORY AND HERITAGE
upon his long history of research and publication of substantial papers on 
the subject, Holtorf reflects broadly on the issues of destruction, change 
and transformation of heritage. In so doing he combines an analysis and 
interpretation of the chapters in this volume with his own perspective on 
this subject.
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Part I





The interlinkage of cultural 
memory, heritage and discourses 
of construction, transformation and 
destruction
Veysel Apaydin
While the overall concept of cultural memory and heritage in theory 
and practice has been widely researched, the relationship between cul-
tural memory and heritage needs further discussion in order to expose 
discourses of importance for groups and communities. In this chapter I 
do not attempt to argue that we need to be more obsessed with protec-
tion and preservation of heritage and memory. On the contrary: I aim to 
present and discuss the ways in which heritage transformation, recon-
struction and destruction can be problematic for communities unless the 
communities themselves actively decide on – and engage with – these 
processes, from a bottom-up perspective. Furthermore, I attempt to 
establish a link between memory and heritage and their importance for 
communities, alongside processes of accumulation and continuity.
I emphasise here the more tangible aspects of cultural heritage, 
particularly monumental/architectural heritage and landscape. With 
their symbolism and meanings, I argue that they are more effective for 
the survival of communities, particularly oppressed communities, in 
areas of the world where conflicts and war are present, or where author-
itarianism has taken hold. Not only does tangible heritage have more 
significance for communities in the situation of war and conflict, but it 
also has a large role as the place where memories are transferred from 
one generation to another, as well as being where cultural narratives are 
kept alive. This is seen in early anthropological studies, for example the 
work of Malinowski, who shows how stories are embodied in the physical 
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material culture and landscape of the Trobriand Islanders (Malinowski 
1922; see also Sommer 2017 for more examples). I would particularly 
like to emphasise that cultural memory and heritage is not presented 
here solely as a process engaged with the past, nor does the material cul-
ture of the past exist only for purposes of ‘remembering’. It is strongly 
suggested here that cultural memory and heritage are processes that 
actively engage the social, economic and political life of the present; they 
are living processes and a tool for the resilience of communities.
This chapter first presents a brief overview of the concept of cul-
tural memory as it has been widely researched and published in cultural 
studies. Second, it exposes the relationship of cultural memory to her-
itage, considering particularly how it is embodied in heritage and the 
need for more research in this area. Third, it moves on to its significance 
for communities from the perspectives of collective identity and sense of 
belonging. In the final section I examine the discourses of and motives 
for the destruction of heritage through violence by focusing especially on 
deliberate and direct destructions.
In this chapter, I particularly address these specific questions: what 
do memory and heritage mean for communities? How have these con-
cepts been used as tools of resilience to protect the collective identity 
and sense of belonging of communities against oppression by hegemonic 
powers? How is memory embodied in heritage and material culture? 
What are the embedded discourses of heritage destruction and construc-
tion? These questions are significant for heritage studies as we live in an 
increasingly conflicted world. While cultural memory and heritage can 
be used for resilience, these concepts are also often abused and destroyed 
during conflicts. They may be targeted and manipulated or erased by 
nation-states, or wiped out for economic development and during gentri-
fication projects, particularly in urban areas.
The entanglement of cultural memory with heritage
Memory is perhaps one of the most difficult areas of the social sciences to 
define and set within boundaries. There may be no ‘one way’ of defining 
or marking the boundaries of the concept of memory. As a concept, mem-
ory is active. It interacts with the everyday life of individuals, groups and 
communities, who in turn engage with a wide range of activities. These 
actions are related to their individual lives, and help to shape individ-
ual memory. Group membership and the life of a community form and 
contribute to the construction of collective memory, which then creates 
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collective identity and a sense of belonging. While the concept of memory 
as understood through neurological science has been widely researched, 
the aim of this chapter is instead to focus on understanding the concept 
of cultural or collective memory as it relates to the everyday life of groups 
and communities.
The terms cultural, social or collective memory are differentiated 
from the memories of an individual by being developed or created through 
social and cultural interactions of groups and communities. Groups and 
communities hold and share cultural values through material culture and 
heritage. These are also used for developing and consolidating memory, 
a sense of belonging and the construction of identity. The term ‘cultural 
memory’ was adopted into heritage studies from sociology – particularly 
from the work of the French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, who devel-
oped the idea and theory of cultural (or social and collective) memory 
with his pioneering work La mémoire collective (1950). The use of these 
terminologies, particularly in heritage studies, can be problematic unless 
the distinction is strongly defined and the meaning of cultural memory 
made explicit for materials of the past and heritage of present (for more 
information about terminologies see Macdonald 2013).
Erll and Rigney explain that ‘cultural memory is an ongoing process 
of remembrance and forgetting in which individuals and groups continue 
to reconfigure their relationship to the past and hence reposition them-
selves in relation to established and emergent memory sites. As the word 
suggests, remembering is better seen as an active engagement with the 
past, as performative rather than reproductive’ (Erll and Rigney 2009, 
2). Similarly, heritage is also an ongoing process as Smith and many 
other scholars in heritage studies have demonstrated (Smith 2006); the 
construction, reconstruction, even destruction of heritage and material 
culture is part of the transformation, development and therefore overall 
process of heritage. Both acts of destruction and construction support 
one another, as I discus below. However, I argue that although engaging 
with past material culture and developing new heritage (and therefore 
memory), as well as heritage destruction, are all part of the process, this 
needs to be decided at the grass roots level by relevant communities. The 
daily, social and economic needs of these communities may – indeed, 
will – be different in every part of the world and should be reflected in the 
decisions made. In this way the ‘process of heritage’ can be more ethical, 
as I discuss in my other contribution to this volume (Apaydin, chapter 5).
In most cases memory is considered to be an agent that is closely 
related to past events and the material culture of the past. This can be seen 
in archaeological studies, which often consider heritage only through 
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past objects, namely historic or archaeological material. However, herit-
age and memory are not only related to the past; they also have direct 
associations with the present and future (Lowenthal 2015). Though both 
are accumulated through time, they are also shaped and developed in the 
present, which in turn gives direction to the future. There is surely an obvi-
ous distinction between memory and history, as Pierre Nora clearly points 
out: ‘memory is living’, but history is always reconstructed from the past 
and very problematic to deal with (Nora 1989, 2). Erll has further noted 
that cultural memory ‘is the totality of the context within which such var-
ied cultural phenomena originate’ (Erll 2011, 7). Taking these points into 
account, the ways in which heritage is also ‘living’ and how it is related to 
social, economic, political and daily life should also be emphasised.
Although memory can be considered a very abstract and subjec-
tive concept, it is highly related to tangible heritage and material culture 
because this is where memory is embodied. Both arise from collective 
performance, and the dynamics of both concepts share many character-
istics (see Sather-Wagstaff 2015). This can be seen in circumstances of 
difficult or contested heritage, and at heritage sites that have a strong 
relationship to the identities of groups and communities. In fact, even 
archaeological sites that were constructed thousands of years ago still 
play a role in the social and everyday life of groups and communities.
The case of the UNESCO world heritage site of Catalhoyuk in Turkey 
is a good example of an instance where heritage unrelated to modern-day 
inhabitants still has a strong impact. Even though local communities have 
no connection to the site in terms of their identity construction, it still 
holds importance for them. This is because the site as a landscape plays 
an important role in daily life. Local communities have been engaging 
in their daily activities for generations there, using the site for economic 
income (see Apaydin 2018) among other activities.
Such uses create an opportunity for heritage sites to survive for gen-
erations, allowing memory and heritage to accumulate for the future, but 
in a way that can adapt and transform themselves to the requirements of 
today’s world. Sather-Wagstaff suggests that heritage cannot exist with-
out continuous performance and active engagement of people within 
everyday life (Sather-Wagstaff 2015). We can agree with this, and fur-
ther argue that memory is also accumulated through time and space. As 
it is a performance of everyday engagement by people, memory cannot 
exist over a long period of time and through generations without herit-
age. While this accumulation depends on the continuing engagement of 
people who actively ‘remember’, it also allows people to reconstruct and 
redevelop this process with the requirements of the present.
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It is worthwhile to define the term ‘performance’ in a heritage con-
text for this chapter. The performance of heritage can be understood as 
any frequent social action or interaction within and between groups and 
communities, using aspects of landscape and nature that provide the 
grounds for developing memory and heritage. Performance is impor-
tant to memory and heritage, as has been emphasised (Holtorf 2018; 
DeSilvey 2017; Harrison 2013a); focusing solely on the preservation of 
past materials can prevent active performance and therefore the devel-
opment of new heritage. It should also be noted that the processes of 
both remembering and forgetting have been well researched in memory 
and heritage studies since the second half of the twentieth century (for 
memory studies see Halbwachs 1950; Nora 1989; Ricoeur 2004; Erll 
and Nunning 2008; Radstone 2008; for heritage studies see Smith 2006; 
Benton 2010; Holtorf 2015; Harrison 2013a, 2013b).
Engaging or disengaging with heritage and memory can be prob-
lematic as it has different dynamics in social and daily life. Heritage and 
cultural memory are closely related at a political level, as both concepts 
have very often been abused to shape and oppress communities whose 
collective identity and sense of belonging is constructed through her-
itage. In this book I consider cultural memory that extends beyond the 
nostalgia of the past. Instead I consider it as a performance of resilience: 
heritage is a reservoir of memory that allows for the survival of collec-
tive identity. Such a perspective is critical to our understanding of herit-
age because the level of engagement with memory and heritage, or the 
significance given to these aspects, may be different across communities 
who value and give meaning to heritage in different ways.
Heritage, memory and community 
The meanings and values of material culture are a popular subject in 
heritage studies, where scholars have engaged with case studies from all 
around the world (Lowenthal 2015; Smith 2006; Harvey 2001; Huyssen 
2003; Ashworth et al. 2007; Smith and Waterton 2009; Winter 2015; 
Jones 2017; Díaz-Andreu 2017). The meanings and values embodied 
in heritage and material culture store memories for different groups, 
and have varied meanings and values for different groups and commu-
nities. While some groups and communities may not value a given spe-
cific aspect of heritage, it might be crucially important for others who 
consider that specific heritage to be linked to their collective identity 
and whose memories may be linked to a specific place (Apaydin 2018). 
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Memory can be a very problematic aspect of heritage in that it is also a 
very complex phenomenon and is always difficult to define; it is used by 
a wide variety of groups, all with different interpretations (see Harvey 
2001). Heritage is also a very plural subject (Ashworth et al. 2007), but 
it has vital importance for storing memory, accumulating and developing 
it. As such it provides grounds for group and community survival.
Castleford
One of the most important case studies, which clearly shows the rela-
tionship between memory and heritage, as well as the meanings of these 
two concepts for communities, is Laurajane Smith’s work at Castleford 
in West Yorkshire, in the north of England. Castleford is a small town, 
formerly based on coal mining, an industry that had great importance 
for the inhabitants. Smith points out that communities were closely tied 
to one another through coal mining before the mines were shut down 
in the 1980s (Smith 2006). The diminution of the coal mining industry 
affected communities hugely, leaving them without a collective heritage 
and therefore with no embodied memory – nor the capacity to begin 
a forgetting process to reframe their community identity. Despite this, 
however, people of the town began to develop and create new heritage, 
and therefore memories, in a powerful act of community resilience.
The work of Smith at Castleford not only demonstrates how tan-
gible heritage is significant for identity and memory, but also illustrates 
the vital importance of heritage for memory and identity for groups 
and communities. Communities in Castleford performed and created 
new heritage (Smith 2006, 237) as part of ongoing memory and herit-
age practice. However, the Castleford response is not always the case in 
many parts of the world where new heritage needs to be developed and 
created. The people of that Yorkshire town had a capacity to hold on as a 
community: they were able to found a community trust that bound them 
together and provided grounds for set daily and social actions, as well as 
the opportunity to build new heritage and memory.
Çattepe
In contrast to Smith’s case study of Castleford is an example in south-
east Turkey. Here economic policies can be shown to have had a similar 
impact, but with even more destructive effect. An enormous dam pro-
ject is under construction, and has already left hundreds of thousands 
of people displaced (see Ronayne 2005, 2006). As an archaeologist and 
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heritage professional, I worked for years in the region. This gave me the 
opportunity to understand the importance of landscape, the concept of 
community, the importance of cultural memory and collective identity 
and the critical nature of the sense of belonging. I also had the chance 
to observe the longitudinal impact of the destructive process of large 
construction projects on local communities and cultural memory and 
heritage.
The dam project impacts on four cities: Siirt, Batman, Diyarbakir 
and Mardin. All are located in southeast Turkey, a predominantly Kurdish 
region which witnessed heavy conflict in the 1990s between the Turkish 
armed forces and the PKK (Kurdish Separatist Party). The conflict dis-
placed thousands of people, but during the peace process in the begin-
ning of the twenty-first century some of the local population managed to 
return to their lands.
The region historically has a very multicultural past. Its his-
tory includes prehistoric civilisations as well as past traces of Turkish, 
Ottoman, Byzantine, Arab, Armenian, Kurdish and the Yazidis cul-
tures, all of whom left behind archaeological and monumental herit-
age. However, because the current population is mostly Kurdish, this is 
the group that has been actively accumulating, engaging and perform-
ing memory in connection with material culture, tangible heritage and 
intangible heritage. In so doing, they have built a strong relationship 
with the landscape and nature. The specific area I worked in is located 
in the Siirt region, on the Botan valley. Here the Botan stream and Tigris 
river merge, around the archaeological site called Çattepe. The site 
demonstrates an intense interlinkage between cultural memory, material 
culture and intangible heritage. It shows how memory and heritage have 
been performed through time and space and so continuously accumu-
lated. It also shows how the area has been changed and transformed by 
diverse identity groups and communities, who have had different social, 
ethnic and political backgrounds.
Occupation of the site goes back to the prehistoric era. The stream 
and river that surround the site have been used for trade and the trans-
portation of people in southeast Turkey all the way down to Iraq from 
prehistory until the twentieth century. Since the early twentieth century 
Kurdish-origin groups have occupied the site, constructing houses and 
gardens on top of the 3000-year-old history. They have actively engaged 
with the landscape, river and nature through generations, developing 
a deep-rooted cultural memory and collective identity in this place. 
Because of active engagement with the area, it has become significant for 
the sense of belonging felt by communities. In contrast to wiping out or 
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destroying previous heritage and material culture, these groups contin-
ued to accumulate their own on top of it until their eviction in the recent 
past. This is a good example for discussion of the transformative and 
 process-based nature of heritage (see Holtorf 2015, 2018; Smith 2006), 
as the site itself and the people living on it continuously transformed 
existing heritage and memory by creating a new one over the course of a 
hundred years.
The main economic activity of the local community is farming, for 
which they used the landscape and the river intensively. The landscape 
and the river have also played a great role in developing intangible her-
itage for local people who were very active in this process. Although the 
dam project has not yet been completed because of the ongoing archaeo-
logical rescue excavations, the local community of Çattepe were evicted 
years ago. Some of them moved to nearby villages, others to the city. 
Many villagers actually used to be employed in the rescue excavations 
(see Apaydin and Hassett 2019). Focused fieldwork with local commu-
nities uncovered local attitudes towards heritage and practices. During 
semi-structured interviews, a former inhabitant of Çateppe offered this 
insight:
Once water comes and covers all area, which includes landscape, 
farming and grazing areas, homes, we won’t have anything tangi-
ble; we won’t able to carry on our daily life as we were doing before; 
and whoever is still here will also move to cities or other regions.
In this vein, members of the local community indeed point out one of the 
main significant tools of developing cultural memory and heritage: the 
ability to engage with, and perform, cultural memory and heritage that 
is not linked to the past or to history but to the present. Pierre Nora has 
noted such a perception (Nora 1989). Landscape, river, home or fields 
are physical places in which memory can be stored; it can have greater 
effect through being visible and tangible. Another point raised by a local 
community member was that landscape and nature contribute signifi-
cantly to a sense of belonging and collective identity; they are a force that 
helps to bind the community together. He emphasised that:
Previous generations and our generations were able to engage 
with this landscape and nature, and therefore were able to con-
tribute to the social and economic life and productivity. However, 
because of the dam everybody has had to leave and move some-
where else.
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The history of the local community of Çattepe region clearly demon-
strates how layers of memory and heritage accumulated through the 
active engagement of communities in landscape and nature. The dam 
construction that has already led to forced migration also shows the 
process of destroying heritage to be one in which affected communities 
have no choice; they are not allowed to be involved with the decision- 
making process of large construction projects. The destructive results, 
shown by the case of Çattepe and across the dam region in southeast 
Turkey, risk communities permanently losing their collective identities 
and sense of belonging. In particular, the loss of homes and the asso-
ciated landscapes may lead to a form of psychological trauma that can 
never be healed.
This can be seen in the ongoing conflict in Syria, which has deprived 
millions of people of their heritage. By this I mean conflict has destroyed 
homes, land, the natural environment and, most importantly, hundreds 
of thousands of people have lost their lives. It is particularly significant 
to point out that people who have lost their landscapes, homes and rel-
atives are likely to suffer severe traumas that cannot be fully healed in 
their later lives; this kind of trauma can indeed continue for generations 
(Summerfield 2000). Moreover, people who have been displaced do not 
always have the opportunity or grounds for creating and developing new 
heritage. Millions of Syrians have now become refugees in many parts of 
the world. They live far away from the homes and people with whom they 
once had strong relationships, also part of a collective memory and iden-
tity as well as vital for a sense of belonging. The comparison of Castleford 
and Çattepe demonstrates the difference between destruction of cultural 
memory, collective identity and heritage, as in the case of Çattepe, and 
community-led reconstruction of those aspects, as at Castleford. In the 
latter case, the community showed strong resilience to continue func-
tioning as a community defined by developing, transforming and creat-
ing new heritage and cultural memory.
Ani
Another historical site with thousands of years of history for considera-
tion is Ani, a UNESCO World Heritage Site located in the east of  Turkey 
on the border of Turkey and Armenia. It demonstrates the process of 
accumulation of cultural memory which has a stronger and more explicit 
 relationship with monumental heritage and landscape. The site shows 
to what extent trauma can impact generations. It also presents how cul-
tural memory and heritage are constructed through active engagement 
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with the daily and social lives of groups and communities who shape and 
reconstruct these important aspects of heritage.
Although the history of Ani goes back thousands of years, the site is 
famous for its medieval period. In the tenth and eleventh centuries when 
the Armenian Kingdom was dominant, magnificent monumental herit-
age was built at the site. In the following centuries, the site was occupied 
by Seljuk, Ottomans and Turks – then, during the latest period of the site, 
by the modern Turkish Republic. The region of the site was occupied by 
a large number of Armenians until the Armenian ethnic cleansing during 
the first quarter of the twentieth century, in which most of the Armenian 
population was affected.
I have spent long periods of time conducting ethnographic fieldwork 
at the site and in the surrounding region. Here I undertook observation, 
participant observations and interviews with community members and 
the visitors to the heritage site. One of the most striking observations – 
but not a surprising one – was the interest shown by ethnic Armenians 
who had been born or lived abroad in visiting the site and viewing the 
landscape. Most of these visitors pointed out the importance of the site 
for their collective identity and sense of belonging. Although they had 
never lived in those lands their great-grandparents had, experiencing the 
trauma of the ethnic cleansing/genocide process. One of these visitors, 
who was born and lives in France, commented:
For us home is still here, although I do not even speak the language 
of this land.
His words provide a strong example of how people who are traumatised 
by certain events are not always able to create and develop new heritage 
and memory.
The site as well as the surrounding landscape is now home to a 
community of Turkish origin, relocated to the area in the early twenti-
eth century. The Turkish members of the local community have actively 
interacted with the landscape, the site and its monuments as part of their 
social and daily lives. This has enabled them to develop their own cul-
tural memory and heritage, built over that of previous civilisations and 
communities such as the Armenians.
Another good example of the continuity of cultural memory and its 
link to material culture is seen in the way the Turkish local community 
members chose to build a new village right next to the site of Ani. In the 
process they dismantled many monumental architectural structures to 
use in building new homes or in creating their own heritage (see Apaydin 
 CULTURAL MEMORY,  HERITAGE AND DISCOURSES 23
2018). These actions, led by the requirements of that time and the needs 
of communities, can be considered as both destruction and reconstruc-
tion, as the stone of monuments was used to create new homes. This kind 
of destruction may be considered as community-led destruction and con-
struction. It is in direct contrast to top-down destruction led by hegem-
onic powers, which I will discuss in the next section.
Palast der Republik, Berlin
While we have discussed community-led reconstruction, in most cases 
reconstruction happens from the top-down. This is where economic and 
political power aim at changing the natural process of accumulation and 
development of cultural memory and heritage. The case of Palast der 
Republik, which used to be People’s Chamber of the German Democratic 
Republic (see Weizman 2013), demonstrates this well. The city itself his-
torically engages with multiple memories, in part from an architectural 
perspective; it also presents a case study in how different hegemonic 
powers have reconstructed the city and its architecture. This results in 
the creation and development of new memories and heritage, to which 
distinct values are attached, in multiple periods of German history up to 
the present.
Andreas Huyssen has researched the interlinkage of memory and 
architecture in Berlin; in his work on ‘the voids of Berlin’, he has described 
it as ‘the city of discontinuous and ruptured history’ (Huyssen 1997, 58). 
The City Palace perhaps demonstrates this ruptured history most clearly as 
it has been reconstructed by different political powers in different periods 
for almost three centuries (see Weizman 2013; Costabile-Heming 2017).
In the twentieth century in particular, the palace went through 
substantial reconstruction. It was damaged during Allied air raids in 
the 1940s, during the Second World War. In the following decades the 
German Democratic Republic demolished the palace, reconstructing it 
again in the late 1970s. Since the unification of Germany, following the 
collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, reconstruction of the city can be seen 
in many parts of Berlin. The City Palace shows how cultural memory and 
heritage are reconstructed by the political powers in parallel to their ide-
ology. Its current reconstruction wiped out the cultural memory of the 
German Democratic Republic, which had been stored there as a potent 
symbol of collective identity (Costabile-Heming 2017).
Since the early years of the twenty-first century, the German gov-
ernment has invested substantially to re-present the palace as part of the 
city’s current urban identity, alongside historic layers and memories of 
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Berlin (Costabile-Heming 2017). It is intended to turn the building into 
a cultural complex: exhibitions and cultural activities can be held within 
the complex structure. Without doubt, the new Palace (due to open in 
2020) will serve to create a new identity for the building. In so doing, it 
will create and develop new memories consistent with the ideology of 
current German political power. Therefore, while architectural or mon-
umental heritage stores and represents memories in a more effective 
way, as noted above, its capacity to evolve also increases its importance 
for political powers, seeking to shape and reconstruct the identities of 
 communities and the public.
A similar case is seen in the recent annihilation of the Ataturk 
Cultural Centre in Taksim square, Istanbul. The structure represented 
strong cultural memories of the secular Turkish Republic; it embodied 
decades of knowledge of secularist Turkey and had therefore been a pow-
erful symbol of the modern state. Nevertheless, it was demolished; a new 
centre will provide new impetus for the creation of memory and heritage, 
this time in parallel to the present government’s ideology (for more detail 
see Apaydin, chapter 5).
Discourses of heritage destruction
Valuing heritage and cultural memory surely depends on the groups and 
communities’ familiarity with the material culture of the past or present. 
Cultural memory and heritage are often used as a tool for communities’ 
survival – or, in other words, for their sustainability. It is also important 
to point out that memory and heritage can also be considered as a threat 
by those who consider specific heritage and memory to be a threat to 
their hegemony. This could be authoritarian nation-states established on 
a certain ethnic origin, or groups who are in conflict with one another 
over ownership rights. Because of this, heritage and memory can be a 
reason for conflict in many parts of the world, with heritage being often 
targeted by other groups.
In order to exemplify this process, imagine first Group A, who share 
values and develop collective memory and identity through material cul-
ture. Then imagine Group B, who consider Group A to be an existential 
threat. They may thus seek to exert power over Group A by destroying or 
controlling heritage and memory that is symbolic of the group. However, 
while this kind of contrast may lead to deliberate targeting of one’s her-
itage and memory, such negativity also motivates both Groups A and B 
to develop and create new heritage as proof of their existence. Jacques 
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Derrida has explained this complex but natural structure of opposition 
with his supplement theory (Derrida 1976, 144–5). He has described 
this negative process as ‛that dangerous supplement’, emphasising that:
the supplement – which here determines that of the representative 
image – harbours within itself two significations whose cohabita-
tion is as strange as it is necessary. The supplement adds itself, it 
is a surplus, a plenitude enriching another plenitude, the fullest 
measure of present. It cumulates and accumulates presence. It is 
thus that art, techné image, representation, convention, etc., come 
as supplements to nature and are rich with this entire cumulating 
function.
Derrida emphasises that these negativities support each other for both 
existence and destruction as well as for construction. Yet this is not some-
thing specific and limited to the twentieth or the twenty-first centuries, 
the former of which has seen large-scale wars, the latter of which fea-
tures ongoing conflicts, such as in Iraq and Syria. Destruction of heritage 
has a long history that dates back to prehistoric times. Sommer points out 
that several deliberate destructions of heritage can be seen in the past 
(Sommer 2017, 38). These include the case of burnt Bronze Age houses 
in the Vinca tells in Denmark and burnt timber structures from the Early 
and Middle Neolithic era in Scotland, along with many other examples 
of deliberate destruction of heritage and landscape (see Sommer 2017).
Having pointed out that the deliberate destruction of heritage is 
not something new, it is also important to highlight the diverse motives 
that inspire deliberate destruction of heritage, and therefore also mem-
ory, in today’s world. In answering the aims and research questions of 
this book, I have tried to bring together case studies from different parts 
of the world, to demonstrate the main motives for deliberate heritage 
and memory destruction alongside examples of this destruction through 
large-scale developments in urban areas. The world has witnessed 
considerable deliberate destruction of monumental and architectural 
destruction of heritage, for example houses and religious buildings in 
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries through war, conflicts and ter-
rorism (see Bevan 2016; Herscher 2010; Walasek 2015). Monumental 
or architectural heritage is targeted as a symbol of cultural and collective 
identity; in containing stored memory, it provides grounds for specific 
groups to exist as a community. Therefore heritage is usually targeted 
first, to erase a group’s existence and identity and to prevent that group 
from developing and creating new heritage and memory.
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Cyprus
The case of Cyprus, and the conflict between the Greek and Turkish com-
munities experienced on the island, may perhaps provide more explicit 
discussion for discourses of heritage destruction, serving to exemplify Der-
rida’s ‘supplement’ theory. In Cyprus, both Turkish and Greek communi-
ties possess a specific heritage and material culture that is significant for 
their collective identity – in particular for their ethnic cultural identity. The 
Greek community’s heritage links back to Christianity and the Hellenic and 
Byzantine Empires, while the Turkish community’s heritage links to Islam 
and the Ottoman Empire (Constantinou and Hatay 2010, 1603).
During the conflict that began in 1974, both sides deliberately tar-
geted monumental and architectural heritage (see particularly Jansen 
2005; Copeaux and Mauss-Copeaux 2005). Two opposed and fiercely 
contested histories and heritages served to create negativity to one 
another; ‘plenitude enriching another plenitude’, to quote Derrida. A 
similar example emerged during the conflict in Kosovo in the late 1990s. 
Here destruction of monumental and architectural heritage through 
ethnic violence was clearly apparent in the Kosovo war. Both sides – 
Albanians and Serbs – targeted architectural heritage, mainly churches 
and mosques, as they believed the other group’s heritage to be a threat to 
their own existence (see Herscher 2010).
These are a few examples and several other case studies can be dis-
cussed from many parts of the world, for example the Buddha statues 
in Afghanistan, Palmyra in Syria, the destruction of native heritage and 
landscape in North and South America as well as in Australia. Although 
the contexts are different, as all these geographic and cultural spaces 
have their own dynamics, it is apparent that the common embedded dis-
course for destruction of memory and heritage from prehistoric times 
onwards is to obtain hegemony, achieved through destruction followed 
by the construction of new heritage and memory. As ‘supplement’ theory 
demonstrates (see Derrida 1976), destruction and construction serve to 
complement one another.
Conclusion: transformation, reuse and destruction – who 
has the right?
Consider the globalisation of the world and the diverse communities 
in which many now live, as well as the persistence of change evident 
throughout history from early periods to the present. Change or trans-
formation of cultures, landscape, people and therefore material culture 
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is inevitable, but the process of this change differs from one context and 
one culture to another. I have tried in this chapter to give an overview 
of the case studies of sites and material culture that are interlinked to 
the cultural memory, collective identity and sense of belonging enjoyed 
by specific groups and communities. While some heritage, and therefore 
memory, was deliberately and violently annihilated and wiped out to 
establish hegemony, other elements were sacrificed for economic devel-
opment and some were reconstructed to reuse.
There is no doubt that all these actions provide grounds for develop-
ing and creating new heritage and therefore memory (see Holtorf 2015, 
2018; DeSilvey 2017); in the world’s rapidly changing cultural contexts, 
destroyed heritage is replaced to adapt to the realities of today’s world 
(Holtorf 2018). The final questions of this chapter then must be: who has 
the right of transforming, reusing and destroying material culture and 
memory? What is the ethical way of going about this process? How can 
consensus be achieved in this process?
As I demonstrated in the different case studies discussed above, 
and in many other examples throughout the volume, there is no single 
answer nor even a single approach to these questions. Transformation 
and reuse of heritage can be part of memory accumulation and continu-
ity; it can create opportunities for developing new heritage and memory, 
and may be helpful and beneficial for communities (see DeSilvey 2017). 
However, in many parts of the world, such transformation and reuse can 
also be abused. The very existence of communities may be annihilated, 
leading to the discontinuity and rupture of history as well as trauma for 
some groups that cannot be easily healed. Every single region and place 
must therefore be considered within its own context.
As a heritage academic and professional, I agree that we should 
be able to facilitate more opportunity for the development and transfor-
mation of heritage, in order to adapt to a changing world. However, we 
should not apply the same approach favoured in places where democ-
racy is established, and the rights of groups and communities are strictly 
protected, to locations where authoritarianism is dominant, or to regions 
that are not stable, or even on the edge of conflict.
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Mega-structural violence: considering 
African literary perspectives on 
infrastructure, modernity and 
destruction
Rachel King
In a 2017 interview,1 the science fiction writer Jeff VanderMeer des-
cribed the challenge of communicating climate change in his novels. 
He explained that ‘global warming is like a haunting because it appears 
everywhere and nowhere at the same time’; it is hard to ‘give concrete 
essence’ to phenomena that move slowly and cause feelings of helpless-
ness. In this last point, VanderMeer echoes a concept that philosopher 
Timothy Morton has called the ‘hyperobject’ (Morton 2013): a thing that 
is, spatially and temporally, so huge that we are not equipped to com-
prehend it in its entirety. VanderMeer suggests that literature can make 
hyperobjects more comprehensible because ‘one thing fiction can do in 
its laboratory is make visible what is often invisible to us’.
Robert Macfarlane has similarly suggested that literature and its 
languages are up to the task of coping with hyperobjects (Macfarlane 
and Morris 2017) – as is evidenced in the online artwork ‘The Bureau of 
Linguistical Reality’, which curates crowdsourced neologisms to ‘provide 
new words to express what people are feeling and experiencing as our 
world changes’.2. My point here is to do with communicating and manag-
ing the impacts of a destruction so immense as to constitute a hyperob-
ject. There are events and objects so damaging that the intellectual and 
practical tools to describe or cope with them may be found in registers 
better suited to popular or literary culture than heritage studies.
Megadams, oil pipelines and other forms of large infrastructure lend 
themselves to this discussion. They are, of course, more concrete than 
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global warming, and in many ways more visibly bounded: we can see the 
limits of dam walls and pipelines, as well as the movement of water and 
oil, and perhaps feel a bit more secure with this containment. But those 
of us accustomed to managing the effects that these projects have on her-
itage are aware – and have been aware for some time now – that these 
impacts reverberate in diverse, often unanticipated ways. To borrow a 
phrase from Bruno Latour, the earth-moving and extractive impacts of 
infrastructure development ‘strike sideways’ (Latour 2001, 16: emphasis 
removed). They produce knock-on effects that include changes to liveli-
hoods, land use and population resettlement; they change access to local 
resources and fuel the politics of representation. Infrastructure develop-
ment schemes also affect people in ways that may be difficult to encap-
sulate within our existing heritage management vocabularies. These 
often privilege languages of loss and value, conditioning us to measur-
ing impact as something that happens all at once. Nor is this helped by 
the standard framework for developer-led mitigation, which defines the 
remit of heritage salvage as the conditions preceding new construction 
rather than development’s long-term effects.
We know of these difficulties in describing experiences of develop-
ment because writer-activists in Africa and the wider world have been 
telling us about them for decades. In this chapter I want to explore some 
themes in this writing that I believe merit further attention from heritage 
scholars. In this I take my cue from Rob Nixon’s Slow Violence and the 
Environmentalism of the Poor (Nixon 2011). In this work he examines a 
genre of environmental activist literature, describing global manifesta-
tions of what he calls ‘slow violence’ visited upon those countries deemed 
in need of development. For Nixon, ‘slow violence’ describes calamities 
brought about both through environmental disasters (erosion, flood-
ing) and human intervention or mismanagement (dam building and 
oil spills), emphasising where the consequences of these forces are ‘dis-
persed across space and time’ (Nixon 2011: 2, 6–9). Slow violence is thus 
related to structural violence – the hidden agencies at work in institu-
tions that perpetuate social injustice and inequality – but focuses specif-
ically on where environmental catastrophes are diffuse, long-lasting and 
not spectacular.
Consequently the effects of projects such as megadams and pipe-
lines are tremendous but often difficult to track, especially in our era of 
‘turbo-capitalism’ and ‘super-modernity’ that dedicates so much media 
space to events that are massive, loud and immediate. In this chapter 
I follow Nixon’s suggestions to pay attention to slow violence as it is 
manifested in the works of several African writer-activists, whose work 
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includes both fiction and political non-fiction or biography (I mainly dis-
cuss the latter here, cf. Meskell and Weiss 2006). I consider what insights 
from this work can offer heritage studies and heritage managers in how 
we conceive of the environmental impacts of infrastructure develop-
ment, how landscape can be both a cultural asset and a potential danger, 
and how we define risk and security in the face of development threats. 
As my main involvement with infrastructure projects has been related 
to heritage mitigation and salvage (King and Arthur 2014; King and Nic 
Eoin 2014; King et al. 2014), much of my discussion is concerned with 
these applications of the themes described here.
When land is a weapon
Land is perhaps the obvious place to begin, especially in light of how 
deeply ‘the land question’ has been entangled in questions of post- 
colonial restitution, empowerment and development in many African 
countries. Written in 1961 amid widespread movements for African 
independence and decolonisation, Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the 
Earth related the structural and economic conditions of colonisation to 
the dehumanisation and psychological trauma experienced by colonised 
peoples. This extended to experiences of alienation from land, including 
both its resources and its entanglement in feelings of belonging and his-
torical self-awareness. Fanon argued that for colonised peoples the ability 
to own and access lands previously arrogated by colonial powers would 
bring dignity as well as rights. Land restitution and rehabilitation were 
correctives to decades (in some cases centuries) of colonialist endeav-
ours to impose prescriptive understandings of civil and moral progress 
on African populations via institutions linking cultivation and ‘effective 
occupation’ to civilisation (for example, Comaroff and Comaroff 1991; 
Vernal 2012; King 2018).
However, for much of the late twentieth century the loudest voices 
clamouring for intervention against environmental destruction (espe-
cially by dams) did not draw strength from arguments such as Fanon’s, 
which linked land with cultural and economic empowerment. Instead 
conservationists such as Wallace Stegner and David Brower, both based 
in the United States, called for the preservation of pristine wildernesses – 
not cultural or socially meaningful places. Nixon argues that Arundhati 
Roy’s 1999 essay ‘The Greater Common Good’, about the hegemony of 
dam-building that lay behind India’s Narmada Valley dams, was a land-
mark work that shifted the environmentalist rhetoric around development 
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from one based on a nature/culture divide to one premised in socio- 
cultural justice, of the sort envisioned by Fanon (Nixon 2011, 154–5). 
The wave of dam-building accompanying the Narmada project was an 
opportunity to highlight not only how in the late 1990s the dam-building 
industry was becoming more globalised, but also how the ‘exploitative 
centre of gravity’ of such projects was shifting to densely populated rural 
places, where land was a source of history, identity and security. Dam-
building, and by extension certain forms of  infrastructure-building, thus 
became cast as ways for states to ‘perform’ development, and also as acts 
of state- and developer-led violence.
Ken Saro-Wiwa’s writing against Shell’s oil extraction in Nigeria 
(1993–8) sits beside Fanon’s linking of land with dignity, North 
American environmentalism’s connection of land rights with custodian-
ship and Roy’s insistence of focusing on the perspectives of people on the 
 politico-economic periphery. In two major non-fiction works – Genocide 
in Nigeria (1992) and A Month and a Day (1995) – Saro-Wiwa describes 
the complicity of the regime of Nigeria’s Sani Abacha and Shell Oil in 
coupling ethnic and environmental violence. The decision to instal oil 
pipelines in the Niger River Delta area, home to political minority com-
munities such as Saro-Wiwa’s Ogoni, was the centrepiece of these texts, 
although Ogoni representation had been a lifelong ‘article of faith’ for the 
author (Saro-Wiwa 1995, 39).
In an earlier work of 1990 (On a Darkling Plain), Saro-Wiwa linked 
oil extraction with dehumanisation in the wake of the Nigerian Civil War 
(1967–70). He observed that ‘oil was very much at the centre of this war’, 
and that post-war development policies ‘have turned the delta and its 
environs into an ecological disaster and dehumanised its inhabitants’ (see 
Saro-Wiwa 1995, 44). His subsequent visits to the United States showed 
the power of environmental consciousness (of the ‘pristine wilderness’ 
sort) in making demands of governments and companies. He describes 
this as a ‘sharpening’ of his awareness to organise a particular kind of 
Ogoni activist platform against oil extraction, one combining a North 
American strain of ecological preservation with a particularly local set 
of concerns about wellbeing and representation (Saro-Wiwa 1995, 54).
Saro-Wiwa’s concept of ‘ecological genocide’ captures this sort of 
environmentalism. He argues that land is a major casualty of destruc-
tion caused by development and its attendant (often flawed) mitigation 
efforts: oil seepage destroys rural livelihoods and pipeline construction 
and management practices tend to disenfranchise local area residents. 
But ‘genocide’ here contains another sense of damage, one in which land 
can be politically and physically weaponised through degradation and 
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pollution. Delta lands may be a cornerstone of Ogoni identity and poli-
tics, but they can also damage Ogoni health and wellbeing. In this view 
Saro-Wiwa differs from contemporaries such as Ngũgı̃  wa Thiong’o, who 
characterised land as a weapon in the hands of colonisers but a source of 
nourishment in the hands of Africans (Caminero-Santangelo 2007, 702).
From a heritage perspective, Saro-Wiwa’s description of eco-
logical genocide illustrates that landscapes – for all the multifaceted 
and  multi-component traits that heritage scholars accord them – have 
changeable social value. Land in Saro-Wiwa’s telling is not just a ‘weapon 
of the weak’ (in James Scott’s now-famous phrase), nor is it primarily 
the province of local knowledge and imagination (Scott 1985). Far from 
being anodyne or ineffably complex, land can have the power to harm in 
two senses: it became increasingly polluted under Shell’s stewardship, 
thus becoming a source of physical danger for residents of the pipeline’s 
catchment, and it was also a mechanism through which the state could 
suppress Ogoni activism. With respect to this latter point, Saro-Wiwa’s 
re-telling of the Ogoni activist movement against Shell and Abacha (the 
focus of A Month and a Day; Saro-Wiwa was executed in 1995 for alleged 
crimes related to his activism) emphasised where Nigeria’s ambitions to 
post-colonial development and economic viability came at the expense 
of Ogoni human rights. Environmental violence here tracked and rein-
forced ethnic factionalism.
Claims to human rights contingent on land rights are certainly 
familiar to heritage scholars, as are the ways in which political faction-
alism can manifest itself in contests over rights to culturally significant 
places. Here, however, we see Saro-Wiwa claiming that land is not equal 
to the payout of political recognition, but rather an active conduit of 
political aggression. This is a significant point to bear in mind in how 
we understand stakeholder access to, and investment in, the territories 
that are contested when infrastructure development demands that we 
identify people who stand to benefit or lose out from landscape destruc-
tion. Imperatives to record or salvage landscapes in the way of building 
projects rarely confront this question, but what if salvaging landscape 
includes salvaging vehicles for violence (cf. Ronayne 2007)?
The haze of modernity
Saro-Wiwa’s writing further showcases how, during the course of the Aba-
cha regime’s involvement with Shell, inequities between ethnic groups in 
Nigeria were widened and allowed to solidify. Meanwhile transnational 
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companies such as Shell were increasingly freed from regulatory con-
straints during the structural adjustment protocols that took hold in the 
1980s and 1990s, which devolved governing powers to a mosaic of extra-
state entities. In highlighting this process, Saro-Wiwa leads us into a brief 
discussion of where tracing experiences of development, or ‘betterment’, 
in Africa blurs the distinction between colonial and post-colonial, and 
renders hazy the dawn of ‘hyper-modernity’.
Transnational connections of the sort just described are familiar 
terrain in heritage studies. This is especially true as twentieth-century 
neoliberal development schemes reached into ever-farther corners of 
the so-called Global South, entrenching heritage in the role of economic 
driver, political persuader and vehicle for global representation. Taking 
development as a subject of historical study, however – especially through 
the lens of popular culture and literature – illustrates where ‘betterment’ 
schemes are part of a longer history of efforts to enclave or localise pov-
erty (arguably beginning in Africa with missionary activities), or at least 
to tell us how poverty relates to the emergence of the modern world (cf. 
Lafrenz Samuels 2009).
Litheko Modisane has described his unease over how African 
modernity has been characterised with a hazy boundary or link to the 
colonial era that whiffs of ambivalence (Modisane 2015: if we can agree 
(in the spirit of archaeologies of the modern world) that modernity 
did not begin with African independence movements but much earlier, 
and perhaps with the spread of global mercantilism, then how are we 
to cope with the roots of modern African heritage that lie in conditions 
of colonial exploitation? Modisane’s anxiety over this hazy boundary is 
instructive. To my mind it encourages us to take another look at the link-
age between transnationalism, development and poverty within a longer 
view of African modernity. If we are prepared to accept that the mod-
ern world was born of global connections, then we should look to where 
transnational involvement of entities bent on ‘bettering’ African commu-
nities instantiated and then perpetuated ideas about poverty and the way 
to uplift it. In part, this amounts to a plea for more nuanced, deeper histo-
ries of development and its legacies in the form of land management, soil 
erosion control, dam-building and mining. It is also a plea for heritage 
studies to locate its practices within an awareness of this history.
But we would do well to return to Saro-Wiwa, and also to more 
recent commentaries on how these legacies of betterment have been 
negotiated in African print cultures over time. In Khwezi Mkhize’s recent 
writing about the birth of South Africa’s first black publication in the early 
twentieth century (Mkhize 2018), there is a resonance with Saro-Wiwa’s 
 MEGA-STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE 39
desire to destabilise the centre-periphery model that positions so many 
African communities as downstream from politics, policy and literary 
trends. Mkhize writes that these early publications, produced by the first 
generation of mission-educated Africans, were a way for this constituency 
to add their voices to the public sphere and critique the failure of liberal 
promises of upliftment and betterment. Escaping the centre-periphery 
model, then, is not just about recovering subaltern voices or provincialis-
ing the metropole. It also requires a reconfiguration of political geography 
to assert that historically marginalised voices can carve out a space in the 
public sphere, and that this space can challenge ideas about betterment.
Critiquing transnational development schemes in a way that dis-
rupts the centre-periphery model, then, is arguably an essential compo-
nent for understanding the length, breadth and duration of development 
interventions in Africa, along with their slow violence.
The meaning of risk
In 1977 Wangari Maathai launched the Green Belt Movement (GBM), 
a Kenyan activist association whose tree-planting efforts not only raised 
global awareness of the conjoined problems of deforestation and soil ero-
sion, but ultimately won Maathai a Nobel Peace Prize. Maathai’s activism 
treated large-scale deforestation as both a contributing factor to the eco-
nomic insecurity of rural women (traditional cultivators) and a symptom 
of the authoritarian policies of Kenya’s long-term president Daniel arap 
Moi, who was in power from 1978 to 2002. In Maathai’s 2008 memoir 
Unbowed, she describes the GBM’s aim to reintroduce ‘a sense of security 
among ordinary people so they do not feel so marginalised and so terror-
ised by the state’. In so doing, Maathai relates the question ‘What does it 
mean to be at risk?’ to environmental, gender and democratic security.
Nixon argues that Maathai’s activism was successful because of its 
intersectionality. The imperative to plant trees and arrest soil erosion was 
about more than preserving forest lands as ‘pristine wilderness’, in line 
with the ‘antihuman’ conservation measures that Kenya inherited from 
colonial economics (Nixon 2011, 139). To understand the net impacts of 
deforestation and soil degradation as slow violence, it is also necessary 
to understand the historical events that positioned rural women as the 
inheritors not only of a historical system of land dispossession and labour 
devaluation, but also of a contemporary programme of resource misman-
agement by Moi’s government. For the GBM, risk could be minimised and 
security achieved by looking both backward to the past and sideways to 
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other, related spheres of impact. Together these optics could provide the 
necessary tools to prevent future conflict among rural communities.
These messages were especially timely within Kenya (affected by 
ethnic factionalism as Moi’s tenure closed its second decade) and the 
wider world. Maathai’s Nobel Prize came in the wake of the 11 September 
2001 attacks and the start of George W. Bush’s Iraq campaign, and she 
in turn faced criticism inflected by misogyny, racism and sentiments that 
tree-planting was too anodyne a focus for a time of terror. However, as 
Nixon explains, Maathai’s writing and activism shows how ‘structures 
of violence sustain tinderbox conditions that cynical political elites can 
readily ignite at great cost to a society’s systematically disenfranchised’ 
(Nixon 2011, 149). If soil erosion causes a chain reaction that leads to 
insecurity and instability, surely something as simply and effectively 
pre-emptive of violence as tree-planting is worth supporting.
The GBM and Maathai’s writing about it raise two significant, 
 heritage-resonant points. The first relates to how slow violence often 
occurs in the passive voice, ‘without clearly articulated agency’ (Nixon 
2011, 136). Part of what makes slow violence so pernicious and so diffi-
cult to keep within one’s analytical field of vision is that it often refuses to 
declare itself as such. Slow violence (once we are aware of it and its traces) 
too easily lends itself to description as a series of regretful events, pro-
duced by the confluence of administrative happenstance or unintended 
consequences. These easily appear as downstream from so many convo-
luted processes that decision-making authority for violence itself becomes 
abstracted. Maathai and the GBM refused to accept this. They held Moi 
and his government directly responsible for rural insecurity, regardless of 
how far removed from the deforestation process they claimed to be.
When considering heritage damaged or put in harm’s way by infra-
structure development programmes, the alphabet soup of funding bod-
ies and the contracting processes of which heritage managers see only a 
small part help to obscure the historical and networked factors behind 
this destruction. This is especially the case as neoliberal development 
schemes have ensured that financing and governance associated with 
large infrastructure construction are dispersed across an assemblage (to 
borrow a phrase from Tania Murray Li, 2007) of institutions; this creates 
a horizontal landscape of power across which to track developer agen-
das (Ferguson 2007). Maathai, along with scholars of neoliberal heritage 
regimes (Coombe 2013), encourages us not to shy away from chasing 
these networks, but instead to probe more deeply into how they imagine 
and instrumentalise heritage. I would argue, along with some anthro-
pologists and historians (for example, Mbembe 2001; Ferguson 2007; 
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Chalfin 2010), that the authority to enact development programmes 
and (potentially) bring about slow violence should never be taken for 
granted, nor be allowed to position itself as too far ‘up there’ in the hier-
archy of governance to be critiqued directly. The corollary of this position 
is more historical and ethnographic work into states and extra-state enti-
ties, along with exploration of how they work together to articulate ideas 
about development and its cultural value.
Second, Maathai illustrates where risk must be evaluated by taking 
into account historical conditions as well as imagined catastrophes. In 
recent years heritage mitigation in development contexts has expanded 
to include not just archaeological salvage, but also intangible heritage 
and oral history recording (for example, Nic Eoin and King 2013; Kleinitz 
and Merlo 2014; Apoh and Gavua 2016). This expanded remit necessar-
ily entails a broader awareness of time and context in a development- 
affected area, and creates opportunities for non-expert voices to define the 
impacts of development on heritage. We see this in projects such as the 
recent inscription of Lesotho’s Sehlabathebe National Park on UNESCO’s 
World Heritage List, which entailed an oral historical survey to ascertain 
local communities’ feelings toward rock art within the park’s boundaries.3 
Rather than rock art-specific comments, the survey elicited long simmering 
concerns by area residents about the lack of economic opportunities and 
their ongoing unhappiness with the forced removals of communities from 
the park’s boundaries in the 1970s. If the direction of heritage manage-
ment associated with population displacement and landscape alteration 
is to include this sort of anthropological or oral historical work, then this 
insistence upon putting present-day impacts in historical contexts of alien-
ation and disenfranchisement will become increasingly commonplace.
Risk – of loss of place and damage to heritage – is related to catastro-
phe that is imagined, but the extent of imagination is rooted in historical 
awareness. The business of managing heritage and its associated risks 
will become increasingly complicated in this era of intangible heritage 
mitigation. We would do well to heed Maathai’s warning that confin-
ing our understanding of heritage impacts to silos (tangible/intangible, 
 historical/contemporary) is to miss the bigger picture.
Conclusion
The discussion in this chapter is a preliminary one, aimed at beginning 
a conversation among heritage studies and print cultures and direct-
ing attention to vocabularies or concepts that can (I believe) enrich 
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approaches to destruction in heritage studies. We live in a time of rapid 
change for heritage, its subjects and its methods; a time of proliferating 
hyperobjects that require us to shift our frames of reference to take in 
ever-larger timescales, assemblages of actors and flows of knowledge. 
However, the writers described here (representing a very small fraction 
of the relevant literature) alert us to the ways in which many themes 
surrounding heritage and destruction are not wholly new, especially in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Landscape destruction, whether through erosion, 
megadams or oil pipelines, both embodies and conducts different forms 
of violence; these can reverberate across time and space in ways that may 
be subtle but devastating. These are not unprecedented conditions, but 
ones that have been in place for decades in countries such as Nigeria, as 
Saro-Wiwa reminded us.
The embeddedness of violence within these sorts of infrastruc-
ture development projects is impossible to ignore. Yet it is also easily 
abstracted, distanced from the complex assemblage of state and extra-
state entities involved. Paying attention to this array of actors, then, 
becomes not just an exercise in tracing new forms of governmentality and 
global heritage, but also in examining how the business of governance 
(increasingly outsourced to non-state actors) implicates decisions about 
heritage management and development that are inherently violent. In 
considering this, we would do well to heed Rosemary Coombe’s insist-
ence to take states, developers, non-governmental organisations and the 
like as subjects of detailed ethnographic and historical enquiry (Coombe 
2013), thereby resisting the abstracting power of slow violence.
Time and risk also emerge as themes worth further consideration. 
Maathai’s GBM illustrates how understanding, anticipating and mitigat-
ing the effects of destruction is an exercise in imagination – but an imagi-
nation that is not infinite; it is influenced or limited by peoples’ historical 
self-awareness, memories and desires. Moreover, destruction is never 
produced through a single policy or set of actions. It is rather located at 
the intersections of historical and contemporary socio-economic circum-
stances that can (in Nixon’s words) ‘sustain tinderbox conditions’ through 
the accretion of slow violence over time. Thinking of slow violence in this 
way offers something of a rejoinder to the suggestion that in our era of 
supermodernity, time and destruction both behave exceptionally fast, 
accelerating and changing course with remarkable velocity (González-
Ruibal 2016, 148–9). I suggest that authors such as Saro-Wiwa and 
Maathai demonstrate how, in the context of destruction, time behaves 
unpredictably and multi-directionally. Soil erosion may be experienced 
as a slow process, but challenge the reasons for it and the same apparatus 
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behind erosion will react with swift, militaristic efficiency. Oil spills are 
catastrophic, fast events, but their negative impacts seep into the future 
(affecting the long-term health and slowly declining livelihoods of mul-
tiple generations of area residents), as well as into the past (in how ideas 
about land and one’s place in it are transformed).
Indeed, this chapter could be glossed as a suggestion to view super-
modernity and destruction as slow phenomena instead of, or in addition 
to, fast ones. Fundamentally, though, the discussion here highlights areas 
in which popular and print cultures can give us food for thought and are 
worth paying attention to. Following authors such as VanderMeer and 
Macfarlane, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, and so crossing gen-
res as well as disciplines, is a necessary step towards beginning to com-
prehend hyperobjects, megastructures and their associated violence.
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Competing for the past: the London 
2012 Olympic Games, archaeology 
and the ‘wasteland’
Jonathan Gardner
Regeneration which wipes out or ignores the past is at best unwise.
Neville Gabie, artist in residence at the London 2012 Olympic Games1
Between 2005 and 2009 a large programme of archaeological fieldwork 
was carried out in Stratford, East London, on what would become the 
main site of the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games (today called the 
Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park, but for brevity referred to here as ‘the 
Olympic Park’; Fig.3.1). This fieldwork presented an opportunity to con-
sider a large spatial and temporal slice through the east of London (see 
Powell 2012a). However, I suggest in this chapter that this work also 
offered the developers of the Games, the Olympic Delivery Authority 
(ODA), another opportunity: a means of publicly legitimising and con-
textualising the rapid changes that the mega event would enact in Strat-
ford. I argue that the results of these archaeological investigations came 
to be seen as the acceptable past of this site, while more recent uses and 
occupations were, in the main, denigrated or ignored by organisers and 
parts of the media. Such an approach is most apparent in the description 
of the pre-event site as an ‘industrial wasteland’, a place seemingly with-
out use and without occupants (for example Neather 2014; Cameron in 
ODA 2011, 5; Atkins 2012, 9; LLDC 2017, para.2).
Below I compare press releases and media reports related to the 
archaeological fieldwork of the Games project with ‘unofficial’ docu-
mentation of the site’s more recent past produced by photographers and 
activists. The aim of making a comparison such as this is, firstly, to show 
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how, through dissemination of archaeological results, the ancient past 
was foregrounded and instrumentalised by the ODA and other Games 
supporters to legitimise the forthcoming changes in Stratford. I demon-
strate that such a focus on the more distant past necessitated a partial 
denial of other stakeholders – namely, the occupants of the site prior 
to 2007 when the Games’ construction began. These people appear to 
be missing from the project’s history, their places of work, residence or 
leisure being labelled, and then rendered physically through compul-
sory purchase and demolition, a ‘wasteland’. The archaeological process 
and its dissemination and repetition appear to have been a part of this 
legitimising process. Ultimately this discussion is intended to blur the 
boundary between what is to be valued as archaeology and what is to be 
considered ‘waste’ in the context of large-scale urban regeneration, and 
indeed the uses and ethics of heritage in development projects.
The mega event
Following Roche, I define ‘mega events’ as large-scale, globally-oriented, 
cultural spectacles that ‘have dramatic character, mass popular appeal 
and international significance’ (Roche 2000, 1), and that usually oper-
ate for only a few weeks or months. Today’s most commonly recognised 
Figure 3.1 The Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park today (Stratford, East 
London). Photograph courtesy of the author. 
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mega events are the FIFA World Cup and the modern Olympic/Paralym-
pic Games, though this term was originally associated with events such 
as the Great Exhibitions (for example, London 1851) and World’s Fairs 
(see Gold and Gold 2005).
This chapter draws upon my broader research into how the mate-
rials of the past are inextricably linked with legitimising discourses 
connected to London’s history of mega event hosting, and how these 
event sites’ histories are mediated for a variety of purposes (for exam-
ple, Gardner forthcoming a). In this case a ‘re-excavation’ of the Olympic 
Park’s past is particularly important as the area changes further in an 
ongoing 20-year ‘legacy’ programme – set to include the building of thou-
sands of new homes, a campus of University College London (UCL East), 
an outpost of the V&A (V&A East) and numerous office developments.
The importance of the past to such mega events, whether related to 
exhibitions or sporting activities, cannot be understated (Gardner forth-
coming a; 2018). At a material level, the past activities of a host site often 
condition its suitability for hosting a mega event. Frequently these are 
liminal urban zones or industrial areas (for example, Strohmayer 2013). 
This suitability also relies on the discursive construction and reification 
of a landscape or neighbourhood – change must be seen to be desirable 
and possible, and the past or existing landscapes must be ‘cast out’ or 
contrasted with that which is to come (Doron 2000). Such representa-
tions have a powerful role in helping to shape how we conceptualise and 
use spaces (Eade 2000, 4–9), whether through recounting the findings of 
archaeologists or some other means such as oral history or photography.
McAtackney and Ryzewksi note that ‘[a]rchaeology has always 
had the potential to show how interpreting material realities can reveal 
different and even deliberately obfuscated narratives of recent history 
[…]’ (McAtackney and Ryzewski 2017, 20). Following this, I suggest 
that a contemporary archaeology of London 2012 cannot only consider 
its official programme of archaeological excavation, but also must map 
how these findings interact with, or are contradicted by, other traces or 
narratives. Hence this chapter’s comparative focus and my interest in the 
discursive construction of ‘the past’ in the support or contestation of this 
mega event.
This research draws methodologically upon a form of ‘critical dis-
course analysis’ – analysing publicly available texts and other media for 
keywords, themes and their interrelationships which help to constitute 
value claims about particular subjects (see Wu and Hu 2015; Waterton 
et al. 2006). Press releases and other public statements produced by 
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archaeologists, the Games’ organisers and others in relation to the 
Olympic Park can be productively compared for the claims they make 
about the nature of the past here (see Shoup 2006 for another exam-
ple).2 The traces of this place’s past and their selective recording, destruc-
tion and promotion have created a diversity of ‘heritage discourses’, not 
all officially sanctioned, which continue to influence the Games’ legacy 
today.
Previous work
To date, little archaeological or heritage-based research has been carried 
out in relation to the modern Olympic Games or mega events more gener-
ally (see however Nordin 2011; Penrose 2012; Hamilakis 2007, chapter 
1; Graff 2012). Importantly for this study, Angela Piccini has shown  – 
through a contemporary archaeological examination of the Vancouver 
2010 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games – that the artistic and cul-
tural programmes of such spectacles (‘official’ and otherwise) highlight 
their political and material incongruities. She further argues that such an 
approach, in ‘presencing absenced pasts’, draws attention to alternative 
viewpoints and histories that are all too readily dismissed by organisers 
(Piccini 2012, 300).
A vast literature exists on the hosting of mega events more gener-
ally (see Gold and Gold 2005). Of most importance here are those works 
discussing the discursive and semiotic content of their displays and per-
formances, given mega events’ emphasis on the role of imagined national 
pasts or distant civilisations with regards to legitimising narratives (for 
example, Gillooly 2007; Jolivette 2009; Silk 2015; Moser 2012). Once 
again, however, little of this work is overtly attuned to how heritage or 
archaeology intersects with mega event development itself, a lacuna 
which the present work seeks to address.
With regards to the London 2012 Olympic Games, a large number 
of works have been written from a more straightforwardly historical 
point of view or related to planning and sociological issues (for exam-
ple, Poynter and MacRury 2009; Cohen 2013; Bernstock 2014). In these 
works the past of Stratford is seen as an important factor in the hosting of 
the Games, and is often connected to the economic marginalisation and 
deprivation the area continues to face. Thus, though not articulated as 
‘heritage’, these authors recognise the burden of the past in this place and 
appreciate that a tabula rasa model of development is ‘misguided at best’, 
as Gabie’s quote at the beginning of this chapter acknowledges.
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The context of the 2012 bid
Arguments are often made that Olympic Games are nakedly neoliberal 
land-grabs disguised as cultural programming, and, with regard to Lon-
don 2012, issues such as the sell-off of public assets or sponsorship and 
tax deals may support this view (Sherwin 2011; Boykoff 2013, 85). How-
ever, given the vast amount of state funding the project received, this was 
not a straightforward corporate sell-off; it was even described as ‘a mas-
sive Keynesian boost to the economy’ by then Culture Secretary Jeremy 
Hunt in 2012 (quoted in Boykoff 2013, 81).
The primary motivation for hosting the Games was ostensibly one 
of regenerating the East End and attracting investment to what had 
become, since the closure of London’s docks from the 1960s onwards, 
one of the most economically depressed areas in the UK.
The effect of the bid (London winning against Paris on 6 July 2005), 
and the subsequent formation of the Olympic Delivery Authority, was 
ultimately to transform a huge area of the East End (and sites elsewhere), 
to build an entirely new set of stadia and facilities for the Games and to 
lay the foundations for legacy development. This relied upon removal of 
the Stratford site’s existing businesses and residents. They were removed 
from the development area through a Compulsory Purchase Order 
(CPO) served in late 2005 and enforced on 2 July 2007 (Davies et al. 
2017, 192).3
There remain serious questions around whether mega events 
enacted through such processes can really achieve an equitable ‘regen-
eration’ and truly empower local communities (Cohen and Watt 2017) – 
and indeed whether cultural mega projects can ‘cure’ urban ills more 
generally (for example, Butler 2007). I will return to this below, but 
pause for now to explore briefly the concept of ‘wasteland’.
Wasted
What makes a wasteland? In the case of London 2012 the language used 
to describe its Stratford site by its developers and much of the media 
seems to refer to a literal ‘waste of space’: terms such as ‘scarred’ and 
‘underdeveloped’, used by the ODA in pre-Games documents, especially 
emphasise this (Armitt in 2011, 20; 2007a, 4). However, a place that 
becomes labelled as wasteland is rarely considered as such until it is 
politically expedient to do so. I would argue that the apparent marginal-
ity of places such as Stratford’s Olympic site, geographical or otherwise, 
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exists for a reason. They were (and are) important as sites of productivity, 
employment, low-cost housing, utilities and places of leisure (see Clifford 
2008; Davis 2009). Below I demonstrate that this labelling also denies 
the history of such activities and the importance of their relationship to 
the wider city, replacing complexity with simplicity and teleology, and 
in this case seems to emphasise and value a distant archaeological past 
rather than the more recent history of the site.
The wasteland is not simply transformed through repetition of how 
recent past uses of the area were unacceptable, but also through acts of 
‘mitigation’, both archaeological and otherwise (for instance environ-
mental decontamination), of the stuff of the past. A material and human 
absence must be created, in order to produce space for ‘regeneration’ 
to occur. This happened in Stratford through compulsory purchase and 
also, I would suggest, through officially sanctioned archaeological work, 
whereby only certain traces of the past were recorded while others were 
forgotten. This erasure was then further enacted through demolition of 
buildings and re-landscaping to create the new Olympic Park. Lastly, I 
suggest the promotion and discussion of these processes of removal 
themselves also served as a means of underpinning the regeneration 
narrative. Such processes enabled the ODA to demonstrate that they 
cared about the past enough to treat it with respect (i.e. showing that 
they ‘saved’ archaeology – despite this being a standard requirement on 
almost all UK development projects). It is to this archaeological process 
that I now turn.
Digging the wasteland
Archaeologists (Fig.3.2) who took part in the excavations for the Olympic 
and Paralympic Games – one of the largest archaeological programmes 
London has ever seen – worked on 122 evaluation trenches and 8 larger 
excavations, alongside geoarchaeologists and buildings specialists (Pow-
ell 2012a). This work targeted known archaeological locations as well as 
sampling an overall percentage of the Olympic Park area. It was carried 
out as a part of a planning condition, the developers being required to 
mitigate damage to archaeological and heritage resources (ODA 2007b). 
Though simplified for brevity here, the project was funded by the devel-
oper (i.e. the ODA). The mitigation was specified by the government’s 
heritage monitor (English Heritage – now Historic England), managed 
by heritage consultants (see Atkins n.d.); the work was then tendered for 
and carried out by contract archaeology companies.
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Figure 3.2 The author drawing an excavated rowing boat in 
December 2007. This site now lies beneath the main Olympic Stadium 
(the London Stadium). Photograph © Maggie Cox/MOLA 2007. 
The fieldwork, running mainly through 2007–8, recovered and 
recorded material from prehistory to the present. Notable sites included 
a small settlement and field systems encompassing successive uses from 
the Middle Bronze Age to Late Iron Age, a succession of mill buildings 
dating from the late sixteenth century onwards and sealed by a late 
Victorian street, an early nineteenth-century reused ship’s boat and an 
anti-aircraft gun emplacement from the Second World War, among many 
other discoveries (see Powell 2012a). Rather than discuss these findings 
in depth here, I instead now turn to how they arguably played a role in 
legitimising the transformation that the mega event brought to this area.
The past as PR
I contend here that the presentation of the archaeological past, and pub-
licity about the fieldwork programme itself – albeit a small part of the 
total Games preparations – were useful from a public relations stand-
point for the ODA and the government in their promotion of the mega 
event. Beyond simply fulfilling their planning legislation obligations, the 
evidence of the past was carefully deployed by the developers to contex-
tualise and support the massive changes being made to the area.
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Due to the nature of contractor-client relationships in commercial 
archaeology, generally speaking mediation of archaeological findings 
on large projects is handled by the client or their representatives (for 
example, consultants) rather than archaeologists themselves. As a con-
sequence, it is often the case that archaeologists do not have full control 
over how their results are presented. The use of archaeology for PR, by 
state-led projects in particular, is well documented. It often serves a vari-
ety of functions, from emphasising national identity to encouraging tour-
ism (for example, Silberman 2007), obfuscation of the politicised nature 
of developments or the encouragement of ‘cultural continuity’ (Shoup 
2006, 239). While I do not of course imply any dishonesty or inaccuracy 
related to archaeological works on the Games project, nonetheless, as we 
will see, the traces of the past can have a multitude of uses in the present 
and not only for archaeological interpretation.
Below I have analysed a series of press releases published by the 
ODA discussing the archaeological work. In doing so, I explore how 
the interpretation of the past was utilised to add support to what might 
otherwise have been seen as an expensive and disruptive mega project. 
These are compared with the mediation of these findings by others (such 
as news outlets), prior to a consideration of alternative histories of the 
site from the recent past in the next section.
In analysis of these press releases certain themes emerge. The first 
is a progressive, narrative-driven discourse highlighting the physical 
remains excavated. This was in keeping with the ODA’s ‘Demolish. Dig. 
Design.’ mantra (Fig.3.3), where the past is cared for and studied, but 
ultimately removed for the event to take place.
The first press release related to archaeology appeared on 28 
November 2007. Entitled Archaeological Work on Games Site finds Evidence 
of the First Londoners and Romans, it told us how ‘the first Londoners … 
lived in thatched circular mud huts on the site that will boast a Zaha 
Hadid designed Aquatics Centre’ and, following descriptions of ancient 
ceramics, that ‘The Aquatics Centre will be beside the river, which is cur-
rently being widened by eight metres as part of a programme to restore 
the ancient waterways of the Lower Lea Valley’ (ODA 2007c). Of most 
interest here is the ODA’s emphasis on this idea of ‘first Londoners’, and 
the conscious linking of this with the developments taking place with the 
Aquatics Centre.4
This linking of past and present is repeated in a later release about 
the same site from March 2008, which noted that ‘archaeologists have 
uncovered the skeletons of early Eastenders buried in graves dating 
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Figure 3.3 ‘Demolish, Dig. Design.’: a hoarding from the Olympic Park 
in 2007. Photograph by Gordon Joly (cropped). CC BY-SA 2.0 2007. 
Available from: https://flic.kr/p/4aSaur.  
back to the Iron Age on the London 2012 Olympic Park’. Tessa Jowell 
(then Olympics Minister) is here quoted as saying: ‘The “big dig” on 
the Olympic Park offers a unique opportunity to witness and under-
stand the fascinating history of this part of east London from ancient 
to modern’ (ODA 2008a). In such language these releases attempt to 
connect these mid-Iron Age people and the development taking place 
for the Games. I return to this shortly, but first consider a few more 
examples.
Another thread seems to be the use of the past to show that rapid 
and large-scale transformation here was natural and legitimate, based 
on the history of the area. The ODA’s then chief executive notes, also 
in the initial press release, that the Olympic development is ‘a story 
of change and transformation dating back centuries’ (2007c). This 
view is subsequently repeated by one of the lead archaeologists on the 
project:
[…] the change represented by the construction of the Olympics 
is absolutely in keeping with all the change that’s happened in the 
Lea Valley beforehand – it’s just happening in a shorter time period. 
(ODA 2009a 0:1:52)
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In such mediation one sometimes gets the sense that the archaeology 
is useful to the ODA insofar as it legitimises their plans and does not 
interfere with construction, rather than primarily as a source of infor-
mation about the past. Another frequent theme in such documents is 
the repetition of the idea that archaeologists were ‘given the opportu-
nity’ to work on the site, suggesting magnanimity on the ODA’s part; for 
instance, ‘The ODA invited [archaeologists] to look for evidence […]’ 
(2008b). This appears somewhat misleading, given that the archaeo-
logical companies involved were not ‘invited’ onto to the site, but were 
involved in a standard process of competitive tendering for the work 
that the developer was required to carry out, as with any other con-
struction project.
Let us consider a few other sources, starting with the primary her-
itage consultancy on the project, Atkins Global. In a statement entitled 
Digging Olympic Gold (Atkins n.d.), describing the cultural heritage 
investigations carried out under their management during the prepara-
tions for London 2012, they note that:
Used effectively, archaeology can help to avoid damage to poten-
tially significant finds and make sure that everyone – from devel-
opers to the local community – views a project favourably from the 
start and long after the work is done.
Later they also suggest that rather than act as a ‘barrier’ to developers, a 
project such as London 2012 ‘demonstrates how archaeologists can […] 
turn what might be a negative into long-lasting positives’. (Atkins n.d.)
Such statements show that London 2012’s developers and their rep-
resentatives were aware of the potential for archaeology to be employed 
as a means of reducing perceived negative impacts associated with the 
development, rather than solely being a requirement for planning or 
opportunity of scientific enquiry.
Dissemination of the results of the Olympic archaeological pro-
gramme was also assisted by extensive media interest. Articles appeared 
regularly in mainstream outlets (for example, Brown 2006; Brooke 
2008; BBC 2009; Daily Mail 2009), again using tropes of ‘gold’ and ‘East 
Enders’, sometimes alongside the words ‘wasteland’ or similar to label 
the more recent past. Archaeological magazines also took note of the 
developments. Current Archaeology, having advertised the piece on its 
front cover as The first East Enders: 10,000 year tale of stinky Stratford, 
concluded their 2000-word article with:
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Once the Victorian industry declined, there was little left to rec-
ommend the region, making it the perfect dumping ground for 
bombed-out building rubble and other landfill. It is only now the 
Olympic Park has opened a new chapter in the Lea’s history that the 
site has been revitalised. 
(Symonds 2012)
Clearly such coverage tends to use archaeological findings rather simplis-
tically. Buried treasure and ancient bodies are common tropes, some of 
which tend to be encouraged by archaeologists themselves (Ascherson 
2004). Rather than focus on inaccuracy or authenticity (see chapters in 
Clack and Brittain 2007), it is worth asking what the effect of such repe-
tition and translation achieved in the case of London 2012.
I suggest that the archaeology presented by the ODA and others, 
was not simply useful as a tool or method of ‘mitigation’ of the pre-Park 
landscape, but also, more importantly, ‘as a socio-political actor in itself’, 
generating effects which went beyond headlines (Zorzin 2015, 117). As 
Atkins’ statement above shows, it would appear that developers realise 
that the past can be useful as a form of public relations management and 
that archaeological knowledge, and the value claims it enacts, can operate 
as a commodity (though not necessarily monetarily based). An archaeo-
logical perspective is valued for what it tells us about the past – but also 
for what it permits in the present and in the future (Moshenska 2010; 
Gestrich 2011; Gardner forthcoming b; Haber 2015). Archaeological 
labour granted the ODA both a means of ‘meeting their local authority 
requirements’ (Atkins n.d.) and an opportunity to show that they cared 
about their responsibilities as developers. As a means of legitimising the 
project, this tied in with a discourse of improvement and, especially, ‘leg-
acy’, foregrounded by the UK government. In 2009 the ODA’s chairman 
wrote in another press release that:
Archaeologists and local people have had the opportunity to learn 
more about the development of Lower Lea Valley and the people 
that have lived here for thousands of years before it is transformed 
for future generations.
(ODA 2009b)
Thus the past (or at least most of it) was arguably seen as a resource for 
the new development and figuratively linked to the future. This fore-
grounding of a particular narrative of what the past was like here – i.e. 
mainly presented as archaeology and very much ‘over’ – was reliant on 
an ‘other’, much more negative vision of more recent times, the late 
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twentieth-century ‘wasteland’. Rightly we should ask: was the wasteland 
really ‘wasted’? If not, what then was the nature of this recent past? How 
was it presented outside of ODA public relations or mainstream media?
Re-populating the wasteland
This other past, the recent ‘prehistory’ of the Olympic Park (i.e. the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first-century period prior to July 2007 when 
Games construction began apace), has until recently gone mostly undis-
cussed, with the wasteland narrative still prevalent today (see, for example, 
public comments on Burrows 2017). Rather than reproduce more press 
releases, I instead turn to those who demonstrated that the site was any-
thing but empty in the run-up to the Games’ development. I suggest that the 
activities taking place here can be seen to be as much a part of the heritage 
of this landscape as the archaeological discoveries discussed above.
A recent publication entitled Dispersal, by Davies et al., combines 
photography, ethnography and mapping (Davies et al. 2017). It pro-
vides a reminder of just how diverse the activities in the pre-Olympic 
zone were up until 2007 (Fig.3.4). The Dispersal archive, documenting 
70 businesses (out of over 280, employing in total more than 5000 peo-
ple prior to 2007), was created and presented by photographers Marion 
Davies and Debra Rapp. Their intention was to ‘document a visual his-
tory of a place and community that was about to vanish’ (Davies et al. 
2017, 33). As Davies points out, the work also aimed to question ‘how it 
[the area] was represented […] as a defunct and decaying wasteland in 
east London, somewhere that was “ripe for redevelopment”’ (Davies et 
al. 2017, 1).5
Their work shows that the ‘industrial heritage’ of the Lea Valley and 
Stratford was anything but consigned to history. In meeting galvanis-
ers, belt makers, set designers, salmon smokers, car repairers and many 
others, they showed that the site was still economically active and far 
from ‘defunct’. The reasons for the success of these latest businesses were 
intermingled with the history of the landscape: the growth of London 
required marginal places such as Stratford to function. Relatively cheap 
land, access to water, railways and then roads, and a prevailing westerly 
wind meant that certain industries could set up here and flourish. These 
latest occupants featured in Dispersal continued to serve the city, despite 
the area’s supposed post-industriality. Yet it was this social and spatial 
marginality that also made the area especially vulnerable to redevelop-
ment (see also Strohmayer 2013).
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Figure 3.4  (above): Parkes Galvanizing Ltd. This 50-year-old 
enterprise had to leave the Park for the construction of the main 
Stadium. Photograph by Diamond Geezer (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) Diamond 
Geezer 2006. Retrieved from: https://flic.kr/p/23JXZd; (below): An 
operative working within Parkes prior to 2007, photographed as part of 
the Dispersal project. Photograph © Marion Davies 2019. 
In his foreword to Dispersal, photographer Mike Seaborne notes that 
there was a near-total failure of ‘official’ archaeology in the Games project 
to record these businesses and indeed the lives intertwined with this place. 
Without the Dispersal photographers and Juliet Davis’ associated research, 
he suggests that they ‘would have been effectively written out of the story’ 
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(in Davies et al. 2017, viii). This calls into question what form archaeo-
logical/heritage investigations (for example, Powell 2012b, foreword) 
should have taken here, especially with Seaborne’s suggestion that the 
area’s more recent heritage was missed by the official programme of work. 
Standing buildings research did occur on modern structures, for example 
the electricity pylons of the area, as part of the official archaeological pro-
gramme (Dwyer 2007), and an oral history recording of a small subset of 
former workers in the wider area was undertaken (ECH 2010). However, 
little work appears to have been undertaken to engage with the thousands 
of workers or hundreds of residents who were required to move out for the 
Games.
Dispersal was not the only means by which the activities of the 
area’s recent past were documented. For example, a dedicated network 
of activists campaigned for those who had to leave their homes to make 
way for the event – again often drawing upon what might be seen as her-
itage discourses, drawing attention to their longevity of occupation and 
an autochthonic connection to the area, but also a close sense of com-
munity. In some cases this took the form of overt anti-Olympic activism, 
with the dogged action of websites such as gamesmonitor.com, who high-
lighted issues ranging from the CPO, job losses, security and the contam-
ination of the Park. This website and others now also act as a record of 
what has changed in the Park area, and indeed as an archive of efforts to 
resist such change and document it. A tradition of activism also survives 
today in ongoing campaigns such as Save Hackney Wick (http://savehack-
neywick.org/), where artists and residents on the fringes of the Olympic 
Park resist demolition and evictions.
Another group displaced by the Games’ development was the 
Manor Garden Allotments Society, who campaigned to save their plots 
of land close to the Olympic Velodrome site. Understandably they made 
much of their close connection with land they had occupied since the 
1920s in their campaign against removal (Life Island 2014), which was 
ultimately unsuccessful. Such a place, though small-scale and less likely 
to generate newspaper headlines than prehistoric villages or buried 
boats, should arguably have been recognised as part of a living heritage 
tradition. The allotments, having transformed an originally marginal 
marshy site adjacent to a landfill, were somewhere valued and treas-
ured; they were explicitly recognised by users as heritage (MGS 2016). 
Despite this, however, they seem to have been left untroubled by official 
archaeological investigations and were removed in late 2007. Traces of 
this heritage were recorded only through the efforts of individuals such 
as photographer Peter Marshall (Fig.3.5) and the members of the Society 
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(who eventually moved to a new site provided by the Games’ developers 
outside the Park boundaries).
Like the work of Davies and Rapp, such efforts, and those of others 
who documented acts of resistance and other recent heritage of the area 
(for example, Husni-Bey 2012; Dixon in Gabie 2012, 125), stand as an 
alternative archaeology of the recent past here, challenging the idea that 
this was an empty wasteland.
Discussion: the valuation of the past 
The ‘official’ presentation of the past of the Olympic Park by its devel-
opers suggests that any notion of this place’s historical value appears to 
stop after the Second World War. As discussed above, the period from 
1945 to 2012 saw further changes in the area, reducing it in the views 
of some to a spatial and temporal ‘wasteland’. This suggests a powerful 
value-judgement at play and, in the language of the mega event, that the 
past was something to be carefully ‘mitigated’ or managed. Mitigation 
in this sense was not only to protect some of said past’s material remains 
through archaeological fieldwork, but also to legitimise the removal of 
traces of more recent activity. Why though was this recent past not seen 
as a form of heritage by the project?
Figure 3.5 The Manor Garden Allotments in early 2007. Photograph 
© 2007 Peter Marshall, mylondondiary.co.uk.  
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A partial answer may be simply that the favouring of certain periods 
by the ODA was a result of contract archaeology’s reliance on UK legis-
lative heritage frameworks and guidance by monitoring bodies such as 
Historic England (named English Heritage at the time of the project) in 
the run-up to the Games specifying the mitigation work. The emphasis in 
such guidance’s language is of the relative ‘significance’ of sites or build-
ings, and thus the level of ‘intervention’ (recording or preservation) they 
require (English Heritage 2008, MOLAS 2002). Such frameworks tend to 
consider the recent past as less significant than more distant eras, usually 
based on a principle of scarcity, and have rarely fully addressed consider-
ations such as intangible heritage value to users in the present. Although 
the programme of works at the Olympic Park was understandably guided 
by these approaches (ODA 2007b), the likes of recording the mid-to-late 
twentieth-century electricity pylons mentioned above show there is con-
siderable variation in the interpretation of ‘value’ as defined by such guid-
ance (though ultimately these were not included in the Games published 
monograph, see Dwyer 2007). It nonetheless seems that these relatively 
‘safe’ approaches to the past influenced the ODA’s dissemination strategy. 
That said, however, this is clearly not the whole story of why only more 
distant periods were discussed positively with regards to the Park’s past, 
nor should the representativeness of such frameworks be accepted with-
out question.
If this was simply an issue of relative research priorities by heritage 
monitoring bodies, archaeological consultants or contractors, then one 
has to ask why there was still this need to cast the more recent past neg-
atively as a wasteland. Some of this denigration would seem to be due to 
the need to present the mega event as a progressive ‘public good’ despite 
the cost to the taxpayer (which could easily be contrasted with the rela-
tive poverty of its host area) and, by 2009, the beginnings of fiscal auster-
ity and growing unemployment (Zimbalist 2015, 109). I would suggest 
progress here relied upon a narrative of the ‘cleaning up’ and ‘improve-
ment’ of the East End, described as ‘regeneration’.
In this conception it seems the still extant industrial past jarred with 
post-industrial and neoliberal visions of what inner London was ‘meant’ 
to be like (i.e. its economy to be based around service industries such 
as finance rather than traditional industry; Eade 2000, 133–4). Along 
with this need for post-industrialism, the low-cost housing, allotments 
and the ‘patchwork’ of uses of the pre-Olympic site seemingly did not fit 
with these more future-oriented visions of the city. Arguably this vision 
of the area as requiring ‘transformation’ and regeneration also relates to 
the historical denigration of the ‘East End’ as a slum or wilderness more 
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generally by the capital’s wealthier and more politically powerful West 
End (Cohen 2013, chapter 1; Eade 2000).
Thus the duality in the use of the past here can be seen as ‘pharma-
konic’: both ‘poison’ and ‘cure’, ‘treasure’ or ‘trash’; residing in indeter-
minacy, flickering between the need to excavate or bury (Butler 2011; 
Derrida 1981). The past at the Olympic Park at times presented the 
‘opportunity’ to create knowledge about history and to establish a sense 
of place for the new Park, at least in its archaeological manifestations. 
This relatively ‘ancient past’ was presented in stark contrast to negative 
visions of the site’s ‘recent past’: as messy, piecemeal and anachronistic, 
jarring with what was seen to be a necessary change for regeneration 
(Cohen 2013, 210). Archaeology was arguably useful as an opportunity 
for good public relations for the organisers in that it could be related 
to a narrative of continuous change and improvement. This discourse 
seemed to suggest that the likes of industrial employment in this area 
was now naturally ‘over’, an activity only legitimate when considered in 
the past, rather than one which had ongoing historical continuity and 
that remained active in the present (see Gardner 2013).
Haber notes that the expert knowledge and claims to truth that pro-
fessional archaeology makes in a development context often occurs at the 
expense of the living communities and living heritage in the place being 
transformed (Haber 2015, 105). This may have occurred, even if inadvert-
ently, in Stratford’s case. This is not to single out for criticism the archaeol-
ogists, consultants or others for a lack of attention to living communities, 
especially given the circumstances of a major project like this – strict con-
trol over dissemination, and tight constraints on budget and time – but it 
is to argue that a major opportunity may have been missed here. Those 
forced to move from the site could have been included to a much greater 
degree as part of the heritage investigations carried out here, rather 
than having their homes, businesses, and spaces of leisure consigned to 
a wasteland. This is not to say archaeologists could have stopped demo-
lition or compulsory purchase orders, or necessarily been able to change 
the narrative of the ODA. However, I would suggest that heritage profes-
sionals could have better supported  those who challenged and resisted 
the ‘wasteland’ narrative through demonstrating that the people dwelling 
and working here up until 2007 had their own connection to the area’s 
history and heritage that was also worthy of recognition.
It is rare for individual archaeologists to speak out against a devel-
opment or to overtly discuss the ethics of working on a particular pro-
ject. This is for a variety of compelling reasons, including the precarious 
nature of employment, the risk of losing repeat work and so forth. In 
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some rare cases, however, archaeologists have actively sided with those 
opposed to what they felt to be unsustainable or unethical forms of devel-
opment, most notably on dam projects (for example, Ronayne 2006; 
Kleinitz and Näser 2013). While this may be unlikely to happen in a UK 
context, a much stronger engagement with the discussion of ethics in the 
commercial sector is required. I would suggest that archaeologists should 
be questioning the narrative of such large projects, to advocate for more 
engagement with those who these schemes displace and to attempt to 
regain some control of the messages or narratives associated with their 
findings. Archaeological work can be a form of profit-making enterprise 
and contract archaeologists are not simply victims of power: they are, at 
times, complicit in its operation (Haber 2015; Hutchings and Salle 2015; 
Gardner forthcoming b).
In the case of London 2012, a more socially engaged archaeology 
could have shown that the industrial and social history the archaeolo-
gists documented so well up until the mid-twentieth century was not 
only dead and buried in the wasteland, but that the landscape they 
picked through had, until only a few months before, been a place of work 
for thousands and a home for hundreds more. In essence, their explora-
tions could have been viewed not simply as an ‘opportunity’ to excavate 
London’s rich past, but also to highlight its diverse present. As we are 
now the mega event’s legacy period, with the development of the Queen 
Elizabeth Olympic Park continuing apace, we are presented – in the 
establishment of institutions such as UCL East and V&A East here – with 
an opportunity to begin to redress this imbalance.
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Notes
1. Gabie 2012, 125.
2. The opinions of the author are solely his own. They do not reflect the position of any archaeo-
logical company he has previously worked for, nor any other entity or individual involved with 
the Olympic Project. All information discussed in this chapter regarding the archaeological 
works programme is derived from material in the public domain which can be found by follow-
ing the links in the references.
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3. CPO is also known as ‘eminent domain’.
4. The term ‘Londoner’ is something of a misnomer as London was not founded until the AD 50s 
and was then some 6 km to the southwest. While ‘East Ender’ is geographically more accurate, 
it may also be a couple of centuries premature.
5. Davis’ research on this process of dispersal of existing businesses is presented with the photo-
graphs in the same volume: Davies et al. 2017.
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Covert erasure and agents of change 
in the heritage city
Colin Sterling 
Heritage and change
Towards the end of 2017 the Victoria and Albert Museum (V&A) 
announced a major new acquisition for their collections: two complete 
maisonettes from the Robin Hood Gardens council estate (RHG) in East 
London. Long threatened with demolition, this much dilapidated brutal-
ist icon (in fact two separate buildings) had become a key battleground 
in fierce debates over the qualities of postwar architecture and the provi-
sion of social housing in the city (Powers 2010). According to Neil Bing-
ham, curator of contemporary architectural collections at the V&A, the 
acquisition would ‘motivate new thinking and research into this highly 
experimental period of British architectural and urban history’ (quoted 
in Brown 2017). Echoing this sentiment Christopher Turner, the muse-
um’s keeper of design, architecture and digital, argued that the huge 
fragment – 8.8 m high, 5.5 m wide and 8 m deep – was ‘worth preserving 
for future generations’ (quoted in Brown 2017).
The news was greeted with great ambivalence. For some the acqui-
sition was unsuitable on the grounds of taste, with brutalism still a much 
maligned architectural style in many circles. For others the act of curato-
rial salvage was bittersweet. Following a hard-fought campaign to pro-
tect the estate from demolition Catherine Croft, director of the Twentieth 
Century Society, commented in 2017 that the site:
[…] could have been refurbished to provide good quality housing. 
[…] Keeping a small section is by no means an adequate way of pre-
serving all that is important about a great building, but nevertheless 
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we are delighted that some sense of the physical materiality of RHG 
will endure. It is very prescient of the V&A to recognise the signif-
icance of the estate, both as an example of high modernist design 
and as a highly controversial conservation disaster. We are sure that 
future generations will be inspired by the exhibit, and be as incred-
ulous that demolition of RHG was allowed as we are today about 
the destruction of the Euston Arch.
Alongside this disillusionment, perhaps the most vocal response to the 
acquisition emerged from those eager to defend not the physical fabric or 
architectural merits of RHG, but the utopian aspirations of good housing 
for all. Although 1500 homes are due to replace RHG’s 214 flats as part of 
the site’s redevelopment, the provision of housing for council tenants and 
those on lower incomes remains unclear. In the words of one commen-
tator, the V&A’s act of ‘preservation’ may ultimately serve as little more 
than ‘PR for luxury condos […] a fetishisation of working-class ways of 
living’ (Pritchard 2017a). Here the very process of saving, conserving, 
displaying and interpreting social housing is called into question as part 
of a ‘state-led cycle of gentrification’ (Pritchard 2017a). This is exacer-
bated by the website for the new development, where former residents 
are invited to ‘share their memories of Robin Hood Gardens’ – a com-
mon practice in heritage-led community work that takes on a different 
meaning under the shadow of large-scale dispossession (a point to which 
I return below).
I highlight the case of RHG here as it brings into sharp focus three of 
the major themes I want to focus on in this chapter: the tension between 
conspicuous practices of demolition and the hidden or ‘covert’ processes 
of social erasure these often obscure; the visibility and capacity of differ-
ent agents or actors in shaping these processes; the knotted relationship 
between heritage and urban development across different scales and 
categories of ‘past presencing’ (Macdonald 2013). Taking ‘the city’ as a 
key site of contestation in debates around destruction and preservation, 
I am interested in the ‘cultural meanings of development’ (Mandle 2011, 
238) as much as the history and potentiality of heritage (the two are 
rarely seen in isolation, of course). This (re)orientation positions critical 
heritage at the nexus of important debates occurring in related fields, 
including urban geography (Hall and Barrett 2017; Colavitti 2018), 
architecture and urbanism (Campkin and Duijzings 2016) and the arts 
(Rosler 2010).
These admittedly wide-ranging lines of enquiry are rationalised 
over the following pages around the core concept of change – a word 
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that has gained considerable traction across the heritage sector in recent 
years, both from a theoretical standpoint and as a rallying cry for con-
servation practice. The National Trust, for example, defines conserva-
tion as ‘the careful management of change’, while English Heritage (now 
re-named Historic England) argues that ‘considered change offers the 
potential to enhance and add value to places, as well as generating the 
need to protect their established heritage values’ (English Heritage 2008, 
15). Cornelius Holtorf meanwhile has been particularly vocal in calling 
for a move away from prevailing attitudes that see heritage as static and 
therefore ‘at risk’, leaning towards an understanding of heritage as ‘the 
continuous manifestation of change over time’ (Holtorf 2015, 417).
These different threads of ‘change management’ work along the 
grain of a world constantly in flux. Organic processes, non-human agen-
cies and vast systemic forces conspire to eradicate any sense of stability 
or continuity in this reading, which radically undermines the perceived 
‘threat’ of destruction (see Holtorf 2016). As Caitlin DeSilvey summa-
rises in her recent book Curated Decay:
In some heritage contexts, the rigidity of professional boundaries 
and the adherence to the preservation paradigm are giving way to 
recognition that processes of change and creative transformation 
can be productive and positive. 
(DeSilvey 2017, 132)
The argument I want to put forward here is broadly supportive of this 
paradigm shift, but with one important caveat. Rather than see change 
itself as the focal point for a renewed critical engagement with the past 
in the present, I suggest that our attention needs to be focused on the dif-
ferential agents of change that constantly shape and reshape heritage. On 
the face of it, this may seem like a rather banal observation. However, it 
gives rise to a series of crucial points of analysis that are liable to remain 
hidden if we continue to foreground the change/preservation dynamic 
as the prime locus of heritage meaning. Most visibly, if we take change 
to be the starting point of heritage rather than its antithesis (something 
I think we should do), then two lines of concern immediately leap out: 
who or what brings about this change, and what are its effects?
The destruction of cultural heritage as a result of conflict, crimi-
nal damage, neglect or over-development has been an important area of 
investigation for heritage researchers since at least the end of the Second 
World War (see Bevan 2006). Indeed, in the longer term, the erasure of 
physical reminders of the past may be understood to have motivated the 
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growth of ‘heritage’ in the first place (Lowenthal 1998). But while the 
loss of buildings, artefacts, sites and landscapes can be considered a core 
concern of the field, less attention has been paid to the social worlds in 
which this destruction occurs, or to the impact it has on the continua-
tion or otherwise of those processes through which heritage is made and 
unmade (see, however, Mah 2012).
This is surprising for a number of reasons – not least the obvious 
link between the erasure of ‘things’ and violence against people (Matthes 
2018). Recognising that this association needs to be at the forefront of 
any discussion about heritage and destruction, I would suggest that the 
tendency of scholars and practitioners in the field to focus on the most 
spectacular or visible acts of demolition effectively occludes the broader 
patterns of erasure and change in which heritage is embedded.
To take a well-known example, the destruction of parts of Palmyra by 
the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant was roundly condemned 
by various high-profile groups and individuals in 2015 (Jeffries 2015; 
Bowersock 2015). At the same time commentators noted the relative 
silence of the heritage world with respect to the dispossession and murder 
of different communities in the country. The same can be said in relation 
to most case studies in the literature around heritage destruction, from the 
bombing of Dresden and other German cities by the British air force during 
the Second World War (Joel 2013) to the spectacle-driven demolition of 
the Bamiyan Buddhas in 2001 (Kalman 2017). Such destructive acts have 
helped to solidify a belief that heritage is in urgent need of protection in 
many different contexts around the world. Taking issue with this stance, 
Holtorf maintains that loss and destruction ‘are not necessarily threats 
to heritage; in fact, they may make heritage’ (Holtorf 2016). As well as 
Palmyra and the Bamiyan Buddhas, Holtorf draws on examples such as the 
Berlin Wall and the Twin Towers to make his argument, suggesting that the 
absence of these objects has been more important for their emergence as 
heritage than their continued presence would have allowed.
At one level this is no doubt true, but the position I want to put 
forward in this chapter is that loss, risk and endangerment also need to 
be considered from the perspective of heritage as process (Smith 2006): 
when we do this, a different set of ‘threats’ emerges. These are more 
closely related to the social worlds of heritage, which – while always in 
a state of flux – may still be understood as vulnerable. Put simply, even if 
heritage as a thing or object may not be ‘at risk’ from acts of destruction, 
for precisely the reasons that Holtorf outlines, heritage as a democratic, 
multi-layered and inclusive process is very much threatened by these 
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acts, which are inherently unilateral, appropriative and exclusionary (as 
well as being in many cases violent and traumatic).
To return briefly to the case of RHG, we can begin to see that this per-
spective opens up a new set of questions around processes of change and 
the visibility or otherwise of erasure. For example, while the Twentieth 
Century Society may have been right to suggest that refurbishment could 
have saved the building, would this have been preferable if all council 
tenants had been evicted and replaced by investment bankers as part of a 
luxury ‘redevelopment’? If not, would the protection of a certain ‘way of 
life’ (working class, ethnically diverse, family oriented) have been more 
desirable from a heritage perspective than the preservation of the buildings 
in situ? Furthermore, if residents had voted for the wholesale demolition 
and rebuilding of the site,1 would heritage advocates have supported or 
hindered this (hopefully) democratic  decision-making process?
These questions are rarely so black and white, of course, and the 
argument can be made that the built environment is such an integral 
component of community and identity formation that the two cannot 
be separated. Nonetheless, my key point remains: heritage as a process 
is interwoven with broader social imbalances and inequities that are 
brought to the surface around issues of change and destruction, and the 
risks and vulnerabilities associated with this dynamic should be a core 
concern of the sector. This can be brought out most obviously in discus-
sions around heritage in the urban landscape, where change is built into 
the very fabric of the field (Bandarin and Van Oers 2012).
The heritage city
Urbanisation is one of the key phenomena of our time: over half the planet 
now lives in cities (UN 2014). A vast literature has emerged to deal with 
this new reality, which impacts on the conceptualisation and use of her-
itage in myriad ways (Jacobs 1961; Amin and Thrift 2002; Massey 2007; 
Zukin 2011; Minton 2012; Merrifield 2014; Anderson 2015). While there 
are many different strands to this thinking, a key thread linking work 
in this area is that ‘the city’ cannot be reduced down to a single idea or 
image. Instead it must be understood as ‘the site where people of all sorts 
and classes mingle, however reluctantly and agonistically, to produce a 
common if perpetually changing and transitory life’ (Harvey 2012, 67).
For the past decade I have travelled from south to north London 
almost every day, either to study at the Institute of Archaeology or to 
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work as a heritage consultant in a carefully restored former school build-
ing in Farringdon. My bus route takes me through or near some of the 
most contentious sites of ‘regeneration’ in the city: the rapidly gentrifying 
neighbourhood of Peckham; the dilapidated council estates of Aylesbury 
and Heygate (the latter now demolished); the heavily branded spaces 
of the South Bank; the vast new ‘public’ squares of Kings Cross, created 
and managed by private money. My point here is not to claim some spe-
cial insight as to the pace of development in London, but to underline 
the commonplace nature of change in the city. Indeed, I would wager 
that most bus routes take in a similarly complex thread of destruction 
and rebuilding, neglect and rejuvenation. To live in a city is to inhabit 
change – the unavoidable warp and weft of the urban.
Sometimes, however, this change is hidden, or is at least down-
played. I have written elsewhere about the peculiar practice of wrap-
ping structures undergoing major repairs or rebuilding in images of 
themselves (Sterling 2017). This takes the now routine spectacle of 
‘facadism’  – where a building is gutted but its facade left in place – to 
sometimes comical levels. Here one of the key functions of heritage in 
the urban environment is made clear: providing a sense of continuity 
or stability in the face of rapid change. Beyond this, familiar concepts 
and practices such as conservation areas, listed buildings, cultural tours 
and specially designated heritage ‘quarters’ all point to the importance 
of heritage (broadly defined) for the city. As a recent UNESCO report on 
sustainable urban development makes clear:
What we call ‘heritage’ is found in quality public spaces or in areas 
marked by layers of time. Cultural expressions give people the oppor-
tunity to identify themselves collectively, to read the traces of history, 
to understand the importance of traditions for their daily life. 
(UNESCO 2016, 17)
Crucially, the issue of managing change is highlighted throughout this 
report, which – in the framework of the UN’s Sustainable Development 
Goals – sees culture as ‘a lever for development’ (ibid).
It should hardly need stating that this view of heritage is far from 
comprehensive and may be considered overly deterministic. Italian jour-
nalist Marco D’Eramo has even coined a term to posit quite the opposite 
viewpoint, suggesting that the ‘heritagisation’ of cities constitutes a form 
of ‘UNESCOcide’ (D’Eramo 2014). While traces of the past may well be 
used to promote regeneration or tourism, heritage is also about resistance 
to change. In London, for example, a series of public campaigns against 
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major development in the 1970s are still felt in discussions around con-
servation and redevelopment today (Murphy 2016). Most famously, in 
the 1970s Covent Garden Market was saved from destruction through a 
grass-roots movement which saw ‘the voices of ordinary people’ included 
in debates over the city’s future in an unprecedented manner (Murphy 
2016, 146). Here, however, another key dimension of heritage in the 
city is exposed, as the communities that made up Covent Garden would 
eventually be displaced through commercial gentrification. For Murphy, 
the preservation and subsequent social transformation of Covent Garden 
was ‘a Pyrrhic victory, in many ways just as bad as losing the buildings 
would have been in the first place’ (ibid).
Heritage cannot be reduced to a single category or process in such 
cases. Instead, it must be seen as a malleable and highly contested com-
ponent in the broader interplay of capital, activism, property speculation 
and commercialisation. What we might call ‘the heritage city’ draws on 
and nurtures all of these forces at once, intersecting with processes of 
destruction and ‘change management’ in countless ways. This supports 
the notion that heritage itself cannot be considered at risk from devel-
opment or erasure. At the same time there needs to be a recognition that 
certain aspects of these developmental pressures do threaten the pro-
duction of different forms of heritage that may contradict the interests 
of neoliberal urban governance. The covert erasure played out through 
these processes is different in kind from that instigated during times of 
conflict, but it is no less meaningful.
The commons and monopoly rent
To explore these ideas further I want to bring in two interrelated themes 
from the work of urbanist and Marxist geographer David Harvey. Across a 
series of essays published over the past two decades, Harvey has put for-
ward an incisive analysis of the myriad ways in which urbanisation and 
capital interact, focused on the differential and highly contested absorp-
tion of capital and labour surplus within the urban environment. Building 
on Henri Lefebvre’s influential concept of the right to the city (Lefebvre 
2003), Harvey sees this process as bound up with complex forms of con-
trol and coercion, which in turn become ‘major sites of political, social, 
and class struggle’ (Harvey 2012, 66). This has been exacerbated since 
the mid-1980s through the widespread application of neoliberal urban 
policies that channel wealth and resources towards dynamic ‘entre-
preneurial’ growth poles (for example, business districts, regeneration 
74 CRIT ICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURAL MEMORY AND HERITAGE
areas) in the hope of creating a spatial version of the ‘trickle down’ effect 
(Harvey 2012, 29). For Harvey, such initiatives have unleashed ‘a verita-
ble flood of creative destruction’ in urban environments across the world 
(Harvey 2012, 86).
At one level, heritage may be seen as a victim of such processes, 
with buildings, landscapes and ways of life overwhelmed by the march 
of capitalist progress. Yet this would be a simplistic reading. Instead we 
need to understand the different ways in which heritage is not just a 
pawn of capitalist destruction, but is itself deeply implicated in the ero-
sion of urban life. Two interconnected strands can be drawn out from 
Harvey’s thinking to help illuminate these processes: the social practice 
of commoning and the notion of monopoly rent.
The urban commons for Harvey are more than simply open spaces 
or public, non-commodified assets. They rather signal ‘an unstable and 
malleable social relation between a particular self-defined social group 
and those aspects of its actually existing or yet-to-be-created social and/
or physical environment deemed crucial to its life and livelihood’ (Harvey 
2012, 73). ‘Commoning’ in this sense is to be seen as a social practice that 
treats certain aspects of the urban environment as ‘off-limits’ to the logics 
of market exchange and market valuations (ibid). Indeed, the exploita-
tion of the commons through such frameworks can lead to their degra-
dation or banalisation – a form of covert erasure that does not destroy 
outright, but rather eats away at the very substance of the commons. Like 
heritage, then, the urban commons are continuously being (re)produced 
and appropriated. Yet we cannot say that the two are synonymous, as her-
itage may be seen as both a foundational feature of the commons and part 
of its exploitation. Here the entanglement of heritage with processes of 
‘Disneyfication’ and gentrification come to the fore. As Harvey explains:
The primary means by which [the commons] is appropriated in 
urban contexts is, of course, through the extraction of land and 
property rents. A community group that struggles to maintain 
ethnic diversity in its neighbourhood and protect against gentrifi-
cation may suddenly find its property prices (and taxes) rising as 
real estate agents market the ‘character’ of their neighbourhoods to 
the wealthy as multicultural, street-lively and diverse. By the time 
the market has done its destructive work, not only have the original 
residents been disposed of that common which they had created 
(often being forced out by rising rents and property taxes), but the 
common itself becomes so debased as to be unrecognisable. 
(Harvey 2012, 77–8)
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The process described here is explained in greater detail by Harvey in 
his 2002 essay The Art of Rent, which examines the contradictions and 
potentialities of a concept that lies at the heart of capitalism’s ‘creative 
destruction’: monopoly rent. Put simply, monopoly rent arises when 
‘social actors can realise an enhanced income stream over an extended 
time by virtue of their exclusive control over some directly or indirectly 
tradable item which is in some crucial respects unique and non- replicable’ 
(Harvey 2012, 90). Tellingly, Harvey provides an extended list of herit-
age objects to explain this uniqueness, from ‘aboriginal art’ to ‘Buddhist 
temples’ (Harvey 2012, 92). These exemplify the special place ‘histori-
cally constituted cultural artefacts and practices’ hold for those wishing 
to capture monopoly rents, which may rest on ‘narratives, interpretations 
and meanings of collective memories’ as much as on the material quali-
ties of particular environments (Harvey 2012, 103).
What is at stake here for Harvey is ‘the power of collective symbolic 
capital, of special marks of distinction that attach to some place, which 
have a significant drawing power upon the flows of capital more gener-
ally’ (Harvey 2012). These marks of distinction do not simply emerge 
from the unique heritage of a social group or location. Instead they are 
constantly made and remade through the work of various actors, which 
may include the knowledge and heritage industries.
None of this should seem particularly novel or radical to those 
familiar with the heritage sector, which has long wrestled with ques-
tions of commodification and symbolic capital (Hewison 1987; Baillie 
et al. 2014; Dicks 2016; Alderman 2016). What I want to suggest here, 
however, is that such processes may prompt us to look again at the privi-
leging of ‘change management’ as a new heritage paradigm and to recon-
sider the diffuse agents and actors that support or hinder such change, 
especially in the context of the heritage city. Although less spectacular 
or immediate than we are perhaps used to, the destructive nature of 
capitalist urbanisation deserves our close attention – not because it is 
destructive per se, but because it exposes the appropriative, exclusion-
ary and exploitative dimensions of heritage change to critical scrutiny. 
We can see this more clearly by returning to Holtorf’s arguments against 
loss aversion, which can now be modified to encompass the covert and 
often deeply inequitable processes of erasure that constantly transform 
the urban environment.
For Holtorf (following Tim Ingold), the destruction of heritage 
‘objects’ should not be seen as inherently detrimental to their capac-
ity to facilitate remembering (Holtorf 2015, 418). Accepting that such 
objects are constantly in ‘a process of becoming rather than a state of 
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being’ allows us to appreciate the ‘valuable function’ they might play in 
society even when subjected to ‘major alterations’ (Holtorf 2015). These 
functions may include acting as tourist sites, providing focal points for 
commemorative events or supporting educational activities. The absence 
of an object does not prohibit such uses. Indeed, as Holtorf has shown 
so clearly, this may be the starting point for the heritage function of a 
particular site or space. Moreover, existing objects may well be replaced 
wholesale by new objects and yet maintain a similar value within society. 
As Holtorf concludes:
What we […] need in Heritage Studies is an intensified discussion 
of how to identify, evaluate and compare the benefits and values of 
cultural heritage objects in constant transformation in society. 
(Holtorf 2015)
Reading such processes through the lens of Harvey, a number of key ques-
tions emerge around the dynamic production of value in relation to her-
itage, and the utility or otherwise of certain heritage ‘objects’ (which may 
be physical, local, intangible, diasporic or any mixture of the above) for 
different social groups. First, we might ask who is building this value, and 
how is it subsequently deployed, interpreted and understood. The social 
practice of commoning, for example, could well be seen as an important 
method of heritage production, especially in the context of urban envi-
ronments where certain communities generate an indefinable (yet highly 
sought after) sense of ‘character’. It is interesting to note, I think, that 
such ‘character’ may often arise in areas previously deemed ‘unsavoury’ 
as a result of material neglect. Through the logic of monopoly rent, such 
localities will eventually come to be seen as desirable and subsequently 
marketed on their unique atmosphere, which will inevitably involve an 
element of ‘sprucing up’ to appeal to more affluent city-dwellers. This pro-
cess of heritage restoration is simultaneously a form of (social) heritage 
erasure – one that the privileging of change management elides, if not 
supports. As Harvey notes, the ‘tragedy’ of the urban commons is that:
[…] those who create an interesting and stimulating everyday 
neighbourhood life lose it to the predatory practices of the real estate 
entrepreneurs, the financiers and upper-class consumers bereft of 
any urban social imagination. The better the common qualities a 
social group creates, the more likely it is to be raided and appropri-
ated by private profit-maximising interests. 
(Harvey 2012, 78)
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On the surface, the slow degradation and banalisation (but not whole-
sale destruction) of the commons can be linked to a familiar conceptual-
isation of heritage as ‘non-renewable’ (Holtorf 2001). In this model, the 
marginalisation and appropriation of particular ways of living through 
monopoly rent may be seen as a case of irreversible erasure. But if we 
see heritage as a permanent process of change, a different set of con-
cerns emerges. Crucially, these concerns circle around the capacity for 
different actors to shape the use and meaning of the past in the present. 
Rather than see either change or destruction as the ‘enemy’, this frame-
work directs us towards a new point of analysis: namely the dense inter-
weaving of heritage with differential and often diametrically opposed 
notions of value, creativity, tradition, history, culture, etc., and the forces 
and actors who seek to define or control these conditions. Building on the 
work of Harvey, those fighting change in and of the heritage city might 
aim to resist the destructive forces of capitalist urbanisation – not simply 
because destruction is antithetical to heritage (it is not), but because this 
mode of erasure shuts down the multitude of voices that help to generate 
further heritage. We can explore this further with reference to the grow-
ing trend of ‘artwashing’ in urban environments, which contains many 
lessons for the heritage field.
Heritage-washing?
The term ‘artwashing’ has gained considerable traction in recent years 
as part of the public discourse surrounding rapid gentrification (O’Sul-
livan 2014; Jones 2016; Francis 2017; Minton 2017a; Mould 2017). In 
the words of researcher and artist-activist Stephen Pritchard, artwashing 
‘uses art to smooth and gloss over capitalism – it hides capitalism’s prim-
itive aggression and acts of oppression that underwrites accumulation 
of capital by dispossession’ (2017b). Pritchard goes on to identify vari-
ous categories of artwashing in his detailed analysis of the subject. These 
include corporate artwashing, such as that carried out by big oil compa-
nies sponsoring art institutions (see Evans 2015), developer-led artwash-
ing, which involves public art and specially designated ‘cultural quarters’, 
and government-led artwashing, in which state and local authorities use 
art to ‘reinforce social agendas’ and notions of ‘social and civic engage-
ment’ (Pritchard 2017b). Artists who choose (unwittingly or not) to 
engage in such activities have been the target of much criticism; by some 
they are viewed as part of a ‘mobilisation of artistic creativity completely 
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devoid of its subjective, complicated and politically charged context’ 
(Mould 2017). Others have claimed that no matter the outcome or cir-
cumstances, artists have an important role to play in supporting commu-
nities to ‘articulate experience’ and ‘advocate for their rights’ in the face 
of neoliberal urban development (Francis 2017). Against the backdrop 
of these ongoing debates, this complex and malleable term may best be 
understood as a rallying point for those challenging the engagement of 
‘the arts’ with capitalism, which is seen as inherently destructive of alter-
native ‘ways of life’ (tellingly, these often remain poorly defined).
There are many points of overlap between such arts-led practices 
and the role of heritage in the city. We might, for example, point to the 
creation of temporary artists’ studios in historic buildings slated for 
redevelopment, or the production of sculptures and other public inter-
ventions which draw on the history of a certain place or community to 
help ‘re-brand’ that locality. Such strategies are often encouraged by local 
government and funding agencies, who see the intersection of arts and 
heritage as beneficial to creative practitioners and local communities 
alike. Having been involved in many such initiatives across London and 
beyond, I am aware both of the immediate social benefits to be gained 
from this approach and of their underlying economic imperatives – which 
may eventually undermine the capacity for certain groups to remain in 
the very places they helped to define.
For Pritchard, this meeting point of arts practice and community 
heritage work offers a particularly fertile ground for a form of socially 
engaged artwashing that is ‘smaller in scale and relatively covert in 
nature’ (Pritchard 2017c). This ‘community artwashing’ may involve 
gathering, sanitising, archiving and re-interpreting the ‘social capital of 
local people’ (ibid). Using language that evokes many of the themes I 
have covered in this chapter, Pritchard describes how there are:
[…] many ‘opportunities’ for arts organisations and artists to exploit 
communities using a facade of ‘community benefit’ and ‘social 
impact’ […] community artwashing exploits intangible assets in a 
neighbourhood faced with or in the early stages of gentrification; 
socially engaged artists become its agents, bringing about a form of 
social change that is antithetical to the principles of social justice. 
(Pritchard 2017c)
Furthermore, this social capital often takes the form of ‘memories, sto-
ries, histories and even old photographs’ which may be used to ‘create 
“memorials” to disadvantaged communities displaced by gentrification’ 
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(Pritchard 2017c). As Pritchard concludes, this form of artwashing deals 
in ‘the one thing that capitalism could not commodify – until now – the 
intangible bonds and ties that keep struggling and long-abandoned local 
people together’ (ibid).
While more research is needed to understand the precise moti-
vations and impacts of such processes, I would like to suggest that 
Pritchard’s characterisation of community artwashing provides an 
important jumping-off point for interrogating the ‘change management’ 
model of heritage in the shadow of capitalist urbanisation. The key ques-
tion here must be: how can we ‘do’ heritage in ways that resist the appro-
priative and exploitative dimensions of neoliberal urban policies, and 
instead promote alternative agencies of change in the heritage city? This 
line of enquiry foregrounds the active and creative capacities of heritage 
without shying away from the complex ideologies and systems of govern-
ance in which these processes are embedded. To return to Holtorf’s belief 
that heritage is constantly evolving and may be expected to fulfil a ‘val-
uable function in society even after being subjected to major alterations’ 
(Holtorf 2015, 418), we might respond: yes, but valuable for whom?
The implicit contradictions of monopoly rent offer one way of tack-
ling the role of heritage in community artwashing. As Harvey makes clear, 
the capitalist desire for monopoly rent involves constant interventions in 
the fields of ‘culture, history, heritage, aesthetics, and meanings’ (Harvey 
2012, 109). These may be deployed in different ways to generate the marks 
of distinction and symbolic capital on which such rent depends. The key 
point here, however, is that such activities generate their own resistance. 
In seeking to produce and maintain ‘unique qualities’, capital encourages 
‘local cultural developments that can be antagonistic to its own smooth 
functioning’ (Harvey 2012, 110). This contradiction provides a certain 
space – however narrow, contested and fragmentary – for oppositional 
practices and politics to take hold. Harvey’s optimistic verdict on this sub-
ject gestures towards a potential role for heritage theorists and practition-
ers who might wish to address this particular form of covert destruction:
By seeking to trade on values of authenticity, locality, history, cul-
ture, collective memories, and tradition they [capitalists in search of 
monopoly rent] open a space for political thought and action within 
which socialist alternatives can be both devised and pursued. The 
space of that commons deserves intense exploration and cultiva-
tion by oppositional movements that embrace cultural producers 
and cultural production as a key element in their political strategy. 
(Harvey 2012, 112)
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Conclusions: beyond change management
In her recent book Big Capital, Anna Minton outlines the many problems 
of the London housing market in stark prose. As her chapter on ‘Demo-
litions’ makes clear, residents of social housing are often seen as ‘collat-
eral damage’ in the rush to rebuild or regenerate council estates (Minton 
2017b, 41). While sites such as Robin Hood Gardens have become 
key battlegrounds in the opposition to this form of covert erasure, lit-
tle attention has been paid to such modes of destruction by heritage 
researchers (despite the interventions of prominent heritage institu-
tions such as the V&A). Perhaps this is because the broader erosion of 
community life is harder to frame within current heritage vocabularies 
than the demolition of a piece of architecture. Although connected, a 
different set of issues coalesce around Harvey’s exploration of the com-
mons and monopoly rent which, I have suggested here, offer one way 
of conceptualising the often paradoxical role of heritage in neoliberal 
forms of ‘creative destruction’. When combined with emerging ideas of 
‘community artwashing’, we can begin to see how the practice and con-
ceptualisation of heritage is a vital ingredient in these often pernicious 
processes.
It is crucial to recognise that heritage may be deployed in many dif-
ferent ways across these debates. It may be used as a statutory protection 
against demolition or redevelopment, or as a collection of stories and 
memories to be used in ‘place-making’, or as a locus for arts-led activism. 
To suggest that heritage can be defined either as a resistance to change 
or as a continual process of becoming seems inadequate in these circum-
stances. Instead we need to track and critique the differential agents and 
forces that shape conceptualisations of heritage within the urban land-
scape – and in so doing pay close attention to the sometimes covert forms 
of destruction they help to sustain and promote.
Change, I would argue, should be the starting point of these dis-
cussions, but not the core emphasis. The concept of heritage as a pro-
cess is now well established, and while this framework has helped us 
to understand how even the complete erasure of a site or building does 
not preclude its active functioning as an object of remembrance (Holtorf 
2015), the imbalances and asymmetries built into such systems need fur-
ther consideration. As I have sought to show with reference to concepts 
drawn from Marxist urban theory, processes of heritage-making open 
out onto a broad range of threats and vulnerabilities that go far beyond 
the destruction of physical remnants of the past. Ultimately, within the 
context of the heritage city, the language of ‘change management’ seems 
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to be at best an absolution of responsibility and at worst a capitulation 
with the very forces of dispossession, alienation and exclusion that we 
should seek to resist.
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Note
1. In February 2018 Mayor of London Sadiq Kahn announced plans to give residents a ballot on 
whether estate regeneration projects should go ahead.
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Heritage, memory and social justice: 
reclaiming space and identity
Veysel Apaydin
The date of 27 May 2013 marked one of the largest environmental 
demonstrations in recent history, as protestors sought to save Istanbul’s 
Gezi Park from being replaced with a shopping mall and a reconstruc-
tion of an Ottoman barracks. The riots and clashes began in Gezi Park 
and spread to other Turkish cities. Millions of people gathered in the city 
centres’ squares and main parks, not only to protest at the proposed dem-
olition of Gezi Park but also to reclaim their own spaces. In the following 
days and weeks Gezi Park and the main squares and parks of other cit-
ies were occupied by the people who had reclaimed them. The protests 
showed resistance against top-down government decisions and the trans-
formation of cultural space for profit-making – and against the attempt 
to challenge the identity construction of those who used these spaces 
through an authoritarian approach. Such resilience demonstrated that 
cultural or public spaces have a significant role as heritage for a public 
who have the right to attach values, ascribe meanings and develop mem-
ories within them.
Many papers from anthropological and sociological perspectives 
have been published since the Gezi Park protests (Arat 2013; Moudouros 
2014; Cayli 2016 and many others). However, it is still important to 
explore discourses of why it is significant to look at cultural space as her-
itage. Such an approach is critical for understanding the aims both of the 
government, in insisting on demolishing these spaces, and of the public, 
in showing resistance to that attempt even if it cost many lives.
This chapter examines the importance of public space as a place 
where heritage is developed, exploring its links with memory and identity 
and the destructive nature of economic development. It then considers 
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the impact of attempted destruction of cultural space on the public and 
their resistance to hegemonic power by taking into account the concepts 
of social theorists Henri Lefebvre (on ‘space and social production’) and 
David Harvey (on ‘the right to the city’ and ‘social justice and spatial 
system’). Through its focus on Gezi Park, this chapter will demonstrate 
the importance of public space for heritage-making, and therefore in 
identity construction and memory development, seen against attempts 
to use such spaces for profit by erasing heritage and memories and 
 re- constructing identities.
Public space, heritage, social production and power
If we are to understand space, we must consider its symbolic mean-
ing and its complex impact upon behavior as it is mediated by the 
cognitive process. 
(Harvey 2009, 36)
Public spaces have great significance for individuals and groups. With 
their meanings, representations and symbols, they are the key tool for 
establishing heritage, constructing identity and developing memories. 
Public spaces, particularly in urban cities, also serve as the voice of the 
people: many groups carry out activities such as protests, festivals, etc., in 
these places, which have great significance for social life. These squares or 
public spaces also represent historic events with monuments. For instance, 
the Republic Monument in Istanbul’s Taksim Square commemorates the 
foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, following the Turkish War 
of Independence. These spaces and monuments are all symbolically sig-
nificant in representing and commemorating certain events in the past.
In the last few decades public spaces have been transformed into 
commercial places and used as profit-making tools for wielding economic 
and political power. Gentrification, urban development and, especially, 
‘mega projects’ have targeted public spaces at the heart of a community’s 
sense of belonging, as well as of the identity of individuals and groups. 
These developments, which have a huge impact on public spaces and the 
environment, have strong links with the ambition of economic develop-
ment (Harvey 2007). The aim of promoting economic development with-
out considering its benefit, both economically and socially, and public 
opinion has affected people’s lives widely, changing their way of life and 
their perceptions (see Harvey 2007). This kind of transformation is par-
ticularly critical in countries such as Turkey, where democracy has been 
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effectively suspended for over five years under an authoritarian regime. 
Public spaces and natural resources are increasingly being abused for 
economic development, for the benefit of elites seeking economic power. 
In this process forests are cut down for construction projects, rivers are 
used for dams and, of course, city squares and public spaces are turned 
into profit-making places.
These places are extremely significant for the daily lives of the 
public, as it is where they produce their values. Because of the impor-
tance of these spaces for heritage-making and memory development, the 
public are motivated to reclaim their own space. This results in strong 
resistance, as in the case of Gezi Park. In other words, top-down deci-
sions made without consulting the public, which neglect the rights and 
benefits of individuals and groups, result in urban crisis; as the philos-
opher Henri Lefebvre has pointed out, they transform, reconstruct and 
erase spaces, heritage and memory (Lefebvre 1991). Certainly cities and 
spaces have many different functions; they therefore contain highly com-
plex meanings and symbols strongly connected to the social, political and 
economic lives of individuals and groups. According to Lefebvre, space 
has several dimensions strongly connected to social production:
... a product that is consumed as a commodity and as a produc-
tive resource in the social reproduction of labor power; a political 
instrument that facilitates forms of social control; … reproduction 
of property relations through legal and planning regimes which 
order space hierarchically; a set of ideological and symbolic super-
structures; … a means of human reappropriation through the 
development of counter spaces forged through artistic expression 
and social resistance. 
(Lefebvre 1991; quoted in Butler 2009, 320)
Space therefore takes an important place in power sharing as well. While 
space is a social production which has been laboured over by ordinary 
people, it is also significant for elites seeking to gain the power to control 
politics and economies. The case study of this paper, Gezi Park, was right 
in the middle of this battle of power sharing. While government aimed to 
make more profit, and to shift the symbol and meaning of the space, the 
public sought to reclaim their space. Because Gezi Park is located in Taksim 
Square, a site that commemorates the Turkish War of Independence follow-
ing the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of a secular 
state, it has great significance for the public identity construction of Turkish 
secularists (Fig.5.1). With its monuments and the Ataturk Cultural Centre, 
it was deliberately constructed as a potent symbol of modern Turkey.
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For decades Taksim Square has been symbolically significant 
for left-wing labour unions and groups. It represents their struggles 
for rights, being formerly the site of union rallies and demonstrations 
(Baykan and Hatuka 2010). Gezi Park, set in the centre of Taksim 
Square, also represents an Armenian minority group who had a grave-
yard located there until the 1930s; although this was later moved, it 
is still significant as a place that affirms identity and offers a sense of 
belonging to Armenians (see Watenpaugh 2013). Lastly, as Gezi Park is 
one of the few green areas in the city centre, it plays a significant role in 
local people’s daily lives.
Although Taksim Square and Gezi Park thus have significant impor-
tance for many different stakeholders, these aspects have been neglected 
by an authoritarian approach that aims to profit from cultural spaces. 
David Harvey has suggested how the notion of cultural rights has been 
turned to the benefit of ‘economic elites’ (Harvey 2007). This kind of 
authoritarian and destructive approach against the demand of people 
whose space was under threat encountered strong resistance. Harvey 
emphasises in his concept of ‘the right to the city’ that public spaces can 
be changed and transformed (Harvey 2003). However, the question is 
whether this change should be creative or destructive, and who it is that 
has the right to bring it about.
Figure 5.1 Overview of Gezi Park, The Republic Monument 
and Taksim Square. ©Google Earth, 2018 Digital Globe. 
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Authoritarianism, destruction and (re)construction
It is widely believed within heritage and political studies that heritage is 
a key tool for constructing identities, developing memories and ascribing 
values (see Smith 2006; Macdonald 2013; Graham and Howard 2016; 
Apaydin 2018). However, heritage is itself a process (Smith 2006) – not 
developed in a short period of time, but rather a long process of social 
production (Lefebvre 1991). It is constructed within groups for collec-
tive social memory (Hall 2005, 25) over generations of social interac-
tion. This construction, particularly in the case of constructing national 
identity, is often imposed by political elites who establish an ‘authorised 
heritage discourse’ (Smith 2006), or in other words, ‘official heritage’ 
(Harrison 2013). The use of authorised heritage discourse can be seen 
widely in undemocratic nation-states, particularly those founded on cer-
tain aspects of identity such as ethnicity, religion and ideology (Kohl and 
Fawcett 1995; Meskell 1998).
The dramatic political transformation of Turkey over the last dec-
ade can clearly be seen in the change and use of authorised heritage 
discourse as well, following an attempt to shift to more Islamic and 
Ottoman values and identity (see Zencirci 2014). The state was estab-
lished on secular values, in direct contrast to the religious values of the 
Ottoman Empire that officially collapsed with the foundation of secular 
Turkey in 1923. The key focus for Turkish heritage discourse by the state 
has always been secularism as well as Turkish ethnicity. In 1980, follow-
ing a military coup in Turkey, Islamic values were added to this herit-
age discourse, but it by and large kept its ethnic and secular orientation 
(Zencirci 2014).
Since 2002, however, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has 
been in power. The party was founded with an Islamic orientation, and it 
has focused on changing the values and means of society’s construction 
of identity, investing it with a more Islamic character (see Zencirci 2014). 
This can be seen in every part of the society and state institutions, par-
ticularly in the education system; this now includes more religious classes 
as economic and political power has shifted during the 17 years that the 
AKP has been in power. However, as Hall (2005) points out, this kind 
of transformation is a slow process and takes time; it is not straightfor-
ward to change the identity of individuals and society. People often resist 
change. Recent elections in Turkey (2018) demonstrate that the public 
remains strictly divided, one half supporting the AKP and the other half, 
whose identity and values are founded on secularism, showing resistance 
to this attempt at transformation.
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Since the AKP assumed governmental power in 2002, its rule has 
been transformed into ‘competitive authoritarianism’, particularly within 
the last five years. The term ‘competitive authoritarianism’ distinguishes 
this type of power from the classic authoritarian regimes common before 
the Cold War. In a competitive authoritarian system elections are still held 
and some democratic norms remain, but power – including state institu-
tions, the judiciary and the media – is controlled by the ruling group. 
This results in a restriction of human rights and freedom of expression 
alongside ‘electoral manipulation, abuse of state resources, harassment 
and violence’ (Levitsky and Way 2010, 3).
In this kind of political atmosphere, the demands of the public are 
often neglected. Particularly in Turkey, authoritarian and oppressive pol-
icies can be seen occurring under the umbrella of economic development 
by abusing natural and public resources, including repurposing public 
spaces for economic development. Taksim Square and Gezi Park were not 
the first cases in which public spaces were targeted for transformation 
through economic development. In many parts of Turkey large develop-
ments have become more common, particularly in the last decade. For 
instance, dam construction in many parts of Turkey (but particularly in 
southeastern and eastern Turkey) has been erasing the landscapes and 
cultural, social and economic spaces of the minority groups: their identi-
ties were attached to these places, and their memories developed there. 
Even though campaigns and public demonstrations were held against 
those developments, the people’s voice has been completely ignored 
(Ronayne 2006).
Since AKP came to power it has increasingly used public spaces and 
natural resources to make more profit and grow the country’s economy 
(see Buğra and Savaskan 2014). These include mega construction and 
development projects in every part of Turkey. This kind of economic and 
political approach is closer to abuse of public spaces and heritage than to 
the often-stated goal of developing economic resources for public ben-
efit. Abusing public spaces, natural resources and landscapes by using 
them for profit making has effectively decentralised public and individ-
ual power.
The aim of exercising this particular form of power – in order to 
decentralise the rights and power (by which I mean people’s values 
and memories) of individuals and groups – is to take social control and 
consolidate power over public rights. This was clearly seen in the Gezi 
Park case. Here the combination of a push for economic development 
and an authoritarian-style approach can be explained in two ways. 
The first follows the argument that public space represents forms of 
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abstract knowledge, produced and controlled by government institutions 
(Lefevbre 1991). Because Taksim Square and Gezi Park symbolically rep-
resent the knowledge and values of secular Turkey, alongside those of 
leftist groups and Armenians, the Turkish elite currently in power aim to 
erase such representation and knowledge; their intention is to shift it to 
a representation of their own, diametrically opposed ideology. In doing 
so, they wish to demolish the Park and reconstruct an Ottoman barracks 
to be a symbol used for identity construction of the ‘new’ Turkey (‘Yeni 
Turkiye’).
The second avenue of explanation for the actions at Gezi Park is 
that the AKP depends on neoliberal policies for profit, particularly for 
‘constructions’ and ‘developments’. Abuse of the space of Gezi Park for 
increasing profit is not something new; it is in fact one of the main aspects 
of the capitalist system in place. This is because space also contributes to 
production (Lefebvre 1991; see Butler 2009 for more details), and space 
needs to be fixed physically to make more profit out of it (Harvey 2009). 
The plan of developing a shopping mall was indeed not only contribut-
ing to Lefebvre’s argument concerning the connections of capitalism and 
space, but also to his analogy about the space:
Social spaces are a recognition that the political dimensions of 
space extend beyond its management and use as a political tool by 
the state. Space is itself a site of political conflict in which the class 
struggle has increasingly been transformed into forms of conflict 
which are spatial as well as political and economic,
(Quoted in Butler 2009, 321)
As the Taksim Square-Gezi Park case demonstrates, space can be used in 
reconstructing identities and erasing memories. The planned shopping 
mall in Gezi Park was not a traditional shopping mall, but was going to 
include a cultural centre and a mosque, as well as an Ottoman barracks, 
to serve as symbols of the new Turkey. In this way, the identity of individ-
uals and communities would be radically changed.
Although the plans to transform and demolish Gezi Park and 
replace it with a shopping mall are currently on hold because of the 
public reaction and community resistance, underlying issues surround-
ing the space’s use remain. The continuing goal of employing this space 
for capitalist enterprise and transforming Turkish identities can be seen 
in the example of the Ataturk Culture Centre (AKM), located in Taksim 
Square. In the 1960s, as one of the first modern buildings in Istanbul 
and a symbol of the Republic of Turkey, the Centre was listed as built 
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heritage, secured by the protection and preservation law. In later years 
the future of AKM became the subject of recurring debate: should it be 
replaced or restored?
In 2008 the Centre was closed prior to demolition. However, 
because of a strong public reaction, community resistance to the build-
ing’s destruction and associated legal requirements, any proposed 
demolition by the current government would clearly take years. Since 
2008 the public, academics and professionals have heavily debated and 
opposed the plan to demolish the Centre. As with the attempt to develop 
Gezi Park, there was no public consultation. Finally in 2018, in a very 
top-down decision, the AKM was demolished, along with its memories, 
symbols and the knowledge it represented. It was rebuilt to develop and 
construct a new identity, and to give a new focus to memory develop-
ment and heritage making. Although destruction is also a natural process 
in constructing new heritage, memories and values, the question for the 
AKM and the Gezi Park must be ‘how ethical was the decision-making 
process?’
Archaeologist and UNESCO chair on Heritage Futures Cornelius 
Holtorf argues that destruction and transformation of heritage can lead 
to new opportunities and possibilities of developing new heritage and 
memories for future generations (Holtorf 2015, 2018). Furthermore, he 
suggests that cultural heritage should be adaptable in order to be sustain-
able; it should be conceived as being as natural as ‘mountains, clouds, 
or waves in the ocean’ as they continually change (Holtorf 2018). It is 
indeed true that heritage is a process, of which construction, destruc-
tion and re-construction are part, and that it should be adaptable in order 
to be sustainable, as he suggests (Holtorf 2015), changing over time. 
Material culture of the past cannot be protected forever; loss is inevita-
ble, and the focus should be on producing new heritage (Harrison 2013).
However, what has been neglected in the arguments of Holtorf and 
other scholars who argue along similar lines (Holtorf 2018; DeSilvey 
2017; Ingold 2010) is the ethical side of this approach. Here my ques-
tions are: who decides what is to be erased, reused and transformed? 
Who decides what is to be demolished in order to build new heritage? 
To what extent can transformation and destruction be creative? Should 
heritage still be transformed, even if it is destructive for people?
This brings us to Harvey’s points on ‘whose rights and whose city?’ 
What is the outcome of destruction of public space, or its transforma-
tion? In this case we ask: what is the outcome of destruction and trans-
formation of built heritage? Is it creative or destructive? Harvey argues 
for the cases of urban spaces, declaring that ‘they are usually both: the 
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city historical site of creative destruction’ (Harvey 2007). This is not dif-
ferent in the context of heritage, as can be seen from many heritage sites. 
Surely the city and city heritage or public space is more complex; they 
have many different claimants or stakeholders and are always contested 
(Mitchell 2003, 4).
Although material culture should be considered as progressive 
cultural production, open to transformation, I argue that this process 
should be managed at the grass-roots level and decided from the bottom 
up. The case of Gezi Park clearly demonstrates that top-down decisions 
to transform public space using a neoliberal and authoritarian approach 
are destructive rather than creative. However, space and heritage can 
be transformed – and new meanings and memories can be developed in 
a positive way – through the actions of ordinary people who have the 
right to claim the space and heritage, as the Gezi Park protest and occu-
pation also demonstrated. Here protests and occupation have shown a 
path towards ethical transformation of space and heritage, attaching 
new meanings and memories to the public space and heritage of Taksim 
Square and Gezi Park for future generations. Furthermore, what the 
Gezi Park protests and occupation also demonstrate is that if attempts 
at change, transformation and reconstruction are imposed on the public 
destructively and from the top down, neglecting people’s demands leads 
to their reclamation of space through resistance to protect values, mean-
ings, memories and identities.
Discourses of resilience in the reclaiming of public space
In many parts of the world implementation of neoliberal policies have 
made cities places of social and economic conflict (Hammami and Uzer 
2018). Istanbul as a whole is an example of the process of urban growth 
and gentrification, the impact of which can be seen in the consequences 
of displacement and inequality. These urban public spaces have been 
built on social experiences. They are therefore closely associated with 
the lived experiences (Lefebvre 1991) of the individuals and groups who 
develop memories there and attach values and meanings to them. Devel-
opment and gentrification thus heavily impact on identity formation. As 
Lefebvre points out:
These form part of the social imaginary of ‘inhabitants and users’ of 
space through which complex symbols are linked to non- hegemonic 
forms of creative practice and social resistance. 
(Lefebvre 1991)
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Although Taksim Square and Gezi Park have different claimants and 
stakeholders, as they have different meanings and representations for 
different people, the diverse participants in the demonstrations prove 
that public space has great significance for people, even if from differ-
ent backgrounds. The demonstrations and occupation were politically 
diverse, with both left and right wing, secular and conservative, majority 
and minority ethnic groups attending. In addition, the protests were also 
demographically diverse, with participation of different age and gender 
groups (Baydar 2014).1
Such diversity of protest participants emphasises the significance 
of urban public spaces for people – something not only linked to political 
meanings and heritage. The diverse structure of the protests showed that 
rights over urban public spaces should be equally divided between the 
state and the people for social justice to flourish (Harvey 2009). Having 
pointed out that the main reason for resisting through demonstrations 
and occupation was to protest at top-down decisions and an authoritar-
ian approach, the question still remains: ‘what were the embedded dis-
courses of resistance from a public space and heritage perspective?’
In his concept of a ‘right to the city’, Harvey emphasises that peo-
ple cannot easily leave their desires, social relationships, values, nature 
and lifestyles (Harvey 2009, 315). In this framing, the right to the city is 
not about access; it rather affirms its people’s right to change themselves 
for the better by changing their environment and public space. I argue 
that these five aspects – social relationships, values, nature, lifestyle and 
rights – were the embedded reasons for the participation of so many peo-
ple in resistance at Gezi Park; they are both crucial for protecting public 
space for heritage-making and also represent basic human rights, highly 
correlated and interlinked.
Social relationships established between individuals and groups 
within one or more communities – communities here defined as being 
divided across certain boundaries (for example, economic, political 
and ethnic) from each other (Cohen 1985) – create social values. Social 
values are obviously complex, subjective and difficult to define as they 
differ across communities. However, they are mostly related to identity, 
attachment and a sense of belonging (Jones 2017; Byrne et al. 2003). 
In heritage studies, heritage has been widely discussed as a social pro-
cess, implying a process of social production by individuals and groups 
through social interactions with one another. Within this process, public 
space is without doubt the most important location for heritage-making. 
This particularly applies to common or public space where people social-
ise and interact.
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Interaction and socialising provides ground for social production, 
such as the creation of memory and identity that shapes everyday life. 
From their construction, the public spaces of Taksim Square, Gezi Park 
and the Ataturk Cultural Centre have been significant places for social 
interaction, establishing social relationships and, most importantly, con-
structing memories of personal significance for members of the public. 
As the diversity of communities involved in resistance to changing these 
spaces proves, these locations have a large role to play in reconciliation 
and peace-building between groups and communities from different 
backgrounds. While heritage can be a divisive element within society, 
the various demographics, ethnicities and economic standing of partici-
pants in the resistance to the demolition of Gezi Park showed that these 
places are valued and have meanings for many groups from different 
backgrounds.
The impact on the physical environment must also be considered. It 
is often acknowledged that the environment has a large impact on iden-
tity construction and plays a role in developing memories (see Clayton 
and Opotow 2003). This acknowledgement mostly focuses on the land-
scape and natural environment. However, Gezi Park, as the only green 
space in Taksim Square, has long been considered part of the area’s natu-
ral environment by the public.
A further consideration is that Taksim Square and its surrounding 
area is one of the busiest parts of Istanbul for social life; people attend 
bars, pubs and night clubs here and it is popular with tourists. The devel-
opment of a shopping mall in a reconstructed Ottoman barracks would 
not only have destroyed public space, but was also going to destroy peo-
ple’s ability to enjoy this kind of lifestyle. Article 8 of the Human Rights 
Act clearly explains that ‘everybody has the right to live their private 
life without government interference’. This is unquestionably one of the 
basic human rights. According to a poll conducted during the demon-
strations by Bilgi University, over 91 per cent of the protestors attending 
demonstrations included in their reasons for participating the breach of 
their democratic rights2 by the government’s authoritarian approach.
As a whole, social relationships and value, nature and lifestyle are 
the main foundation for identity, memory and a sense of belonging. They 
serve as tools for community survival. These aspects are also features of 
the basic human rights for every individual, group and community, giving 
them the right to protect and preserve them if necessary. Therefore her-
itage and space are closely interlinked with human rights (see Silverman 
and Ruggles 2007), and can be a positive force to overcome injustice cre-
ated by  powerful elites.
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Conclusion: right to change and transform
In his substantial book Social Justice and the City, David Harvey demon-
strates the strong relationship between human rights, social justice and 
the city and heritage. He emphasises that rights in the city are not only 
about the freedom of individuals to access resources but also, and most 
importantly, about their having the right to change the city by themselves. 
He goes on to say that this process, the transformation of resources, is 
not about the individuals; it is part of an exercise of collective power to 
reshape resources (Harvey 2009, 315). Gezi Park has become one of 
the great examples of resistance against authoritarian approaches and 
top-down decisions that aim to transform and destroy public space and 
heritage. However, while the importance of heritage has been discussed 
widely from the perspective of identity, memory and a sense of belong-
ing, the question of ‘who has the right to change and transform heritage?’ 
and its corollary, ‘what is the ethical way of achieving this?’, have not 
received sufficient attention.
Using, constructing and reconstructing cultural resources is such a 
complicated area that it is a nearly paradoxical concept. Harvey suggests 
that the right of exercising cultural resources should be led by the public, 
as it is a source of collective power. What I argue here is that, one way 
or another, the vital issues of how to consume cultural resources, and of 
how to change and transform cultural heritage and public space, must 
be led by the public concerned. The people should have priority in devel-
oping, changing and transforming cultural heritage. Giving the right to 
change and transform heritage to people can in fact make heritage more 
sustainable for future generations – rather than erring too much on the 
preservationist side, which can prohibit growth.
In the case of Gezi Park heritage, transformation and change have 
actually never ceased since it was established. New meanings were added 
and new memories developed, with the area providing a resource for dif-
ferent identity constructions for over a century. Change and transforma-
tion is surely inevitable for heritage, as Holtorf has suggested (Holtorf 
2018). Gezi Park and other heritage sites and public spaces will continue 
to change; they will gain new meanings and new memories as people 
ascribe them. However, in heritage studies, we need to focus on the eth-
ical sides of the transformation and change process of heritage rather 
than its conclusion, and to discuss how this process can be made more 
ethical, bottom-up and essentially more democratic.
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Amnesia by design: building and 
rebuilding in a Mediterranean small 
island-state
Reuben Grima
The Republic of Malta is a small island-state in the central Mediterra-
nean, 90 km south of Sicily. Three basic characteristics define the con-
ditions that make it an interesting case of contestation over space, place, 
heritage and memory. First, it is an extremely small country, with a land 
area of 316 sq. km, mostly accounted for by the two main islands of Malta 
and Gozo. Second, the islands have been inhabited for most of the past 
eight millennia, resulting in a rich archaeological and architectural patri-
mony across the archipelago. Third, Malta’s population is currently esti-
mated at around half a million inhabitants, making it one of the most 
densely populated territories on Earth. Taken together, these three fac-
tors have resulted in a situation where space and land use are hotly con-
tested issues and where, inevitably, the protection of cultural heritage is 
also under severe pressures and bitterly contested.
This chapter is divided into three parts. It will first trace the evo-
lution of some key developments leading up to the situation today. The 
present-day pressures that the construction industry is creating on cul-
tural heritage, how these are being managed and the consequences for 
the historic environment are then examined. Some of the underlying 
dynamics, discourses and other factors that are determining decisions 
today are then discussed.
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A brief genesis of contestation of place, heritage 
and memory in Malta
The presence of deep natural harbours, combined with the islands’ posi-
tion between the eastern and western basins of the Mediterranean, have 
given the islands a strategic value out of proportion to their miniscule 
size. Fleets and garrisons of different powers have been stationed here, in 
turn creating a demand for more services. One consequence has been the 
growth of the population, whose food requirements have long since out-
stripped the archipelago’s productive capacity; dependence on imported 
staples, such as grain from Sicily, is well documented at least since the 
fifteenth century. Over the past two centuries Malta’s population has wit-
nessed an exponential growth, roughly doubling every hundred years. 
Standing at c.100,000 in the late eighteenth century, it was past 200,000 
by 1900; a century later, at the turn of the millennium, it was well over 
400,000 (Cassar 2000, 33). During the second decade of the twenty-first 
century the archipelago has witnessed one of the most rapid surges in 
population in its history, mostly driven by immigration. Official figures 
put the population in 2017 at 475,000 (National Statistics Office 2018), 
but the actual figure may be higher.
In parallel with the increase in population, the archipelago has also 
witnessed an exponential increase in built-up areas. Since attaining inde-
pendence from Britain in 1964, a succession of building booms has made 
Malta one of the most densely built-up countries on Earth. According 
to one source, ‘between 1956 and 1997, the percentage of built-up area 
on the Maltese Islands increased from 4% to 22% of the total land area’ 
(Ministry for the Environment 2001). In recent years, a renewed building 
boom has continued this trend. By 2015, 23.7 per cent of Malta’s land 
area was under artificial cover, by far the highest proportion in all the 
countries of the European Union, for which the average is 4.2 per cent 
(Eurostat 2018). Far from abating, this trend has become more acute. In 
2015 alone, the number of permits registered an increase of 34 per cent 
with respect to the previous year, far outstripping the rate of increase in 
the rest of the European Union (National Statistics Office 2016, 80–2). At 
time of writing, in 2019, an unprecedented number of major infrastruc-
tural projects, aimed at creating high-rise blocks of luxury apartments 
that promise lucrative profits, are being planned and executed.
Against this backdrop, the protection of architectural and archaeo-
logical resources, and of the cultural landscape more generally, has had 
a slow-moving and painful history. During the period of British colonial 
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administration (1800–1964), the first legislation to protect architectural 
and archaeological monuments came only in 1910, after decades of com-
plaints that the patrimony of the archipelago was being neglected and 
irretrievably damaged (Mallia 1985, Bugeja 2011, Grima 2011). The fact 
that the protection of cultural heritage was enforced under the aegis of 
a foreign power helped to instil the perception among some sectors of 
the local population that heritage was fundamentally an alien interest. 
Oft-repeated cautionary tales of forced expropriation when archaeologi-
cal discoveries were made during building works appear to have entered 
popular consciousness during the course of the twentieth century – rein-
forcing the attitude that such discoveries on one’s property were bad 
news and an excuse for unwarranted interference by the state. Stories 
abound of discoveries that were left unreported and quickly destroyed 
or reburied, particularly during the second half of the twentieth century.
The advent of independence and the end of the British colonial 
administration in 1964 saw no sudden change in these deeply-rooted 
attitudes. In many ways, the new national administration found itself 
inheriting and stepping into the shoes of the British administrators. The 
protection of cultural heritage was to prove no exception. The same prag-
matic resentment of any measures to protect architectural or archaeo-
logical heritage on one’s property persisted as part of the post-colonial 
popular mindset. An amoral familism not dissimilar to that observed 
and described by Herzveld in the historic urban centre of Rethimno on 
Crete (Herzveld 1991) is also evident in Malta. In Rethimno, Herzveld 
describes how unauthorised works on historic buildings would be under-
taken overnight to delay or avoid detection and enforcement, a manoeu-
vre not unknown in the Maltese context. In both contexts, regulations 
to safeguard the historic fabric have been widely perceived as a burden 
imposed by alien interests.
Against the above backdrop, successive governments in the fledg-
ling state have found themselves threading a tightrope between dem-
agoguery and appeasement on the one hand, and efforts to establish a 
planning, protection and enforcement system adequate to the immense 
challenges of sustainable development of such a densely inhabited and 
densely built territory on the other. One important milestone in 1992 
was the Planning Development Act; this consolidated and updated plan-
ning legislation with the aim of regulating land use and better protecting 
the cultural and natural landscape. The same year, the Council of Europe 
Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage, also known 
as the Valletta Convention, was launched during a meeting in Malta.
 AMNESIA BY DESIGN 101
Less than a decade later, Malta was to witness one of the darkest 
moments in the history of the management of its heritage. In April 2001 
a serious case of vandalism on the prehistoric megalithic monument of 
Mnajdra provoked national outrage. Thousands of citizens joined a pro-
test march in Valletta in an unprecedented and forceful show of popular 
concern about Malta’s cultural heritage. In 2002 the 1925 Antiquities 
Protection Act was finally replaced by a new Cultural Heritage Act, which 
created distinct bodies for the protection of cultural heritage and for 
the management of public museums and monuments. Hopes ran high 
that the protection of cultural resources and the cultural landscape in 
Malta had entered a new chapter of increased public awareness and more 
responsible stewardship. This optimism was further reinforced by Malta’s 
accession to the European Union on 1 May 2004.
The same decade witnessed a series of landmark decisions on 
major projects to commercialise large tracts of some of the most scenic 
landscapes in Malta and Gozo. Between 2002 and 2004 three separate 
proposals for golf courses were put forward, two on Malta and one on 
Gozo. Each of these met with sustained, widespread and well-organised 
protests by NGOs and civil society, encouraged by the stricter environ-
mental protection regulation that Malta was now expected to follow as 
a member of the European Union. The final outcome was that by 2007 
each one of the proposals was either refused permission or withdrawn, 
as reported by the press at the time (‘MEPA throws out Rabat golf course 
proposal’, Times of Malta, 10 September 2004; ‘EU wants more protection 
for Ta’ Ċenċ’, Times of Malta, 30 August 2006; ‘Nature park instead of golf 
course’, Times of Malta, 13 May 2007).
In two cases, the landscapes in question were accorded an improved 
protection status. Another major proposal put forward during the same 
period was for a coastal marina at Ħondoq ir-Rummien, Gozo. A pro-
longed campaign of public protest lasting more than a decade led to the 
refusal of planning permission in 2013 (‘Tribunal rejects latest Ħondoq 
plan’, Times of Malta, 3 May 2013).
Other key decisions taken during the same period gave less reason 
for optimism. In 2006 the painstaking efforts of the previous two decades 
to contain the sprawl of construction activity suffered a major reversal 
when, under the guise of a rationalisation exercise (a misnomer if ever 
there was one), the boundaries of the areas where building was allowed 
were extended by 86 hectares – even though there were still over 300 
hectares (3 sq. km) of unbuilt land within the development zone bound-
aries (SPED 2015, 9).
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The global crash of 2008 appears to have slowed down construc-
tion activity. It became less lucrative as the prices of property in other 
European countries took a dive, while construction expenses increased 
as a result of the rising price of oil and steel. Five years later, however, 
the global economic recovery had set the stage for a renewed building 
frenzy on Malta.
The perfect storm
Since 2013 a combination of global and local factors has brought about 
one of the most intense, rapid and destructive chapters in the long history 
of Malta’s cultural landscape. A new government was voted in. Although 
nominally left-wing, it has turned out to be the most laissez-faire, neo-
liberal government that Malta has ever had, ruthlessly prioritising free- 
market capitalism above any other consideration. Riding on the wave of 
a global economic recovery, it launched a series of incentives to attract 
foreign businesses and investors. At the heart of these incentives was the 
attraction of investment in real estate. Demand for property was boosted 
by firms setting up their offices in Malta, particularly in the gaming sec-
tor. Thousands of employees and their families relocated to Malta in a 
short space of time, resulting in one of the most rapid surges in popula-
tion in the islands’ history.
A lucrative scheme to sell Maltese passports to wealthy individuals 
keen on obtaining a European Union passport was introduced in 2014. 
It artificially added to existing pressures on the availability of property 
because of the condition that all prospective passport buyers are required 
to ‘… lease property in Malta for a minimum value of €16,000 per 
annum, or purchase property for a minimum value of €350,000’ (Malta 
Individual Investment Programme Agency n.d.). A related concern is the 
risk that the purchase of expensive properties in Malta may also serve as 
a vehicle for money-laundering on an international level.
In parallel with the policies that, as noted above, are pushing up the 
demand for more properties, there have also been a series of measures 
aimed at reducing the regulation and control of the construction indus-
try. In Malta the construction industry is an extremely powerful lobby, 
with the resources to fund political parties, and consequently to influ-
ence their policies when returned to power. Since 2013 the dismantling 
of planning control has been openly embraced by government, and even 
flaunted as a positive, ‘pro-business’ measure. Planning procedures and 
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the planning regulatory framework have been considerably diluted. In 
2014 a new ‘floor-area ratio policy’ (FAR) to encourage high-rise build-
ings came into effect. Parts of the document were not subjected to proper 
public scrutiny before the policy came into force. The Structure Plan that 
had guided land use planning since the early 1990s was replaced in 2015 
by a rather flimsier ‘Strategic Plan for Environment and Development’ 
(SPED 2015). In 2016 new Development Planning Regulations stream-
lined the planning permit procedure by reducing the time allowed for 
consultation and evaluation before issuing a permit (Legal Notice 162 
of 2016).
The factors outlined above are shaping supply and demand for real 
estate, to create a mutually reinforcing loop. Policies pushing up demand 
for property have also pushed up the price of real estate, making it more 
lucrative for the building industry to meet this demand. The more lax 
approach to planning control is also facilitating the ever-increasing 
tempo of this vicious circle. The preservation of the historic environment 
is caught in a pincer between these two forces, and has suffered a succes-
sion of mutilations which were hardly imaginable only a decade previ-
ously. The full impact of this dangerous cocktail of policies is becoming 
increasingly evident, as more applications for building works are sub-
mitted and, more often than not, approved. Ironically, this activity is not 
required to create employment for the local population. On the contrary: 
the building industry is experiencing a shortage of skilled labour, which 
is being addressed by a large immigrant workforce, which in turn is mak-
ing further demands on the property market. Nor is this building activity 
necessitated by the housing needs of the existing population. Many prop-
erties are being traded as a form of investment, often owned by foreign-
ers who only use them for a short period of the year.
The main motivation, the gain resulting from this building frenzy, 
is the quick financial gain made by property speculators and building 
contractors. It is not simply a motivation, but a driving force that is dic-
tating government policy. At the heart of this crisis is the fact that the 
government has openly declared that it should not and cannot interfere 
with market forces, but should let itself be driven by them. This position 
is largely rhetorical because the present situation is evidently the result, 
arguably even the purpose, of the policies that have been outlined.
The unprecedented scale and speed of the construction activity is 
engulfing more and more neighbourhoods, obliterating historic land-
marks and transforming neighbourhoods beyond recognition. Since 
2018 mounting concerns about the irreversible impacts of this transfor-
mation have been voiced by a wide cross-section of NGOs, professional 
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bodies, industrialists and individuals. In April 2018 a public declara-
tion about the importance of safeguarding Malta’s historic environment 
was co-written and signed by no less than 22 organisations, including 
practically all the country’s heritage and environmental NGOs as well as 
the Chamber of Architects (‘NGOs plead for protection for the nation’s 
heritage in stone’, Times of Malta, 18 April 2018). In a reaction to such 
concerns, the Prime Minister memorably quipped that ‘there is no pause 
button in economics’. This was arguably a tacit admission that while poli-
cies had helped to engineer the growing crisis, there was no plan in place 
to slow this down or reverse it (‘Economy has no pause button – Muscat’, 
Times of Malta, 4 June 2018).
At the time of writing (October 2019), an ever-widening sector of 
society is becoming increasingly worried about the impacts and con-
sequences of this perfect storm of unbridled construction works. The 
social costs of the policies that have led to this situation have continued 
to become increasingly evident, and the negative impact on the quality 
of life of more people and more neighbourhoods increasingly clear. As a 
result, more voices than ever before are publicly voicing their alarm at the 
degradation of their built heritage and the quality of their environment, 
and at the rate that the landscape is being altered beyond recognition.
Public dissent has had mixed results. In November 2017, after years 
of protests by NGOs and local community groups, a government proposal 
to allow the building of a new university campus on one of the more 
pristine stretches of coastline at Żonqor was put on hold (‘AUM should 
not build Żonqor campus yet – Education Minister’, Times of Malta, 17 
November 2017).
In March 2018, after a campaign lasting several months was led by a 
local heritage NGO, the government decided to drop plans for the exten-
sion of an industrial estate on agricultural land in the limits of the village 
of Żejtun (‘Wirt iż-Żejtun heartened by government’s Bulebel assurance’, 
Times of Malta, 7 March 2018). In May, almost two years after planning 
permission had been granted for the Townsquare skyscraper, the permit 
was annulled as a result of an appeal championed by cultural heritage 
NGOs (‘Townsquare back to square one – Tribunal sends plans back to 
the PA’, Times of Malta, 3 May 2018). The skyscraper would have had a 
severe visual impact on the World Heritage City of Valletta. Following the 
annulment, project proposals were revised to reduce the height of the 
skyscraper, in a fresh attempt to obtain a building permit.
An even more gargantuan mega project has been proposed for the 
coastal area between Saint George’s Bay and Pembroke, on Malta’s north-
east shore. Incorporating a hotel, retail space and luxury apartments, the 
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project entails the dismantling or destruction of a series of nineteenth- 
and early twentieth-century historic buildings, including the earliest 
examples of British military barracks surviving in Malta, dating from 
around 1860. The proposal mobilised public protests and formal objec-
tions on an unprecedented scale. Concerns were voiced by many opinion 
leaders, from across the political spectrum. In September 2018, notwith-
standing the objections received from a record 4,000 individuals and 
organisations, the Planning Authority Board voted to grant permission.
The decision to grant permission for the mega project in Saint 
George’s Bay unleashed a fresh wave of public outrage. A number of char-
acteristics of this project, and of the reactions it has provoked, suggest that 
it may represent a new watershed in the galvanisation of public opinion 
and resistance. Apart from its enormous impact on historic landmarks 
and on the character of the bay, the project would, if realised, severely 
impact the quality of life in the nearby residential neighbourhoods. A 
large swathe of these would be permanently cast into the shadow of the 
proposed buildings. Traffic impact, congestion and increased pollution 
are also areas of major concern. The impacts on the historic environment 
were therefore inseparable from the impacts on the quality of life of the 
residential community.
The net result was that objectors have not been limited to NGOs and 
isolated individuals, as had often been the case in other instances. Here, 
instead, an entire community has been mobilised, while politicians from 
the whole range of political persuasions have spoken out against the pro-
ject, and against how the decision to approve it was reached. The sheer 
scale of the project has made the impacts it would have more evident, 
and more readily appreciable by the general public. As a result, the dis-
course used in objections and protests has also undergone an interesting 
shift. References to equity, social justice and solar rights have become 
increasingly prevalent, the most memorable being ‘tidfnuniex ħajjin’ [‘do 
not bury us alive’]. An appeal against this planning decision was jointly 
lodged by a number of individuals and NGOs (‘Protesters make another 
attempt to stop db Group project’, Times of Malta, 2 November 2018). The 
decision to grant planning permission was upheld in the initial appeal 
process. The protesting NGOs and citizen groups then took the matter 
to court, where a landmark ruling annulled the planning permit in June 
2019 (‘db Group project permit cancelled in “huge” court decision’, Times 
of Malta, 19 June 2019).
Another monster project which began to dominate public debate 
in 2018 was the proposal of a tunnel some 13 km long. It would run 
beneath the seabed to connect the main island of the archipelago, Malta, 
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to the second island, Gozo, which has a population of c.30,000 (‘Public 
calls for Malta-Gozo tunnel works being prepared’, Times of Malta, 7 
November 2018). The proposal is being presented by the government of 
the country as a fait-accompli to which it is already committed, in spite 
of widespread concerns about its economic viability and environmen-
tal impact – even doubts about whether it is the most effective solution 
to improve connectivity to the main island for the population of Gozo. 
Other issues are involved too. As an EU member state, Malta is bound to 
respect the European Union’s Strategic Environment Assessment (SEA) 
Directive, which requires states to ensure that major planning strategy 
and policy decisions are subjected to an impact assessment of the var-
ious alternatives that may be available. No such SEA was made public 
before the declarations by government that it was committed to the pro-
ject going ahead.
Discussion: amnesia by design
The policy changes and planning decisions considered above have caused 
a drastic transformation of Malta’s landscapes and are eroding the quali-
ties of the historic built environment. Some of the underlying discourses 
and dynamics that have made this transformation possible deserve closer 
scrutiny.
The first point to note is the manner in which measures to encour-
age the construction boom are being justified, and even vaunted, by 
deploying a rhetoric of progress and economic improvement. The wide-
spread use of the blanket term ‘development’ to refer to all construction 
activity obfuscates the issue, by making no distinction between building 
interventions that improve the quality of life of the people impacted and 
building interventions that fail to do so. On closer scrutiny, the claims of 
progress and economic improvement do not appear to be well substanti-
ated. As already noted, these projects cannot be justified by any need to 
generate employment, because current labour requirements in the con-
struction industry and in the hospitality sector already far exceed what 
the locally available workforce can provide. The type of infrastructure 
that is being created, and the contribution that it will make to the coun-
try’s future wellbeing, also raise questions. It consists largely of luxurious 
apartments and hotels, driven by private entrepreneurship and specula-
tion. State-driven social housing and affordable housing projects, mean-
while, have proceeded at a much slower rate. A further concern is that 
the cost of public assets – such as open spaces and historic streetscapes, 
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which are being degraded or obliterated to make way for new build-
ings – is not being quantified and accounted for. The loss of these non- 
renewable resources is divesting present and future generations of some 
of the country’s scarcest assets. From a long-term economic perspective, 
it represents a permanent impoverishment of present and future citizens 
and of their quality of life.
In light of the above considerations, the prevailing rhetoric that unre-
strained construction activity leads to economic improvement appears 
highly questionable. Huge profits are evidently being made by private 
individuals investing in speculative property ‘developments’, often aided 
and abetted by grants of public land at prices widely considered to be a 
fraction of its actual market value. However, this private accumulation of 
wealth is happening at the price of permanently stripping away irreplace-
able public assets, and an incremental public impoverishment.
A second key point is that, in the context under discussion, the ero-
sion of the historic environment is not the result of any deliberate strat-
egy to erase the memory of the past; it is rather a side effect of the model 
of economic progress outlined above. In the rhetoric of this paradigm 
of economic progress, the loss of elements of the historic environment, 
at the successive scales of individual buildings, historic centres and the 
wider cultural landscape, is the necessary price that must be paid for that 
progress to happen. This line of reasoning is also embedded in popular 
discourse and is widely accepted as pragmatic and sensible; concerns 
about the preservation of the historic environment, particularly in urban 
contexts, are dismissed as unrealistic nostalgia, which may stand in the 
way of economic progress.
The erasure of different elements of Malta’s historic cultural land-
scapes has progressed steadily during successive building booms since 
independence. As already noted, during the first decade of the new mil-
lennium, proposals for four major projects that were going to degrade 
large areas of some of the country’s most scenic landscapes were thwarted 
by national public outrage. At the same time, however, demolition and 
building activity in and around the historic urban cores did not provoke 
any comparably widespread or consistent popular outrage. Such activity 
had more often been met by token resistance from NGOs, widely held to 
represent a minority fringe opinion. The preponderant public sentiment 
was more often resignation or even apathy in the face of these necessary 
changes. The resulting erosion of historic urban landscapes and of the 
accumulation of memories associated with those places has been a form 
of elective amnesia, in which the majority of the population has been a 
consenting and even active accomplice.
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The instances during the first decade of the millennium, when 
public protest was widespread, sustained and organised enough to halt 
a proposed construction project, considered earlier, were concerned 
with relatively pristine areas, widely cherished for their rural and nat-
ural beauty. A number of distinctions may be drawn between the pro-
test movements that preceded the 2008 global economic crisis, which 
brought about a brief interlude in such pressures, and the public reac-
tions that have been witnessed in the second decade of the millennium. 
As already noted, the scale and intensity of building activity in recent 
years has been unprecedented. These new pressures are also changing 
the anatomy of the citizen protest movement in Malta. At the heart of 
this change is the growing realisation that what is at stake is not just a 
notion of ‘heritage’ or ‘landscape’ which needed to be safeguarded for 
public enjoyment and leisure. What is at stake now is the very liveability 
of the daily environments in which most people spend most of their time 
on a regular basis. The result has been a significant shift in the readiness 
of citizens to engage with environmental issues, and with the planning 
process itself. This brings us to another key point: the growing realisa-
tion among members of the public that proper care of the historic envi-
ronment is inseparable from the responsible stewardship of the places 
they inhabit, and consequently inseparable from their quality of life. 
As argued by Baldwin and King, planning can only succeed in creating 
sustainable environments that respect quality of life if it is informed by 
 community-based values (Baldwin and King 2018).
The close relationship between the safeguarding of a historic environ-
ment and the quality of life of the people who inhabit it is a central tenet of 
two Council of Europe conventions. The European Landscape Convention 
(Florence 2000) and the Council of Europe Framework Convention on 
the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society (Faro 2005) both spell out 
that the foremost reason why cultural heritage and landscapes matter is 
because they affect the quality of people’s lives. The European Landscape 
Convention explicitly embraces ordinary and degraded landscapes in its 
scope, as well as outstanding or pristine landscapes. Places matter, because 
people live there. The centrality of the citizen is further underlined in the 
Faro Convention, which declares that the right to enjoy cultural heritage is 
a fundamental human right. Although at time of writing neither of these 
conventions have been ratified by Malta, they are nonetheless extremely 
relevant to the contestations being played out over Malta’s landscapes.
Public attitudes to the historic built environment in Malta are shift-
ing in ways that reflect the new paradigm encapsulated in these two 
conventions, as demonstrated by a recent study (Sausmekat 2018). The 
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protection of historic buildings and landscapes has moved from being 
the preserve of idealistic individuals and NGOs to become a much more 
mainstream concern. The daily reality of demolition and replacement of 
elements of the historic built fabric has been a grim and unforgiving edu-
cation for the entire public, which has been brought face to face with the 
practical consequences of these transformations of their living environ-
ment. Practical experience is repeatedly showing that negligence of the 
historic built fabric often goes hand in hand with a neglect of the needs 
and wishes of local communities. On the other hand, careful stewardship 
of the historic values of a place is integral to the holistic care of places to 
improve the quality of the lives of the people who inhabit them.
With this spreading realisation, the environmental issues that mem-
bers of the public are engaging with are changing, and so is the discourse 
that they are using. This was very evident in the build-up to the decision 
to grant planning permission for the mega-complex at Saint George’s 
Bay in September 2018, and in its aftermath. The local press was awash 
with reports, opinion pieces, individual letters to the press and online 
comments. They combined to express outrage and concern at the loss of 
the historic character, features and fabric as part and parcel of the wider 
impacts on the quality of life of the surrounding neighbourhoods.
Conclusion
Malta today may be at a watershed moment. The mantra that an unfet-
tered building industry is the key to securing the country’s economic 
wellbeing, which was until recently tacitly accepted by a large part of the 
Maltese public, is at the time of writing being questioned more critically 
and more widely than ever before. The growing realisation that it is only 
making rich people richer, at the cost of public impoverishment in terms 
of quality of life, is becoming a stark reality for more and more people 
impacted by the scale and ferocity of the changes being wrought by the 
construction boom. There is also a growing realisation that the loss of 
public assets and quality of life is much more permanent than any bene-
fits spilling over from the construction boom, and that the decisions being 
taken today will have serious negative impacts on the next generation.
By the last quarter of 2018, a new factor that entered the equation 
was the concern expressed in various quarters of the building industry 
that the sheer amount of new property being built could end up flooding 
the market. The result might be a glut of property that could not be sold. 
Such market forces are likely to play a part in slowing the current rate of 
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construction, but not in time to prevent the ongoing degradation of the 
historic environment.
Concerns about the range of negative impacts on health being 
caused by these changes are also becoming more widespread. The 
requirement for Health Impact Assessment for major projects has gen-
erally been brushed aside in recent years. However, isolated voices have 
continued to raise concerns about the negative impacts that these fast 
changes may have on the physiological, mental and psychological well-
being of resident communities.
As these realisations spread, so does the perception that caring for 
the features and fabric of the historic built environment is not an exotic 
and inconvenient minority interest, but rather an essential pillar to good 
living, for present and future generations. The extent of the historic envi-
ronment that will be allowed to be lost in the coming years will depend 
on how quickly this shift in perceptions spreads, takes hold and galva-
nises public opinion.
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Vanishing heritage, materialising 
memory: construction, destruction 
and social action in contemporary 
Madrid
Jaime Almansa-Sánchez and Nekbet Corpas-Cívicos
These lieux de mémoire are fundamentally remains, the ultimate 
embodiments of a memorial consciousness that has barely survived 
in a historical age that calls out for memory because it has aban-
doned it. 
(Nora 1989, 12)
This chapter is not a defence of neocapitalism and its effects on archaeol-
ogy and heritage. However, it reflects on the results of this model and its 
consequences for the construction of new memories and realities. Within 
a context of constant change, development has become one of the main 
characteristics of recent years. The destruction of the built environment 
in late modernity has been recognised as closely related to the loss of 
memory within our society (Connerton 2009). Meanwhile the reactions 
to the destruction of archaeological heritage argue for creating these 
lieux de mémoire (Nora 1989) in Madrid as a form of memory materiali-
sation within a clear context of destruction.
Much has been written about commercial archaeology and the 
loss of archaeological heritage (for example, Aparicio 2015; Gnecco and 
Schmidt Dias 2015). However, we begin with the question: what is the 
generative dimension of this destructive process? Although far from per-
fect, current (commercial) management models have saved some archae-
ological sites from destruction. And although we cannot assume that 
those sites were the most valuable, either for science or for the general 
public, both those sites saved and those destroyed constitute the basis for 
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the future construction of – at least – the official collective memories of 
regions and countries.
In considering this approach, this chapter tackles these issues from 
different perspectives. First, it explores the development of archaeologi-
cal heritage management in Madrid through its legislative development 
and some examples. Subsequently, it addresses two significant founda-
tions of archaeological heritage management: values and discourses. 
The chapter concludes with what we recognise as a positive turn in the 
understanding of the dynamics of archaeological heritage management, 
value and memory.
Archaeological heritage management in Madrid
Spain suffered a traumatic dictatorship since the uprising and conse-
quent Civil War of the 1930s. After years of isolation, the backing of 
the United States and the Stabilization Plan of 1959 led to an economic 
boom that eventually had tremendous consequences for archaeology. 
Urban and peri-urban spaces were deeply affected by new developments 
(industry, housing and infrastructure), which started the beginning of 
rescue archaeology in the 1960s (Rodríguez Temiño 2004).
The Law of Urban Planning of 1956, and associated instructions 
approved by many cities in the early 1960s (for example, Madrid in 1964), 
collided with a still working republican law, amended only by a decree 
of 1958 that allowed the administration to be aware of any works con-
ducted near registered monuments. Nevertheless, there was still a lack of 
resources and planning actually to record everything that appeared dur-
ing construction works and was not already registered under the 1958 
decree. Weeks before the death of dictator Francisco Franco in November 
1975, Spain ratified the London Convention of 1969, and the Transition 
to the new regime saw deep legal changes. A first draft in 1981 consid-
ered the regulation of urban archaeology (Fernández Miranda 1980), 
but the law finally passed in 1985, the LPHE (Ley 16/1985 de Patrimonio 
Histórico Español), set a different scenario. The State decentralised and 
autonomous competencies emerged, being the Culture ones for Madrid 
granted weeks before the approval of the LPHE. These fresh competen-
cies meant that the new law just passed had to be applied regionally, in 
a process where each region took a different path – although all led to a 
very similar destination (Querol 2010).
A new model for managing archaeological heritage in Madrid 
emerged in the late 1980s. This model, known as the Modelo Madrid, 
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sowed the seed of preventive archaeology (for example, Querol and 
Martínez Díaz 1996); it opened the door to commercial practice similar to 
the British model started by RESCUE (Rahtz 1974). Modelo Madrid was 
based on the identification of large archaeological areas, in which inter-
ventions should be conducted only when building work was taking place 
(Velasco 1992). Modelo Madrid was theoretically useful to enforce the 
law, but it led to a management model in which the regional government 
merely overviewed private intervention in an administrative manner.
Commercial archaeology grew rapidly after Spain joined the 
European Economic Community (as it was then named) in January 
1986. It subsequently adopted the basic principles of European policy, 
such as the Polluter pays principle and a wider attention to heritage in 
the planning process. This responded to the Council Directive 85/337/
EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and 
private projects on the environment. This in turn forced the approval of 
the Real Decreto Legislativo 1302/1986, de 28 de junio, de evaluación de 
impacto ambiental, which enforced the need for environmental impact 
assessments (including on cultural heritage) and opened the door to the 
implementation of the Polluter pays principle in Spain.
Some major construction works illustrate how the management 
model in Madrid evolved. During the 1990s the construction of a tunnel 
and an underground parking space in the centric Plaza de Oriente unveiled 
remains of the medieval city. The threat of destruction to these remains 
led to some protests and deep concern over the way in which the process 
was managed (for example, Caballero Zoreda 1996). Dozens of compre-
hensive interventions have affected the surrounding area over the last 30 
years, thus making the remains visible in many cases – whatever the con-
ditions – thanks to the social and professional impact of the events at Plaza 
de Oriente. Soon after this occurred, the construction of a new terminal 
for Barajas airport projected major archaeological works (Aena 1999). The 
media reported the biggest archaeological survey in Spain’s history, involv-
ing almost 12,000 pits and several excavations. There is no trace of the 
results of this survey in Barajas, nor in the collective memory of the capital.
However, it is possible that the biggest intervention in archaeolog-
ical heritage (mis)management started in the early 2000s. The terraces 
of the Manzanares river are one of the main protected archaeological 
areas in the region, and a series of tunnels crossing them were proposed. 
The developers decided to split up the project into small sectors to avoid 
obligations regarding environmental impact assessment – a dodge that 
resulted in sanctions from the European Court of Justice and the Superior 
Court of Madrid. The works did not stop, however, and hundreds of 
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archaeologists tirelessly recorded all sites affected. The investment in 
archaeology was unprecedented, but the outcome for society was not 
substantial. After a temporary exhibition of ten months duration, along 
with its catalogue (Rus and Domínguez 2008) and several scientific pub-
lications, all the archaeological work was plunged into oblivion until 
now. Meanwhile new underground lines (Trabada et al. 2006), or the 
so-called Túnel de la Risa (‘Tunnel of Laughter’) between Chamartín and 
Atocha stations, managed to commit vast sums of money to relocate and 
display archaeological remains, such as those on Ópera station or the one 
of El Buen Suceso in Sol, the centre of Madrid (Fig.7.1).
While those examples show the darker side of commercial archaeol-
ogy, they also resulted in the beginning of new interests such as Modern 
and Contemporary Archaeologies in Spain (Bengoetxea 2017: 66). 
Examples like Casas del Canal in 2000 (Morín de Pablos et al. 2002) set the 
starting point of a crucial period for the development of an archaeology of 
the Spanish Civil War. In this instance commercial archaeology has been 
key – not only in terms of research, but also of public outreach and policy 
shaping (with a new plan to document, study and protect all the remains of 
the period in Madrid, being heavily funded by the regional government).
Figure 7.1 Remains of El Buen Suceso in Sol train station. The outcome 
of the display is questionable, but the investment had no precedent in 
Madrid. Photograph © the authors. 
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The panorama remained mostly unchanged. Modelo Madrid was out 
of effect after many interventions in protected areas, and the new mod-
els of preventive archaeology fomented more flexibility. However, the 
reality was far from optimistic and the predation of developers appeared 
to have no limits. Madrid had approved its own regional heritage law in 
1998, under consensus, but had not included many advances in com-
parison to the national frame law. In 2011, following Spain’s ratification 
of the Valletta Convention, a professional association of archaeologists, 
AMTTA, posted several parliamentary questions regarding the law’s reg-
ulatory development. The written answer on 24 November stated that 
the law was sufficiently regulated and there was no need for further 
changes (PE 195/11 R 3049). This was ratified in a sectorial committee 
on 11 February 2012. Only 12 days later, however, the press office of the 
regional government announced an imminent new law whose draft was 
ready by the end of May. Why? Maybe the forces of neoliberalism.
The legal fight against this new law was fierce. Firstly, AMTTA made 
some amendments (AMTTA 2012) while different statements and news 
were released (for example, Ansede 2012; Querol 2012; Torija López 
2012). That summer AMTTA integrated into MCyP, a civic platform 
already fighting for many heritage sites in the region, and so pushed ahead 
the protest against the law (Fig.7.2). A working group of experts was set up 
Figure 7.2 During a protest against the new law and for the protection of 
cultural heritage in front of the main building of the regional government 
(2012). Photograph © the authors. 
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to advise on a sensible reform of the draft. Nonetheless, the majority of the 
government party in the regional parliament passed the law with minor 
amendments1 in June 2013 – contrary to the advice of their own legal team 
and over 6000 signatures from professionals opposed to it. Finally, after an 
appeal to the Constitutional court, 20 per cent of the law was suspended 
only a year after its approval. Today the new reform has been slowed down 
by the daily affairs of the current government, but the process has made 
several public – and professional – movements for the protection of cul-
tural heritage in the region more visible.
Do citizens dream of archaeological sites?
Considering that the destruction of archaeological remains occurred in 
the context of neoliberalism, one might wonder whether what is pro-
tected from economic ravage is a matter of public interest. Measuring the 
real impact of archaeology in society requires recurrent comprehensive 
sociological studies, which have yet to be done. Current surveys (rang-
ing from the classic work in the USA by Ramos and Duganne [2000] to 
other regional attempts such as the one by Castillo et al. [2016]) show 
a great deal of public concern about archaeological heritage and their 
values (European Commission 2017; Marx et al. 2017). Yet, looking at 
the data of the last survey on cultural habits in Spain (MCU 2019), only 
21.8 per cent of the population has visited an archaeological site in the 
period of the study; in the same time 45.3 per cent of the total population 
has visited a museum, with 22.5 per cent of them visiting archaeological 
museums. Maybe it is popular culture that moves the appeal to archaeol-
ogy (Holtorf 2005, 150), with the likes of Indiana Jones and Lara Croft 
inspiring the public.
Similarly, in the process of approval and appeal of the new her-
itage law in Madrid, media coverage was scarce. Public involvement 
was limited to MCyP members with few other colleagues, and only the 
political support of the opposition parties in the region seemed to legit-
imise the struggle (see Almansa-Sánchez 2017 for a larger analysis of 
these power/politics relations). Compared to other social movements 
fighting for better pensions, education or health in the last months, the 
real impact was low.
Although capable of lobbying governments and mobilising public 
opinion, associations are faced with several challenges. From a sociolog-
ical perspective, there are factors that influence people’s involvement in 
them. Financial means, educational attainment, time available or social 
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skills constrain or enable participation (Van Ingen and Van der Meer 
2011). Additionally, studies of associative patterns in Spain indicate that 
middle-aged and pre-retired people are the largest groups involved, while 
the number of younger people tends to be lower (Ariño 2007, 270). One 
could thus reasonably question the representativeness of associations to 
reflect public values regarding cultural heritage.
Value is a core concept in archaeological heritage management. In 
his classic book Valuing Ancient Things, Carman explored how archae-
ological heritage was managed, including the conformation of its so- 
understood intrinsic value (Carman 1996). Drawing on Thomson’s 
Rubbish Theory, in which the way that rubbish is treated defines its invisi-
bility or its recognition (Thomson 1979), Carman analyses the process of 
designation and protection by means of law. Heritage laws accord public 
value to ancient remains, thus removing them from the sphere of ordi-
nary objects and the rules affecting these objects (for example, market 
laws) – at least in theory. Simply put, then, our decisions and interven-
tions on elements of the past (for example, through law designation) 
very much affect their social valuation, and may set new ways of under-
standing and valuing them in motion. However, it should be stressed that 
the values that are publicly created and sanctioned through this process 
do not exclude other possible readings and valuations. In fact, official 
recognition does not necessarily have any particular resonance in ordi-
nary people’s lives due to its top-down nature.
As we mention below regarding Madrid’s regional network of 
archaeological sites, the public does possess a genuine if vague interest 
in these sites. Arguably, however, intervention may be variously defined. 
Via raising questions about a specific site and carrying out research, 
archaeologists may attach a series of diverse values to the place under 
scrutiny (Carman 2011, 496). Following this thread, then, academic and 
professional archaeological interest in a site has contributed to shape 
some of its values.
The Plan de Yacimientos Visitables de la Comunidad de Madrid is a 
case in point of how, broadly speaking, decisions made on what should 
be cultural heritage and how to deal with it scarcely resonate with ordi-
nary people. This network, started in 2003 by the regional government, 
includes 21 sites already open and 17 still under analysis (Fig.7.3). Any 
new addition to the network is based on ‘scientific and technical crite-
ria’ in order to ‘provide the citizenry with elements for self-identification 
with their past and their territory’ (Comunidad de Madrid n.d.). But 
it also answers to a homogeneous territorial distribution in which the 
 different sub-regions must be represented.
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Figure 7.3 Distribution of archaeological sites in the Plan de 
Yacimientos Visitables. Source: Comunidad de Madrid. 
Nevertheless, the relationship of the public with these spaces is not 
assessed nor taken into account. Moreover, some of the activities to pro-
mote the sites are undertaken by an entirely different department (for 
example, the dramatised visits conducted by the tourism directorate). The 
Visigoth sites of Navalvillar and Navalahija provide scenarios of a com-
munity archaeology project originally conducted from a commercial unit 
(Equipo A de Arqueología). Local citizens had the opportunity to participate 
in the excavations (ABC 2012) and to become involved in a long-term rela-
tionship with the sites in a research project backed by the local council.
As much as this project, which can be understood as a pseudo 
bottom-up initiative, has been positive, other sites have been more 
controversial. For example, the Roman road of Galapagar was a target 
of the critiques made to the regional government for failing to protect 
the site correctly (García Flores 2017), although at the same time the 
project aims to serve as a catalyst for economic development within the 
region (Terc3ra Información 2017). As for the Spanish Civil War bunker 
Blockhaus 13, in Colmenar del Arroyo, questions were raised about the 
type of narratives promoted by the site. Was it supporting only one side 
of the war? Would it become a focus for militarism and war, rather than 
an opportunity to criticise past conflict and violence (Colectivo Utopía 
Contagiosa 2017)? While a huge economic effort has been made on the 
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archaeology of the Spanish Civil War and its enhancement, the regional 
government’s silence is of little help in addressing these public concerns. 
Management of the sites is also controversial, as problems of access and 
abandonment of the sites (not directly managed by the regional govern-
ment, but left to the local councils or private hands) are common. As 
mentioned, poor public involvement in this network of open archaeolog-
ical spaces highlights the low impact that some interventions may have 
on the wider public consciousness.
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, for many people some of the 
best well-known archaeological sites of their town are, apparently, those 
affected by controversy (Castillo et al. 2016, 305). However, the value of 
all these sites is officially taken for granted, while only a few examples 
can be labelled as successful.
Chinese whispers
Critical Heritage Studies have until recently focused on analysing the dis-
courses of heritage experts. Although it is clear that we have witnessed 
the emergence of new approaches to Cultural Heritage exploring mate-
riality, performance, emotions and affects since Smith’s (2006) Author-
ised Heritage Discourse (AHD), it is clear that discourses are a significant 
part of research into heritage. They can be understood as ‘ways of rep-
resenting aspects of the world – the processes, relations and structures 
of the material world, the “mental world” of thoughts, feelings, beliefs 
and so forth, and the social world’ (Fairclough 2003, 124). Not only do 
they describe the world, but they also have a material impact upon it as 
they naturalise and create particular ways of understanding it. The idea 
of one single monolithic heritage discourse should be dismissed (Pen-
delbury 2013), yet the official discourses about cultural heritage have 
stressed the pre-eminence of experts in speaking for it. Furthermore, 
terms such as ‘cultural heritage’ are not even part of the general public’s 
way of speaking in some scenarios (Sánchez-Carretero 2012). In other 
non- rural areas, these discourses have been mobilised by non-experts 
to resist political decisions threatening the landscapes they live in (De 
Cesari and Herzfeld 2015), forming at least part of people’s vocabulary 
in contexts not threatened by development (Castillo et al. 2016, 299). 
We should turn now to consider the effects of archaeological heritage 
destruction at other levels.
The case of Alcalá de Henares, a World Heritage town close to 
Madrid, is quite significant. This town, along with many others located 
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alongside the Henares river, suffered an intense pressure of development 
over the 1960s and 1970s as part of the area’s industrialisation. The town 
grew in an uncontrolled way around the historic city centre. Many new 
residential areas associated with Alcalá’s industrialisation lacked adequate 
living infrastructure and standards (Vallhonrat and Rascón 2011, 12–13), 
although the city centre remained largely undisturbed by these changes. 
In 1998 this historic precinct and the university of Alcalá were inscribed in 
the World Heritage List as a first example of medieval urban planning and 
a university town (ICOMOS 1998). However, Alcalá is more than its city 
centre. Four archaeological sites lie outside the core protected area: the 
Roman villa of Complutum, the Roman villa of Val, the Visigoth necropolis 
of Camino de los Afligidos and the Calcolithic site of La Esgaravita. Only 
Complutum has been included within the regional network of open archae-
ological sites, yet all four archaeological sites have been subject to intense 
civic surveillance regarding their protection and care.
Complutum was discovered in the 1970s as the result of a series of 
construction works in one of the emerging quarters of the western part 
of Alcalá, designed to provide accommodation for the town’s industrial 
workers (Fernández-Galiano 1984). It could safely be said that the dis-
covery and works carried out in this archaeological site raised awareness 
of the relevance of protecting the town’s archaeological heritage (Castillo 
2012, 52), as described below. From 1972 to 1976 a series of Roman 
mosaics were unearthed. Their size and beauty meant that they were 
removed and sent to the National Archaeological Museum in Madrid. This 
archaeological intervention was organised by the central government 
(Almagro Basch 1974), as the works took place before the competencies 
were transferred and the LPHE passed (p. 112). Despite this discovery, 
the construction works still continued and most of the site was built over.
The area had long been significant for the local population. It con-
tained the place where, according to a local legend, two young shepherds – 
Los Santos Niños (‘the two sainted children’) – had been tortured to death 
due to their Christian faith. There was a visible Roman wall in the area, 
later identified as part of Complutum’s basilica (Fernández-Galiano 1984, 
270); it was believed by local people to be where the children had been 
bound and tortured. In the 1960s the owners of the land where the wall 
was standing decided to build a small church to house it (García Saldaña 
1986, 65–6) – a decision that finally protected the wall from destruction.
Due to the poor planning of the construction works, the local 
council decided in 1984 to buy this land to create a public park. Aware 
of the archaeological findings, they arranged for an assessment of the 
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archaeological potential of the area to be carried out, resulting in the iden-
tification of the remains as the town of Complutum. It was then decided 
that comprehensive archaeological campaigns should take place in the 
area, and an archaeological school was set up to excavate and restore the 
remains. At this point archaeological heritage was the responsibility of 
the regional government, a situation that changed the scope of events.
Considering these interventions, it is understandable that these 
archaeological works remained in the memory of the neighbours. They 
raised an awareness among local people that the rescue of these archae-
ological sites helped to foster. Some of them still remember the works 
and the associated discoveries, and recall how works were halted (albeit 
temporarily) whenever materials appeared:
There were many times when workers were digging trenches to 
introduce wirings … archaeologists were right there to monitor 
what was there, and all of this [area] is full of archaeology, actu-
ally even this [the point where we are right now] is full of archaeol-
ogy […] Many people have found things and have hidden them … 
Stones and columns were unearthed at the end of the street and of 
course the archaeologists were there waiting and if they saw a tile 
they stopped everything.
(Resident 1 of the residential area closest to Complutum in 
Alcalá, speaking in March 2017)
The new neighbours mobilised to defend Complutum and the materials 
unearthed on the site (see below). Some of them could recall how the 
landscape looked at that time:
Look, there was a construction work around here, in fact I have got 
some work done in my apartment block and we had to divert it a bit, 
but around here there were a pair of Roman conduits of the  sewerage 
system that converged here, they are beautiful, Roman, and the end 
of it is around there [pointing to the distance], close to the river and 
discharging waters to the river […] and between those three trees 
there was another conduit, they were wonderful […] even the sew-
erage system was beautiful … I saw them at the beginning because 
they [the archaeologists] carried out a lot of excavations and they 
were really interested because it was the beginning …
(Resident 2 of the residential area closest to Complutum in 
Alcalá, speaking in March 2017)
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It would be safe to say that people were – initially at least – influenced by all 
these changes, and the local council became increasingly sensitive to pro-
tecting archaeological heritage. In fact, as a result of the findings made in 
the area during the 1970s, both residents and archaeologists supplied infor-
mation on archaeological findings, and any intent to hide or destroy them, to 
the city council (Alcalá Hoy 1984). The local elections held in 1983 saw vic-
tory by the left-wing political party that put forward an electoral programme 
focused on the ‘recovery of Alcalá’ (the programme’s actual title). This pro-
gramme emphasised the importance of the past for the future of the town; it 
was believed that the past could serve as a uniting force for Alcalá’s increas-
ingly diverse population (in the words of Alcalá’s mayor from 1983–7, speak-
ing in July 2016). Sensitivity towards the past of Alcalá was reflected not only 
in the recent archaeological excavations in Complutum, in the land owned by 
the city council, but also in the organisation of an exhibition to display some 
of the findings made in 1984 (Fundación Colegio del Rey 1987).
Complutum’s discovery triggered public surveillance of the site over 
the 1980s and 1990s, while the different regional and local governments 
got to grips with their new responsibilities. In October 1988 Complutum was 
designated as Bien de Interés Cultural, the highest level of protection for cul-
tural heritage. A month later, one of the early associations that had sprung 
up at that time, CODEPHAM, demanded specific measures to protect the 
archaeological site of Complutum (Diario 16, 1988). Further criticisms of 
Complutum’s preservation described how the site was being progressively 
abandoned, worsening the quality of life in the neighbourhood. In the 
1990s people living close to Complutum were complaining about the inse-
curity in the area, with Complutum at its centre. The whole neighbourhood 
had become affected by drugs and alcohol while unemployment rates esca-
lated (Castillo et al. forthcoming). Residents of the area and the local civic 
association asked the city council to fence off the archaeological site, then 
heavily used by drug addicts with consequent damage (Diario de Alcalá 
1994; Puerta de Madrid 1995). Complutum was eventually fenced off with 
a stone wall, rendering the site isolated (Fig.7.4). While today many of 
Alcalá’s people do know about this archaeological site (Castillo et al. 2016, 
305), a significant number of residents in the adjacent residential area to 
Complutum have never visited it (Castillo et al. forthcoming).
Overall, we encounter several realities regarding the different stake-
holders involved. First we have the professionals, unearthing the past 
under the pressure of development. Their voice is hardly heard, but the 
remains were made visible and triggered a public response. Second we find 
the people of the area, concerned and committed in many cases, but silent 
and even indifferent in many others, a situation that has increased over 
time. Nowadays, for example, many are no longer interested in the site.
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While the Roman past of Alcalá de Henares became a feature of 
local politics, relevant Neolithic sites such as Las Matillas were silently 
destroyed by development. All of this suggests that we still do not fully 
understand why some spaces are valued and fought for when threatened 
and others left to oblivion and destruction. This all happens in a public 
sphere where media and discourse are highly relevant (Habermas 1989), 
playing a fundamental role in shaping ideas and actions. Last but not 
least, institutional stakeholders are usually perceived in a negative light 
by all the other actors (Torcal and Montero 2006). Undoubtedly, adminis-
tration is the easiest scapegoat to blame for the failures of archaeological 
heritage management – by people who do not appreciate the constraints 
of public procedures nor, in many cases, the scarce resources available 
that usually restrict officials’ capacity for action.
Construction has been a key industry in Spain, and the develop-
ment of Madrid has been a radical example of it since the 1960s. First 
with rescue interventions, then with preventive schemes – whatever 
their outcome – archaeology has come into being within the society of 
Madrid; it has created significant memories of a past, regardless of how 
glorious, painful or indifferent that past may be. This is now part of the 
collective knowledge publicly available about the region. Trying to find 
the silver lining in what was, and still is, a dark episode for the manage-
ment of archaeological heritage, its destruction had a price, but also a 
(small) reward.
Figure 7.4 A view of Complutum. © Asociación de Vecinos Cervantes, 
Alcalá de Henares, 1998. 
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Discussion: the future that never happened … 
As we have seen, what remains of the past emerges from a complex 
process in which different actors get involved. No single actor should 
be fully blamed for all the failures to preserve the archaeological past. 
Like the threads of a single ball of yarn, each episode, decision, action 
and  counter-action affected the total picture, resulting in a very different 
outcome. We may have ultimately all failed in the final goal of making 
archaeology relevant, but along the way we dragged in many people and 
many stories that made the attempt worthwhile. Today probably more 
people have a clearer idea about archaeology and our responsibilities to 
the past in Madrid. Maybe this would have never been possible without 
the destruction of archaeological heritage.
Following the draft law of 1981, everything might have been differ-
ent. Article 63.1 established agreements between owners and the admin-
istration, while Article 68.3 set the standards of authorisation that we 
still do not have today. Imagining an alternative future, the passing of 
this law would have entailed a wholly different scenario for the devel-
opment of archaeology in Spain. However, it is not the only possible sce-
nario. Depending on where we set the Jonbar hinge, an infinite number of 
outcomes is possible. Clearly, a different regulation would have fostered 
a different management model with different outcomes, although not 
necessarily better. A more restrictive legislation, able actually to protect 
all archaeological heritage from destruction, would surely have raised 
other conflicts. Ultimately people might have not valued archaeological 
heritage above a desire for better infrastructure or amenities. Probably 
legislation would have not been able to solve all problems related to the 
management of archaeological heritage, such conflicts normally requir-
ing more creative and flexible approaches than the law permits. This 
analysis does not intend to be deterministic. It seeks rather to highlight 
the complex social fabric in which archaeological heritage is only a small 
part – but one relevant in constructing sites of memory.
Have we not sufficiently regretted and deplored the loss or destruc-
tion, by our predecessors, of potentially informative sources to 
avoid opening ourselves to the same reproach from our successors? 
Memory has been wholly absorbed by its meticulous reconstitution. 
Its new vocation is to record; delegating to the archive the respon-
sibility of remembering, it sheds its signs upon depositing them 
there, as a snake sheds its skin. 
(Nora 1989: 13)
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This quote stands on the basis of current archaeological heritage man-
agement. It can explain initiatives such as the Plan de Yacimientos Vis-
itables or the social concern for the protection of certain archaeological 
remains. Acting as lieux de mémoire, those sites saved from destruction 
and the processes that have given them birth define landmarks: remain-
ders of memory as a resort to remember our past, to shape our identity 
or, more simply, to archive our history, even as the records from the inter-
ventions of the last decades that rest in the stores of the museum do.
Construction work has destroyed hundreds of archaeological sites 
in Madrid. Sometimes, indeed on most occasions, this destruction took 
place unnoticed by the people around it. On other occasions this destruc-
tion provoked a backlash in the form of public protest, somehow raising 
concern about archaeological heritage and creating memories out of the 
endangered remains. Overall, however, archaeological heritage manage-
ment recorded the past and archived it as a form of rematerialising the 
memories of a vanishing heritage. We delegated to these archives some 
responsibility of remembering, as Nora has pointed out, but nevertheless 
we still have them.
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Note
1. The main amendments to the law were two articles – as additional provisions – for the con-
struction of new casinos in the region, confirming the relationship between the law and the 
‘Eurovegas’ project. This (ultimately unsuccessful) project aimed to develop a huge area in 
the southwest of the capital for a casino compound managed by a major international com-
pany. During the process the negotiators asked the government to create special provisions 
for the project, such as permission to smoke, within the compound (Marcos 2013). In terms 
of heritage, the overall aim of the new law was to facilitate bureaucracy for developers and 
‘relax’ the protection of certain properties. As the first law passed during the negotiations, 
the aforementioned provisions ensured the goodwill of the regional government towards the 
casino project.
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Part III




Considering the denigration and 
destruction of Indigenous heritage as 
violence
George Nicholas and Claire Smith
Beyond the sphere of lethal violence lays a much broader domain of 
destruction, fear, insecurity, vulnerability, and harm. 
(Isaac 2012: 235)
Heritage matters. It is cherished and celebrated, but also frequently 
 contested. It is a touchstone to the past, both individual and collective. It 
connects cultural memory to particular places or events and defines expec-
tations about, and responsibilities to, the connections that people have 
between generations, over centuries if not millennia. Heritage, and the ben-
efits that flow from it, is such an essential part of people’s lives that a person’s 
unfettered access to their heritage should be considered a basic human right.
Yet this is problematic. While heritage is important to all peoples, 
and everyone’s cultural legacy is worthy of respect and protection, 
Indigenous peoples historically have had the least control over their her-
itage. Their history, identity, worldview and wellbeing are intrinsically 
tied to heritage, both tangible and intangible, in ways that are signifi-
cantly different from the dominant society. In a world that aspires to be 
post-colonial, the challenges associated with state-controlled heritage 
legislation are acute and often a source of conflict, with substantial social, 
political and economic consequences. The limited ability of Indigenous 
peoples to make decisions concerning the control of their own heritage 
and welfare is a continuing affront to human rights. In addition, the 
persistent denigration of their intangible heritage and the destruction 
of ancient sites, burial grounds and sacred places constitutes a form of 
structural violence (Bernbeck 2008; Smith 2007).
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To date, there has been only limited discussion of the ways in which 
cultural heritage informs the human rights of Indigenous peoples (for 
example, Baird 2014; Langfield et al. 2010; Lenzerini 2016a; Schmidt 
1996; Silverman and Ruggles 2007). There is recognition in princi-
ple, most notably in the United Nation’s Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), but little consideration in practice – and 
even then only incompletely in terms of what is actually protected (for 
example, tangible vs. intangible heritage [Nicholas 2017]). The question 
of who benefits from other people’s heritage requires careful considera-
tion (Anderson and Geismar 2017; Harrison 2010; Murphy 2016).
There is also the larger question of the responsibilities of, and 
opportunities for, academics and others whose careers have long prof-
ited from research on Indigenous cultures. In her frank discussion of 
challenges faced in her research on the human rights of children born of 
war, Charli Carpenter writes ‘The choice of human rights subject matter 
is one of the first moments in which human rights intellectuals exercise 
power over the global rights agenda’ (Carpenter 2012, 365). Carpenter’s 
statement resonates with the intent of this paper, which is situated at 
the nexus of community engagement, academic discourse and political 
change regarding the nature of – and indeed the future of – Indigenous 
heritage protection.
We argue two points in this chapter. The first is that access to, and 
benefits from, one’s heritage are basic human rights, and that the appro-
priation, denigration or destruction of that heritage is a denial of these 
fundamental needs. The second is that the cultural harms that occur 
when Indigenous peoples’ heritage is lost or threatened through inten-
tional actions, inaction or ignorance by others constitutes a form of struc-
tural violence; it is, to use Deborah Kapchan’s phrase, ‘an abrogation of 
human rights’ (2014, 4).
Our orientation focuses on Australia, Canada and the United States, 
but extends in a more limited fashion to other settler countries. We inten-
tionally foreground Indigenous heritage, but many of our comments also 
apply to other populations.
Human rights and Indigenous peoples
Human rights are the fundamental rights and freedoms that belong to 
all people, regardless of factors such as race, sex, nationality, ethnic-
ity, language or religion. They are based on shared values such as dig-
nity, fairness, equality, respect and independence. The United Nation’s 
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International Bill of Human Rights includes the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, passed in 1948, and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. As outlined in these documents, 
human rights include the rights to life and liberty, freedom from slavery 
and torture, freedom of opinion and expression and the right to work 
and to receive an education. Though the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights highlights the right of benefits of 
cultural freedom and scientific progress, it stops short of including the 
right to protect and enjoy cultural heritage as a human right. However, 
the rights of Indigenous peoples in regards to their cultural heritage are 
outlined in the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (United 
Nations 2007). In this chapter we discuss anthropological and archaeo-
logical practice in terms of the following articles in this declaration:
Article 11
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to practise and revitalise their cul-
tural traditions and customs. This includes the right to maintain, protect 
and develop the past, present and future manifestations of their cultures, 
such as archaeological and historical sites, artefacts, designs, ceremo-
nies, technologies and visual and performing arts and literature.
Article 12
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practise, develop and 
teach their spiritual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies; 
the right to maintain, protect and have access in privacy to their religious 
and cultural sites; the right to the use and control of their ceremonial 
objects; and the right to the repatriation of their human remains.
Article 31
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and 
develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional 
cultural expressions, as well as the manifestations of their sciences, tech-
nologies and cultures, including human and genetic resources, seeds, 
medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora, oral tradi-
tions, literatures, designs, sports and traditional games and visual and 
performing arts. They also have the right to maintain, control, protect 
and develop their intellectual property over such cultural heritage, tradi-
tional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions.
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What is missing here is an acknowledgement of the consequences 
of governments and others ignoring or acting contrary to those listed 
rights – resulting in what is often termed ‘human rights abuses’.
For governments, this may be an act of convenience. However, 
there are consequences, often severe, for those whose rights are abused 
or ignored.
We also challenge the conventional emphasis on tangible expres-
sions of heritage, which are foregrounded in the Hague Convention for 
the Protection of Cultural Property, as well as in the majority of those 
state, provincial and national policies drafted to protect archaeological 
sites and materials. Weighting the tangible over the intangible results 
in a skewed and incomplete means of acknowledging, respecting and 
protecting the intangible aspects of heritage (Anderson and Geismar 
2017; Antons and Logan 2018; Smith and Akagawa 2009), which for 
Indigenous peoples tend to be the most important, as discussed below.
The intangibility of Indigenous heritage
‘Heritage’ can be defined as the objects, places, knowledge, customs, 
practices, relationships with other species, stories, songs and designs, 
passed between generations, that define or contribute to a person’s or 
group’s identity, history, worldview and wellbeing (Nicholas 2017, 214). 
Indigenous peoples have always made it clear that their heritage is an 
integral element of their lives and wellbeing, and that their conceptions 
of, and engagement with, the world may be fundamentally different 
from that of the dominant society. Yet historically they have had limited 
and generally very ineffective participation in matters concerning their 
own heritage in colonial contexts. Those concerns have been broadcast 
both widely and loudly, speaking to the social, spiritual and economic 
harms they have suffered in the past and still endure today. Government 
responses to these concerns have generally focused on consultation, 
rather than obtaining consent. The recent emphasis on reconciliation in 
settler countries is notable, but too often is a ‘feel good’ exercise, with no 
real effort to change fundamentally how things are done.
Worldwide a growing number of archaeologists, anthropologists 
and other researchers (often themselves Indigenous) have been working 
to achieve meaningful inclusion of, and collaborations with, Indigenous 
communities in projects related to their heritage. However, there remain 
tremendous challenges in establishing and enacting more respectful, 
ethical and effective policies to protect objects, practices and places of 
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significance, especially when fundamental differences exist between 
Western1 and Indigenous societies over how heritage is perceived or 
defined. For example, familiar dichotomies that define a Western world-
view – people/nature, natural/supernatural, and so on – may be absent 
in Indigenous perspectives, meaning that ancestral beings may be part 
of this existence, not some other realm. This necessitates a more inclu-
sive definition of ‘heritage’ that is framed within some Indigenous world-
views as hishuk ish tsawalk (Nuu-chah-nulth for ‘everything is one and all 
is interconnected’ (Atleo 2011).
Fully recognising, respecting and protecting Indigenous cultural 
heritage is more than an issue of academic interest. It is bound up with 
challenging questions about consent, sovereignty and jurisdiction, social 
justice and human rights, and about how all descendant groups can 
most effectively control access to, and benefit from, their own heritage. 
Professional associations, government agencies and international bodies 
are increasingly joining with universities and Indigenous organisations 
to develop solutions to these challenges. For its part, the United Nations 
has set a broad mandate with the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, but it is another matter to put this, and the recommendations 
of various Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, into practice. Thus, 
despite recognition of the need for change to achieve greater equity, 
making the transition from theory to practice to policy requires signifi-
cant effort and understanding, as well as systemic level changes.
The task of protecting heritage objects and sites, of whatever cul-
tural affiliation, falls primarily within the realm of provincial or federal 
laws and policies, with some protection afforded by intellectual prop-
erty law. In Canada heritage legislation provides only limited protection 
of ancestral heritage. In some cases, there is unequal protection under 
the law for settler vs. Indigenous human remains, with the latter often 
considered to be scientific specimens (for example, Zimmerman 1989). 
Additionally, heritage policies are strongly influenced by economic pres-
sures. Protecting heritage sites may thus pit Indigenous peoples against 
private landowners and other interest groups. Finally, the most power-
ful manifestation of heritage site protection is largely via the domain of 
professional cultural resource management, which is today over a $1 
billion-a-year industry. However, some critics note that this profession, 
which ostensibly serves to aid commercial endeavours in complying with 
heritage laws, effectively facilitates development more than it protects 
Indigenous peoples’ heritage.
The current situation is complex. The actions that heritage practi-
tioners take are often situated at the nexus of debates over such topics 
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as open vs. restricted access to data, knowledge vs. justice and univer-
sal access vs. culture-based rights. There is also uncertainty about what 
a nation’s acceptance of UNDRIP really means, and what the steps for 
implementation should be.
For example, only months after Canada officially removed its objec-
tor status to the Declaration, ‘Justice Minister Jodi Wilson-Raybould 
called its adaptation into Canadian law “unworkable” in a statement to 
the Assembly of First Nations’. In Australia, Aboriginal people have raised 
concerns about its slow implementation. And in the United States, there 
is much uncertainty about what will happen under the Trump adminis-
tration. What is also problematic with some UNDRIP signatories is that 
the appearance of governments acting ethically and responsibly towards 
human rights obscures the reality of the continuing loss of heritage sites.
The result is that in settler countries there is increasing acknowl-
edgement that (a) Indigenous heritage must be protected more fully and 
effectively and (b) protection of heritage needs to be discussed in rela-
tion to human rights and social justice. This is reflected by discussions of 
heritage matters at the state, provincial or territory level (for example, 
Borrows 2017; Hunt and Ellsmore 2016; Soderland and Lilley 2015), 
the national level (for example, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions), 
and beyond (for example, UNDRIP). However, there is currently too little 
sense of direction, too much inertia or too little incentive by many of the 
parties who have a major role to play here. At the same time, in Canada 
and the United States, the public sees tax dollars being spent to rectify 
poor, ad hoc decisions made regarding heritage preservation when 
threatened Indigenous burial grounds or sacred sites slated for destruc-
tion and development are eventually purchased by the government.
Threats to heritage as acts of violence
For many archaeologists, one of the darkest moments in memory was 
the globally publicised destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas in Afghan-
istan in 2001. That was until that event was eclipsed by the far wider 
destruction of artefacts and heritage sites by ISIS at Palmyra, Syria and 
elsewhere (for example, Newson and Young 2018). The impact of such 
events is especially vivid because participants often filmed the events. 
Such actions are not unique; Wikipedia’s ‘List of Destroyed Heritage’ 
provides examples of intentional heritage destruction in almost 60 coun-
tries. These are but a sample of a much larger and longer-term history of 
such destructive acts.
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The loss of archaeological sites daily is staggering – the result of 
development, erosion, conflict and looting. The sale of antiquities, both 
legal and otherwise, continues seemingly unabated, feeding a seem-
ingly insatiable market (Barker 2018). This is exacerbated within con-
flict zones, where site looting and artefact sales by insurgents are used 
to fund weapon purchases, at the same time that explosions destroy 
sites and objects (for example, Hardy 2016; Weiss and Connelly 2017). 
Highlighted in such instances of wanton destruction is the loss of his-
tory and scientific potential, which can be interpreted as violence against 
history.
Below we discuss cases where Indigenous heritage sites, burial 
grounds and sacred places have been lost through intentional denigra-
tion, destruction or appropriation. We argue that this constitutes a form 
of both violence and human rights abuse. To understand why requires 
an understanding of how Indigenous conceptions of heritage across the 
world can be fundamentally different from those found in Western soci-
ety. Identifying the wider scope of potential sources of harm (Fig.8.1) is 
of vital importance in developing more inclusive and effective heritage 
protection practices.
What constitutes violence?
The World Health Organization defines violence as ‘the intentional use 
of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another 
person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a 
high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, malde-
velopment, or deprivation’.
Without wanting to detract attention from more explicit forms of 
harm, the loss of access to or, more obviously, the destruction of herit-
age sites is a form of violence that has significant adverse effects upon 
Figure 8.1 Basic sources of harm to heritage sites and values. 
Courtesy of the authors 
1. Site damage or destruction (due to development)
2. Site looting
3. Intentional site destruction (e.g., Bamiyan)
4. Cultural appropriation and commodification
5. Challenging religious, ontological or historical beliefs and knowledge
6. Restrictions on access to/use of heritage objects and places
7. Failure to acknowledge oral history and traditional knowledge as legitimate
8. Failure to acknowledge heritage
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Indigenous peoples. For them those sites are considered necessary not 
only to their historical continuity and world-views but also to their phys-
ical and psychological wellbeing, as well as their survival as distinct soci-
eties. This is articulated well by a First Nations community member in 
British Columbia:
Ruby Peters believed that the disturbance of the ancient burial 
ground at Somenos Creek not only offended and disrupted relations 
with the deceased but also resulted in physical danger for the living. 
Only by conversing with the deceased and using her ritual knowl-
edge could she at least partially restore the requisite balance of rela-
tions between the world of the living and the world of the dead.
(McLay et al. 2008, 155)
When used to describe harms resulting from disturbing heritage sites, 
‘violence’ is seldom in the vocabulary of archaeologists, except when 
it involves (in an abstract way) acts of violence against ‘their’ (shared 
worldly) heritage, such as the Bamiyan Buddhas (also see Hamilakis 
2003; Lenzerini 2016b). Yet by looking at this through the lens of indi-
geneity, we must acknowledge that real harm occurs to people in these 
situations. The loss of less spectacular ancestral sites in settler countries 
occurs largely unnoticed every day.
Even when the threats are known, legal efforts may fail or existing 
protection be removed, as evidenced in cases such as these:
• On 2 November 2017 the Supreme Court of Canada ruled against 
the Ktunaxa Nation’s efforts to prevent a ski resort being devel-
oped in an area of spiritual importance known as Qat’muk, where 
the Grizzly Bear Spirit resides. The court concluded that ‘The 
charter protects the freedom to worship, but does not protect the 
spiritual focal point of worship’. Yet the Ktunaxa had asked the 
court to validate not their right to worship, but their right to con-
tinue essential traditional practices. They fear the Grizzly Bear 
Spirit will be driven away, further debilitating their connection to 
a living landscape.
• On 3 December 2017 Donald Trump signed two proclama-
tions that will greatly reduce the size of Bears Ears and Grand 
 Staircase-Escalante National Parks in Utah, opening two million 
acres of previously protected land to mining, logging and other 
uses. This move threatens the wellbeing of the Hopi, Navajo, Ute 
and Zuni peoples by endangering an immense number of heritage 
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sites, burials and sacred places (Doelle 2017). While all US federal 
lands require compliance with the National Historic Preservation 
Act and the National Environmental Policy Act, the oversight of 
these acts is not as stringent as the overarching cultural and envi-
ronmental protection afforded to national monuments. Cultural 
harms are considered inevitable, including threats to the archaeo-
logical record of ancient habitation areas and activities across the 
landscape. But even more disturbing will be the weakening of pro-
tection of places of great historical or spiritual importance funda-
mental to the beliefs and world-view of the Hopi, Navajo, Ute and 
Zuni peoples.
• In Western Australia the extensive Murujuga petroglyphs of the 
Dampier Peninsula (estimated at about one million images), is 
under threat of destruction by the petrochemical industry, with 
about one-quarter already lost (Hirini 2018). Petroglyphs and 
pictographs are considered animate, the embodiment of the cre-
ator beings who formed the land, laws and customs of Aboriginal 
peoples. The damage comes from unauthorised visits, as well as 
vandalism and destruction. Efforts are underway to bolster protec-
tion, including an application to have Murujuga listed as a World 
Heritage site, but this would limit the Traditional Owners’ control. 
In the Kimberley region the Wanjina-Wunggurr people find them-
selves challenged by the impact of cultural tourism on sacred rock 
art sites; they thus seek to prevent inappropriate viewing, hearing 
or reproduction of secret ceremonies, artwork, song cycles and 
sacred narratives (Graber 2009), all of which cause harm.
• Worldwide, the slow pace of repatriation and reburial – especially 
of ancestral remains – continues to be a source of great frustration 
to Indigenous peoples. While great strides have been made in Aus-
tralia and Canada, the pace elsewhere has been slower. In Sweden, 
for example, the return of Sámi heritage and Sámi human remains 
in collections has progressed little in recent years (Ojala and Nor-
din 2015). In the United States the Native American Graves Protec-
tion and Repatriation Act is still the impetus for most repatriations, 
which means that many ancestral human remains fall outside its 
legal scope and thus require voluntary, not mandated, return.
Do the types of harms evident in these examples – denigration, destruc-
tion or cultural appropriation of heritage sites – constitute a form of 
violence? For the Ktunaxa, Qat’muk is not a ‘place’ or ‘spiritual focal 
point’ but a living presence; for the peoples of the Big Ears National 
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Park, that landscape is literally alive with their history. Such connec-
tions to the land, and their importance, are well documented. Yet 
economics continues to take precedence over heritage values. Today 
the salvage ethnography of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
colonial Australia, the Americas and elsewhere has been replaced by 
heritage management companies seeking to salvage (and sometimes 
preserve) the material record of past lifeways for posterity – although 
this is being countered by activist archaeology in aid of protecting the 
interests of living peoples.
Case studies
We identify three sectors where violence occurs in heritage contexts: 
objects, places and information. Each of these has been subject to appro-
priation, denigration or destruction of heritage that is a denial of Indige-
nous human rights and a source of significant trauma.
A. Objects
1. Mortuary items and ancestral human remains
The antiquities market has always been dependent on the looting of 
archaeological sites worldwide, most often burial grounds. The 
image of over 650 exposed burials at Slack Farm, Kentucky in 1987 
remains etched into the memory of many North American archae-
ologists. Throughout the American Southwest, artefact hunting 
has often targeted burials as a source of highly desired (and sale-
able) ancient pottery (such as Mimbres) and other items, as is the 
case with tomb robbing elsewhere in the world.
Even more egregious has been the collection of body parts, whether 
as war trophies or ‘ethnographic specimens’, including the heads, 
skulls and scalps of Indigenous peoples from battlegrounds and 
burials – practices that cause severe harm to descendant commu-
nities (Colwell 2017). While especially common in the nineteenth 
century (for example, there was a considerable market in Maori 
mokomakai [tattooed heads]), it is only recently that eBay and 
other online markets have stopped such sales, though they still 
continue elsewhere (Cumback 2018).
In other contexts, Indigenous peoples consider blood, hair and other 
body elements, including DNA, to be no different from an indi-
vidual. For example, in the Maori worldview, Durie (2014, 1141) 
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notes that ‘people are vulnerable if their body parts, including 
fluids, fall into malicious hands’. Underlying that fear is a wide-
spread conviction that the mistreatment of body parts, including 
even a human shadow, can result in mental or physical harm to an 
individual. This contributes to concerns expressed by Indigenous 
peoples worldwide about bio-cultural research done by archaeolo-
gists, geneticists and others, and the consequences thereof (Kowal 
et al. 2013).
2. Sacred Items
The procurement and sale of sacred objects is no less harmful. In 
Australia, sacred items such as tjuringa, cyclons and bullroarers 
are readily found in online auctions and other venues. Despite 
protests, there continues to be a market for these, facilitated by 
internet sales. What is less apparent is that some anthropologists 
and scholars have caused harm by collecting such items, with or 
without permission. For example, Theodore Strehlow, who grew 
up among the Arrernte in central Australia, was entrusted with 
the songs and ceremonies associated with particular Dreaming 
locales, and with sacred objects associated with them. He later felt 
that the elders no longer possessed the requisite knowledge and 
refused to return these items to those who, in his view, had become 
the outsiders to Arrernte culture (Cox 2018; Morton 2018).
In the American Southwest, the Hopi have pursued the return of their 
katsina through the French courts (Liljeblad 2017), while the 
Zuni have sought to procure the return of Ahayu:da (Merrill et al. 
1993). These wooden effigies are sacred objects of great signifi-
cance, and the embodiment of spiritual beings. For the Sto:lo of 
British Columbia, carved stone figurines such as T’xwelåtse (‘Man 
Turned to Stone’) are treated as actual beings, not as representa-
tions: ‘T’Xwelátse is a man. He was turned to stone, but he is still 
alive’ (Sto:lo Nation 2012, 15). Most archaeologists and heritage 
managers have little experience with what is literally (in this case) 
‘living heritage’, and are thus unaware of its effects on health and 
wellbeing. The inappropriate use of Indigenous cultural patri-
mony, such as wearing a T-shirt bearing an ancient rock art image 
(the embodiment of a spiritual being), may not only be harmful to 
that society – it may also be considered dangerous, since a spiritual 
being may be present in that image and harm the wearer.
Some archaeologists refuse to acknowledge claims that some ancient 
items may have religious significance to contemporary communi-
ties. This is still the case in California, where there are significantly 
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different interpretations of bifurcated sticks found in caches in 
certain caves. In a recent presentation (McArthur and Robinson 
2017), archaeologists contended that these pieces of wood were 
‘multi-purpose sticks used in variety of ways’, contrary to the con-
tention of the local Native American tribe that these were ‘spirit 
sticks’ and thus religious artefacts. The denial of the veracity of the 
religious beliefs of a person or group causes consternation; so does 
the position that proof is needed to verify a claim that an object has 
a religious rather than a utilitarian purpose.
B. Places
Denigration can also occur through a failure to treat important sites and 
places with the respect and dignity that is accorded comparable sites and 
places in the wider society, as these three examples indicate.
1. Standing Rock, South Dakota, United States
In 2016 the Standing Rock Sioux tribe led the resistance to the Dakota 
Access Pipeline. Their concerns were over the path of the pipeline, 
which desecrated burial grounds, and, more generally, a lack of 
adequate consultation regarding sites and a failure to recognise 
the pipeline’s impact on the cultural, spiritual and environmental 
dimensions of the land and water. Water is an often overlooked 
aspect of heritage; it not only connects the stories, plants and 
places, but literally flows through and between all aspects of peo-
ple’s lives and lands, past and present. Equally concerning was the 
decision to relocate the pipeline closer to the Native community, 
but further away from a non-Native community who would not 
have to bear the future consequences of its construction.
For their part, the archaeological community also highlighted short-
comings in the process. The Society for American Archaeology 
pointed to potential ‘violations of the Archaeological Resources 
Protection Act, as well as North Dakota State Law 23–06-27 (the 
“Protection of Human Burial Sites, Human Remains, and Burial 
Goods” section of “Care and Custody of the Dead”)’ and to the 
US Army Corps of Engineers’ ‘past errors in dealing with cultural 
heritage, human remains, and sacred traditional cultural proper-
ties’ (Gifford-Gonzalez 2017). The SAA’s concern was primarily 
concerned with the impact of the pipeline on tangible heritage 
and the effect of inadequate mitigation on the archaeological 
record.
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2. Nibutani Dam, Hokkaido, Japan
In northern Japan the construction of the Nibutani Dam in 1973, 
and the subsequent inundation of a large portion of the Saru river 
valley severely challenged the livelihood and cultural traditions 
of the Indigenous Ainu (Maruyama 2012). The Ainu are depend-
ent on the deeply spiritual relationship they have with their land; 
flooding effectively destroyed some of their burial grounds, chashi 
(‘sacred places’) and other locales of importance. The expropri-
ation of Ainu land was simply a continuation of centuries of dis-
enfranchisement and assimilation of a people whose traditional 
territory, Ainu Mosir, once extended far beyond Hokkaido.
In 1997 a court ruling found that the expropriation was illegal, and 
the cultural and religious significance of the valley had not been 
considered. The illegality of this massive construction project 
speaks strongly of the dismissive treatment accorded to the Ainu 
at that time. In his memoir of Ainu life, Kayana Shigeru writes 
that ‘In the space of a mere 100 years, they [the Japanese state] 
nearly decimated the Ainu culture and language that had taken 
tens of thousands of years to come to being on this earth’ (Shigeru 
1994, 153).
Somewhat ironically, the events at Nibutani ultimately led to the 
Japanese Diet officially recognising the Ainu as the Indigenous 
people of Japan in 2008. Today, after centuries of oppression, the 
Japanese government is supporting Ainu cultural preservation. 
Yet there is no denying the violence they have endured through 
discrimination and disenfranchisement, coupled with the loss of 
heritage sites.
3. Unregistered Graves, Northern Territory, Australia
In the Northern Territory the graves of Aboriginal people in remote 
communities are not recorded in any register, while those in set-
tler townships are. This traverses the human right for Indigenous 
peoples to be treated with equality, respect and dignity in regard 
to the treatment of their dead. Virtually every member of every 
remote Aboriginal community in the Northern Territory has a rel-
ative lying in an unmarked grave in the local cemetery, but they 
do not know exactly where. The consequences are complex. While 
the inability to care properly for deceased family members feeds 
into a general sense of disempowerment, there is also a percep-
tion – in a situation where people are continuously and structur-
ally disempowered – that their children are being denied their 
human rights.
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The failure to register the graves of Aboriginal people in remote com-
munities is part of the wider problem of structural racism in the 
Northern Territory, Australia. Like the infamous Northern Terri-
tory National Emergency Response of 2007, which could only be 
enacted through the suspension of the Racial Discrimination Act 
1975, race-based discrimination is enacted through geography. 
The communities targeted are those in which Aboriginal people 
reside. While such legislative Acts were acts of commission well 
into the twentieth century, the failure to register the graves of Abo-
riginal people in remote communities was an act of omission. Both 
are a failure to recognise and protect human rights in Australia.
This is a Territory-wide problem: we estimate that there are around 
5000 unmarked Aboriginal graves across the Territory. While 
some remote communities are tiny and/or recent, others have 
been around for more than a century. Larger communities could 
have hundreds of unmarked graves. While new cemeteries legisla-
tion is being drafted that will likely have similar requirements for 
urban and regional cemeteries, this will be relevant only in terms 
of future graves. So far the Northern Territory government has 
refused to allocate resources to the recording of existing graves.
C. Information/Intellectual Property
The right to ‘maintain, control, protect and develop their intellectual 
property over their cultural heritage’ is enshrined in Article 31 of United 
Nation’s (2007) Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People. These 
rights can be threatened or traversed, however, when Indigenous cul-
tural knowledge is improperly disseminated or used.
1. Australia
Moorcroft and Byrne have pointed out that ‘the mass of documentation 
on Indigenous people in libraries and archives has been collected, 
analysed and discussed by government officers, anthropologists, 
historians and others but sometimes not even seen by the indig-
enous people it covers’ (Moorcroft and Byrne 1996, 87). In 1989 
Henrietta Fourmile, a Yidinjdji woman and researcher, lamented 
that ‘The information collected about us is simply not owned by us’ 
(Fourmile 1989, 4). Today many researchers work on the basis of 
informal agreements, and appropriate protocols for collecting and 
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sharing Indigenous knowledge have been developed for a number 
of contexts (for example, Jackson and Smith 2005). The approach 
advocated emerges from a number of polemical disputes.
In the past, Indigenous knowledge collected by a researcher was dis-
tributed at the researcher’s discretion, without seeking approval 
from the Indigenous people concerned. This led to several acri-
monious disputes concerning the publication of photographs of 
secret-sacred ceremonies of Aboriginal people in Central Aus-
tralia. The best-known controversy was the publication of photo-
graphs taken by anthropologist Ted Strehlow. This prompted a call 
for the return of ceremonial objects given into his care by Elders 
many years earlier (Morton 2018). Likewise, Charles Mountford’s 
book Nomads of the Australian Desert (1976) contained detailed 
information on secret-sacred men’s ceremonies, as well as photo-
graphs that should not have been viewed by women, children or 
uninitiated boys. If viewed by the wrong people, the traditional 
punishment was death.
This latter case engendered a legal dispute that would change the 
ethical parameters of archaeology and anthropology in Australia. 
In Foster v Mountford and Rigby Ltd (1976), members of the Pit-
jantjatjara Council used a breach of confidence action successfully 
to obtain an injunction preventing Nomads of the Australian Desert 
from being distributed in the Northern Territory, on the grounds 
that it contained information that could only have been shown or 
revealed to the author in confidence. Furthermore, the plaintiffs 
successfully argued that the ‘revelation of the secrets contained 
in the book to their women, children, and uninitiated men may 
undermine the social and religious stability of their hard-pressed 
community’ (Australian Government’s Attorney General Depart-
ment 1994). Further publication of this book was prevented on the 
grounds that the author had breached confidentiality (Moorcroft 
and Byrne 1996, 91).
2. Ancient DNA
Today, genomics challenges long-held understandings of individual 
and group identity. Issues of identity are of particular importance 
for Indigenous peoples, for whom scientific pronouncements about 
identity claims may have profound social, cultural, political and 
economic consequences. While new genetic information yields 
new insights into population origins, movements and admixtures 
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to address archaeological – or, increasingly,  community-raised 
questions – it is often provided without context (Pullman and 
Nicholas 2012). There is also a long and unfortunate history of sci-
entific and medical studies conducted on Indigenous populations 
without free, prior and informed consent (see TallBear 2013 for 
one review). Participation in such studies, whether self-initiated 
or not, makes an individual’s genetic profile (usually anonymised) 
available to others. In addition, a person’s decision to go ahead 
with DNA testing might bring others into the conversation, 
whether they want to be present or not.
The genetic and biological information derived from archaeolog-
ical and related studies may also challenge Indigenous peo-
ples’ identity and claims, the repatriation of ancestral human 
remains, band enrollment and attaining federal recognition as 
an Indigenous group (Walker et al. 2016). Increasingly, Indige-
nous peoples are partnering in research projects that can yield 
information of importance to them, including revealing connec-
tions to ancestral populations. Perhaps the best known contro-
versy is that of the Ancient One, also known as Kennewick Man, 
whose remains were found on the banks of the Columbia river 
in Washington State, USA, in 1996. For almost two decades, the 
skeletal remains of this 9000-year old individual were the focus 
of a battle for custody by a coalition of Native American tribes 
from that region and archaeologists largely based at the Smith-
sonian Institution’s National Museum for Natural History (Wat-
kins 2004; Burke et al. 2008). Although the legal resolution of 
this long-standing debate was dependent upon the aDNA anal-
ysis, which verified the claims of the Colville-Umatilla Confed-
eracy, considerable harm was done to the claimants, and more 
generally to Indigenous peoples, when pressed to validate their 
claims.
Examples of the problematic use of aDNA in scientific studies and its 
(potential) harm for Indigenous peoples are outlined by Walker 
et al. (2016). In eastern Canada, the identity of the historic (and 
extinct) Beothuk and relationship to both earlier archaeological 
populations and contemporary First Nations has been questioned 
(for example, Duggan et al. 2017). This is more than an academic 
issue, as it has complicated requests by the Mi’kmaq to have Beo-
thuk and other remains repatriated. Bolnick notes that ‘because 
Western understandings of relatedness are largely biogenetic in 
nature, we give DNA substantial power to adjudicate questions 
 DENIGRATION AND DESTRUCTION  147
about anything associated with relatedness’ (Bolnick 2016, 13). 
This can result in biological indicators being used to deny cultur-
ally defined affinity and to upset long-held religious beliefs or oral 
traditions.
Writing of the Beothuk identity, Pullman argues that the common 
narrative of colonial oppression, which all Indigenous peoples 
share, should figure prominently in particular discussions about 
repatriation – whether or not a definitive biological or cultural link 
or unbroken lineal descent can be established to specific remains 
(Pullman 2017, 18). Accordingly, we would argue that Chief Mi’sel 
Joe has the moral authority to speak on behalf of the Beothuk 
based on this shared historical narrative and on his current role 
as an Indigenous leader in the continuing story of the Aboriginal 
presence in Newfoundland. Biology and culture are not irrelevant 
to this discussion, but neither are they determinative.
Respecting Indigenous rights
How do notions of heritage protection change when we shift to a human 
rights-based model that also acknowledges Indigenous conceptions of 
responsibility? What can be done with, by and for Indigenous peoples 
to give them increased control and support in reclaiming their heritage 
and traditional practices? Developing practical and achievable strategies 
for protecting Indigenous heritage needs to be pursued via three specific 
goals:
1. Developing a fuller, less Western-centric understanding of ‘herit-
age’ that will enable more informed and equitable decision- making 
in the protection of objects, places and information of value to 
descendant communities and public understanding thereof
2. Assessing the limitations of existing heritage protection policies in 
Canada in order to make recommendations for their revision and 
more effective implementation
3. Working with Indigenous community leaders, heritage manage-
ment professionals and government representatives to: (a) iden-
tify alternate models of heritage preservation and protection that 
acknowledge and incorporate community-based heritage val-
ues and protect Indigenous rights; (b) consider the viability of a 
national action plan for this.
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Indigenous rights and national interests
In Canada recent developments in constitutional and international 
human rights law have set the stage for a much-needed reassessment and 
reformulation of ineffective heritage laws and policies. The shift from 
thinking about heritage as property to viewing heritage as an essential 
aspect of human rights in international law is supported by the findings 
of Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the UN’s Declara-
tion on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), which includes the 
right to self-determination. While governments are being challenged for 
their ineffective and unequitable heritage protection policies, scholars 
and practitioners from many sectors can provide the intellectual leader-
ship and evidence base to support this shift. At the same time, the gov-
ernment’s support for Indigenous rights continues to be uneven in the 
face of government-supported economic initiatives (for example, Coastal 
GasLink Pipeline [Temper 2018]). Similar seemingly contradictory gov-
ernment and/or legislative challenges continue to play out in the United 
States (Bears Ears National Park), Sweden (MacNeil 2017) and else-
where, as well as the legal standing of Traditional Knowledge.
It is also a one-step-forward and one-step-back situation in 
Australia. Positive developments include an increased recognition of the 
role of Indigenous peoples in managing heritage and greater acceptance 
of the nexus between cultural and environmental heritage, including 
widespread recognition of the cultural values of water. In Victoria the use 
of traditional fire knowledge as a land management tool is being devel-
oped in a partnership between land care groups and traditional custodi-
ans – in part a response to devastating bushfires in recent years. A major 
development in shared responsibility is the Kungun Ngarrindjeri Yunnan 
(Listening to Ngarrindjeri People Talking) Agreement between the South 
Australian Government and the Ngarrindjeri Regional Authority. This 
ensures that the Ngarrindjeri have an active role in caring for lands and 
waters, and benefit from the management of parks and reserves within 
their native title claim.
Overall, however, heritage legislation in Australia is seriously defec-
tive, due to both state and federal governments prioritising development. 
Across Australia developers are able to seek ministerial consent to ‘disturb’ 
any Aboriginal site in the state and have the right to appeal such ministe-
rial decisions, while the traditional custodians and/or native title holders 
have no such right. There have been some notable backward steps as well: 
the once world-leading Australian Heritage Commission was replaced in 
2003 by the Australian Heritage Council, with severely curtained powers 
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and minimal budget. More recently the Western Australian government 
have changed the criteria for classifying heritage sites so that they have 
to show current ‘religious activity’ to qualify for listing. This has resulted 
in the delisting of many sites, and a dramatic reduction in the number of 
eligible sites in the face of expedited development.
Worldwide, assessment and development decisions continue to 
engender the cumulative, incremental destruction of Indigenous cul-
tural heritage. It is difficult to determine the overall impact as there is 
no nationally co-ordinated data about the condition and integrity of 
Indigenous heritage places. Situations such as this are contrary to a key 
provision in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples – the 
requirement that governments obtain Indigenous Peoples’ ‘free, prior, 
and informed consent’ before embarking on any development project or 
action that affects territory.
Indigenous rights and academic institutions
Responsibility has to be borne by institutions as well as researchers. All 
too often, research focusing on Indigenous peoples is seen by them as yet 
another form of colonialism – a mining of their culture, their knowledge. 
Their heritage is often viewed as public domain, free for the taking or 
the researching of, especially in archaeological contexts. Today universi-
ties require ethics approval for research involving living peoples, which 
is an important development. Yet university-based Indigenous research 
seldom adequately addresses the significant power inequalities that exist 
between researchers and communities, especially in terms of providing 
fair and equitable benefit flows and of data ownership.
One of the clearest examples of an institution denigrating the 
rights of Indigenous people is the dispute between the University of 
Western Australia and Aboriginal groups in relation to the field notes of 
anthropologist Ronald Berndt, which are under a 30-year embargo. This 
embargo includes interviews with a senior Ngadjuri man, Barney Warria, 
collected by Berndt between 1939 and 1944 (Berndt 1987, 15; see also 
Gray 2014). The Ngadjuri have attempted to gain access to the field notes 
since the early twenty-first century. They argue that there is no legal basis 
for the current embargo as the field notes are rightfully the shared intel-
lectual property of both Berndt and Warria. However, Barney Warria’s 
biological grandson, Ngadjuri Elder Vince Copley, contends that the field 
notes could not have been produced by either Berndt or Warria by him-
self. This is shared intellectual property since one shared his specialist 
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knowledge while the other recorded it (see Smith et al. 2018). Moreover, 
much of Barney Warria’s knowledge was recorded ‘verbatim’ in Berndt’s 
field notes (Berndt 1987, 27).
Today the University of Western Australia is the responsible body, 
but it takes the position that it is required by law to maintain the integ-
rity of Catherine Berndt’s will. The University has rejected numerous and 
repeated attempts by Aboriginal groups to access the field notes, other 
than on two occasions when directed by court order in relation to native 
title claims. As it stands, the embargoed material – held in the Berndt 
Museum at the university – will not be accessible until 2024. One of the 
most confounding aspects of this is that the situation has not changed 
since the lament of Henrietta Fourmile in 1989 (p. 144) and the obser-
vation of Colin Tatz in 1979: ‘For Aborigines the ultimate indignity is the 
sovereignty of those who control the gathering and dissemination of the 
written and spoken word concerning their situation’ (Tatz 1979, 86).
Conclusions
We have both worked with and for Indigenous communities for decades 
in aid of heritage protection, sometimes as facilitators, sometimes as con-
duits. Our approach is grounded in the rights of Indigenous peoples to 
control their cultural and intellectual property (see Nicholas and Ban-
nister 2004; Smith and Jackson 2008), and also our sometimes-activist 
stance. One statement we have frequently encountered is ‘We are tired of 
talking; we want action’. To many Indigenous people, the loss of heritage 
objects and places is not a matter of academic discourse about ‘the loss to 
science’, or ‘how our understanding of the human past is diminished’. It 
is, instead, the destruction of burial grounds and sacred places. For them, 
the appropriation and misuse of intangible Indigenous heritage consti-
tutes a form of violence and an abuse of human rights that directly and 
detrimentally affects their wellbeing and identity. It is death, or at least 
serious damage, by a thousand cuts.
At a global level, there is some recognition that heritage loss affects 
more than just objects. In 2017 the UN Security Council unanimously 
approved a resolution condemning the destruction of cultural heritage. 
Irina Bokova, head of UNESCO, stated: ‘Heritage is identity – it is belong-
ing,’ she told the Council after the vote. ‘The deliberate destruction of 
heritage is a war crime – it has become a tactic of war, in a global strategy 
of cultural cleansing.’ Bokova went on to explain that this is why defend-
ing cultural heritage ‘is a security imperative, inseparable from that of 
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defending human lives’ (Lederer, Times of Israel, 25 March 2017). As 
with UNDRIP, action is needed, not just words.
But real action requires real commitment on the ground. We urge 
researchers to undertake their responsibilities in such a way that they 
comply with human rights principles and, where possible, place major 
human rights issues on political and public agendas:
One cannot help but exert an agenda-setting effect simply by calling 
attention to under-served categories of people and contrasting their 
circumstances to the allegedly universal standards to which human 
rights advocates claim to subscribe. In this sense, my methodology 
was inevitably political. 
(Carpenter 2012, 377)
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Indigenous Latino heritage: 
destruction, invisibility, appropriation, 
revival, survivance
Paul Edward Montgomery Ramírez
The stories and images that non-Indigenous people have of Indigenous 
pasts frequently and prominently feature conflict and loss. Before the 
1980s many of these spoke of ‘primitive’ people who impeded progress 
and needed to be civilised and brought into modernity, or as savage 
beings who needed to be subdued. The active force in these stories is, 
inevitably, the settler-colonist and their violence (be it their heroic tri-
umph over savagery or collateral damage in the benevolent effort of 
bringing civilisation). Some civil servants may have considered colonial 
violence to undermine the ‘civilising mission’, but until recently question-
ing the mission itself was less often expressed (see Smits 2008).
Even as these narratives became untenable, and depictions of 
Indigenous peoples became more sympathetic, they still focused largely 
on settler violence located in the past. Popular media depictions of 
Indigenous peoples are mostly framed in a time in the colonial past, or 
just on the cusp thereof, for instance the critically acclaimed films Dances 
with Wolves (1990) and La Otra Conquista (2000). These narratives play 
a role in advancing the notion of vanishing people. The recent photo-
graphic collection, Before They Pass Away, features images of Indigenous 
people who are depicted as under threat of the effects of globalisation 
(Nelson 2013). This, however, is still a projection of the Western or settler 
perspective onto what is ‘Indigenous’, as will be addressed in more detail 
later in this chapter. Stephen Correy, director of Survival International, 
has described Nelson’s photographs as fantasy which exoticises 
Indigenous peoples and ‘echo[s] a colonial vision which remains deeply 
destructive of peoples who try and reject its domination’ (Correy 2014). 
The vanishing of Indigenous peoples in instances such as this is linked 
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with a perception that these groups are reserved to an unchanging and 
‘pristine’ existence, namely one which exists only in the past tense. Both 
the view of lionisation of colonialism and the mourning of the disappear-
ance of ‘the Native’ provide narratives which are less about Indigenous 
peoples and more about lessons in morality for settler- colonists and other 
non-Indigenous groups. And keeping Indigenous people uncentred in 
narratives allegedly about them serves only to do harm.
Not only are Indigenous bodies at risk from their marginal positions, 
and from discrimination, but so is their heritage – tangible and intangible. 
Destruction and theft of heritage do play significant roles in the existences 
of modern Indigenous peoples. Despite the position of Central America as 
marginal in the already subaltern world of Latin America, Indigenous popu-
lations have endured – and continue to endure – yet a third layering of mar-
ginalisation. Indigenous heritages in Central America face not only physical 
destruction; even their cultures are not free from being taken from them 
and repurposed, drawing power towards the states that marginalise them. 
These repeated damages inflicted upon colonised people compound further 
damages, which lead to very real issues of mental and physical health and 
serve only to maintain cycles of systematic harm against Indigenous people.
‘Si sos puro indio’
From the beginning of the colonisation of Central America, Indigenous 
people have been targets of systemic and casual discrimination. The 
destruction of sovereign prehispanic societies and their ways of life is 
well known from a historical stance. The physical abuse and enslavement 
of Indigenous bodies is also known, though to a lesser extent (see Whis-
nant 1995, 14–27; Gould 1998). The purpose of this work is not to, yet 
again, place Indigenous people in the past.
Modern populations endure substantial marginalisation and dis-
crimination within Central American states. While the region itself is 
economically disadvantaged, its Indigenous populations suffer from 
far higher poverty rates: 5.9 times and 2.8 times higher in Panama 
and Guatemala respectively (UNPFII 2009, 27–8), with 79 per cent 
of Indigenous Guatemalans falling below the poverty line in 2000 
(McEwan and Townbridge 2007, 61). Not only is poverty a major issue fac-
ing Indigenous peoples, but health is also a significant concern. In Panama 
and Guatemala Indigenous people average lives that are 10 and 13 years 
shorter than those of non-Indigenous people (UNPFII 2009, chapter 5). 
An estimated 50 per cent of Indigenous people suffer from diabetes and 
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in Honduras malnutrition affects 95 per cent of young people under 14. 
In addition, access to and completion of education disproportionately 
affects these groups. In Guatemala under 50 per cent of Indigenous teen-
agers have completed primary education; in Nicaragua only five per cent 
of Indigenous people complete secondary education (UNPFII 2017, 121).
More alarmingly, surmounting barriers to education has not led to 
significantly greater incomes nor to better health (UNPFII 2009,  chapter 1). 
The stigma against Indigenous people has not only been systemic, but is 
also reinforced in casual society. The title of this section is one of many 
Nicaraguan idioms that disparage Indigenous people, reducing them to 
animals or maintaining that they are incapable of doing anything good 
(García Bresó 1992, 126). Little value is placed on the lives or knowledge of 
modern Indigenous people by outsiders. And these devaluations fit into the 
languages and practice of continued genocide against Indigenous peoples.
Genocidal practices of the destruction of cultural items – built, nat-
ural or intangible – have negative impacts on the wellbeing of Indigenous 
people: so much is commonly understood. Among Indigenous Latin@s, 
traumas experienced by individuals also link into health in deeper ways. 
The ailment susto (terror) is a cultural disease wherein a single traumatic 
event leads to the onset of an illness. A study among Indigenous com-
munities in Guatemala found that individuals identified specific events, 
and the ensuing susto, as the cause of their diabetes (Chary et al. 2012). 
Bearing this Indigenous understanding of illness in mind, it becomes 
clear how harm from cultural theft and destruction compounds with very 
real concerns for health.
While the UN Declaration on the Right of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP) was adopted in 2007 to help safeguard communities and their 
people from genocidal practice – with each Central American state vot-
ing in favour – and specifically affirms the right to cultural heritage, the 
Declaration has been often ignored: Indigenous heritage continues to be 
destroyed and appropriated in numerous ways.
Destruction of tangible heritage sites
Indigenous peoples have the right to practise and revitalize their 
cultural traditions and customs. This includes the right to maintain, 
protect and develop the past, present and future manifestations of 
their cultures, such as archaeological and historical sites, artefacts, 
designs, ceremonies, technologies and visual and performing arts 
and literature. 
(UNDRIP 11.1)
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The devastation of prehispanic Central American heritage began almost 
immediately after European contact. As is the case in much of the world 
which has been subjected to imperialism, the ransacking of tangible her-
itage – objects, buildings, monuments – in Central America has been, and 
is, endemic: a matter that has been attested to in academic literature (see 
Whisnant 1995, 273–312; Yates 2015). That being the case, this chapter 
will not place great focus on looting and repatriation issues themselves, 
but rather on the impacts of looting through other topics herein.
Locations designated as archaeological sites, be they petroglyphs or 
building complexes, often retain significance in the cultural and spiritual 
lives of Indigenous peoples in the region. These sites also have been 
counted among available resources for the heritage tourism industries 
of many Central American states. At these sites developed for consump-
tion, the interpretation and management is seldom done with modern 
Indigenous people in mind – nor do they tend to receive much in the way 
of economic benefit (Arden 2004; Johnson 2006, 186–92). Rather, the 
connection of modern Indigenous people to the sites is often ignored. 
Nor is free access often a guaranteed right, with outright exclusion not 
being unknown.
Archaeological sites not developed for tourism sometimes meet 
a different fate. The Uxbenká site in Belize is held to be sacred to the 
Mopan-Maya people of Santa Cruz. On 20 June 2015 a non-Indigenous 
man, Rupert Myles, was detained by members of the village when he 
interrupted a fajina (traditional meeting) and threatened them with 
violence (Humes 2016). Myles’ actions were a result of the commu-
nity issuing him a final eviction notice for the house he had constructed 
on Uxbenká and for having allegedly bulldozed a portion of the site to 
make a driveway. Previous appeals to local authorities and the coun-
try’s Institute of Archaeology to remove Myles had been ignored, despite 
Santa Cruz holding customary rights to the site, meaning that the land 
is acknowledged to belong to Indigenous communities and should be 
admininstered according to their customs. The customary rights were 
made legally binding by a Belizean Supreme Court decision in 2007 
(Cultural Survival 2015).
Subsequently 13 members of Santa Cruz, including Cristina Coc, a 
Q’eqchi’ Maya land rights activist, were arrested by the police on charges 
of unlawful detention and assault, regardless of the fact that two of them 
had not even been present when Rupert Myles was detained. Criminal 
charges against Myles, for the partial destruction of Uxbenká, were later 
dropped by the Institute of Archaeology, which instead reached an ‘ami-
cable solution’ with him (Humes 2016). During this case non-Indigenous 
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Belizeans voiced negative views of Maya people, claiming that the Maya 
feel superior to the ‘national’ identity and seek to have extra rights over 
them (Cultural Survival 2015).
Tourism as an industry makes up a substantial portion of Belize’s 
GDP, and archaeological sites make an important contribution to this. 
With no apparent sense of irony, Indigenous people are excluded from 
the development and economic benefits of culturally significant sites – 
even as non-Indigenous people hold negative views of ‘indios’ for pro-
tecting those very sites from which they themselves benefit. The desires 
of Indigenous people are often framed as being acts of selfishness or of 
wanting special privilege over others. Indigenous people are still often 
branded as impeding progress, to the harm of the ‘nation’.
Destruction of biocultural heritage, landscapes and 
communities
Indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practise, develop 
and teach their spiritual and religious traditions, customs and cer-
emonies; the right to maintain, protect, and have access in privacy 
to their religious and cultural sites; the right to the use and control 
of their ceremonial objects; and the right to the repatriation of their 
human remains. 
(UNDRIP 12.1)
The UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean spe-
cifically detailed that processes of extracting natural resources should be 
carried out in a way that results in ‘more inclusive’ development and notes 
that in this process there would be ‘inevitable’ conflicts (ECLAC 2013, 
8 and 14). Often the rhetoric of development in states such as those in 
Central America – not limited to the extraction of natural resources – is 
framed around lifting people out of extreme poverty.
The per capita income of Central American states, with the excep-
tion of Panama and Costa Rica, falls below the average for Latin America 
(US$ 8342.20); the lowest, Nicaragua, averaged US$ 2151.38 in 2016 
(World Bank 2018). It is from this position that projects are spoken of, 
with the promise of increased incomes and access to resources and/or 
energy. This is sometimes framed using the language of self-sufficiency 
and resistance to imperial powers, as in the case of Nicaragua’s Inter-
Oceanic Canal project (Cupples and Glynn 2018, 1–10). While the goal 
of being able to alleviate poverty and build sustainable and self-reliant 
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economies is not in itself a negative one, many projects clothed in such 
language are not what they seem to be on the surface. In fact, they can be 
in direct opposition to the interests and wellbeing of Indigenous peoples.
The creation of a canal linking the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans has 
held a place in the social and political climate of Nicaragua since the eight-
eenth century. Control over the production (and ownership) of this project 
brought about military interference by the United States throughout the 
first half of the nineteenth century. Goals of the influential revolutionary 
leader Augusto Sandino included the withdrawal of US Marines and the 
guarantee of Nicaraguan sovereignty over the proposed canal (de Nogales 
1932, 12–20). Most recently, the Ortega regime controversially con-
ceded land to the Hong Kong Nicaragua Canal Development Investment 
Company (HKND Group) for US$50 million in 2013, despite objections 
on  financial, environmental and sovereignty grounds, and Indigenous 
rights concerns.
The proposed route not only cut through archaeologically rich 
areas, but it would also have gone through lands in an autonomous 
region of Nicaragua, displacing some 80 per cent of the Indigenous Rama 
population and endangering the lifeways of neighbouring communities 
(see Cupples and Glynn 2018, 44–8). Throughout the consultation pro-
cess, however, the Rama communities maintained that they had never 
been consulted (save perhaps for a selected few), nor would they have 
agreed if they had been.
Details on the beneficial economic impacts of this construction 
were somewhat nebulous from the onset. However, the risks to prehis-
panic heritage were likely to have been significant (even with the govern-
ment’s stated commitment to support the creation of museums to house 
artefacts that the project would uncover). Such risks would certainly 
have been negative to the cultural existences and heritage of Indigenous 
 peoples in the east of Nicaragua.
Similarly, in Honduras, the construction of a 22-megawatt hydroelec-
tric dam on the Río Gualcarque, called Agua Zarca, was met with Indigenous 
resistance. The project was a collaboration, starting in 2006, between the 
companies SinoHydro, The World Bank International Finance Corporation 
(both until 2013) and the Honduran company Desarrollos Energéticos SA 
(DESA). When the plans for this construction were announced, the Lenca 
people filed complaints with the government and began to stage protests, 
claiming not to have been consulted during the process. For the Lenca, 
the Río Gualcarque constitutes a site sacred to their cultural beliefs. Berta 
Cáceres, the co-founder of the Consejo Cívico de Organizaciones Populares 
e Indígenas de Honduras (COPINH), stated that:
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In our world-views, we are beings who come from the Earth, from 
the water and from corn. The Lenca people are ancestral guardians 
of the rivers, in turn protected by the spirits of young girls, who teach 
us that giving our lives in various ways for the protection of the rivers 
is giving our lives for the wellbeing of humanity and of this planet. 
(Goldman Environmental Prize 2015)
Anti-dam protests were met with violence: 101 protestors were killed 
between 2010 and 2014 and four COPINH members were murdered: 
Tomás Garcia in 2013 and Berta Cáceres, Nelson García and Lebia Yaneth 
in 2016 (Watts 2016). The public outcry over this violence eventually led 
to the withdrawal of funding bodies from the project, and by 2018 no fewer 
than nine arrests had been made for the murder of Berta Cáceres. Among 
those were employees of the company DESA (including the then executive 
president, Roberto David Castillo Mejia) and members of the Honduran 
military (New York Times 2018). In 2017 the organisations financing DESA 
withdrew their funding amid charges of human rights abuses.
Appropriation of intangible heritages
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and 
develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and tradi-
tional cultural expressions, … oral traditions, literatures, designs, 
sports and traditional games and visual and performing arts. They 
also have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their 
intellectual property over such cultural heritage, traditional knowl-
edge, and traditional cultural expressions. 
(UNDRIP 31.1)
More insidious than the outright destruction of Indigenous landscapes 
and tangible heritage are the processes of seizing cultural trappings and 
expressions – many of which exist as a form of resistance against geno-
cide – and turning them into a product which promotes nostalgia and 
patriotism connected to ‘national’ state identity. Such appropriations 
serve, regardless of intention, to erase Indigenous cultures and peoples. 
Central America has a history of rendering Indigenous people invisible by 
delegating them to the past. This is often framed through the language of 
mestizaje, wherein the ‘indios’ have vanished and been transformed into 
modern people: the mestizos.
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Unlike the narratives of Anglo-settler states, much of Latin America 
attached their foundations on this story of the mixing of Indigenous 
and European (while usually ignoring African factors) to create a ‘more 
perfect’ race. From ‘los indios’ came passions and fierce independence. 
And, as Augusto Sandino (the symbolic inspiration for the more recent 
Sandinistas) declared:
I used to look with resentment on the colonizing work of Spain, 
but today I have profound admiration for it. … Spain gave us its 
language, its civilization, and its blood. We consider ourselves the 
Spanish Indians of America. 
(cited in Field 1998, 437)
This logic came with several consequences. Firstly it allowed people in Cen-
tral America (and in wider Latin America) to build identities which, while 
indebted to European inheritances, were not the same, nor lesser, and 
were not beholden to European imperial control. This was a  foundation to 
anti-imperial nation-building in Central America. At the same time, this 
concept is also a weapon against Indigenous peoples themselves. It placed 
the Indigenous in a time which no longer exists, but of which the mod-
ern inhabitants of whichever state – be it Costa Rica or El Salvador – are 
the inheritors. Social engineers and historians spoke matter of factly of 
the ‘complete disappearance’ of Indigenous peoples, either by disease or 
by the rise of the mestizo (de Peralta 1893, xvi–xvii; Cuadra 1981, 209), 
regardless of the fact that the people they referred to continue to exist 
to this day. In so doing they denied the existence of Indigenous peoples 
outright, dismissing their claims to tradition and identity.
The models of mestizaje did not foster ‘a new hybrid or mestizo 
culture that marries the best of two different civilizations [but] plainly 
and simply … a Western model’ (Bonfil Batalla in Field 1998, 436): one 
that Indigenous people were labelled with, regardless of acceptance or 
not. Within this construct, then, pueblos indígenas (Indigenous commu-
nities) became considered as social classes (campesino: peasant; artes-
ano: artisan), rather than as being of different ethnicities. To the view of 
dominant society, those people ceased to be ‘real Indians’. Historians and 
anthropologists seemed to agree with this approach well into the nine-
teenth century. How could these campesinos be considered Indigenous 
if they mainly spoke Spanish and did not look like as an ‘indio’ should?
Not only did the construction of a myth of vanished ‘indios’ 
 structurally undermine Indigenous resistance by silencing communities, 
but it also did so by removing markers of identity from them – recasting 
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Indigenous people into moulds that dominant society deemed more 
useful. Numerous Indigenous performances in Pacific Nicaragua and in 
Northwest Costa Rica were marked for their uses of masks and as spiritual 
covenants with saints, characteristics that were acknowledged even into 
the 1960s (Borland 2006, 112). However, in both states these customs of 
Mangue-Chorotega people were branded as ‘lo típico’ culture and placed 
on display as such, both locally and abroad (Stocker 2013, 160). One 
such masked performance, El Güegüense, from Mangue-Chorotega pueb-
los indígenas in Nicaragua, was inscribed as World Intangible Cultural 
Heritage in 2008. This performance revolves around an Indigenous trick-
ster figure (Güegüense, whose name means roughly ‘The Wise One’) and 
his dealings with colonial authorities. Within the play, Indigenous lan-
guage and wilful misunderstandings are used to mock and resist colonial 
power, while appearing to co-operate with it.
The origins and meanings of El Güegüense have been debated and 
used to prove agendas of both the ‘inevitable triumph’ of mestizaje, or a 
class struggle in line with revolutionary ideologies of Sandinismo (see 
Field 1999). Both of those uses of El Güegüense take for granted mesti-
zaje and pueblos indígenas as classes (not cultures), but ignore Mangue-
Chorotega understandings of it as being performance of Indigenous 
resistance to colonisation (Field 1999, 169–212). Under the lens of mesti-
zaje, the very instruments of survival could be altered into one altogether 
changed – one with a memory of the past and present far different from 
the realities of the marginal people who needed them in the first place.
In the political world that came into being in the 1970s, Indigenous 
resistances and the people who carried them out were further worked 
into the revolutionary narratives and identity construction of the FSLN 
(Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional) in Nicaragua. Sandinista ora-
tors tapped into anti-colonial pasts and lionised Indigenous figures. Many 
people from pueblos indígenas felt that ‘[t]he fact that the Frente could 
respect our history kept our relationship with the Frente very close for a 
long time’ (de la Concepción cited in Field 1998, 438) – so close, indeed, 
that pueblos indígenas took up arms against the Somoza dictatorship in 
co-operation with the FSLN (even though they did so as a  continuation 
of a long series of Indigenous rebellions).
At the same time, in Costa Rica, a legal process recognised eight 
Indigenous groups and established territorios indígenas (Stocker 2013, 
154), now numbering 24. One community in Guanacaste, Matambú cam-
paigned for the designation under the understanding that the  government 
would purchase land owned by recent settlers and redistributed to 
Chorotega (ibid). Reservation status was eventually given to them in 1980.
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Despite political shifts seemingly in favour of Indigenous people 
in the late 1970s and 1980s, however, benefits to those who had been 
tied into state identity did not manifest. The Monimboseño (Mangue-
Chorotega) intellectual Flavio Gamboa remarked on the post-Revolution 
relationship in Nicaragua:
The Frente recognized the rights of Indians only on the Atlantic 
Coast; the costesos were against the revolution, but they got 
 autonomy. The Indians of the Pacific were always in favor of the rev-
olution, but they got nothing. 
(Field 1998, 439)
And, indeed, despite leading revolts which sprang life into the  Nicaraguan 
Revolution, the compass of ‘real’ Indigenous pointed to the Atlantic coast 
shortly after the FSLN victory.
For Chorotega in Costa Rica, designation of Matambú was fraught 
with problems. Some community members resented it, either because 
of a wish to avoid social stigma or out of the implications that Chorotega 
communities in the rest of Guanacaste would not be legally respected 
as being Indigenous. Despite having everything but geography in com-
mon, according to the language of the Reservation Status only Chorotega 
already within the territorio indígena could be called Indigenous and own 
land in the territory. As a direct result of the contrived establishment, the 
indigeneity of all Chorotega people was called into question. Due to their 
similarities with allegedly non-Indigenous neighbours, the narrative of 
mestizaje reared its head again. As a result:
In the case of the Chorotega … history denied Chorotega identity, 
law imposed it and delimited it within specific places and social 
 science decried its authenticity. 
(Stocker 2013, 160)
The myth of mestizaje and the co-option of Indigenous heritages have 
rendered Indigenous people invisible in plain sight. Not only are identi-
ties trivialised and diminished, but the stigmas and negative impacts that 
are placed on ‘indios’ remain, regardless of dominant society’s accept-
ance of them as being ‘real’ indios or not. The community of Matambú 
still suffers from the humiliations placed on them for being Indigenous, 
and yet the questioning of their authenticity by social scientists has dis-
qualified them from receiving an equal portion of government funding 
which is provided to territorios indígenas (Stocker 2013, 157). And for 
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the pueblos indígenas that fought alongside the Sandinistas, part of their 
repayment was to again be rendered into classes of campesinos or artesa-
nos. All the while, the intangible heritage of Indigenous peoples such as 
the Chorotega continues to be lo típico.
‘Sí, soy puro indio’
Stories about Indigenous people are almost always about destruction, 
loss and tragedy. I refuse to tell only those stories.
The situation for Indigenous people in Central America (and the 
rest of the world) is a difficult one. Those qualities of loss and inequal-
ity are very real and should never be trivialised. However, to colour the 
entire existence of Indigenous people in this way is to feed the lie that 
we are destined to extinction. This ignores the vibrancy and resilience of 
Indigenous bodies and cultures, even in the face of forbidding difficulties. 
Pueblos indígenas in Central America have survived for five  centuries, 
producing beautiful expressions of their cultures along the way.
That Indigenous people fight to safeguard and maintain control over 
their tangible heritages is a familiar subject to both academic discourse 
and to journalism. Examples from Central America have been used in this 
chapter to highlight the ways in which this region fits into the wider pic-
ture of struggle and defiance. But the appropriation and weaponisation 
of the intangible is a less straightforward matter. The force of mestizaje 
has entangled the Indigenous with dominant societies which have long 
been in opposition. Assertions of Indigenous identity have come in many 
forms, in response to this force.
Denial of the authenticity of certain Indigenous identities fall on 
those cultures which ‘appear’ to not be the tropic images of an ‘indio’; the 
ones who have had aspects of their cultures seized for the  settler-state 
nation-building projects. Settler images and understandings of what 
 constitutes being ‘really’ Indigenous are often degrading, and their colo-
nial definitions (sometimes offered as an ‘olive branch’) may be met with 
outright rejection, deemed to be both patronising and meaningless to 
the lives of the Indigenous peoples being so ‘defined’ (Field 1995; 1998, 
432). In other contexts the very images which are stereotyped have made 
their way into Indigenous performance as a wilful signal to outsiders of 
staking an Indigenous claim to intangible heritage. It would be mislead-
ing to consider actions of ‘playing up’ tropic, colonised understandings 
of the ‘Indian’ as accepting of coloniality or as a cynical pandering for the 
sake of attracting tourist income. Rather, as Stocker has observed:
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It is a product of history in a place that denied Indigenous existence 
for centuries, followed by a legal system that recognized it, encap-
sulated it in reservations, and sought to assimilate it. The ‘success’ 
of such assimilation projects is evident in the fact that in order to 
present Chorotega Indigenous imagery today, it must be done 
through artefacts left over from a past when Indigenous existence 
was undeniable, or it must follow stereotypes plain enough to be 
recognized as Indian in a nation whose appropriation of Indigenous 
traditions has rendered them ineffective at evoking recognition of 
their Chorotega origins. 
(Stocker 2013, 152)
Evoking ancestral images, those of the prehispanic past, is a tool for mod-
ern Indigenous peoples in Central America. The objects left behind by 
those who came before continue to find relevance for survivance of their 
descendants. One of the criteria of Indigenous identity which Matambú 
listed in their bid to become a territorio indígena was an ‘abundance of 
prehispanic artefacts in the area’ (Stocker 2013, 154). Elsewhere, art 
styles from prehispanic artefacts have found their way into the works 
of modern artisans – connecting themselves and their work with that of 
their ancestors, and bringing recent archaeological interpretations into 
their conversations (Weil 2004, 245).
Revivals in products using prehispanic designs may be recent in 
some places; in others they may have been maintained for a much longer 
period, as they are passed from people to people. And while the entan-
glement with state identities and Indigenous artistic creation facilitates 
the appropriation of designs for their use in tourism industries (retail and 
marketing), engagement with intellectual property laws and adoption of 
trademarks is becoming increasingly prevalent to enforce Indigenous 
claims to their cultures (Aragon 2012, 273). An example of this is the 
communities engaging with Costa Rica’s Ministry of Culture to reach an 
agreement of a trademark for Chorotega Ceramics, specifically aimed at 
reproductions for sale in museums and heritage sites (WIPO 2016, 26).
The very mechanisms which were used to assist in the advancement 
of mestizaje, the historic writings of conquistadors and legal  documents 
appealing to colonial powers for the award of non-Indigenous social stand-
ings, are now the basis from which individuals and communities assert 
their indigeneity (Romero Vargas 1988, 490 cited in Field 1998, 437; 
Stocker 2013, 151). The Indigenous characteristics of some organisations 
in Central America have been questioned by historians and social scien-
tists, because of their adaptations under colonial power (Field 1998, 434). 
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While institutions among Indigenous communities may have suffered par-
tial dismantling, or disruption, the understanding of their authenticity, 
and their importance to communities themselves, should not be trivial-
ised. Even if they have been ‘latinised’, these organisations can be ‘pow-
erful predictors of present-day measures of socioeconomic development’ 
(Angeles and Elizalde 2017). Nor should the actions of these communities 
in fostering relationships with dominant political parties and their state 
officials be dismissed as co-option or collusion, as such interactions can 
make the ‘creation of local knowledge in the struggles against extrac-
tive capital more explicit’ (Savino 2016, 406). Even the appropriation 
of Indigenous culture, such as El Güegüense, into state identity and con-
stitutional language can undermine neoliberal and colonial authorities 
(Cupples and Glynn 2018, 11).
Through remembering and using the past, while adapting to the 
present, Indigenous peoples have survived genocides – and will con-
tinue to do so. Many of the people who identify as mestizo do so to avoid 
anti-Indigenous abuse and to ensure their family’s survival. There are 
those who are yet asleep, dreaming of the Indigenous, unaware that 
mestizaje is something that can be rejected. As images of ‘los indios’ are 
navigated and used to raise Indigenous voices and combat social stigmas, 
some of those ‘mestizos’ may awaken. The power of mestizaje is one that 
can be grappled with, taking back intangible heritage from state power 
and becoming an instrument for Indigenous survival.
Just like The Wise One would have done.
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‘Rescuing’ the ground from under 
their feet? Contract archaeology 
and human rights violations in the 
Brazilian Amazon
Bruna Cigaran da Rocha
The Tapajós river basin is inhabited by several Indigenous peoples and 
traditional communities, collectively known as forest peoples. The cul-
tural heritage of forest peoples includes sacred places as well as day-to-
day locations where significant events occurred within the lifetime of 
community members. Archaeological sites dating from the late Pleisto-
cene to living memory integrate this heritage, as do areas with no visible 
cultural remains. The specific ways of life of forest peoples are intimately 
related to the territories they occupy, and also form part of their heritage.
The Brazilian Federal Government and a number of private com-
panies have been building 43 large (i.e. producing over 30 megawatts) 
hydroelectric dams along the Tapajós and its tributaries (Fearnside 
2015; 2016), Fig.10.1. This equates to transforming vast, free-flowing 
rivers into a series of lakes by flooding extensive areas. Despite the inclu-
sion of archaeologists to carry out related studies and assessments, the 
construction of these dams is leading to the irreversible destruction of 
humanised landscapes and, consequently, to forest peoples’ heritage. To 
make matters worse, the work has been conducted in a wider context 
of human rights violations, where local opposition to the dams has seen 
the state employ military force to protect private interests. The ‘salvag-
ing’ of archaeological remains in such contexts – undertaken without the 
free, prior and informed consent of the forest peoples affected – is para-
doxical, since these projects are in fact leading to the discontinuation of 
unique and irreplaceable ways of life.
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Figure 10.1 Dams and projected flooded areas along the Tapajós 
basin. Map by Maurício Torres.
On the Tapajós, the dams that could destroy forest peoples’ heritage 
have not yet been built, but they are already leading to processes of ter-
ritorial expropriation and to human rights violations. On the Teles Pires 
river the four dams already built have led to the irreversible destruction 
of heritage of the utmost importance to forest peoples of the region. 
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This chapter considers both contexts, focusing particularly upon the 
Munduruku people and Beiradeiro communities – both of whom have 
been at the forefront of resistance to hydroelectric (and related) projects.
Places of history and culture treated as another open 
vein of Latin America
As they descend from the Brazilian shield towards the Amazon river, the 
waters of the main tributaries of the Tapajós, the Teles Pires, Juruena 
and Jamanxim rivers, as well as the upper course of the Tapajós river 
itself, pour over numerous falls, rapids and cascades (Fig.10.2). These 
geological features are intertwined with the basin’s millennial human 
past (for example, Honorato de Oliveira 2015; Simões 1976). The areas 
surrounding Amazonian river rapids can be understood as persistent 
places (as defined by Bowser and Zedeño 2009) that have acted as spaces 
of interaction between Amerindian peoples in the ancient – i.e. prior to 
AD 1500 – Amazonian past (Almeida 2013). At the lowermost rapids of 
the Tapajós, ‘hybrid’ ceramics suggest ancient interactions between the 
speakers of Tupian and Carib languages (Rocha 2017; forthcoming).1 
Following the European invasion of the Americas, the difficulty of nav-
igating the Tapajós’ rapids and tributaries meant they acted as a buffer, 
delaying Euro-Brazilian incursions and colonisation of the river’s upper 
reaches in contrast to its lower course (Rocha 2017) (Fig.10.3).
The geological characteristics of the Upper Tapajós and its tributar-
ies – comprising relatively narrow and deep watercourses – mean that 
dam builders see these river stretches as propitious for the generation of 
hydroelectric power. In addition, because of the geographical location of 
the Tapajós, Teles Pires and Juruena, agribusiness sees these rivers as an 
ideal route to connect centres of grain production in central Brazil with 
an exit to the north of the country (Alarcon et al. 2016), leading into 
the Amazon river and so to the Atlantic. The construction of the Tapajós 
basin dams and related infrastructure is being undertaken through part-
nerships involving the Brazilian state energy company and consortiums 
of national enterprises from countries including China, France, Portugal 
and Spain.
The aims of dam construction are to supply the mining industry 
with subsidised energy to exploit the area’s vast mineral reserves and to 
create a vast industrial waterway to move commodities (i.e. soy) cheaply 
from the nation’s interior to the coast (Alarcon et al. 2016; Branford 
2016). Ultimately, dam construction advances the frontiers of industrial 
172 CRIT ICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURAL MEMORY AND HERITAGE
Figure 10.3 The lower course of the Tapajós, in contrast, is wide and 
accessible to large watercraft, including industrial barges. Photograph 
by Bruna da Rocha. 
Figure 10.2 The waters of the Upper Tapajós, Jamanxim, Juruena and 
Teles Pires rivers are characterised by a large number of rapids, making 
navigation hazardous. Photograph by Bruna da Rocha. 
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civilisation into traditionally occupied territories. To secure the passage 
of large barges, the turbulent rapids of these rivers must be submerged 
or dynamited for the construction of locks. This project for the Tapajós 
river basin – to supply highly concentrated industries with energy, or to 
provide a channel for commodities – entirely disregards the perspectives 
of the region’s forest peoples (Fig.10.4).
The forest peoples of the Tapajós
The ethnographic composition of the Tapajós is diverse, including different 
Indigenous peoples and traditional communities. Arawak, Tupian, Carib and 
Gê language stocks are represented and isolated languages, belonging to 
the Iranxe and Nambiquara language families, are also spoken. Traditional 
communities do not necessarily see themselves as Indigenous, but they also 
live collectively and in close relation to the surrounding environment. Both 
Indigenous peoples and traditional communities live in traditionally occu-
pied territories. This concept relates to the construction of specific identities 
alongside the construction of specific territories (Almeida 2004, 29).
Figure 10.4 Cargill’s terminal at the town of Santarém, on the lower 
Tapajós, from where soy is shipped off down the Amazon river and into 
the Atlantic Ocean. Photograph by Vinicius Honorato de Oliveira. 
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To these forest peoples, the rivers are a source of vital sustenance 
and transport. Not only this: their unwritten histories have taken place 
along these many river rapids. Their collective memories are based on 
oral transmission and are anchored upon specific geographical markers 
within their territories – something that is fundamental to their identi-
ties. These markers are meaningful places that dot the Tapajós river and 
its tributaries. They may or may not be defined strictly as archaeological 
‘sites’, in the sense that they may or may not contain material vestiges 
from past human activity (Munduruku people 2013a; Pugliese Jr and 
Valle 2015; Torres 2008; 2014; Rocha 2017). As such, however, these 
places – and their significance – tend to be imperceptible to outsiders.
Among the Indigenous peoples, speakers of Tupian languages 
are prevalent. Their presence stretches far back into the past: linguis-
tic research proposes that the Tupian language stock is between 4000–
6000 years old and originated along the headwaters of the southern 
Amazonian tributaries (Rodrigues 1964; 2007; Urban 2006 [1992], 92).
The Munduruku
The Munduruku are Tupian speakers who today number around 13,000 
people, constituting the most numerous Amerindian collectivity in the 
basin (Fig.10.5). Their rapid expansion from the upper reaches of the 
Tapajós river into the Lower Tapajós and adjacent areas began in the latter 
half of the eighteenth century, leading the entire river to become ‘Mundu-
ruku country’. Following this great expansion, from the second half of the 
 nineteenth century Munduruku territory would begin to fragment as the 
frontiers of national society pushed into the Upper Tapajós and Lower Teles 
Pires and Juruena rivers. Currently, the Munduruku are distributed among 
14 Indigenous lands in different stages of the recognition process by the 
Brazilian state. In accordance with their long occupation of the region, 
however, what they understand to be their territory goes far beyond these 
delimited areas (Loures 2017, 179; Munduruku people 2013a).
Among the areas that the Munduruku inhabit is the Sawre Muybu 
Indigenous Land, known to them as Daje Kapap Eïpi. This is located near 
the limits between the Upper and Lower Tapajós, but official recognition of 
this territory has been hampered by a series of setbacks. According to the 
Brazilian constitution, officially recognised Indigenous territories cannot 
be flooded by dam construction, nor can their occupants be forcibly relo-
cated. Because of the federal government’s interest in building dams on the 
Tapajós – as the then president of the National Indian Foundation, FUNAI 
(to give the Brazilian acronym) would later admit to the Munduruku – this 
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recognition process is not yet complete. It has resulted in a state of land 
insecurity for the Munduruku of Daje Kapap Eïpi.
A fundamental heritage category for the Munduruku consists of 
sacred places. These can be potent features in the landscape, archaeolog-
ical sites or more discreet locales; access can be restricted except to the 
initiated. They are often salient topographical features and may house 
supernatural entities, such as spirit mothers of fish or game animals, or 
they may be where significant mythical-historical events occurred. In the 
1950s anthropologist Robert Murphy observed that to the Munduruku, 
‘The single most important class of supernaturals believed to be active in 
the world are the spirit mothers of the game animals’ (Murphy 1958, 13).
The Beiradeiros
The Beiradeiros live along the western bank of the Upper Tapajós in a 
territory called Montanha and Mangabal.2 They are one among the 
many communities of forest dwellers scattered throughout the region, 
having inhabited the area for at least eight generations. In addition to 
being descended from the migrants who came from the arid Brazilian 
northeast to tap rubber, the Beiradeiros are also descended from Amer-
indians – particularly Indigenous women – who married or were made to 
marry the rubber tappers (Torres 2008, 99–102).
Figure 10.5 Munduruku General Assembly at Sai Cinza village in 
early 2013. The sign in the background reads ‘We want the Tapajós alive 
forever’. Photograph by Vinicius Honorato de Oliveira. 
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Like the Munduruku, the Beiraderos have also suffered a significant 
reduction of their original territory. The map produced by Col. Raymundo 
Pereira Brazil, a rubber baron of the Tapajós in the early twentieth century, 
shows the upper course of the Tapajós lined with place names given by the 
rubber tappers who then occupied its eastern and western banks; many 
of these names are still used today. In the 1940s the Beiradeiros moved 
en masse to the river’s west bank after attacks by Kayapó Indians; author-
ities expelled them from within the limits of the newly created Amazon 
National Park in the early 1970s (Torres and Figueiredo 2005). Yet the 
places the Beiradeiros left behind remain charged with memories. Such 
is the case of cemeteries where their ancestors were buried (Fig.10.6), but 
there are less obvious instances, too. Torres (2014, 239–40) explains:
Memory is referenced through and in space. A seringueira (Hevea bra-
siliensis) tree [where, 60 years ago, Dona Clarinda savoured animated 
amorous encounters with Alvarês, which she claims twisted the 
tree’s trunk] or the buriti (Mauritia flexuosa) forest, where Seu Chico 
Caititu narrates a fantastical confrontation with two jaguars at the 
same time; the beach where, when still a girl, Dona Tereza Lobo was 
washing dishes when she was caught by a sucuriju (anaconda) snake, 
but was then saved by her father; the place where once a tree trunk of 
an old rubber boss stood, where several rubber tappers were tortured 
and killed, and where, still today, apparitions can be seen and heard.
Figure 10.6 At a protest against logging concessions, Beiradeiros 
make reference to the fact that they have ancient cemeteries on the 
eastern bank of the river. Photograph by Barbara Dias. 
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In 2006 the Beiradeiros won an historic judicial victory that rec-
ognised their collective land rights over those of landgrabbers who had 
forged documents denying their protracted presence in the area. They 
then began to campaign for recognition of their territory by the state as 
an Extractive Reserve (RESEX), to help them guarantee their way of life 
and their collective ownership of the territory. However, the government 
decided that the RESEX process should not go ahead because it would 
interfere with the plans to build hydroelectric dams.3 Following years of 
insecurity, the Beiradeiros finally achieved official recognition of their 
collectively owned territory (in a modality known as an Agroextractivist 
Settlement Project) in 2013. This does not enjoy the same level of protec-
tion as an Extractivist Reserve, however.
The very identity of the Beiradeiros is inextricably linked to their rela-
tionship with the river; the term itself means ‘those who live on the river-
banks’ (in this case, of the Tapajós). If the São Luiz, Jatobá and Chacorão 
dams are built, this landscape will be transformed beyond recognition.
The importance of territory
The land rights of both the Beiradeiros and the Munduruku were there-
fore impacted by the Tapajós dams even before construction got under-
way. Torres (2008) explains the close relationship between territory and 
the identity of the Beiradeiros:
They would not only lose the place they lived in and from which 
they drew their livelihoods, because … that form of life structures 
itself around the land – but further, of that land, specifically. The 
education of the children, the organisation of work, the structure of 
the family, sociability – ultimately, all the many spheres of that pop-
ulation’s life are articulated around and mediated by the territory 
they occupy. The loss of this territory means the extinction of that 
way of life and of that culture, unique and exclusive to that place. 
(Torres 2008, 313, italics in original)
This analysis can also be applied to the Munduruku: as Rozeninho Saw 
Munduruku once stated, ‘We are nothing without [our] land’.4 Research-
ers working within such contexts participate – inadvertently or not – in 
projects that openly violate the right to land of forest peoples and, funda-
mentally, to their historically constructed, unique ways of living in spe-
cific places that are far from being virgin forest.
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Environmental licensing: a ‘bureaucratic ritual 
of territorial occupation’5
Since 1986 Brazilian legislation requires studies to analyse the ways in 
which infrastructure projects can affect the environment or society dur-
ing or after their construction. This involves the production of Environ-
mental Impact Studies and Reports (Portuguese acronym, EIA-RIMA). In 
theory, this should allow for both the evaluation of the probable impacts 
of planned construction and later evaluation of the actual impacts on 
society, the environment and the local and regional economy, as well 
as on cultural heritage. Studies related to environmental licensing are 
organised into phases, which relate to the different stages and licences 
given to the construction project (i.e. prior to construction, during con-
struction and finally in operation).
One of the legacies of the construction of the Balbina hydroelec-
tric dam in the state of Amazonas in the 1980s, however, was to turn 
the environmental licensing process into an exercise in rubber stamping 
(Fearnside 2016, 38–9).
Environmental licensing brings together a complex network of state 
and private actors. The former comprises various state agencies with dif-
ferent missions: FUNAI, for instance, is supposed to protect the consti-
tutional rights of Indigenous peoples, while the Ministry of Mines and 
Energy (which yields far more clout, in terms of power and resources) 
advances the interests of the mining sector, closely allied to private inter-
ests. Private actors range from Brazilian and multinational energy cor-
porations to specialised consultancies (including archaeological/cultural 
heritage outfits), which are paid by the dam consortiums to carry out the 
environmental assessments. Social and cultural elements are subsumed 
within these ‘environmental’ assessments. Here they receive substan-
tially less attention and tend to be treated as ‘subjective’, in contrast with 
elements related to the so-called ‘hard’ sciences (Folhes 2016, 146–8).
The marked expansion of archaeological licensing work, particu-
larly from 2007 when the government launched its ‘Growth Acceleration 
Program’, has led to the commodification of the archaeological discipline in 
Brazil and has acted to legitimate dam and infrastructure projects, portray-
ing them as enablers of the ‘discovery’ of archaeological remains (Bezerra 
2015, 823 and 824). From 2002 ‘Heritage Education’ became a further 
requirement of archaeological licensing work. Through such projects, the 
state has advanced its preservationist discourse and promoted the stand-
ardisation of the perception of material culture and the past (Bezerra 2015, 
823). On the execution of Heritage Education projects, Bezerra writes:
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Ideas, activities and results from dozens of projects are known only 
to the people directly involved. The materials produced in these 
projects reveal many problems, such [as] inadequate languages; 
the extreme simplification of contents; a total disregard of local his-
tories; and the lack of a critical perspective (Bezerra 2010). Local 
communities suffer the collateral effect of HE [heritage education] 
programs, purportedly alleviated by a number of booklets and by 
senseless educational kits. The main collateral effect is the idea that 
HE programs serve, indeed, to educate otherwise uneducated peo-
ple, in this case about their own heritage. 
(Bezerra 2015, 826)
A further – and fundamental – problem is that there is no clear frame-
work for implementing the right of Indigenous peoples and traditional 
communities to be consulted in relation to infrastructure projects that 
will impact their territories and ways of life. The Brazilian Constitution 
of 1988 recognises the right of Indigenous peoples to their own beliefs, 
customs and traditions; since 2002 Brazil has also been a signatory to 
the 169 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Convention of the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO). This stipulates that Indigenous peoples 
should have the right to free, informed and prior consultation regarding 
projects undertaken in or near their territories. The Convention consti-
tutes an important mechanism to guarantee the rights of ethnic minori-
ties within democratic systems (Camões Boaventura 2018).6
Although environmental licensing programmes foresee moments 
of ‘public meetings’ that should in theory allow members of the public 
to question projects that will affect them, these are often more of a ‘PR 
exercise’: information presented is not impartial and procedures for par-
ticipation tend to exclude local people. Such meetings operate more as a 
tick-box exercise than as a real opportunity for the public to voice their 
opposition – and for this opposition to be incorporated into the project 
design, or even to lead to the cancellation of projects. Two journalists 
who witnessed a public meeting held for the São Manoel dam (built on 
the Teles Pires river) in September 2013 reported that zero participation 
from local people was permitted (Branford and Fernandez 2013).
Guns and reports: Operation Tapajós
In 2005–6 scientists began travelling to the Upper Tapajós river to con-
duct the studies required by Brazil’s environmental licensing legislation 
for the Jatobá and São Luiz do Tapajós dams. These were undertaken for 
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the first stage known as ‘Inventory Studies’, which involves widespread 
surveys of the area to be impacted. A few years later, with the political 
decision to build the dams already taken, researchers would return for 
the next phase, known as EIA-RIMA.
In 2012 an initiative called ‘Diálogo Tapajós’ (‘Tapajós Dialogue’), 
set up by the Tapajós Study Group,7 began to fabricate a consultation pro-
cess with the Beiradeiros. This ironically named initiative ‘informed’ the 
Beiradeiros that the São Luiz do Tapajós and Jatobá dams would inevitably 
be built, and that the Beiradeiros’ ‘options’ were to be relocated, compen-
sated or to receive credit (Monteiro and Rodrigues 2012). In this attempt 
psychologically to undermine the Beiradeiros’ resistance, cancellation of 
the dam projects was simply not put forward as an alternative open to them.
By 2012, however, the Munduruku resistance movement Ipereğ Ayũ,8 
which had the Tapajós dams as its principal target, had begun to demon-
strate its opposition to dam projects in the region. Ipereğ Ayũ had realised 
that if they allowed environmental impact studies to proceed, it would be 
impossible to halt dam construction. They began to demand their right to 
be consulted in accordance with Article 231 of the Brazilian Constitution 
and with the ILO’s 169 Convention. The Beiradeiros followed suit. In 2014 
both the Munduruku and the Beiradeiros drew up their own ‘consultation 
protocols’; these specified the manner in which they could be informed 
and the ways in which they could take collective decisions in conform-
ity with their cultural specificities. However, members of the government 
stated that the Beiradeiros did not have the right to be consulted like the 
Munduruku.9 They also claimed that the outcome of consultations would 
in any case not have the power to stop the continuation of projects.10
In response to the Munduruku’s protests, on 25 March 2013 the 
government launched Operation Tapajós. This saw heavily armed per-
sonnel drafted into the area to accompany researchers tasked with con-
ducting technical studies for the EIA-RIMAs of the São Luiz and Jatobá 
hydroelectric dams. The government justified this by claiming the armed 
personnel were there simply to protect researchers because the region 
was ‘dangerous’.
For the Munduruku, this brought back vivid memories of the ‘day 
of terror’ they had experienced on the Teles Pires river in early November 
2012. On that occasion the Brazilian Federal Police and National Security 
Guard had descended with full force upon the Munduruku village of Teles 
Pires in the state of Mato Grosso, resulting in the death of Adenilson Kirixi 
Munduruku (Rocha, Valle et al. 2013; Branford and Torres 2017a; b).
At the end of March 2013, the Munduruku of Sawre Muybu were ter-
rified by a military incursion into their territory. A helicopter repeatedly 
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circled over the village of Sawre Muybu, at times flying so close to the 
houses that the palm thatch roofs were blown off. The Munduruku 
did not feel safe to leave village areas to go to their manioc gardens, to 
collect wild fruits or to hunt, lest they come across researchers accom-
panied by heavily armed guards. The danger – particularly to hunters 
who normally carried rifles – was evident, and people went hungry as 
a result (Valle 2013).11 A similar sense of fear and intimidation affected 
the Beiradeiros at Mangabal, where another contingent of armed guards 
had been drafted to accompany researchers working to produce the 
Jatobá dam studies.
On 16 April 2013 a Federal Appeals Court finally suspended the 
operation. Researchers, including archaeologists working for consultan-
cies, continued to conduct studies for the São Luiz and Jatobá dams. By 
then the word pesquisador (researcher) had acquired extremely negative 
connotations among forest peoples of the region, having become synon-
ymous with outsiders working for the dam consortium.
A few months later, in June 2013, members of Ipereğ Ayũ detained 
a group of 25 researchers employed by a construction company called 
Concremat, which was funding environmental impact assessment stud-
ies related to the Jatobá dam (Loures 2017, 178–85). The Munduruku 
found them in an area containing rock art considered sacred by the 
Munduruku (Munduruku people 2013a). They confiscated the flora and 
fauna collected by the scientists and held three researchers captive for 
two days. In an open letter entitled ‘Researchers, do not enter our lands’, 
the Munduruku forbade researchers from entering their lands (see 
Munduruku people 2013d).
The Munduruku released the hostages upon receiving a guarantee 
by representatives of FUNAI that they would be consulted about the dam 
projects and the continuation of impact assessment studies. Less than a 
month later, however, researchers working for Concremat had returned – 
this time under armed escort, provided by the country’s National Security 
Guard (Loures and Torres 2017).
The Munduruku and Beiradeiro strategy of resistance related to 
environmental licensing on the Tapajós river proper eventually met with 
some success. On 4 August 2016 the Environmental Impact Studies of 
the São Luiz do Tapajós dam were considered insufficient by IBAMA, the 
Environment Agency responsible for conceding the licence, and the pro-
ject was suspended. One of the principal elements leading to this decision 
was that the dam’s construction would lead to the forced relocation of 
the Munduruku of Daje Kapap Eïpi (officially known as Sawre Muybu) – 
something that is unconstitutional under Brazilian law.
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On the Teles Pires, ecocide and ethnocide are two sides 
of the same coin12
Meanwhile, as the eyes of the world were focused on the Belo Monte dam 
on the Xingu river, the Brazilian Environment Agency, IBAMA, issued the 
licences authorising the construction of the Teles Pires and São Manoel 
dams. These duly went into operation in 2014 and 2017 respectively,13 
in spite of the fact that the dams did not fulfil all the requirements of 
FUNAI and IPHAN. The Environmental Impact Studies of both these 
dams repeatedly downplayed the impacts and risks associated with their 
construction and implementation. There was no proper consultation of 
Indigenous peoples and traditional communities, as required by the ILO 
169 Convention. Nor were specific impacts upon Indigenous peoples 
given due attention – indeed, the ‘Indigenous component studies’ focused 
upon specific impacts to Indigenous peoples were not even undertaken 
for the Teles Pires dam (Fórum Teles Pires 2017, 4–6).
Though a series of rulings were issued that should have para-
lysed the construction and subsequent operation of the dams, these 
were repeatedly overturned through the deployment of a mechanism 
called ‘security suspension’ (suspensão de segurança) (see Oliveira and 
Vieira 2016; Trindade et al. 2016). Created during the Brazilian mil-
itary dictatorship, this mechanism was employed in conjunction with 
allegations that dam construction was justified in terms of ‘national 
security’.
The Teles Pires dam destroyed the Sete Quedas Rapids, a sacred place 
of paramount importance to the Munduruku, Apiaká and Kayabi peoples. 
For the Munduruku, this was where the spirits of the dead travelled to:
… Paribixexe: this is a beautiful waterfall with seven falls in the form 
of a stairway. This is the place where the dead are living, the heaven 
of the dead, which is to say, the world of the living, the kingdom of the 
dead. It is a sacred place for the Munduruku, Kayabi and Apiaká 
people, and also where diverse species and sizes of fish procreate, 
where the mother of the fish resides. On the walls can be seen rock 
paintings left by Muraycoko, father of writing, inscriptions left for 
the Munduruku since remote times by the hand of Surabudodot. 
There are also funerary urns buried at this place, the graveyard of 
our ancient warriors. There is also a portal there that cannot be 
seen by ordinary men, but rather is only visible to spiritual leaders, 
shamans. 
(Munduruku people 2013a)
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Because these rapids have been dynamited and submerged, the spirits of 
the dead no longer have a place to go. They also housed spirit mothers 
of the fish. Migratory fish spawned at Sete Quedas every year – meaning 
that these rapids played a fundamental role in regional ecosystems and 
in the food supply of dozens of communities.
In the Environmental Impact Study for the Teles Pires dam, the 
cultural importance of the Sete Quedas Rapids was reduced, being 
referred in generic terms as ‘symbolic’ for the inhabitants of the munic-
ipality of Parnaíta. No reference was made to the specific significance 
of the rapids for the Apiaká, Kayabi and Munduruku peoples (Usina 
Hidrelétrica Teles Pires, 2010, vol.4, chapter 5, 270). The importance 
of Sete Quedas to the Indians had been widely known. Yet studies 
related to the cultural heritage of the area were still able to proceed 
(Pugliese Jr and Valle 2015).
The archaeological consultancy conducting the environmen-
tal licensing of the Teles Pires dam excavated 12 vessels that the 
Munduruku claim to be funerary urns belonging to their ancestors. 
When the Munduruku discovered that whole vessels had been exca-
vated, they lodged a formal complaint with the Public Prosecution 
Service because of what they understood to be a violation of an ancient 
cemetery. During their occupation of the Belo Monte dam site in 2013, 
the Munduruku wrote on separate occasions that ‘You steal the bones 
of the ancients that are buried in our lands’ (Munduruku people 2013b) 
and ‘On the Teles Pires, the bones of our relatives, which are very 
ancient, were found. You are destroying a sacred place’ (Munduruku 
people 2013c).
In 2017 the Munduruku twice attempted to visit the excavated 
funerary urns and sacred places that have been destroyed on the Teles 
Pires river by travelling upstream to the São Manoel dam site (Fig.10.7). 
On the second occasion, in October 2017, they were met with the National 
Security Force and tear gas as they arrived.14 For the Munduruku, the 
implications of the destruction of these sacred places are deadly:
It is a time of death. The Munduruku will start dying. They will have 
accidents. Even simple accidents will lead to death. Lightning will 
strike and kill an Indian. A branch will fall from a tree and kill an 
Indian. It’s not chance. It’s all because the government interfered 
with a sacred site.
(Valmira Krixi Biwūn, interviewed by Sue Branford and Maurício 
Torres, November 2016)
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The dynamiting of the sacred site is the end of religion and the 
end of culture. It is the end of the Munduruku people. When they 
dynamited the waterfall [rapids], they dynamited the Mother of 
the Fish and the Mother of the Animals we hunt. So these fish 
and these animals will die. All that we are involved with will die. 
So this is the end of the Munduruku.
(Eurico Krixi Munduruku, interviewed by 
Sue Branford and Maurício Torres, November 2016).15
On 2 December 2016 the 5th Session of the Federal Appeals Court of 
the 1st Region (for which the Brazilian acronym is TRF1) unanimously 
ruled that the free, prior and informed consultation of the Kayabi, Mun-
duruku and Apiaká peoples impacted by the construction of the Teles 
Pires dam should have been undertaken in accordance with the ILO’s 
169 Convention. The appeals court judges also considered the operat-
ing licence for the Teles Pires dam to be invalid. The dam has already 
been built, however. A ruling is also to take place regarding the failure 
of the state to obey the ILO 169 Convention in relation to the São Luiz 
do Tapajós dam, which would impact both Munduruku and Beiradeiro 
territories.16
Figure 10.7 Munduruku visit the São Manoel dam on the Lower Teles 
Pires river. Photograph by Fernanda Moreira. 
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Closing remarks
Perhaps seeing themselves as ‘neutral’, scientists working for the Tapajós 
basin dams’ environmental licensing studies have been working within 
contexts of human rights violations and territorial expropriation. By con-
tinuing to work in these circumstances, these scientists have been com-
plicit in the oppression of the forest peoples of the Tapajós basin.
The construction of the Teles Pires and São Manoel dams has 
inflicted irreversible destruction upon the cultural heritage of the 
region’s Indigenous peoples. The dams on the Tapajós river threaten to 
aggravate this scenario, also affecting the Beiradeiros and other tradi-
tional communities. In these contexts, archaeological ‘rescue’ operations 
have become part of a machinery employed to legitimise the partial or 
complete destruction of traditionally occupied territories, and the con-
comitant expropriation of forest peoples living in them. Thus, while ‘sal-
vaging’ archaeological samples from destruction, archaeological ‘rescue’ 
work paradoxically comes to integrate a process that will result in the dis-
continuation of traditional ways of living and the annihilation of places 
vital to forest peoples. The responsibility for this is clear: ‘The thought-
less actions of archaeologists in development projects can turn them into 
kidnappers of the past, of history, and also of the fate and rights of the 
communities impacted’ (Bezerra 2015, 830).
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Notes
1. Recommendation no.260 – Casa Civil, 16 April 2008.
2. Recommendation no.260 – Casa Civil, 16 April 2008.
3. Recommendation no.260 – Casa Civil, 16 April 2008.
4. Statement given at the launch of the book Ocekadi: hidrelétricas, conflitos socioambientais e 
resistência na Bacia do Tapajós. Santarém, 28 June 2016.
5. Cf Folhes 2016.
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6. Avaliable at Amazonia Real [online], http://amazonia.org.br/2017/11/mpf-defende- 
obrigatoriedade-de-consultar-povos-afetados-por-empreendimentos-hidreletricos-
na-amazonia/?utm_source=akna&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Not% 
EDcias+da+Amaz%F4nia+-+28+de+novembro+de+2017. Accessed on 9 April 2018.
7. Composed of the Brazilian state energy companies Eletrobrás and Eletronorte and the private-
ly owned companies Brazilian Neoenergia, Camargo Corrêa, Copel, Cemig, French GDF Suez 
and EDF and Spanish Endesa Brasil.
8. Ipereğ Ayũ can mean the people ‘who know how to defend themselves’ or ‘who are not easy to 
trick’ or ‘who are difficult to catch’ (Loures and Torres 2017).
9. See for instance https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nYbR6ejV0ao&feature=youtu.be. 
 Accessed 19 May 2018.
10. An example of this can be seen here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zj1Pc6yAP0Q. 
 Accessed 19 May 2018.
11. Interview given to Instituto Humanitas Unisinos [online]. Avaliable at http://www.ihu.unis-
inos.br/entrevistas/operacao-tapajos-osmunduruku-nao-querem-guerra-entrevista- especial-
com-roani-valle. Accessed on 9 November 2016.
12. Cf Francisco Noelli (pers. comm., 15 January 2016).
13. The Teles Pires dam consortium is made up of Odebrecht, Voith, Alston, PCE and Intertechne. 
The São Manoel dam consortium is composed of China’s Three Gorges Corporation, Energia 
de Portugal and the Brazilian state company Furnas.
14. See https://news.mongabay.com/2018/04/ngos-denounce-tapajos-basin-intimidation- 
violence-brazil-inaction/.
15. See https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/the-end-of-a-people-amazon-dam-destroys- 
sacredmunduruku-heaven/. Accessed 5 January 2017.
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Order and disorder: Indigenous 
Australian cultural heritages and the 
case of settler-colonial ambivalence
Amanda Kearney
This chapter is a study in order and disorder, creation and destruction, 
viewed as separable but contingent events. Taking Indigenous Austral-
ian cultural heritages as the point of engagement, here configured as 
ancestral land and seascapes, this chapter explores the reflexive respon-
sibility that defines Indigenous relationships with heritage – in contrast 
to a broadly configured settler-colonial ambivalence to such heritage. It 
also discusses a series of events that led to the destruction of an ancestral 
dugong maintenance site in the Gulf of Carpentaria, northern Australia – 
a place of cultural significance to the Marra and Yanyuwa people.1
In considering how dispositions of responsive reflexivity, retreat 
and ambivalence co-exist within this context – and, more broadly, in rela-
tion to Australian Indigenous cultural heritages – this chapter lays bare 
the competing ontics that underscore and undermine heritage value, 
as well as efforts at safeguarding and ongoing sustenance of important 
heritage places in settler-colonial contexts. In the context of this chap-
ter, ontics are those aspects of everyday life that take on physical, real or 
factual elements of existence; this may take the form of human action or 
place features.
Framing the discussion of heritage and destruction through a dis-
course of order and disorder, which aligns with the theme of local empir-
icism, this chapter then examines how it is that competing axiologies, or 
theories of values, have emerged in relation to Indigenous cultural herit-
ages in Australia. The primary argument presented here is that axiolog-
ical retreat, as a form of ambivalence or ‘failure to care’ exhibited by the 
state and neoliberal economies, is a destructive ontology that can lead to 
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the decline and loss of cultural heritage. Destructive ontologies rely upon 
the refusal to recognise one domain as made up of self-affirmed, legiti-
mate, understandable and ordered elements and presences.
In Australia this translates to a denial of the integrity and empiri-
cism of Indigenous land and seascapes as made up of ancestral beings. 
Finding ways to shift this destructive ontology is a prevailing challenge 
in settler-colonial contexts. What is needed is an axiological return, made 
all the more urgent by Heider’s caution that ‘[d]estruction is easy and 
can be very swift, while construction often involves a long and difficult 
process’ (Heider 2005, 11).
I begin this discussion with some reflection on the principles of 
‘order and disorder’. An ordered state of being, in this context, occurs 
when heritage prevails and maintains a continued presence and rele-
vancy in a cultural group’s life at present. A disordered state is where this 
process is compromised, due to heritage being destroyed or erased – not 
only in a physical sense, but also in terms of censure around the social 
memories that support and sustain the ongoing health of cultural expres-
sions. When these begin to decline or to face opposition, due to lack of 
opportunity to engage with heritage (through legislative alienation, 
physical alienation and cognitive erasure), then heritage itself is compro-
mised and rendered disordered. It becomes out of sync with the people 
and cultural worlds that render it meaningful.
The view adopted here is that something has order as long as it is 
capable of self-restoration and relational pronouncement (in that it is 
known and declared). In those instances where incoming cultural agents 
impact negatively upon heritage – as witnessed, for example, in the colo-
nial history of settler Australian interactions with Indigenous peoples’ 
cultural heritages – disordering occurs among an otherwise ordered, 
known and meaningful phenomenon: that is, the living heritage, as the 
country of Aboriginal Australians.
Order and disorder in place
Order and disorder, creation and destruction are brought together often 
in discussions of cultural heritage, reflecting situations whereby heritage 
that has endured is subject to threat and loss. Destruction, precipitated by 
ontologies of harm or ambivalence, is an ongoing reality for Indigenous 
people. A ledger of ruination and obliteration marks an expanding phys-
ical and political presence of the settler-colonial state across Indigenous 
homelands. This process began in 1788 and is accompanied by the creep 
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of its neoliberal economies of extraction (amplified in more recent dec-
ades by a nationwide booming resource industry); see Stoler for a discus-
sion of ruination as a political project that ‘lays waste to certain peoples, 
relations and things that accumulate in specific places’ (Stoler 2012, 11).
Disorder in such contexts relies upon the existence of states of 
integrity – that is, an ordered cultural world in which people recognise 
and take inspiration from expressions, habits, practices and presences 
that verify their place in the world. Only that which is ordered can be dis-
ordered. In Australia this has been witnessed in the alienation of people 
from their ancestral homelands, the physical loss of place through extrac-
tive industries, the demolition of rock art sites, the erasure of landmarks 
as the bodies of ancestral beings and the desecration of sacred sites (see 
Burke and Smith 2010 and Smith and Ward 2000 for discussions of the 
broader conflicts regarding heritage).
For the purpose of this discussion, Indigenous cultural heritage is 
defined broadly as the geographical and spiritual cosmos within which 
the lives of Indigenous people take place and the context into which ances-
tral presences are etched. Places and the world of meaning through which 
an Indigenous people move are therefore expressions of cultural integrity 
and autonomy. Writ large across this heritage is an emotional geography – 
a world that triggers emotion as an affective state of consciousness, expe-
rienced in relational encounters with social memory, ancestral beings and 
contexts for identity projection. Places can make people feel healthy, rel-
evant, happy, content and nurtured (see Davidson et al. 2005, Davidson 
and Milligan 2004, Kearney 2009, Seamon 2012, 2014). These contexts 
locate human life in a nested ecology. In this the human position is that 
small, central, nested domain from which individuals perceive the world 
through their own subjective experiences (Wimberley 2009, ix).
In settler-colonial and intercultural spaces, place is endlessly rein-
terpreted in power struggles and through informal negotiations over 
their meaning and representation. In this vein, places can serve as pow-
erful tools for furthering the political vision of certain groups or insti-
tutions; but they can also be destroyed. Cultural heritage that takes the 
form of important places is one way of anchoring cultural identities, ver-
ifying existence and ensuring tangible and intangible points of gathering 
and affection for cultural constituents. The creation of heritage is multi-
faceted and may rely on human or nonhuman agency. Creation precedes 
destruction: the latter obliterates the former. As such they are related 
states, yet require ontologies that are diametrically opposed. Disorder 
and destruction compromise existence through the collapse of local 
empiricism. They make regeneration difficult, if not impossible.
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Order is understood here as a series of interactive states that lead 
to prospering, survival and ongoing interactions. Order evokes integrity 
in particular structural and functional properties, a concept that ensures 
the survival of functional properties for as long as they are called upon to 
support life. Disorder, on the other hand, invokes states of decline, disar-
ray, damage or loss of elements important to the whole. Where cultural 
heritage is taken as our point of reflection, ordered states allow for the 
integrity of heritage to prevail. They ensure ongoing human relations (as 
creation, maintenance and safeguarding), while disorder brings about 
destruction in physical forms. It results in the erosion of social memories 
attached to heritage and generates conditions in which the wholeness of 
heritage, as held in webs of social, cultural and political meaning, begins 
to fall away.
Destruction rarely takes heed of creation’s deep time, nor makes 
any concession to the complex tangible and intangible conditions that 
give rise to human cultural heritage. It brings rapid decline and erasure 
to vital parts of human existence. Creation, by contrast, is often a long 
and difficult process, whether involving human labour and physical 
effort to construct or requiring generations upon generations of people 
sharing the orality of ancestral connections.
The distressing reality of disordering actions and the ontologies 
that facilitate the decline of cultural heritage is that its creation is often 
steeped so deeply in time that it evades a temporal stamp. Too often cul-
tural heritage is simply understood as ‘having always been there’. The 
destructive ontologies explored throughout this chapter, both as ambiv-
alence and as a failure to care, distinguish settler-colonial engagements 
and treatments of Indigenous cultural heritages. While a generalising 
statement, a case is made for this ambivalence as a condition of deep 
colonising.
The concept of ambivalence is introduced by Rose (Rose 1996a, 6), 
then expanded by Seton and Bradley to distinguish the process of con-
quest that remains embedded within the institutions and practices of the 
settler-colonial state (Seton and Bradley 2005, 33). Claiming the conti-
nent, under the British Crown and by dint of the Doctrine of Discovery 
in 1788, required the creation of a ‘ground zero’: a designification of 
what was in place and in turn a resignification of desirous imaginaries on 
to the landmass (Rose 2004, Kearney 2017). Bearing in mind this land 
mass is also configured as distinct Indigenous nations using more than 
250 surviving Indigenous language groups, with many more at the point 
of initial colonisation, there are bound to be competing and contesting 
ontologies that exist in relation to heritage.
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Local empiricism and law
Place is distinguished by local empiricism and order: inherent sets of 
relations that distinguish the meaning and substance of a place (Kearney 
2017, 157). It is through incremental decline or the rapid assault of this 
order that it is prevented from enacting its own agency and liberties of 
rhythm are compromised. The local empiricism that gives rise to place 
is expressed through induction, causation and causal explanation, as 
grounded in place itself.
Induction – as the processes or actions that bring about or give rise 
to place – is a multifaceted concept. It may have tangible or intangible 
qualities, as processes of physical becoming or ancestral enlivening shape 
and inspire the place world. The induction of place order is an expres-
sion of how the world comes to be as it is; its ability to sustain and thrive 
is embroiled in relations of cause and effect, into which human life is 
recruited as kin, relational other, co-presence or agent of harm. The nature 
and effect of these relations are powerfully expressed through commu-
nicative events in place. These in turn articulate not only the character of 
place but also its biography, as populated by multifarious co-presences.
According to kincentric ecology, which distinguishes many 
Indigenous conceptions of place and cultural heritage as linked to land 
and seascapes, human life is one part of place’s local empiricism; it plays 
a role in the experience, rhythm and distinctiveness of place (see Salmón 
2000). As co-presences and kin, this role is vital to maintaining the integ-
rity of place order. When local empiricism is upheld, then integrity – 
defined as a form of coherence, holism and durability – converges into 
an order of resilience.
Resilience as a capacity to sustain or adapt in the face of adver-
sity, when bound to a kincentric view of life, requires both people and 
place to experience life simultaneously. The linking of resilience with 
kinship is echoed by Skolimowski’s concept of living in ‘right relations’ 
(Skolimowski 1993, 7). As an extension of this integrity, to be in a crit-
ical intimacy with place is to live in reverence, or ‘empathy fused with 
reverence’ (Skolimowski 1993, 7). He has further noted that ‘Living with 
reverence on the earth is to watch, notice and live in heightened contact’ 
(Skolimowski 1993, 7), conditions which support a kincentric ecology as 
well as the health of the land and sea as heritage.
Indigenous Australian cultures and heritages are grounded in the 
importance of country – that is, the land, seas and waters that hold the 
ancestral Law for Indigenous language groups. The land and sea form a 
canvas on to and through which ancestral activity is always present and 
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moving. It is the action of ancestral beings that shapes the very terms of 
existence for Indigenous groups. Rose writes of Indigenous homelands as 
country – that is, a ‘nourishing terrain’ and ‘a place that gives and receives 
life. Not just imagined or represented, it is lived in and lived with’ (Rose 
1996b, 7). Many Indigenous people talk about country in the same way 
that they would refer to a person: they speak to country, sing to country, 
visit country, worry about country, feel sorry for country and long for 
country. People say that country knows, hears, smells, takes notice, takes 
care and is sorry or happy.
Country is therefore not a generalised or undifferentiated type of 
place. Rather, it is a living entity with a yesterday, today and tomorrow: 
it possesses a consciousness, and an enduring will towards life (Rose 
1996b:7). Country is fathomed in equal parts through an understanding 
of tangible and intangible cultural expressions. Yet the act of separating 
these two forms is futile. It is at once both and all that is in between. 
Country is kin, language, Law, human and nonhuman; it is past and pres-
ent; it is land, water, resources, elements and sentiency.
Country is the socially constructed and culturally delimited presence 
and scene for the everyday life in which Indigenous Australians – and, in 
the context of the following case study, Marra and Yanyuwa peoples in 
the Gulf of Carpentaria – find themselves operating. Local empiricism is 
found in country, and is expressed as the processes or actions that bring 
about or give rise to place. In this case such actions are those carried out 
by ancestral beings as they walked, crawled, slithered, climbed, flew and 
stopped on country; some left their mark, others their story, their bodies 
or remnants of their activity (Rose 2000, 104).
This is, in the first instance, a process of physical becoming and an 
enlivening of the world. It also contains vital knowledge and informa-
tion, referred to by Marra and Yanyuwa as ‘Law’ – that is, an empiricism 
relating to how things sustain and thrive through relations of cause and 
effect. What follows is a description of such heritage and its destruction. 
This anchors the discussion within Marra and Yanyuwa country, and also 
within the wider scene of the settler-colonial state. It scopes out the very 
act of destruction as something that disregards the local empiricism of 
place and introduces disordered states.
Heritage destruction
This discussion takes its lead from Heider, who describes destruction as 
an action in which ‘one replaces an order with a lower degree of order, 
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or lack of order [disorder]’ (Heider 2005, 9). Destruction entails trans-
formation to nothing (Heider 2005, 9–10), or equally the ruin of power 
and function and a consequent breaking into pieces (Heider 2005, 10). 
As noted above, Heider believes that ‘Destruction is easy and can be very 
swift, while construction often involves a long and difficult process’ (Hei-
der 2005, 11). He has further observed that:
One can easily make disorder out of ordered entities; one can wreck 
them even if one has no idea what makes them work. For destruc-
tion the energy can be undirected and haphazard, for building up, 
it has to be guided.
(Heider 2005, 11).
To expand on this further, I now move to Marra country in northern 
Australia.
Marra country occupies the Limmen Bight in the Gulf of Carpentaria, 
northern Australia, while Yanyuwa country lies to the southwest of the 
Gulf. Both groups identify as saltwater people. Their respective countries 
are shaped by the acts and actions of ancestral beings who gave form and 
substance to their territories. Marra and Yanyuwa are distinct Indigenous 
language groups, although they share a long history of intermarriage and 
cultural exchange. This is often expressed in shared ceremonies, shared 
ancestral narratives and Dreaming pathways, travelled by spirit ancestors 
who moved through one territorial estate into the other. Dreaming, in the 
words of Indigenous Australian people, is a subtle and complex term (see 
Wolfe 1991). Dreaming pathways and places are often the travelling and 
stopping points for ancestral beings as they moved through country; they 
may often be distinguished by physical markers that are either the bodies 
of the ancestral beings, the objects they carried or the result of their actions 
(Hume 2000, Rose 2000; see also Griffiths 2018). According to many 
Aboriginal cosmologies, ancestral beings are not only responsible for shap-
ing the land and sea: they are also what imbue it with significance and value.
The place to which this chapter turns its attention, and the instance 
of heritage destruction that occurred there, is important for Marra and 
Yanyuwa alike. This site and its features resonate potently with the salt-
water sensibilities and heritages of both Indigenous groups. The place in 
question is Wunubarryi. It is a dugong maintenance site, located some 
7 km southeast of the Limmen river, in the Northern Territory (Bradley 
1997, 2000) (Fig.11.1).
Wunubarryi (referred to in Western nomenclature as Mount 
Young) is an important Dugong Dreaming place; Marra and Yanyuwa 
share in its control and use. Yanyuwa have a series of closely related 
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Dreaming places, including one for the Lone Male Dugong (jiyamirama) 
at Wungunda, on the southern bank of the mouth of the Crooked river, 
and another at Wirdiwirdila, a small island in the Wearyan river. Places 
such as these are linked through the logic and practice of a saltwater 
kincentric ecology. In the description of site destruction presented here, 
I have opted to describe the place of Wunubarryi in its fullest sense – 
that is, the form it took prior to destruction. This present perfect form is 
designed to reflect the integrity that is Wunubarryi’s empiricism and law, 
derived from its ancestral linkages.
To the east of the hill that comprises Wunubarryi lay a number of 
quartzite outcrops ‘which look remarkably like semi-submerged dugong 
with a back and snout out of the water’ (Bradley 1997, 202) (Fig.11.2). 
These rocks are a herd of dugongs and a single dolphin, stranded on dry 
Figure 11.1 Map of Wunubarryi, in the Gulf of Carpentaria, Northern 
Territory, Australia. Details are provided of the dugong herd and lone 
dolphin at Wunubarryi. Map design by Fiona Brady. 
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Figure 11.2 Tommy Reilly Nawurrungu striking one of the dugong at 
Wunubarryi with a hammerstone (from Bradley 1997, 450) 
land by a receding king tide (bambiliwa) during the Dreaming, the time 
of ancestral creation.
The dugong herd at Wunubarryi includes several large rocks, 
partially buried, which are male and female dugongs. It is the female 
dugongs with which Marra and Yanyuwa engage directly in the act of 
maintenance and ritual engagement (Bradley 1988, 111–12, Bradley 
1997, 200–1). When men wish to perform these rituals – it has tradi-
tionally been the domain of men to undertake these – they approach the 
Dugong Dreaming herd and brush down the body of the female dugongs 
with leafy branches (Bradley 1988, 111; Bradley 1997, 202).
Upon a visit to Wunubarryi in the early 1980s, anthropologist John 
Bradley recorded several hammerstones laying in close proximity to and 
alongside the female dugongs. He noted that the practice, as explained to 
him by Marra men, involved a hammerstone being lifted up and brought 
down upon the body of the female dugong. Some of the female dugongs 
were recorded at this time as having deep grooves and depressions across 
their backs, indicating that the rites of maintenance were of ‘some antiq-
uity’ (Bradley 1997, 203). Marra men recalled that at the same time as 
the hammerstones struck the dugong’s body, the names of dugong hunt-
ing localities along the coast and in the area of the Sir Edward Pellew 
Islands of the southwest Gulf of Carpentaria were called out by those in 
attendance. According to Bradley, ‘every fragment of rock that comes off 
a dugong stone, for example, is a potential dugong’ (Bradley 1997, 205). 
He provides a translated example of this calling out as follows:
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You dugongs, listen to me, you will come out from here and you will 
travel to Wuthanda (McArthur River mouth), Liwujujuluwa (Crooked 
river mouth), Lidambuwa (Sharkers Point) and Bulubuluwiji 
(Wearyan river mouth). Listen to these words that I am telling you! 
(Bradley 1988, 112)
Another recitation, recorded previously by Bradley in 1985, conveys the 
relational substance of this place and the terms of human engagement:
Yes, I am here, jungkayi [guardian] for you dugong, listen to me, 
come out from here and go. Yes, go! Go from here! Arise up and go 
to the sea grass! To Walkanjawalkarri and Manukulungku, Munuli, 
yes, and eastwards to Kaluwangarra and Ngurruwirririla, Wijiwijila 
and Rrawali, yes, and then on to Babalungku, Aburri, Wurruwiji, 
Wuthuwuthari, Wumarndu, Warriwiyala, Wuburrnyarrangka and 
Mangurrungurru, yes, and arise and go to Kuluwurra, Wuthanda, 
Wanakurla, Wudambuwa, Liwujujulhuwa, Lidambuwa, yes, 
and Warrkungka, Lukuthikuthila, Libankuwa, Maruwanmala, 
Bulubuluwiji. Yes, go, I am here jungkayi, you dugong are my 
mother Go! Go! I am telling you.
(Tommy Nawurrungu, speaking in 1985, 
cited in Bradley 1997, 202)
Wunubarryi is associated in the fullest sense with the maintenance and 
fecundity of dugongs throughout the Gulf of Carpentaria. To Marra and 
Yanyuwa, Wunubarryi is wirrimalaru – a term that denotes a status that 
translates to being a powerful place, one that combines the attributes of 
high position with spiritual, symbolic and political power. The term is 
used in reference to ancestral Dreamings, ceremonies, sacred objects, 
individual people, groups of people and places. Places considered wir-
rimalaru are of great importance to Marra and Yanyuwa, as they repre-
sent ‘country that is always strong, strong forever’ (Gordon Lansen, pers. 
comm., 20 September 2002).
In 1976 the Dugong Dreaming at Wunubarryi was desecrated. The 
white leaseholders of what was then Nathan River Pastoral Station, a 
non-Indigenous land holding which incorporated Wunubarryi within 
its limits, dug out two of the female dugongs while constructing a four-
wheel drive track through the area (Bradley 1997, 203). News of this 
destruction made its way to the Marra and Yanyuwa, and was received 
with great distress. People’s concern was primarily directed at the effects 
of this desecration on the health of the dugong population in the Gulf of 
Carpentaria (Bradley 1997, 203).
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The road being constructed also cut through a nearby Kunabibi 
ground. The Kunabibi is a ceremony dedicated to the celebration of 
ritual estates, reinforcing ancestral substance as linked to country of 
the Mermaid (a-Marrarabarna)  and the Whirlwind Rainbow Serpent 
(Walalu) Dreamings (Bradley with Yanyuwa Families 2017, 117, 470). 
Kunabibi is a regional ceremony practised across a number of different 
language groups throughout Australia. Each group has their own vari-
ant of the ceremony, but groups often gathered to perform Kunabibi 
collectively with neighbours. In coming together, ritual practice would 
combine the discrete practices of each group in a large-scale ceremony 
involving men and women, and ceremony grounds for men and women 
(John Bradley, pers. comm., 20 July 2018).
Wunubarryi was a place where regional groups would come together 
to perform Kunabibi at a Marra-centric Kunabibi ground. The ceremony 
grounds of both men and women at Wunubarryi were desecrated by the 
road construction in 1976. This particular ceremony ground dated from 
the mid-1950s and represented the very last Marra-specific Kunabibi site 
in the region (John Bradley, pers. comm., 20 July 2018).
The Marra and Yanyuwa peoples found out about the 1976 dese-
cration of Wunubarryi some time later, during sacred site recordings 
with heritage consultant Dehne McLaughlin (McLaughlin 1978). This 
site destruction was locally condemned, and gained public mention in 
the 1977 Borroloola Land Claim hearings (John Bradley, pers. comm., 20 
July 2018). The Land Claim hearings marked the beginnings of a polit-
ical history involving the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) 
Act 1976. The Wunubarryi desecration was detailed in the Land Claim 
hearings, along with other cases of deliberate destruction of sacred sites 
across Yanyuwa and Marra country, including the desecration of log cof-
fin burials within a cave on South West Island, in the Gulf of Carpentaria. 
This amounted to evidence of the harm done by White Australians to 
Aboriginal lands and waters throughout the region, while also conveying 
the roles and obligations of a kincentric ecology across these territories. 
Recognising the emotional harms caused by site destruction and the dis-
regard of Indigenous cultural heritages was one part of the Land Claim 
process, in which the enduring nature of this kincentric ecology is the 
fundamental justification for the return of land rights.
The second desecration of Wunubarryi occurred in 1984. News of this 
reached the community much more quickly, for it occurred at a time when 
Indigenous people, emboldened by the results of regional Land Claims, 
began to move once again across their country, scrutinising the activities 
of pastoralists and leaseholders. In this instance the pastoralist upgraded 
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the existing road (as cleared in 1976), again moving the already relocated 
female dugongs and digging further through the ceremony ground. In the 
case of the 1976 desecration nothing could be done, due to a lack of lawful 
provisions that would require the non- Indigenous leaseholders to consult 
with Marra over works in the area. By the time of the second violation, 
however, the Aboriginal Sacred Sites Authority – an independent statutory 
authority responsible for overseeing the protection of Aboriginal sacred 
sites in the Northern Territory – had come into existence. It had registered 
the area of Wunubarryi as a sacred site, yet no prosecutions occurred 
because the person who committed the secondary act was no longer in the 
Northern Territory, and his whereabouts were not known.
In 1984 Tommy Reilly Nawurrungu, a senior Marra man, recorded 
the following comments with anthropologist John Bradley:
Today when I saw those dugong by the graded road I was very sorry. 
We don’t mind people putting a road away from the ceremony 
place, but we do not want the road by the ceremony. It is no use say-
ing sorry about the place after they dig it up. They should find out 
first. Man comes sneaking in just like him stealing a car, as if there is 
no person owning this country. 
(John Bradley, ethnographic field notes, 
pers. comm., 20 July 2018)
In 1984 Dulu Burranda, another senior Marra man, struggled to come to 
terms with the events, exclaiming ‘We never came from anywhere else, 
we come from here. How can they do this to our country?’ (John Bradley, 
ethnographic field notes, pers. comm., 20 July 2018). Some years later, 
in 2002, I spoke with Yanyuwa elders about earlier events at Wunubarryi. 
Annie Karrakayn reflected on the social memories linked to this place:
My father would go hit the stone and dugong would go and run out 
all over the country. But they been killem that place, those white-
fellas, they been separating the land and sea, for them it’s nothing, 
just empty. But I think they are jealous and greedy ones, can’t see 
all one mob, land and sea, all area belong to us people. That place 
is dugong, but when they killem [it’s because] nobody don’t do any-
thing that’s good for us around here. 
(Annie Karrakayn, pers. comm., 3 October 2002)
In 2018, while travelling and working in the Limmen National Park with 
Indigenous landowners, discussions of site destruction at Wunubarryi 
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emerged once again. The Nathan River Pastoral Station was converted to 
a national park in 2012, becoming part of the extensive Limmen National 
Park. In a series of conversations with the senior Marra man David 
Barrett, it became clear that the social memories of this destruction of 
place remain strong: people still express disbelief that such events were 
allowed to occur. David has grown up in the region and now works as 
an Indigenous sea ranger there, conducting regional management and 
safeguarding to ensure the health and wellbeing of his sea country. Now 
aged 32, he was not even born when either of the desecrations took place 
at Wunubarryi, yet his knowledge of these events, and his exasperation 
at the disregard shown for Indigenous people’s cultural heritage more 
broadly, are evident when he reflects:
The problem keeps going today, charter companies take tourists all 
over the place, and they even come in on choppers. They pay noth-
ing to be there and the helicopters land right there, right near that 
place [Wunubarryi]. Those charter people just make up stories for 
tourists about what’s there. They don’t care about the real story or 
anything else, they just mess it all up over and over again. I think 
it all started with that old pastoralist, that whitefella who dug out 
the dugongs at Wunubarryi. He did that just to build a fishing track. 
Since then nothing’s really changed, same old story. But it’s a beau-
tiful place out there, yeah, really something.
(David Barrett, pers. comm., 4 July 2018)
So how is it that, in the face of ancestral importance and great cultural 
meaning, the desecration of the dugong herd and dolphin at Wunubar-
ryi and the destruction of the Kunabibi ceremony ground could occur? 
The complications in this case are that these events took place against a 
backdrop of enduring settler-colonialism. The incidents were supported 
by white settler/leaseholder ignorance, a lack of political and legal safe-
guards and a condition of geographical isolation, removing any surveil-
lance that might have helped to prevent such destructive acts. In this part 
of the Gulf of Carpentaria, Indigenous and non-Indigenous residents 
live alongside one another; their histories have been interwoven since 
the early nineteenth century, in a complex mix of violent and amicable 
terms. A pattern of resistance, accommodation and entanglement in 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous relations distinguishes this part of Aus-
tralia, as it does elsewhere.
Yet the prevailing ontics (habits of action and expression) of every-
day life have ensured white dominance and control over the lands and 
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waters. Despite land rights legislation being instated during this time, 
Indigenous groups have still had to pursue their rights through the 
provisions of the settler-colonial state. I propose that the destruction 
of Wunubarryi was an act, or a sequence of actions, of settler-colonial 
ambivalence – part of a long chain in destructive ontics that are linked 
to coloniality. Such ambivalence transmutes into a form of violence in 
its commitment to axiological retreat that is a failure to care. Axiological 
retreat, as I explore it here, invokes principles of disregard and moral 
disengagement at a level so normalised that the question of care passes 
into oblivion for those who enact the violence, and for the systems that 
ultimately support them.
Destructive ontologies and responsive reflexivity
Wunubarryi and the Marra and Yanyuwa kin that care for this place carry 
testimonies of violence. The ethnographic record of cultural wounding 
for Indigenous Australians (see Kearney 2014, 2017) is a densely packed 
account of physical and cultural harms. These include the dispossession 
of rights to lands, waters and heritage – and, since 1788, the tireless 
pursuit of rights and provisions to safeguard the cultural expressions, 
ways of knowing and of being. Testimonies of violence have been given 
in families and communities, trials and commissions, through films and 
even in solitude (Weine 2006, xiii). Testimonies of violence and harm 
demonstrate the power of speech acts for those who have lived through 
disordering events, and the importance of those aspects of life that have 
been fundamentally rearranged through destructive acts. As testimo-
nies, speech acts that demarcate the destruction of heritage and place 
value are powerful; they resist silencing and emphasise remembering 
by retrieving and sharing memories of ‘what has happened’. Marra and 
Yanyuwa testimonies of what has occurred at Wunubarryi are evidence 
of this. In this case, however, it is not only the testimony of humans that 
recounts the destruction of heritage, but also the testimony of the place 
itself.
Wunubarryi offers a non-verbal account of destruction that serves 
as testimony to the effects of harm. The physical evidence of destruction 
as scars – and the subsequent harms this caused to the dugong popula-
tions in the Gulf of Carpentaria, and to the emotional wellbeing of Marra 
and Yanyuwa – highlight the interconnectivity of a single destructive act 
in a kincentric ecology. As Salmón has noted, ‘Life in any environment 
is viable only when humans view their surroundings as kin; that their 
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mutual roles are essential for survival’ (Salmón 2000, 1332). In a striking 
analogy, he adds that ‘If one aspect of the lasso is removed, the integrity 
of the circle is threatened and all other aspects are weakened’ (Salmón 
2000, 1329).
Responsiveness to the testimonies of destroyed places may also 
express what Albrecht describes as ‘solastalgia’ (Albrecht 2006). 
Conveying the intimacy of heritage destruction and its effects on the lives 
of those responsible for such heritage very closely, solastalgia describes 
the ‘pain or sickness caused by the loss of, or inability to derive solace 
from, the present state of one’s home environment’ (Albrecht 2006, 35). 
The enduring quality of Marra and Yanyuwa social memories born of 
the destruction of Wunubarryi and the harms done to this dugong herd, 
dolphin and the neighbouring Kunabibi ground, speak to a deeply held 
sadness connected to loss. As Albrecht has perceived, ‘Solastalgia exists 
when there is recognition that the beloved place in which one resides is 
under assault (physical desolation)’ (Albrecht 2006, 35).
In this instance Marra and Yanyuwa may not reside permanently 
at Wunubarryi, but their kin do: that is, the ancestral dugongs and dol-
phin. This is home in the broadest sense of the word that is country, a 
homeland within which lie all the elements of Marra and Yanyuwa Law. 
Albrecht has commented that ‘Solastalgia is the lived experience of the 
loss of value of the present and is manifest in a feeling of dislocation, 
of being undermined by forces that destroy the potential for solace to 
be derived from the immediate and given’ (Albrecht 2006, 35). In this 
instance, a form of value nihilism has fuelled the destructive ontologies 
of non-Indigenous place relations. This has taken hold as a failure to care 
for the integrity and value of Wunubarryi; in this instance decisive care 
is mediated only by the effect to which self-interest is under threat. The 
consequential harms of unearthing the female dugongs were in this case 
sufficiently diffused so as to restrict the likelihood of care and conse-
quence for non-Indigenous perpetrators. Did the pastoralist know of the 
dugongs? Certainly these were known about in the case of the second 
wave of destruction in 1984, which thus represents a ‘failure to care’ and 
a willful axiological retreat. To enact harm to this place in the second 
instance pushes the destructive ontology into the realm of moral disen-
gagement, expressed as ambivalence and axiological retreat in settler- 
colonial apprehensions of Indigenous cultural heritage.
The dispositions of responsive reflexivity, retreat and ambiva-
lence co-exist within the context of Wunubarryi and, more broadly, of 
Australian Indigenous cultural heritages and the settler state. These 
lay bare the competing ontics that underscore and undermine heritage 
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value, and efforts at safeguarding Indigenous places of importance. 
These are distinguished by two orientations towards heritage and the 
place world. The first is that of responsive reflexivity; the second is unre-
sponsive reflexivity.
Responsive reflexivity involves fully engaging reflexive self- 
awareness, and in doing so acknowledging reflexivity beyond the self. 
In this case, the condition of knowing the self increases the likelihood 
of seeing and knowing the existences of others, human or otherwise. In 
the case of destruction and disorder, this reflexive awareness is extended 
to imagine and to witness more fully the experiences of that which is 
harmed. Unresponsive reflexivity stops at the self; it denies an expanding 
reflexive awareness to include other beings and dispositions of conse-
quence and importance. In sum, it manifests as unwillingness to imagine 
the lived experience of destruction and disorder, a lack of commitment 
to witnessing such events and lingering encounters and, sadly, a denial of 
their harmful effects altogether.
In the first instance, namely responsive reflexivity, responsiveness 
is receptiveness to the acknowledgement of value, harm and sensitivity 
to their causation. This might be expressed as an empathic response or a 
drive to remediate and mitigate against further harm. Responsive reflex-
ivity heavily involves and implicates the human in the causation of harm, 
even as it draws on human witnesses (or kin) to acknowledge and there-
fore through response alleviate the suffering of place. In contrast, unre-
sponsive reflexivity – as characterising the non-Indigenous protagonists’ 
orientation in this case study – is characterised by passivity, even in the 
face of exposure to or knowledge of place harm.
As an act of choice, this unresponsive reflexivity represents a distant 
form of witnessing. A person may avail themselves of it to recognise harm 
to a lesser or greater degree, but he or she will opt out from a dialogic 
encounter as one that prompts reflection. The witness may be unmoved 
to care or act in response, instead availing himself or herself only to the 
position of ‘knowing about’ place harm. Such a position may cause an 
individual or group of people to locate place harm as secondary to the 
interests of people, or as something inevitable and part of a ‘modern 
world system’. It may be cast as an unfortunate outcome, or a necessary 
burden to be carried by distant cultural others.
Responsive reflexivity and unresponsive reflexivity both involve con-
sciousness of actions, events and even change as a form of witnessing. Yet 
these actions and harms are processed through very different axiologies 
and may lead to very different ontologies in people and place relations. 
Where heritage destruction occurs and disorder takes hold, human life 
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is drawn into a relational encounter in which response and non- response 
might appear to be two options. Responsive reflexivity is juxtaposed by 
unresponsive reflexivity, yet it exists as one part on a continuum of engage-
ment. Here reflexivity is treated as that state of being in which the self is 
encountered as a communal actor, consistently problematised in relation 
to something or someone else (Finlay 2003; Gough 2003).
It is the distinction between ‘having knowledge of’ and ‘having 
faith in the claim of consequence’ that is pertinent to this discussion 
of destructive ontologies. To ‘have knowledge of place harm’ is akin to 
spectatorship; a situation in which witnessing involves the knowledge or 
even perhaps observation of harm, yet an enduring separation between 
the effects of that harm and the continuation of certain forms of life. 
Consequential harms may be overlooked, justified, diminished or even 
denied by spectators in this mode of unresponsive reflexivity.
Witnessing of the intimate kind and ‘having faith’ in the occur-
rence of harm brings an altogether different response. This may be a 
vivid awareness of circumstances, as is the case with Wunubarryi and 
the worrying effects of its destruction on the health of dugong popula-
tions throughout the Gulf, or the health of Marra and Yanyuwa kin who 
are connected to this place. For Indigenous owners of heritage, people 
come to feel and embody the harm done to places such as Wunubarryi, 
while seeking out epistemological frameworks for describing it. So they 
also are drawn to care, and thus express dissent, anger, sadness or long-
ing at what has occurred. Intimate forms of witnessing have at their core 
a sense of responsibility. Such responsibility throws open the limits of 
obligation, care, culpability and investment in something greater than 
human life.
Final thoughts on axiological return
One way of shrinking the gap, within which heritage destruction as a 
failure to care occurs, is to balance the concern for human rights with 
that of human responsibility, or radically to replace the former with the 
latter as a new framework for configuring rights, accountability and 
action. Responsibility is associated with the ways in which dependen-
cies and interactions are mediated, on terms that not only protect and 
provide for the human right to life, but fully enact responsibility in the 
protection and caring for all life – configured here as the co-presences 
that culminate in a culturally distinct place world. Instead of the human 
right to ‘do as they wish’ being paramount, there is instead an overriding 
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responsibility to support the conditions by which all else experiences its 
freedom as a form of internal order and local empiricism. These ‘relations 
of interdependence’ have been described by Rose as bearing responsibil-
ities for others (Rose 2008, 110).
Emphasising responsibility is about enhancing relational aware-
ness and recognition as to the intercultural worlds in which we exist, 
particularly in the settler-colonial scene that is Australia. The establish-
ment of responsibility returns this discussion to a wider realm of kinship. 
Human roles and responsibility are derived from relational ontologies 
and awareness, and it is kinship that structures cycles of responsibility 
(Pierotti 2008, 185). By this we mean kinship as something pervasive, a 
concept greater than people’s biological and social relationships to one 
another and inclusive of all and any elements of the place world in which 
humans are one element. A kincentric ecology functions in accordance 
with multifarious agents that extend beyond human life, thus enlarging 
our perceptual selves and the capacity to see other agents and presences 
of consequence. Kincentricity compels the awareness that other agents 
and co-presences possess and demand rights through their inherent 
character and order.
Seeking pathways to an axiological return, in which kinship between 
people and place is found, and inspired, is the final objective here. This 
requires a reflective discussion on the principles and relational commit-
ments essential to kincentric ecology, as a heuristic and practical device 
aimed at redressing heritage destructions worldwide. Most importantly 
the challenge of how these principles can be lived and re-entered into 
the normative practice of everyday place interactions among cultural and 
ethnic groups worldwide, as inclusive of Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
identities, should be engaged. In concluding, it is proposed that kincen-
tric ecology provides the most substantial epistemology for realising 
ontological and axiological shifts in human conceptualisations and rela-
tionships with place. In so doing they expand the scope of care to include 
heritage as the encompassing context into which human life is projected, 
reflected and affirmed.
Note
1. A dugong is an aquatic mammal found on the coasts of the Indian Ocean from eastern Africa to 
northern Australia. Maintenance sites or ‘increase’ sites are locations tied to a particular spe-
cies or phenomena that requires ‘activating’. The literature on ‘increase’ habits reveals a range 
of human practices designed to aid the increase process, including the stacking of stones, the 
striking or brushing of rock surfaces, painting and repainting of rock art, building of shrines or 
the bearing of stone objects on the body (see McNiven 2016, 197).
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Part IV





Cultural memory as a mechanism 
for community cohesion: Dayr Mar 
Elian esh-Sharqi, Qaryatayn, Syria
Emma Loosley Leeming
The destruction of Mar Elian and Palmyra
At the end of August 2015 the monastery of Mar Elian was destroyed in 
the town of Qaryatayn, Syria. This small settlement is located roughly in 
the centre of an imaginary triangle created by the three points of Damas-
cus, Homs and Palmyra; it exists, as Palmyra does, because of an ancient 
oasis. In this case the town is located in the arid zone where the Syrian 
steppe shades into desert, rather than being at the heart of the Syrian 
Desert, and is therefore significantly less picturesque than Palmyra. At 
the time when the monastery was destroyed by daesh the act was over-
shadowed in the international media by events taking place in Palmyra, 
several hours drive to the east at the centre of the Syrian Desert. In fact it 
is arguable that this particular episode of destruction would never have 
reached a wider audience at all had daesh not elected to post one of their 
propaganda videos on the internet recording this event.1 Such a public 
performance (Harmanşah 2015, 170–7) was notably at odds with their 
more clandestine demolition activities over in Palmyra.
While the concentration on the destruction of a UNESCO listed 
World Heritage Site in the mainstream media is entirely understandable, 
the majority of the world overlooked the simple fact that most people 
are more emotionally invested in monuments that have played a forma-
tive role in their emotional and psychological development. A nationally 
important symbol such as the Houses of Parliament for the British or the 
Arc de Triomphe for the French may trigger national pride and stand as a 
symbol of a nation, but we must question how far people are emotionally 
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connected to such sites in the long term. Of course there would be major 
shock and dismay if these buildings came to harm, but would their loss 
leave an emotional or spiritual void behind?
This article is not the place to pursue this speculation further. The 
author’s intention is rather to point out that whereas the loss of the mon-
uments of Palmyra has yet to be fully explored in emotional terms, the 
destruction of Mar Elian can already be said to have had an immediate 
impact on the mental wellbeing of the Qurwani.2 We can assert this with rel-
ative surety because the presence of the shrine marked not only the religious 
centre of the town for Christians and Muslims alike, but it also represented 
the tangible proof of a foundation myth central to their self-perception.
The two villages: a story of tolerance and co-existence
Once upon a time, over a thousand years ago, there were two villages 
that stood side by side in the Syrian Desert. They were called in Syriac, 
their native language, quryo tartain or ‘the two villages’. Both were 
Christian and they lived alongside each other peacefully. There came 
a time when a new religion was brought to them across the desert by 
the desert Arabs, and so the people of the two villages got together 
to decide what they should do for the best. After some discussion it 
was agreed that one village would remain Christian while the other 
adopted this new religion. At that time there was no knowing which 
of these two faiths would prove triumphant in Syria and so a pact 
was made: whichever faith became dominant, the people of that vil-
lage swore to protect their brothers and neighbours from oppression 
and to uphold their right to maintain their religious beliefs. As we 
now know, the Muslims won this battle, but ever since the Muslims of 
Qaryatayn have respected and protected their Christian neighbours, 
remembering the pact made by their ancestors.3
This story is at the centre of how the people of Qaryatayn define them-
selves and why this relatively small community4 argued that their 
intra-confessional relationships were more stable and respectful than 
those in neighbouring settlements. One pivotal aspect of this narra-
tive begins with what it means to be Qurwani. Unsurprisingly there is 
a range of opinions on who is, and is not, considered a fully accepted 
native citizen of the town, and of course there is a difference between 
self- perception and the perception of other people. This issue came into 
sharp relief in the first years of the twenty-first century, when the author 
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was undertaking archaeological fieldwork at Mar Elian. Local people of 
different religious beliefs would visit the site to pray at the tomb, and to 
stop and chat with the interesting foreigner who had started to live in the 
old mudbrick tower in the semi-ruined cloister.
At the centre of this communal self-belief was the monastery of Mar 
Elian, specifically the Byzantine tomb at the heart of the complex. This 
represented for the local population the tangible historical proof of the 
veracity of this legend. The saint is believed by the local Christians to have 
been the teacher of the great Syriac theologian, poet and hymnographer 
St Ephrem. He is believed to have died in the vicinity of Qaryatayn as he 
returned from a pilgrimage in the Holy Land to his home in Mesopotamia. 
Dayr Mar Elian esh-Sharqi translates as the ‘Monastery of St Julian of the 
East’. The saint was also referred to in Arabic as Mar Elian esh-Sheikh 
and in Syriac as Mar Yulyano Sobo, both of which mean St Julian the Old 
Man, with the word Sheikh carrying extra implications of a wise elderly 
leader. Finally, his ‘other’ identity in the town was that of Sheikh Ahmed 
Hauri or Khouri, an Arabic word used for Christian priests, and this was 
the designation used by the Muslim Qurwani.
It appeared to matter little to the Qurwani whether their neighbours 
venerated Mar Elian or Sheikh Ahmed. An easy co-existence at the shrine 
meant that the sarcophagus was draped not only with Christian tapes-
tries featuring images of the Virgin underneath a pile of votive offerings, 
but also, beneath the other coverings, the tomb was covered with the 
green satin shroud familiar from the graves of Muslim Holy Men.
Insider or outsider? The liminal role of Qaryatayn’s 
Christian bedu and other outsiders
When it came to unravelling the underlying attitudes that underpinned 
the life of Qaryatayn, the first surprise was that the inhabitants were not 
all fellahin. This is the term applied to settled villagers who work the land 
or run small artisanal or commercial premises in the town. Instead it tran-
spired that Qaryatayn also had a bedu population; they remained slightly 
apart from the majority, maintaining their own traditions and following 
a different domestic arrangement. Specifically this meant an entire bedu 
clan living in one village house that was sparsely furnished with little 
more than sponge mats, rugs and cushions for sitting on in the day and 
sleeping on at night, and cooking utensils in the kitchen. Whereas the 
inter-generational settled village families often hosted grandparents, 
parents and all unmarried children, whatever their age, under one roof, 
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a bedu household would also include multiple married siblings, along 
with their spouses and children, in the same home so that uncles, aunts 
and cousins all lived together. The next surprise was that not all these 
bedu were Muslim. Indeed, the most numerous family to attend the Syr-
ian Catholic Church every Sunday and to send the most children to cate-
chism classes each Friday was Bayt Habib, who were Christian bedu.
Bayt Habib were easily distinguishable from their friends and 
neighbours by the fact that they bore a strong physical rememblance to 
one another;5 they also tended to use names that referred to the natu-
ral world rather than traditional Christian names.6 They were headed by 
the family patriarch, Abu Nasif, – one of the last generation to remember 
the traditional life of the bedu before the twentieth-century evolution of 
nation-states in the Levant.
Abu Nasif had been educated on the Mount of Olives by French 
Benedictine monks at a time when his family still roamed the desert on 
camelback. He said that the family, like all other Syrian bedu, had been 
forced by financial constraints to sell the camels to wealthier bedu from 
the Arabian Peninsula in the 1950s. Since that time they had followed a 
pattern of half the family following the herds in the summer, with the rest 
remaining in the family home in Qaryatayn. Transport was usually by don-
key, with trucks hired to move the herds longer distances if the usual pas-
tures proved insufficient – an increasing problem due to the droughts Syria 
has experienced from the 1990s onwards. During the winter all the family 
could live together as there was sufficient grazing around the town for the 
herders to keep close to home. Alternatively in the long school summer 
holidays almost all the family went with the herds – only the very old, the 
very young or sick, and those needed to care for them, remained behind. 
This financial model also relied on some members of the family work-
ing outside the herd by taking on more conventional paid employment. 
Fatlullah, one of Abu Nasif’s sons, was a schoolteacher and his salary was 
paid into the family budget to support the costs of running the household 
for all the Habib clan, despite the fact that he and his wife had no children.
Until the 1980s, when a termite problem led to the collapse of the 
range of mudbrick buildings along the east side of the monastic enclo-
sure,7 Bayt Habib had lived in the monastery of Mar Elian and acted as the 
de facto guardians of the site. This initially appeared to be evidence of how 
the clan were a fully integrated part of the town, but further exploration 
proved the opposite to be true. Abu Nasif was clear that the family were 
incomers, having emigrated from the village of Basireh at some point in 
the seventeenth century. Until then, he said, they had been custodians of a 
Khan at a crossroads on the road to Palmyra, but the combined factors of a 
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change in routes across the desert coupled with a failure of the water sup-
ply had seen the clan relocate to Qaryatayn.8 At no point was it made clear 
at what time they had taken up residence in the monastery. However, 
since textual evidence suggests that it may have fallen into disrepair from 
the seventeenth century onwards (Kaufhold 1995, 48–199), and this was 
the period in which the family left Basireh, it is possible that their occupa-
tion of the monastery could indeed have stretched back that far.
It soon became apparent that it was the perceived otherness of Bayt 
Habib that would have equipped them to guard the shrine. While the 
official narrative of the shrine was that Mar Elian was the unifying pres-
ence behind peace in Qaryatayn, his presence had also sparked a vicious, 
intra-communal feud. This discord was not between Christian and Muslim 
Qurwani, but rather occurred as a result of Christian factionalism. In the 
seventeenth century the Catholic Church founded the Syrian Catholic 
Church to cater for Arabic and Syriac-speaking Syrian Orthodox Christians 
who had been converted to Rome by missionaries, but who continued to 
pray in their ancestral language and keep many of their ancient liturgical 
practices. It is unclear when Dayr Mar Elian ceased as a functional monastic 
community. What we do know is that so many Christians in the Qalamoun 
region converted to Syrian Catholicism that Syrian Orthodoxy was wiped 
out in the area, and the monastery of Mar Musa al-Habashi near Nabk was 
passed to the Catholic Church in the early nineteenth century.
Approximately 45 km to the northeast of Mar Musa, Qaryatayn was 
located at the faultline between places such as Nabk, which had adopted 
Catholicism, and the villages further towards the desert such as Sadad, 
which had resolutely remained Syrian Orthodox. The two village priests 
thus fought each other for the custodianship of the monastery which, 
although ruined, still housed a small chapel and the tomb of the saint. 
This was such a problematic issue that as late as the 1950s local people 
report the two priests breaking each other’s limbs in a fist fight over who 
was the worthy custodian of the shrine. None of this impacted on the 
Christian-Muslim relations in the village, but it did lead some Muslims, 
not without reason, to question the validity of a Christian faith that 
appeared to have leaders incapable of forgiveness.
Given this animosity, it was therefore advantageous to have a group 
who, though active members of the Syrian Catholic congregation, occu-
pied a liminal role as residents of both the desert and of Qaryatayn, as 
Bayt Habib was viewed in a number of ways as being outside the main-
stream of settled village life. This impression that an outsider should be 
the site guardian was reinforced by the appointment of a new custodian 
in the 1990s. Abu Fadi is a member of the Atallah family who, although 
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relatively populous and self-identifying as Qurwani, are also referred to 
as outsiders by other Qurwani. This is largely because they only arrived 
in Qaryatayn from Damascus in the early twentieth century and, like Bayt 
Habib, maintained a pronounced tradition of first cousin marriage. In fact 
any marriages conducted outside the family have favoured the bringing in 
of wives from outside Qaryatayn and the wider region entirely; this marks 
them out as not fully Qurwani to their neighbours, who marry within the 
town or choose to take a spouse from the nearer villages such as Sadad. In 
both these cases it raises the question as to whether the choice of a slightly 
‘alien’ guardian was a mechanism employed to defuse the internal tensions 
simmering over which Christian faction controlled access to the shrine.
These strong views among the Christians of who was truly Qurwani 
and who was still perceived as an outsider, even after a century or more 
of their ancestors living in the town, pointed to the fact that the shared 
communal memory of the settlement was extremely strong, and that 
oral traditions relating to faith and lineage were far more important to 
inhabitants than conventional written modes of recording history. Part of 
this pride can perhaps be ascribed to the fact that the Qurwani perceived 
themselves to be truly ‘people of the book’, as Qaryatayn has been identi-
fied with the city of Hazar Enan in the Old Testament (Numbers 34:9–10, 
Ezekiel 47:17, 48:1) and the settlement was the centre of a kingdom in 
the Middle Bronze Age.9 This presumed biblical history, coupled with the 
narrative that argued that both Christianity and Islam were adopted early 
by the inhabitants of the town, meant that faith was seen as a central ele-
ment of communal identity; there was great pride in the antiquity of these 
unbroken lines of religious transmission. With this being the case it could 
be argued that this ‘purity’ of religious lineage was what the Qurwani saw 
as being central to their identity, and why they were so adamant that oth-
ers were not true Qurwani, even after the passage of four centuries.
Conventional historical and archaeological discourse and 
their intersection with oral histories
Interestingly we have a number of accounts of European travellers who 
passed through the town in the nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries. These have proved surprisingly helpful in verifying many of the oral 
traditions recounted by local people. These verifications relate to both 
people and locations, and have acted as a useful mechanism for gauging 
whether or not the oral memories of the town appeared to have been 
transmitted in a largely factual and accurate manner.
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The first instance of this intersection occurred on a visit in 2001 
with Fr Jacques Mourad, the Syrian Catholic priest of the town, and 
some   of his parishioners to the substantial tell lying to the south and 
slightly to the east of the modern settlement. On the way the road passed 
a small rise with a substantial mudbrick building standing on the raised 
ground. The car was stopped for us to get out and explore the large ruins 
of a building. It was more elaborate than most village constructions, with 
the builders going to the trouble of shaping ogee arches above doors and 
windows. The local men explained that this had been the Ottoman police 
station and barracks of the town until the dissolution of the Ottoman 
Empire after the First World War had led to the end of the garrison and 
the abandonment of the building.
There were many ruined mudbrick structures in the vicinity and it was 
explained that the settled area of the town had progressively moved north-
wards over the twentieth century, leaving the earlier habitations to collapse. 
The presence of a significant garrison (although no details of where it was 
located in the town) is supported by the testimony of Isabel Burton (Burton 
1875, 214ff), who visited in the early 1870s. She reports that her party was 
greeted by the village sheikh and an ecclesiastical representative, and that 
later they were introduced to Omar Beg, a Hungarian Brigadier-General, 
in command of 1600 Ottoman troops stationed in Qaryatayn. The location 
pointed out in 2001 was in the vicinity of where the nineteenth-century 
town had been built, with local people clarifying that new homes had been 
built of cinder blocks and cement throughout the second half of the twenti-
eth century. Modern water supply networks had meant that they no longer 
needed to be located close to the oasis and its accompanying network of irri-
gation channels that directed water to a labyrinth of small walled kitchen 
gardens and orchards. It was explained that the drier climate of the modern 
town was more comfortable in the summer than the humid area near the 
oasis. There was also a lower risk of spreading waterborne disease if people 
only frequented the area as a sort of allotment: for a start, there was less 
chance of sewage contaminating the main water supply.
The second instance of an earlier testimony being directly supported 
by a contemporary inhabitant of the town occurred in 2002, when I called 
on Fr Jacques in his parish house in the centre of Qaryatayn. A young 
Muslim man was visiting him for coffee – a regular occurrence, given the 
generally relaxed community relations between the two religions – and 
they were discussing local history, the visitor being a direct descendant of 
the famed sheikh of the late nineteenth/early twentieth centuries, Fayyad 
Agha. I had read about this figure in the letters and diaries of Gertrude 
Bell,10 but did not admit this to the visitor. He proceeded to talk about 
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the ‘English lady who said she was an archaeologist, but we all knew she 
was a spy’ and to ask if as another British female archaeologist I too was 
engaged in espionage. Despite this assertion, he was proud of his great- 
grandfather’s friendship with Bell, saying that the two had remained 
friends for many years. This is also supported by the written evidence. Bell 
records a journey to Palmyra by car, stopping at Qaryatayn for lunch,11 in a 
letter to her father of 1925. Taken together, the two letters mentioned here 
point to a pattern of visiting the town that lasted for at least 25 years. This 
echoes the testimony of Fayyad Agha’s relative that Bell was viewed as a 
close family friend who visited often over a period of many years, rather 
than being somebody who had only a fleeting relationship with Qaryatayn.
Interestingly oral evidence also proved accurate when speaking to 
the older members of the community about vanished monastic buildings. 
Before excavations began at Dayr Mar Elian, Abu Nasif pointed to the 
areas in which the kitchen had been located and the storeroom where the 
parish priest had kept the eucharistic wine. Excavations in these sectors 
yielded a large amount of kitchen waste such as poultry and domesticated 
animal bones, as well as fragments of eggshell and broken ceramics and 
large amphorae respectively. When the residue in the amphorae was fil-
tered in a flotation tank, it was found to contain many grape seeds; these 
verified the claims that it had been the area to store parish wine and other 
grape products such as grape molasses. Older female visitors pointed out 
features such as where they had lived before the collapse of the walls, and 
where their smaller kitchens had been built. All of these reminiscences 
were supported by the archaeological evidence, when features such as 
drains and tannour ovens were later excavated in the sectors indicated.
Therefore, taking all the evidence into account, it was clear that oral 
history was the accepted way for the Qurwani to record their past and pass 
it on to the next generation. While it was only possible to verify these stories 
as far back as the nineteenth century (the examples above), or at the most 
the seventeenth century (Abu Nasif’s story of the Khan in Basireh), in each 
case encountered by the author the textual sources or the archaeology sup-
ported the oral testimony, whether or not the source was fellahin or bedu.
Shared memory as a social unifier
The collective memory of a shared historical past common to all Qurwani 
has always been most evident each year on 9 September. This is the feast 
day of Mar Elian and eid Mar Elian was the most significant day in the 
town each year, apart from Christmas and Easter for the Christians and 
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Ramadan, Eid al Fitr and Eid al Adha for the Muslims. Preparations for 
the eid would begin several days in advance of the feast. A framework 
of metal poles was stretched across the cloister interior. This was then 
covered with a large tarpaulin to create an open-sided marquee so that 
participants were shaded from the sun during the festivities – a necessary 
precaution, given that the heat in early September is often still in excess 
of 30 degrees C. The western end of the cloister was given over to a Bayt 
Sha’ar, a traditional bedu tent that acted as a field kitchen. Here large 
cauldrons were heated over portable gas rings to prepare the desert spe-
ciality of mansaf, goat or mutton cooked with bulgur wheat, pistachios, 
almonds and mixed spices, for everyone attending the festival.
While Christians from neighbouring towns would visit for the feast – 
including the Syrian Catholic Metropolitan of Homs, Hama and Nabk, 
who would officiate at the mass – the Muslim participants in the eid were 
drawn only from Qaryatayn itself. Throughout the day those taking part 
in the event would pray at the tomb and light candles in the shrine, regard-
less of whether they were Muslim or Christian, Syrian Catholic or Syrian 
Orthodox. While only Christian participants took Holy Communion dur-
ing the mass, the other elements of the service were open to all. This was 
particularly the case with the homily. In 2001 the author witnessed the 
late Monsignor Georges Kassab deliver an address which told the life of 
Mar Elian, and how modern Christians could learn from his example. 
Immediately afterwards Sheikh Assad, Mufti of Qaryatayn, spoke on the 
life and deeds of Sheikh Ahmed Hauri/Khouri. There was no controversy 
about these variant accounts of the life of the figure believed to be interred 
in the Byzantine sarcophagus in the shrine. After the service the religious 
leaders retired to a small reception room together while the laity sang, 
danced the dabkeh and ate mansaf together. This annual ritual was pivotal 
in underpinning the shared historical past of all Qurwani, who believed 
that their home was special as it had been chosen by a Holy Man as the 
place for his human remains to rest in perpetuity.
Therefore, even when tensions arose between the communities as 
they did at times – for example when younger Muslim men became too 
persistent in their attentions to Christian girls walking through the village 
in jeans and with uncovered hair – the shared shrine and the continu-
ing presence of Mar Elian was invoked as an example to encourage good 
behaviour and inter-religious friendship. The kufic inscription that hung 
above the entry/exit to the monastery dated to 1473. It was a warning by 
a local emir that all pilgrims to the site were under his personal protection; 
any attacks on them would be severely punished. The pervasive presence 
of Mar Elian across the town, and his central role as the spiritual patron of 
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all Qurwani, was a major part of Qaryatayn’s belief that, although one of 
the most economically deprived settlements in Syria, the town had a great 
past and was still a significant cultural and historical element of Syrian 
history. The monastery was pointed to as the marker of this ancient reli-
gious significance, in the same way that the tell was used as a signifier of 
great antiquity and former political and territorial greatness.
The question we face now is that in a situation where the cultural 
memory of a community is so inextricably linked with a physical loca-
tion, what will be the long-term effects on that community when their 
shrine is destroyed?
The future for Dayr Mar Elian and Qaryatayn
The first thing that must be addressed here is that despite the destruction 
of the monastery by daesh in 2015, and the fact that the entire Chris-
tian population of the town had been taken hostage by the terrorists, the 
overwhelming majority of Christians managed to reach Homs and safety 
in the autumn of 2015.12 Only a handful of Christians elected to remain 
in their homes or were unable to leave as they had been arrested and sent 
to Raqqa. At the time of writing, this group of survivors remain internally 
displaced within Syria or have tried to leave the country.13
We are thus immediately faced with a cultural dislocation. For the 
first time in over 1500 years Qaryatayn has been stripped of its Christian 
population. The churches are empty shells. It still remains unclear when 
it will be safe for the Christian Qurwani to return and, if they do so, how 
many of them will actually remain in Syria at that time? Some are in 
Canada and others in Europe already. Are they going to want to return to 
a difficult future when many have young children now in education and 
building a new life overseas?
The Muslims were divided between those who remained and those 
who left. However, since their Christian neighbours were forced to leave 
in order to avoid forced conversion or death at the hands of daesh, the 
remaining Qurwani have seen their town destroyed by the Syrian and 
Russian forces who retook it from the terrorists. This caused the complete 
destruction of amenities such as the bakeries, water-purification and 
pumping works and the electrical network, as well as the levelling of many 
private houses and the looting/burning of the kitchen gardens, relied on 
by many to feed themselves. Nor did this mark the end of their problems, 
as in 2017 daesh returned and the pattern was repeated a second time – 
only this time a significant number of Qurwani were massacred.14
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This again marks a significant point in the history of the town, 
which throughout the twentieth century had observed the tragedy of 
 others. Elderly people recount tales of families adopting Armenian chil-
dren who had escaped across the desert from Ottoman concentration 
camps, for example, but Qaryatayn had remained relatively untouched 
by the conflicts experienced in less remote settlements. Here the war has 
been brought into a previously peaceful region, and there is currently no 
indication of how the events of the past few years will impact on future 
generations. Will the latest massacre mean that the Christians fail to 
return entirely? Will the remaining Muslim inhabitants feel so trauma-
tised that they encourage their children to seek their futures elsewhere? 
Or will the strong sense of community and emotional attachment to the 
town draw the inhabitants back to rebuild a new future together when 
things become more stable? At the moment the situation is unclear, 
leaving the town facing an uncertain future. It has been agreed that no 
decisions on the rebuilding of the town can be undertaken without some 
degree of certainty that there will not be another outbreak of violence 
in the region.
Just as the future is uncertain for the inhabitants of the town, so 
the monastery’s continued existence is held in the balance at the time 
of writing. Although the ancient monastery, notably the chapel with 
the shrine, was ostentatiously destroyed by daesh, with the sarcoph-
agus being smashed and the bones being scattered, the new church 
at the site was left almost untouched; they simply burnt the books 
found in the church and the monastic library and took away the bell. 
However, the church was then burnt out in the Syrian and Russian 
advance on the town, leaving only a stone shell of the building. There 
is a determination to return and rebuild the site and, from an archaeo-
logical standpoint, the destruction of the medieval cloister means that 
there is no ethical reason why we should not now dig deeper in an 
effort to reconstruct the original late antique foundation.
The element of the unknown is how the community will view the site 
without the sarcophagus. If some bones have been salvaged and placed in 
a small ossuary, can this become the new focus of community veneration? 
If all the remains have been lost, will the sanctity of place endure without 
the central focus of prayer that the sarcophagus offered in the past?
These questions are issues that many communities have faced in the 
past, but it is only now that such destructive acts are viewed as crimes 
against humanity.15 As we move forward with more recognition and a 
deeper understanding of the value of how a place of worship, cemetery 
or meeting place may be integral to the mental, emotional or spiritual 
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wellbeing of a community, this will become a growing area of study. We 
cannot hope to end these senseless acts of destruction, but we can perhaps 
learn how to try and mitigate the long-term impact of these events and to 
develop strategies for aiding community renewal in the future.
Notes
 1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q84NWoEHQuE . Accessed 11 January 2018.
 2. This is the term that the people of Qaryatayn use to describe themselves, and so the townspeo-
ple will be referred to in this way throughout the article.
 3. Oral history of the Qurwani, told to the author on one of her first visits to the town in 2001 and 
repeated and referred to on many subsequent occasions.
 4. Local inhabitants reckoned their town to have housed 20,000–25,000 people before the war 
began in 2011.
 5. Less charitable neighbours claimed that they all had the ‘same face’.
 6. For example, Kawkab (planet), Qamar (moon) or Nimr (tiger).
 7. The exact date of this event was a little unclear, but most people settled on 1986 as the year of 
the collapse. The mudbrick tower where the author lived was the only part of the accommoda-
tion to remain standing.
 8. This testimony was supported by the fact that a brief inspection of the land at the place where 
the older Homs–Palmyra road and the Damascus–Palmyra highway meet showed the outline 
of a long-abandoned khan (caravanserai) in the triangular intersection.
 9. Pers. comm., November, 2015, Michel al-Maqdissi, former Director of Excavations of the Di-
rectorate General of Antiquities and Museums (DGAM), Damascus.
10. See, for example, her letter of 17 May 1900 to an unknown recipient at http://gertrudebell.
ncl.ac.uk/letter_details.php?letter_id=1190 and the possible image of Fayyad Agha at http://
gertrudebell.ncl.ac.uk/photo_details.php?photo_id=260 . Accessed 11 January 2018.
11. http://gertrudebell.ncl.ac.uk/letter_details.php?letter_id=851 . Accessed 11 January 2018.
12. Pers.comm., May, 2016. The details behind this amazing feat cannot be made public until the 
end of the war in order to protect those involved.
13. Tragically several of these people subsequently drowned trying to reach Greece by boat from 
Turkey. Pers. comm. Fr Jacques Mourad. 
14. See http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-al-qaryatayn-syria- attack-
kills-civilians-raqqa-islamic-state-army-revenge-a8014746.html and http://syriadirect.org/
news/after-dozens-reported-killed-in-qaryatayn-‘massacre’-one-resident-tells-her-story/. 
 Accessed 12 January 2018.
15. In fact the case of Qaryatayn was included in the consultation document prepared by the 
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Bosnia and the destruction of identity
Helen Walasek
This chapter will focus on the intentional destruction of cultural and reli-
gious property during the 1992–5 Bosnian War and the ethnic cleansing 
that drove it. It examines not only how international actors proved una-
ble (or unwilling) to stop the destruction, but after the war had ended 
failed to situate post-conflict restoration and reconstruction of cultural 
heritage within the framework of justice and human rights for the victims 
of the conflict – despite the clear aims of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 
this respect. It explores, as well, the powerful link between cultural herit-
age and identity, and the significance that restoration of their destroyed 
heritage came to hold for the victims of ethnic cleansing.
The background to destruction
An understanding of the backdrop to the destruction of cultural property 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war of the early 1990s requires first 
a brief outline of the trajectory and ideologies behind the conflict. The 
1992–5 Bosnian War was by far the most violent of the Wars of Yugoslav 
Succession that accompanied the dissolution of the federal state of Yugo-
slavia into its constituent republics as the majority became independent 
states. The move towards independence grew out of a variety of reasons, 
but became particularly acute following the rise of Slobodan Milošević 
and the so-called Greater Serbia Project (Ramet 2006) with its trend 
towards ethno-religious nationalism and ethnic exclusivism. By the time 
open warfare broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina in spring 1992, Slovenia 
and Croatia had already proclaimed their independence. Neighbouring 
Croatia, home to a large Serb minority, had been under attack for over 
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a year by the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) and Serbian paramilitary 
units, and almost one-third of its territory (along Bosnia-Herzegovina’s 
western border) was under the control of the breakaway Serb para-state 
of Republika Srpska Krajina (RSK). Scores of historic structures were 
attacked during the Croatian conflict, but the most notorious episode of 
intentional cultural heritage destruction was the JNA bombardment of 
the UNESCO World Heritage Site of Dubrovnik.
The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was to prove even more devas-
tating. It was a conflict that galvanised intense public polemic and 
had a far-reaching and long-lasting impact that continues to influence 
 policy-makers today. One of the defining (and most reported) features 
of the war was the extensive intentional destruction of cultural and reli-
gious property (particularly its Ottoman and Islamic heritage), both as 
symbols of ethno-religious affiliation and of a historically diverse Bosnian 
identity. It was the greatest destruction of cultural heritage in Europe 
since the Second World War and aroused global condemnation, from 
the United Nations and UNESCO to the person on the street in London, 
New York, Istanbul, Cairo and Kuala Lumpur. While the National Library 
(Vijećnica) in Sarajevo and the Old Bridge (Stari Most) at Mostar became 
iconic in international perceptions of the attacks on cultural heritage, the 
hundreds of devastated and demolished mosques were potent symbols 
across the Islamic world.
Unlike Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina was a demo-
graphic patchwork of three principal ethno-national groups: Bosnian 
Muslims (Bosniaks), Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats and the ambi-
tions of Serbia under Milošević and Croatia, under the leadership of 
Franjo Tuđman, towards its territory were plain to see. Following a 
republic-wide referendum, Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence 
from Yugoslavia in March 1992; in May 1992 it became a member state 
of the United Nations.
The conflict initially pitted Bosnian Serb separatist forces against 
the legally elected, internationally-recognised government of Bosnia-
Herzegovina (labelled by many commentators, however, as ‘Muslim’). 
Secessionist Bosnian Serbs, led by Radovan Karadžić, established a 
breakaway para-state of Republika Srpska and, aided by the JNA and 
Serbian and Montenegrin paramilitary units which moved into Bosnia 
from Serbia, began a systematic and aggressive programme of ethnic 
cleansing of non-Serb populations (targeting both Muslims and Croats) 
aimed at creating a contiguous, mono-ethnic territory that was exclu-
sively Serb in character. By autumn 1992 Bosnian Serb forces controlled 
over 70 per cent of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s territory.
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During these campaigns of ethnic cleansing countless atrocities 
and human rights abuses considered war crimes and breaches of interna-
tional humanitarian law took place, including the destruction of the reli-
gious and cultural symbols of the expelled populations. At the same time, 
the three and a half-year siege of Bosnia’s capital Sarajevo began, by first 
JNA, then by Bosnian Serb forces under the command of Ratko Mladić. It 
was during the early months of the siege in August 1992 that the National 
Library was bombarded and set alight with incendiary shells.
A ‘war within a war’ followed in January 1993, when Bosnian 
Croat forces (Hrvatsko vijeće obrane/HVO), propelled by the Vance-
Owen Plan that proposed the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into eth-
nically dominated cantons, turned on their Bosnian government allies in 
a move to gain territory for an ethnically homogenous Croat para-state 
of Herceg-Bosna, a move that received substantial support from Croatia 
and the Croatian Army. During this conflict scores of towns and villages 
were ethnically cleansed of their non-Croat inhabitants and their cul-
tural and religious property destroyed, Mostar was devastated and the 
Old Bridge destroyed by HVO shelling in November 1993. This conflict 
ended with the Washington Agreement of March 1994 and the creation 
of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (the so-called Muslim-Croat 
Federation).
Although no serious analyst considers the Bosnian War a religious 
or ethnic war (but rather the outcome of a political project), perceptions 
of ethno-national and ethno-religious differences and the near and dis-
tant past, particularly the events of the Second World War and the period 
when Bosnia-Herzegovina formed part of the Ottoman Empire, were 
certainly mobilised by those driving the conflict. From early on, the sys-
tematic and deliberate nature of the destruction of cultural and religious 
heritage (usually far from the frontlines), as well as the reasons behind 
it, were clearly understood by observers and victims alike, reasons that 
were often overtly articulated by the perpetrators themselves (Walasek 
2015, 55). The purposeful destruction of built structures that functioned 
as markers of ethno-religious identity aimed at obliterating the mate-
rial evidence of a group’s long-term roots in a locality, transforming a 
once visibly diverse cultural landscape into an apparently historically 
mono-ethnic domain.
The greatest part of the destruction was carried out as an integral 
part of the aggressive campaigns of ethnic cleansing waged by secession-
ist Bosnian Serb, and later, Bosnian Croat forces and their allies, in their 
attempts to create contiguous mono-ethnic territories. Thus the destruc-
tion of the tangible symbols of the long historic presence of the groups 
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targeted for removal (most often Bosnia’s Muslims) should not be seen 
in isolation, but rather as going hand in hand with multiple atrocities 
and human rights abuses. The destruction was rarely collateral. The 
vast majority of attacks on cultural and religious property were pre- 
meditated, systematic and took place far from the frontlines. Elsewhere, 
in cities like Sarajevo and Mostar, not so easily overrun, structures with 
no ethno-national affiliation, but which embodied Bosnia-Herzegovina’s 
centuries-long diversity were targeted, including museums, archives, 
libraries and institutions like Sarajevo’s Oriental Institute. For this was 
not only an attempt to violently eradicate particular ethno-religious 
groups, but an attempt to deny that a collective pan-Bosnian identity had 
ever existed.
The types of built heritage destroyed or badly damaged were over-
whelmingly religious and overwhelmingly Ottoman, or associated with 
Muslims or Islam. Thus in Banja Luka, de facto capital of the separatist 
Bosnian Serb leadership, where there were no military operations at 
any time, 15 mosques (12 of them listed national monuments before 
the war), including the sixteenth-century domed Ferhadija Mosque, 
along with other important Islamic or Ottoman structures, like the city’s 
ancient clock tower, were intentionally blown up over the course of 1993. 
Elsewhere, small towns such as Foča and Stolac were devastated (by 
Bosnian Serb forces and their allies and by Bosnian Croat forces respec-
tively) by the well-organised demolition of their historic Ottoman cores. 
All their mosques (and in the case of Stolac, its Orthodox churches) were 
systematically destroyed, as were entire Muslim neighbourhoods, and 
their Muslim inhabitants forcibly driven out, imprisoned, tortured, raped 
or killed. While there were deliberate attacks on, and destruction of, the 
Catholic/Croat and Orthodox/Serb heritage, such as for instance, the 
demolition of the Austro-Hungarian era Catholic church in Nevesinje and 
the Franciscan monastery at Plehan and the Serbian Orthodox Cathedral 
(Saborna Crkva) in Mostar and the monastery at Žitomislić, this was on 
a far lesser scale than on those structures associated with Muslims, Islam 
or the Ottomans.
In rural settings or urban fringes, destroyed structures were typically 
left to crumble. But in town and village centres, now controlled by the 
perpetrators and supporters of ethnic cleansing, there was active inter-
vention: the remains of mosques such as the Ferhadija and the domed 
sixteenth-century Aladža Mosque in Foča (regarded by many as the most 
beautiful mosque in South-East Europe), were razed to the ground, 
their remnants trucked to landfill sites or thrown into rivers and reser-
voirs. Municipal authorities removed mosques from their urban plans. 
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The levelled sites of what had once been sacred structures went on to be 
used as car parks and locations for communal rubbish containers, or left 
as empty, rubbish-strewn spaces. In a few cases rubble from destroyed 
mosques was used to cover Muslim victims buried in mass grave sites, 
such as the case of the Savska Mosque at Brčko, whose remains were dis-
covered by war crimes investigators while excavating a mass grave near 
the town.
The particular targeting of minarets and their removal from the 
landscape was noted by one expert observer as ‘… a kind of architec-
tural equivalent to the removal of the population, and visible proof that 
the Muslims had left’ (Kaiser 2002). By the end of the war, with one 
exception, not a single intact minaret was left standing on territories 
occupied by Bosnian Serb forces. These were the first steps in the cre-
ation of a mono-ethnic realm with a fictitious past, where in 1993 the 
mayor of Bosnian Serb-held Zvornik could tell journalists visiting the 
once Muslim-majority town: ‘There were never any mosques in Zvornik’.
It should be emphasised, however, that this was not an equiva-
lent and mutual destruction by all three principal warring parties in the 
conflict (as it is sometimes still portrayed). Rather, investigations and 
analysis have compellingly demonstrated that the greatest part of the 
deliberate destruction of religious and cultural property took place dur-
ing campaigns of ethnic cleansing, the principal perpetrators of which 
were Bosnian Serb forces and their allies, followed by Bosnian Croat 
secessionists. While Bosnian government forces did breach the Geneva 
Conventions, it had no policies of ethnic cleansing and did not engage in 
such operations (Walasek 2015, 58).
International responses to the destruction
As the destruction continued, the ineffectiveness of international legal 
instruments for protecting cultural heritage in times of conflict – such as 
The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event 
of Armed Conflict of 1954 – became all too evident. Such important mon-
uments as the Ferhadija Mosque and the Old Bridge were not destroyed 
until 1993, more than a year after the war had begun. Yet despite the 
presence of a large multinational United Nations peacekeeping and 
humanitarian aid presence across Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNPROFOR, 
UNHCR, ICRC, etc.), backed by a string of United Nations Resolutions 
condemning ethnic cleansing, the international community seemed 
 unable to prevent such acts.
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The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) 
was to be the sole international organisation to take any form of early 
action, sending consultant experts to assess the destruction and publish 
their findings in ten Information Reports on War Damage to the Cultural 
Heritage in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (COE 1993–1997). PACE 
hoped these reports would inform the international community of the 
scale of the destruction, encourage efforts to stop it and promote active 
intervention to protect the heritage in what the first report in early 1993 
called ‘cultural cleansing’ and ‘a cultural catastrophe in the heart of 
Europe’.
From the start the PACE reports raised what remains an aspiration 
even 25 years later: the importance of integrating support for the cul-
tural heritage into traditional humanitarian aid and the importance of 
emergency assistance before the conflict ended. The Council of Europe 
parliamentarians in 1993 urged international actors to beware of hiding 
behind ‘false reasons’ for not intervening at an early stage, nor to feel 
ashamed of being concerned for the cultural heritage while people were 
suffering, pointing out the socio-economic and psychological dimensions 
of the destruction.
Yet while international humanitarian law clearly mandates protec-
tion of a people’s cultural property, being seen to privilege responding to 
violence towards buildings over violence towards people was problem-
atic for most international organisations, even those concerned entirely 
with heritage protection, and remains so. Preserving historic monuments 
or supporting museums and heritage organisations, if considered at all 
by the aid community, was regarded as of minor importance in the face 
of what they believed were more pressing humanitarian problems – and 
this is still the case. Combined with an unwillingness to provide emer-
gency assistance to protect the built heritage while the conflict was ongo-
ing (usually on the grounds that it might be attacked again), this ensured 
that almost no assistance was given to protect Bosnia-Herzegovina’s cul-
tural heritage during the war.
Bosnia, then, became the paradigm of intentional cultural property 
destruction, not only among heritage professionals, but across disciplines 
from the military to humanitarian aid organisations in the years follow-
ing the end of the war as they struggled to find answers to the questions 
raised by the all too obvious inability of the international community, 
in all its varied embodiments, to prevent the horrors of ethnic cleansing 
and the accompanying destruction of cultural and religious property, and 
where its representatives were frequently left as passive onlookers.
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The International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY)
There was, however, one international institution which did aim to find 
justice for victims of the Bosnian War to which the international commu-
nity gave its (sometimes grudging) support. The International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was created under a United 
Nations Security Council Resolution in 1993 (Res. 827 (1993)), with a 
mandate to call to account those who committed or allowed war crimes 
and human rights abuses to take place. The ICTY has played a seminal 
role in the development of international human rights law – including 
that relating to cultural heritage – and has demonstrated how closely 
protection of cultural and religious property is tied to peoples’ rights to 
enjoyment of their cultural heritage, and how intimately cultural herit-
age and identity are linked (Brammertz et al. 2016).
The inclusion of crimes against cultural and religious property 
in the ICTY’s Statute was an important addition to international legal 
instruments. But the Tribunal’s most distinctive contribution to the pros-
ecution of crimes against cultural heritage has been its landmark indict-
ments and judgements which, in case after case, established that the 
deliberate destruction of structures which symbolised a group’s identity 
were a manifestation of persecution and a crime against humanity.
Yet since the ICTY’s mandate ended in 2017, the limitations of inter-
national justice for prosecuting crimes against cultural property during 
conflict have become apparent. There were virtually no prosecutions or 
convictions, apart from the bombardment of Dubrovnik, for the destruc-
tion of historic monuments as a crime in itself. Most guilty verdicts for the 
destruction of cultural property came from linking the destruction to per-
secution, and thus focused principally on religious structures. No-one has 
been prosecuted for the destruction of cultural property at the historic 
city of Jajce during the war. Nor has the ICTY satisfactorily explained 
why the mosques intentionally destroyed in Banja Luka (including the 
Ferhadija), and the shelling of the Sarajevo’s National Library, all of 
which appeared in its 1995 indictment of Radovan Karadžić and Ratko 
Mladić, were removed from final indictments. Most shocking of all, the 
2013 guilty verdicts for the destruction of the Old Bridge at Mostar on the 
defendants in the Prlić et al case were overturned on appeal in November 
2017, raising once again the question of what constitutes military neces-
sity (ICTY, Prlić et al. 2017).
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Dayton, human rights and heritage
The signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) in December 1995 
marked the end of the Bosnian War and Bosnia-Herzegovina’s formal 
division into two entities: the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (the 
so-called Muslim-Croat Federation) and Serb-dominated Republika 
Srpska. A huge international military and civilian presence, headed by 
a NATO-led multinational peacekeeping force (IFOR/SFOR) and the 
Office of the High Representative (OHR), oversaw implementation of the 
DPA. Billions of dollars in humanitarian aid poured into the country in an 
enormous reconstruction and state-building exercise.
An overarching aim of the Dayton Peace Agreement was to 
reverse the effects of ethnic cleansing in the hope of restoring Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s pre-war diversity. Furthermore, to those drafting Dayton, 
addressing the devastation to Bosnia’s cultural heritage was considered 
so essential to the peace process that Annex 8 of the Agreement provided 
for the formation of a Commission to Preserve National Monuments. Two 
other Annexes of the DPA were also to have a crucial impact on recon-
struction of the cultural heritage: Annex 6 on Human Rights, which 
incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights and estab-
lished a Human Rights Chamber (HRC), and Annex 7 on Refugees and 
Displaced Persons, which ensured the right of return for refugees and 
displaced persons to live in their pre-war homes.
As refugees and the displaced slowly began to return to the locali-
ties from which they had been ethnically cleansed, these Annexes of the 
DPA were increasingly invoked in the struggle to restore and rebuild. 
Restoration and preservation of Bosnia’s destroyed and damaged historic 
monuments, then, in theory, should have taken place within the frame-
work of the Dayton Agreement, supporting the return of refugees and 
displaced people to the homes and communities from which they had 
been forcibly expelled.
Yet, with few exceptions, the international community’s involve-
ment in heritage restoration in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the critical first 
post-conflict decade can be characterised by a narrow focus on a small 
number of high-profile projects, chief among them the World Bank-led, 
UNESCO-co-ordinated restoration of the Old Bridge and the historic 
core of Mostar. The iconic bridge came to be extensively mobilised as 
a visible symbol of the ideas of reconciliation and the reconstruction of 
relations between Bosnia’s ethno-national groups that the international 
community was keen to promote in the aftermath of the war, with the 
result that a substantial amount of the international funding available for 
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post-conflict heritage restoration was swallowed up by the many projects 
in Mostar.
There was no linkage of heritage restoration to the return process by 
international actors, and little discussion of justice or human rights for the 
survivors of ethnic cleansing, despite that the majority of historic struc-
tures in need of restoration were in those localities where ethnic cleansing 
had taken place. International support for restoration projects for war- 
damaged or destroyed historic structures in Republika Srpska, or locations 
in the Federation where there was opposition from hostile, ethno-national 
power structures, was non-existent as donors feared to become involved in 
what they perceived to be difficult and contentious settings.
Yet it was in just such settings that returnees focused on literally 
‘restoring’ their communities – including the right to equality in the pub-
lic space through the reconstruction of the built markers of their iden-
tity. This was often in the face of determined obstruction and violence 
from hardline nationalist local authorities and their followers, many of 
whom had been active participants in ethnic cleansing. For of all the var-
ied domestic and international actors involved in post-conflict cultural 
property restoration in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the most significant were 
those communities who had been ethnically cleansed and were now 
dispersed throughout Bosnia, across the region and around the globe. 
Reconstruction of the destroyed markers of community identity became 
almost an imperative for returnees, closely bound up with restoring feel-
ings of security and home. But, as we shall see, the absent could have as 
much agency in restoring communities as those who physically returned 
to the places from which they had been ethnically cleansed.
Sites of memory: a virtual Bosnia
A little explored phenomenon is the crucial role played by scores of town 
and village websites created by ethnically cleansed refugees and the 
internally displaced during and in the years after the war in construct-
ing a virtual Bosnia which enabled globally-dispersed communities to 
maintain their cohesion. With internet usage becoming widespread just 
as war broke out, and as large swathes of Bosnia-Herzegovina were eth-
nically cleansed, these websites became quite literally sites of memory, 
heritage and identity, key mechanisms in recreating the localities from 
which communities had been expelled, keeping alive what had been lost 
through destruction and absence (Riedlmayer and Naron 2009; Walasek 
2015, 230).
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As the advocates of ethnic exclusivism began to rewrite the past, 
the pre-conflict histories of ethnically cleansed towns and villages 
were memorialised, documented and made accessible via such web-
sites. Typically such sites included galleries of visual images (including 
pre-war photographs, old postcards and other illustrative material) of 
now-destroyed structures and townscapes, people and events from both 
the recent and more distant past, as well as information on history and 
heritage, often incorporating transcriptions of scholarly articles, newly 
written texts and such commonplace yet revealing documents of pre-
war demographics as telephone directories posted on the exemplary 
(but now defunct) www.Focaci.org. It could be argued that through these 
websites, communities (particularly their younger members) gained far 
greater direct access to information about their history and heritage than 
they had before the war.
After the war, as parts of expelled communities began to return 
(or even before they began to return), these websites became channels 
for many ‘restorative’ and community-sustaining actions, including 
fundraising for rebuilding mosques and churches. The majority of these 
place- focused websites have now disappeared from the web, a huge loss 
of these almost unrecorded sites of community memory. But among 
those still functioning in 2018 is the more widely-based Bošnjaci.Net 
(www. bosnjaci.net). From 2006 Bošnjaci.Net promoted fundraising cam-
paigns for rebuilding devastated and demolished mosques in Eastern 
Herzegovina (now in Republika Srpska), an area to which few Muslims 
had returned and where the situation for those who had was felt to be the 
worst in the country. In 2009 the campaign explicitly called on Bosniaks 
(Muslims) not to abandon their ‘cultural and religious traces in the 
region’ and urged them to be persistent in preserving their heritage and 
identity to ensure that the fate of the civilisation of Islamic Spain was not 
repeated (Bošnjaci.Net 2009).
Reconstruction as an imperative
An exploration of a handful of the initiatives to reconstruct cultural and 
religious property in Eastern Herzegovina that featured in the Bošnjaci.
Net campaigns reveals the meanings these reconstructions came to hold, 
both for those who returned and those who did not, as well as for Bosnian 
Muslims/Bosniaks and the Islamic Community1 more widely. As has been 
discussed, the reconstruction of intentionally destroyed religious struc-
tures became almost an imperative for the returning ethnically cleansed, 
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an important part of re-establishing a sense of home and belonging. But 
such reconstructions could also be powerful acts of remembrance and 
bearing witness, a way of ensuring that the new histories being created 
by the ideologues and supporters of ethnic exclusivism were exposed.
In 2000 and 2001 the author of this article, with the archaeologist 
Richard Carlton, made two field trips to Bosnia-Herzegovina to carry 
out an independent assessment of the uneven, occasionally inaccurate 
and sometimes contradictory information available from the various 
published and unpublished sources then available (and in 2019 still not 
superseded) on the damage and destruction caused to the country’s cul-
tural and religious heritage during and immediately after the 1992–5 
Bosnian War.
A comprehensive survey would have been impossible in the short 
time available, but we hoped to visit, photograph and otherwise doc-
ument sites (many in isolated rural locations) for which even at that 
time – more than five years after the end of the war – there was still no 
corroborated data. These trips proved, in fact, to be the first field sur-
vey of the breadth of destruction of the Islamic/Ottoman heritage across 
Republika Srpska and the photographic and other site records collected 
were given as evidence to the International Criminal Tribunal for the for-
mer Yugoslavia/ICTY (Walasek 2015, 155).
In 2015 we decided to revisit many of the places in Eastern 
Herzegovina that we had recorded in 2000. It was now 20 years since 
the end of the war and 15 since our original survey. We aimed to see 
whether ethnically cleansed communities had indeed returned, and if 
their destroyed heritage had been reconstructed. These were all loca-
tions where there had been no military action, but which had been the 
scenes of the violent ethnic cleansing of their non-Serb (largely Muslim) 
populations. Among the localities we revisited were Gacko, Nevesinje, 
Plana and Skočigrm, all of which had figured in the the Bošnjaci.Net 
fundraising campaigns and which are focused on below.
Just as it is our duty not to forget Srebrenica, the holocaust of the 
Jews, it is our duty not to forget our demolished mosques.
(www.klix.ba 2014)
These were the words spoken by Enis Tanović, leader of the Islamic Com-
munity in the small town of Gacko, not far from Foča, on 7 May 2014, 
almost 19 years after the end of the Bosnian War, as he spoke to a gath-
ering in front of Gacko’s recently reconstructed Mehmed-aga Zvizdić 
Mosque. Before the 1992–5 war the population of Gacko had been 
 BOSNIA AND THE DESTRUCTION OF IDENTITY 235
almost evenly divided between Serbs and Muslims. But the little town 
and its wider municipality had seen the ethnic cleansing of its Muslim 
population in 1992. Now, over 20 years later, not a single Muslim had 
returned to live in the town, although a small number had returned to 
live in villages nearby.
The date of 7 May was the anniversary of the destruction of the 
Ferhadija Mosque in 1993, a date chosen by the Islamic Community of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina to be the ‘Day of the Mosque’, a time when Muslims 
were meant to reflect not only on the importance of the mosque in Islam, 
but on the destruction of mosques during the war. In Gacko, Enis Tanović 
had tenaciously led the local Islamic Community and its reconstruction 
efforts. But Gacko was no longer a place where Muslims could feel at 
home. Across the municipality six mosques had been destroyed, among 
them the central Mehmed-aga Zvizdić Mosque, which had been razed to 
the ground. Of the three which had been rebuilt since the end of the war, 
two had been attacked again in 2001 and 2008, long after the signing of 
the Dayton Agreement. Early returnees trying to reconstruct their homes 
often found them planted with landmines.
Even as Enis Tanović addressed the gathering outside the newly 
reconstructed mosque and the Mufti of Mostar, Seid Smajkić, impressed 
on listeners the importance of preserving their religious and cultural 
identity in their centuries-old homes, anti-Muslim songs could be heard 
coming from nearby cafes and many walls in the town carried prominent 
graffiti glorifying the indicted war criminals, Ratko Mladić and Vojislav 
Šešelj. Despite this, Tanović felt a compelling mission ‘to restore life in 
Gacko’, to restore a sense of ‘home’ for its returning Muslims, beginning 
with the reconstruction of the mosques and the restoration of place – 
which he saw as providing the essential foundation for those who came 
after him to build on (HadžiMuhamedović 2015, 90).
In Nevesinje, the local imam, Mehmed Čopelj, told us a similar story 
as he took us around the different religious sites. As in Gacko, there had 
been violent ethnic cleansing of Nevesinje’s non-Serb population, includ-
ing the total destruction of all the town’s functioning mosques and its 
Catholic church – all in the absence of any military operations. Before the 
war Muslims had formed just over 15 per cent of Nevesinje’s population. 
Yet in 2015 not a single Muslim (including Čopelj himself) had returned 
to live in the town itself, mainly due to security fears, although they did 
live in villages nearby.
Nevertheless, the Islamic Community had restored two mosques in 
the town centre and the seventeenth-century Ljubović Mosque in nearby 
Odžak (where in fact no Muslims now lived). The Čučkova Mosque, 
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which had not been in use before the war and had not been attacked, 
had been already restored as a functioning mosque and reconstruction 
of the main Careva Mosque was nearing completion. The Careva Mosque 
had been completely demolished and its remains (along with those of the 
Catholic church) dumped at a landfill site outside town.
The Islamic Community had also received permission to recon-
struct a third mosque – the Dugalića Mosque. But, as Ef. Čopelj asked, 
apart from the question of funding, so few Muslims had returned and 
as they already had two functioning mosques: ‘Who would go to it? We 
don’t need another mosque.’ Yet when we saw the site of the Dugalića 
Mosque, it was if the 15 years since we had travelled around Republika 
Srpska looking at parking lots and heaps of stones had not passed. The 
unfenced site was still being used for parking cars, still had rubbish 
dumpsters parked on it and was still being used for chopping wood, all – 
in theory – illegal. Meanwhile the nearby Serbian Orthodox Church, its 
precinct surrounded by a low fence, was carefully and beautifully kept.
Memorial mosques
The urge for the ethnically cleansed to re-establish a visible presence in 
the landscape also encompasses the phenomenon of what Carlton has 
called ‘memorial mosques’ – that is, mosques that were reconstructed 
in the absence of any Muslim returnees to places that were ethnically 
cleansed (Carlton 2017). One was the historic seventeenth-century Avdić 
Mosque in the devastated Muslim village of Plana, just north of Bileća 
and about 40 miles as the crow flies from the Adriatic coast, with its dis-
tinctive square campanile minaret believed to have been originally built 
by Christian builders from Dubrovnik. Another was the small mosque 
without a minaret (mesdžid) in the tiny hamlet of Skočigrm, close to the 
Montenegrin border.
Through internet and other fundraising activities, donations for 
rebuilding these two mosques came from donors dispersed by ethnic 
cleansing as far afield as the United States, Canada, Singapore, Indonesia, 
Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, as well as 
throughout Bosnia and the region. Many donors had once been resident 
or had family connections to the localities, but others had no connection 
at all. In the United States the Association of Citizens of Bileća in Chicago 
held a special campaign for the reconstruction of the Avdić Mosque. 
The fundraising and reconstructions proceeded slowly: while the main 
structure of the Avdić Mosque had been rebuilt by 2010, there were not 
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sufficient funds to complete the work, and it was not formally reopened 
until August 2013. Yet not a single person had returned to live in the dev-
astated village, and when we visited Plana and the Avdić Mosque in 2015 
its houses were still abandoned roofless shells.
Yet although there has been no return of living Muslim communi-
ties to either Plana or Skočigrm, nevertheless both mosques are used, if 
rarely. In early May 2017, for the first time in 25 years, a mevlud was 
held at the Avdić Mosque, bringing together Bilećani from Scandinavia, 
America, Canada and Australia, as well as from towns and cities in the 
Federation (balkans.aljazeera.net 2017). And in one respect there is a 
growing permanent congregation, a phenomenon repeated at countless 
reconstructed religious sites across Bosnia-Herzegovina – a congregation 
of the dead. Graveyards are gradually being populated by the recent dead 
and their memorials, as the absent or those who left before the war and 
their descendants choose to be buried in the precincts of their ancestral 
mosque or church.
Note
1. The Islamic Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina is both a legal entity and the highest Muslim 
religious authority in the country.
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‘Bombing Pompeii!!! Why not the 
Pyramids?’ Myths and memories 
of the Allied bombing of Pompeii, 
August–September 1943
Nigel D. Pollard
In August and September 1943 Pompeii was hit by over 160 bombs 
dropped by British, Canadian and US aircraft (Maiuri 1956, 110; García 
y García 2006, 24–5, n.15). These caused considerable damage to the 
archaeological site, most of it in the southwestern part of the ancient city. 
This included the destruction of the Antiquarium (on-site museum) and 
damage to the House of the Faun (Works of Art in Italy 1945, 25; García 
y García 2006). The ‘real’ explanation is that the damage was accidental, 
due to inaccuracies in bombing other targets nearby. However, alterna-
tive explanations – namely that the bombing was deliberate and aimed at 
German troops occupying the site – did emerge at the time and have per-
sisted (Rowland 2014, 251). While these alternative explanations are, 
strictly speaking, incorrect, they shed important light on contemporary 
attitudes towards heritage in total war, popular misconceptions about 
bombing and issues of memory and authority in historical evidence.
My recent study of documentation from the UK National Archives 
and the US Air Force Historical Research Agency collection showed that 
bombs hit Pompeii in error rather than because it was targeted deliber-
ately (Pollard, in press). Damage was done in two phases, firstly on the 
night of 24–25 August 1943, and secondly between 13 and 26 September 
1943 (García y García 2006, 31–4). The bombs that caused damage on 
the night of 24–25 August were dropped in error by British bombers; they 
were intending to attack railway marshalling yards and steelworks at 
nearby Torre Annunziata. The bombs that hit the site in September were 
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intended for important transportation nodes (road and rail intersec-
tions) west of the site, between modern Pompeii and Torre Annunziata. 
Bombing these transportation targets formed part of the effort to stem 
the dangerous German counterattack against the Allied Salerno beach-
head south of Pompeii (see Molony 1973, 289–324; Blumensen 1969, 
115–36). Bombing was mostly carried out in good visibility with very lit-
tle opposition, but the intended targets were too close to the site and con-
temporary bombing methods too inaccurate to avoid damaging Roman 
Pompeii.
However, as noted, alternative explanations emerged at the time and 
sometimes recur even in recent discussions. These explanations hold that 
ancient Pompeii was bombed deliberately, either because German troops 
occupied the site or because Allied commanders mistakenly believed 
that they did. There are three intersecting ‘strands’ seen in contemporary 
media and post-war memoirs and accounts. One is exemplified by the 
accounts of Allied journalists and military personnel who visited the site 
after its liberation. Another comprises the memories and opinions of con-
temporary Italian civilians – especially Amedeo Maiuri, the archaeologi-
cal superintendent of Campania, whose activities at Pompeii at this time 
have been examined recently (Osanna 2017). Another ‘strand’ derives 
from a broadcast by Radio Londra, the BBC wartime Italian language ser-
vice, following the first bombing of Pompeii.
The interrelationships of these strands are complicated by their chro-
nology. While all relate to events that occurred between 25 August and 2 
October 1943, the dates on which accounts were broadcast or published 
range from 29 August 1943 to 1978. The accounts are set out here in the 
order in which events took place, or were alleged to have taken place.
25 September 1943: Radio Londra reported by Maiuri
Pompeii was first damaged by bombing on the night of 24–25 August 
1943, the result of inaccurate RAF bombing targeting the steelworks at 
Torre Annunziata, 1.5 km west of the ancient site, and the nearby mar-
shalling yards. Site records report instances of damage on that night. All 
occurred in the southwest corner, closest to Torre Annunziata, including 
the destruction of the Antiquarium by the Porta Marina (García y García 
2006, 31–2; Maiuri 1956). To put this in perspective, that night’s damage 
to Pompeii, while serious where bombs hit, probably was caused by 4–6 
bombs, while contemporary RAF records suggest over 300 bombs (rang-
ing from 500lb–4000lb) were dropped during the night’s attack.
 ‘BOMBING POMPEI I ! ! !  WHY NOT THE PYRAMIDS? ’  241
Maiuri’s Taccuino napoletano (A Neapolitan Notebook) takes the 
form of a contemporary diary of events through which he lived. However, 
its structure is belied by some entries’ foreknowledge of events to come, 
and occasional reflections from the perspective of 1956. Maiuri recounts 
that at the time of the August bombing, Radio Londra (the BBC Italian 
service) deplored damage to the site, but justified it by claiming that a 
German headquarters was located in the Albergo del Sole hotel by the 
Porta Marina (Maiuri 1956, 107). While I have not been able to verify 
the broadcast independently of Maiuri’s account – it is not, for example, 
among the Radio Londra broadcasts catalogued in Piccialuti Caprioli’s 
inventory (Piccialuti Caprioli 1976) – there is no particular reason to dis-
believe the substance of Maiuri’s memory on this occasion.
In contrast, The Times reported and analysed the previous night’s 
bombing solely as an attack on installations at Torre Annunziata, with 
no mention of Pompeii as a target (The Times, ‘Naples Railways Again 
Bombed’, 26 August 1943, 3).
13–26 September 1943: Allied newspaper reports
The main phase of bomb damage to Pompeii was 13–20 September 1943. 
It is clear from contemporary Allied documentation that this was acci-
dental damage caused by attacks against road and rail targets close to 
the ancient site. Contemporary bombing was insufficiently accurate to 
ensure that none of the bombs aimed at those targets hit Pompeii instead. 
Wartime data for USAAF daytime bombing under comparable conditions 
to those encountered around Pompeii (United States Strategic Bombing 
Survey 1947) suggest that 70 per cent of bombs might land more than 
1000 ft (305 m) from their intended target, 18 per cent more than a mile 
(1609 m) from it, and so forth. One heavily bombed transportation tar-
get lay only c.300 m from the western limits of the archaeological site of 
Pompeii, and from the wartime bombing accuracy data c.5 per cent of the 
bombs aimed at that target might have been expected to fall on the site, 
even in good conditions.
These attacks formed part of the Allied response to dangerous 
German counterattacks against the Salerno beachhead that had begun 
on 12 September. They were intended to prevent or delay movement 
of reinforcements and supplies to the Salerno area. Numerous contem-
porary US and British newspaper reports of the bombing specify road 
and rail routes near Pompeii as the intended targets, rather than the site 
itself. Among them are The Times [London] (15 September 1943, 4; 17 
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September 1943, 3); Chicago Daily Tribune (15 September 1943, 4) and 
New York Times (15 September 1943, 1). Their agreement with official 
records is hardly surprising, as official communiqués often served as the 
newspapers’ sources. However, this agreement also implies no concerted 
effort to distort the reasons for the bombing at this time by suggesting, 
for example, that German troops actually occupied the ancient site.
15 September 1943: memoirs of Amedeo Maiuri
Maiuri’s Taccuino napoletano (1956) records a widespread belief among 
local Italians that the ancient site of Pompeii was occupied by German 
troops. He himself knew this to be incorrect, but believed that the Allies 
bombed the site because of an incorrect assessment on their part that it 
was true.
This allegation first appears in Maiuri’s observations on resistance 
to the Salerno landings in an entry dated 4 September 1943. This dis-
cusses the initial (subsidiary) British landing in Calabria on 3 September. 
However, his reflections also anticipate the main Allied landing in the 
Gulf of Salerno on 8 September – emphasising that, despite its appear-
ance, Taccuino napoletano is not an unedited version of Maiuri’s contem-
porary diary. He recounts:
News gathered by bad informants must have led the [Allied] military 
headquarters to believe that Pompeii was a fortified camp and that 
the ruins were hiding armed men and munitions. Some small group 
of visitors or deserters surprised on the Theatre steps by reconnais-
sance flights surely provided confirmation of that belief. Another 
factor … was our own unfortunate use in those days of reinforced 
concrete and eternit [corrugated cement with asbestos fibres] for 
roofing [excavated Roman] buildings in the New Excavations, mak-
ing them look like barracks. In this way a myth was created that 
Pompei had become a German strongpoint. The myth spread and 
grew, to the point that in my pained stupor I even heard it repeated, 
by a young Red Cross nurse at the hospital in Torre del Greco when 
I was being treated there. Therefore it was not a surprise when the 
first American correspondent told me, as justification of the bomb-
ing, that their headquarters had been informed, with certainty, that 
a whole German armoured division was encamped in the ruins.
(Maiuri 1956, 109–10; author’s translation)
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Maiuri’s reference to the hospital at Torre del Greco is explained in a later 
entry relating his treatment there after being wounded nearby on 15 Sep-
tember 1943 by an Allied air attack. The medical staff were amazed that 
he had been in Pompeii, because they had heard that there was an entire 
German division in the excavations ready to resist the Allied landings at 
Salerno. The circulation of this false story, Maiuri claims, was the ‘unfor-
tunate reason why those 160 bombs fell on the blameless ruins of Pom-
peii’ (Maiuri 1956, 119–20; my translation).
Thus Maiuri’s story was that Pompeii was bombed deliberately 
by the Allies due to their (mistaken) assessment that German troops 
occupied the site. He suggests this derived from inaccurate information 
passed on by ‘bad informants’ and misinterpretation of aerial recon-
naissance data. When local Italian civilians had come to believe that 
the Germans were in the ruins is unclear from Maiuri’s account, but he 
implies that such stories were current by 15 September, the date when he 
was hospitalised.
The day after Allied entry into Naples (2 October), Associated Press 
correspondent Relman Morin met and interviewed Maiuri in the city’s 
Museo Nazionale. Still wounded, Maiuri was living in the museum. The 
interview included discussion of the museum itself and other cultural sites 
in Naples, and Maiuri also expressed his views on events at Pompeii. Clearly 
he believed that the site had been deliberately targeted, but mistakenly so:
The tragic irony of the bombing of Pompeii was that the Germans 
had never actually encamped inside the famous excavated city. 
[Maiuri] said they were only in the vicinity. 
(Morin 1943)
29 September 1943: Allied correspondents at Pompeii 
on its liberation
A BBC radio report was recorded in Pompeii itself by Canadian corre-
spondent Matthew Henry Halton on 29 September 1943. It is clear from 
the recording (Imperial War Museum catalogue 1369, 29 September 
1943) that combat was still going on in his immediate vicinity.
And early today I was able to enter Pompeii – you can hear the 
sound of enemy guns – with one of the first British units … I speak 
now from Pompeii. I speak actually from the ruins of the Roman 
amphitheatre, nearly 2000 years old. I am standing on the high wall 
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of this amphitheatre. It was used by the Germans as a gun position, 
with the result that we had to bomb it, and there is a gaping bomb 
crater right in the middle of the arena.
30 September 1943: memoirs of Mortimer Wheeler
The strand of ‘Allied personnel and journalists’ is also represented by 
the memoirs of the Royal Artillery’s Brigadier Mortimer Wheeler, a well-
known archaeologist. He was important in the origins of Allied military 
cultural property protection (Wheeler 1955, 1–2; see Nicholas 1995, 
215–17; Moshenka and Shadla-Hall 2011). Wheeler reminisces, in a 
characteristically stagey account, on a visit to Pompeii on the night of 30 
September 1943, the day after the site’s liberation (see Hawkes 1982, 
224 for the date of the anecdote):
More than six years previously in the dusk I had thrust my mili-
tary caravan into the Amphitheatre gate of Pompeii as far as a new 
bomb-crater would allow me, and all night long that same Vesuvius 
had leered at me with an inflamed Cyclopean eye. At dawn I had 
walked into the city, a little gingerly, preceded by a sapper who thrust 
a bayonet ever and anon into the suspect soil. The reconstructed 
two-storey houses of the nuovi scavi had been bombed with satisfac-
tory nicety by our fellows up above: not their fault – they had been 
told that a German armoured division was ‘in Pompeii’, and the map 
writes POMPEII across the blackened mass of the old city, while the 
insignificant modern townlet on the main road is merely ‘Pompeii’.
While Wheeler’s observation is correct for the standard GSGS 4228 series 
1:25,000 Allied military maps of the area, his explanation for the bomb-
ing is contradicted by all the contemporary Allied air force documents. It is 
curious that Wheeler, a British Army officer recently involved in establish-
ing British military cultural property protection efforts in Libya, should 
give an ‘incorrect’ explanation of the bombing, one that is documented 
nowhere else. At first glance, it is tempting to take Wheeler (a soldier and 
archaeologist) as an authority. Yet his military duties as commander of an 
anti-aircraft regiment at that time meant that he was far from the head-
quarters planning the bombing, and there is no particular reason why he 
would have known the ‘real’ explanation for the damage. Furthermore 
this anecdote, more entertaining than evidence-based, accords well with 
Wheeler’s critical and impatient stance (documented in contemporary let-
ters) towards wartime Allied cultural property protection efforts.
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16 October 1943: memoirs of Spike Milligan
Pompeii soon became a regular destination for Allied personnel on leave. 
An early documented example is the visit paid on 16 October 1943 by 
Gunner Spike Milligan of the Royal Artillery (subsequently a famous 
comedian). In his wartime memoirs, Milligan observes:
I discovered that the Americans had actually bombed it! They 
believed German infantry were hiding in it! Not much damage had 
been done, museum staff were already at work trying to repair it. 
Bombing Pompeii!!! Why not the Pyramids, Germans might be hid-
ing there? 
(Milligan 1980, 51)
Comic hyperbole aside, the theme that the site was bombed because it 
was German-occupied (or because the Allies believed it to be German- 
occupied) recurs.
9 November 1943: ‘Damage at Pompeii. British Officer’s 
Account’, The Times
On 9 November 1943, a few weeks after Milligan’s visit, The Times pub-
lished an account entitled ‘Damage at Pompeii. British Officer’s Account’. 
Attributed to a contemporary military visitor, it re-iterated the suggestion 
that Pompeii was bombed because it was occupied by German troops:
We have received from a British officer, who recently visited 
Pompeii, an account of the damage done to the place during 
September, when the Germans were encamped on the site and 
allied aircraft were obliged to treat it as a military objective. The 
following is a summary of damage observed …
12–15 April 1944: Italian staff at Pompeii  
to Capt. F. H. J. Maxse
Allied officers of the Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Subcom-
mission of Allied Military Government undertook inspection visits to 
Pompeii after the bombing and liberation of the site (Coccoli 2017; 
Nicholas 1995, 222–72). There they liaised with local staff (including 
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Maiuri) regarding repair and re-opening of the site. A report of one 
such visit was written on 17 April 1944 by British monuments officer 
Captain Frederick H. J. Maxse (Royal Sussex Regiment), recording 
his visit to Pompeii and Herculaneum on 12–15 April. Surprisingly, 
Maxse relied on local Italian staff for an explanation of the damage. 
He reports:
From the evidence given by the custodian and other personnel 
who witnessed the bombings it would appear that the object 
was to destroy a German Command Post in the Albergo [hotel] 
near the Porta Marina and the concentration of bombs round the 
Museum and the Forum suggests the likelihood of such an aim. 
There were a few German tanks near the Villa dei Misteri, but the 
only German troops inside the old city were visitors. There was no 
concentration of troops within the old city …
(Subcommission MFAA 1944, 3)
This explanation mirrors Maiuri’s account of the Radio Londra broad-
cast – unsurprisingly since Maiuri directed the staff on the site. He and 
his colleagues shared the experience of the bombing and undoubt-
edly discussed it. While Maxse does not specifically cite Maiuri as his 
source, he was certainly present for part of the visit, actually taking 
Maxse to Herculaneum on 15 April. This anecdote is also interesting 
in that it confounds expectations of authority. Here a British officer 
appears to be relying on local Italian civilians to explain damage 
inflicted by the officer’s own air force. However, as with Wheeler, 
there is no reason why Maxse, a junior officer within the institutions 
of Allied military government, should have had any special insight 
into the bombing.
Thus there are essentially three ‘incorrect’ explanations of why 
Pompeii was bombed. To summarise:
A. Accidental: collateral damage while bombing a German 
headquarters near the site
This explanation was advanced in the Radio Londra broadcast regarding 
damage caused on 24–25 August 1943, published by Maiuri in 1956. It 
was reported to Maxse in April 1944.
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B. Deliberate: targeting of the archaeological site because it was 
occupied by German troops and thus a legitimate military target
This is seen on/after 29 September 1943 in accounts by Allied corre-
spondents and visitors. A conviction that the site was occupied by Ger-
man troops is also attributed by Maiuri to local Italian civilians, with the 
implication that this story was current by c.15 September.
C. Deliberate: intentional targeting of the archaeological site due 
to mistaken intelligence
The third explanation for the damage is that ancient Pompeii was tar-
geted deliberately but mistakenly. This is either because Allied com-
manders made an incorrect assessment that the site was occupied by 
German troops (Maiuri), or because of an error confusing ancient and 
modern Pompeii on the map (Wheeler).
Explanation ‘A’ – that damage was collateral to the bombing of a 
German headquarters near the site – is implausible as a ‘real’ explanation 
of the damage to Pompeii on that night. Maiuri (1956, 107–9) states that 
a ‘little group’ (not a headquarters) of Germans were in the hotel. He 
outlines German military dispositions around, but not in, the archaeo-
logical site, something reiterated in other contemporary accounts (see 
Pesce 1993, 120). Even had the Albergo del Sole headquarters existed, 
none of the documentation of operations by the Allied air forces suggests 
that it was targeted. Nor would the Allies have been able to target a sin-
gle building precisely, especially at night when the damage was caused. 
As already noted, the intended targets near Pompeii on 24–25 August 
were the Torre Annunziata steelworks and railway marshalling yards. 
Undoubtedly the damage to ancient Pompeii was caused by a few stray 
bombs intended for those targets.
However, the reported Radio Londra explanation may have been 
created and propagated by British sources to counter negative stories 
about damage to the site in the Italian and international press, invoking 
military necessity due to German military ‘use’. I can find no evidence 
that this explanation was cited directly in English language broadcasts 
or media. For example, The Times article of 26 August 1943 discusses 
the night’s missions against the railway system and steelworks at Torre 
Annunziata without reference to Pompeii, either in terms of targeting or 
of damage. On the other hand, the damage was reported in contempo-
rary Italian and German media, such as the Giornale d’Italia (27 August 
1943, 1; 29–30 August 1943, 3) and the Kölnische Zeitung (28 August 
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1943, 2). All three refer to damage to the Arch of Drusus in the Forum, 
the House of Romulus and Remus and the Antiquarium. So does dis-
cussion of Pompeii in a New York Times article citing ‘Rome radio’ as its 
source (27 August 1943, 4; see also García y García 2006, 21).
It seems likely that the message – damage to Pompeii was caused in 
the course of an attack against a German military target – was specifically 
tailored for Italian audiences. Concern about Italian public opinion regard-
ing damage to heritage sites by Allied forces is documented in a number 
of contemporary Allied military documents. While Radio Londra avoided 
the overtly propagandistic content of other ‘black’ Allied radio stations 
and print sources, its substantial audience in Italy, its ability to respond to 
Italian press reports and the anecdotal and discursive nature of much of its 
programming made it an effective medium for shaping Italian perceptions 
of the damage (see Briggs 1970, 435–41; Piccialuti Caprioli 1976).
Explanations ‘B’ (that the archaeological site was targeted delib-
erately because it was occupied by German troops) and ‘C’ (that it was 
targeted deliberately because the Allies believed it, incorrectly, to be 
German-occupied) are clearly interrelated.
In international law, German military use of a heritage site would 
have legitimised its bombardment on the grounds of military necessity. 
The 1907 Hague Convention was the basis of international law on this 
issue in 1943 and by extension of contemporary military law, quoted in 
both the [British] War Office, Manual of Military Law (1929) and the 
[US] War Department’s Rules of Land Warfare (1940). Hague 1907 
(Article IV, in International Committee of the Red Cross, 2017) states:
In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to 
spare, as far as possible, … historic monuments … provided they 
are not being used at the time for military purposes.
Protocols for targeting in the vicinity of heritage sites distributed to Med-
iterranean Allied Air Forces in February 1944 echo this legal provision:
If a town is in the actual zone of military operations on the ground, 
and is occupied by the enemy, no restrictions whatever are to be 
applied. The sole determining factor will be the requirements of the 
military situation. 
(Headquarters Mediterranean Allied Air Forces 1944, 2)
Thus a plausible claim that German troops had occupied the archaeo-
logical site of Pompeii could be used to shift responsibility for its damage 
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from the Allies onto the Germans – implicitly branding them as barbarous 
for using a heritage site for military purposes and exposing it to damage. 
Certainly Allied and Axis/German media competed to depict one another 
as careless or downright rapacious of cultural property during the Italian 
campaign (Nicholas 1995, 231). While the idea that deliberately target-
ing a heritage site can be more legitimate than accidental damage seems 
strange, the key legal distinction is based on enemy occupation and a con-
sequent judgement of military necessity. Enemy occupation of an historic 
building removes its protection from targeting, whereas responsibility for 
accidental damage is a far more problematic issue. The British Manual 
of Military Law (War Office 1929, Amendment No.12, p.33, note 1 on 
No.133) emphasises that accidental and collateral damage is a grey area:
Hague Rules 27. The introduction of long range artillery, aircraft 
&c. makes it difficult to ensure immunity for such buildings, but 
they should not be bombarded deliberately.
The legal status of collateral damage to heritage sites close to (but not 
occupied by) military forces remains problematic in post-war interna-
tional law (Boylan 1993, 55–6). Furthermore, a claim of deliberate tar-
geting (rather than collateral damage) masked the relative inaccuracy 
of contemporary Allied bombing techniques and tactics from friendly 
civilians as well as from the enemy. Pre-war debates about bombing had 
led to exaggerated perceptions of its accuracy and effectiveness among 
both military and civilians (Overy 2014, 19–55). Naivety regarding the 
realities of bombing in 1943 is revealed by a contemporary newspaper 
anecdote of how Superintendent Maiuri tried to signal Allied bombers 
away from the site of Pompeii (Morin 1943, 15) and García y García’s 
modern incomprehension that bombers might hit the site in error even in 
daytime, in clear view (García y García 2006, 26).
Thus propagation of explanation ‘B’ may have been an attractive 
option to the Allies. Explanation ‘C’ is merely a version of ‘B’, perhaps 
reflecting cynicism about the competence of higher command and mili-
tary intelligence.
However, there is no clear evidence that explanation ‘B’ originated 
high up in Allied political and military circles as deliberate propaganda – 
at least not with respect to the damage inflicted in September. As noted, 
contemporary newspaper reports in the US and Britain specify (correctly) 
that the intended targets of the bombing were transportation systems 
near the modern (and ancient) town. Claims that German troops made 
military use of the site and were deliberately targeted by Allied bombing 
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seem to have emerged and spread at grassroots level, among Allied cor-
respondents and military visitors to the site, rather than descending from 
the top as organised propaganda to justify the damage. Even The Times 
report of 9 November cites a source ‘on the ground’, namely the ‘British 
officer, who recently visited Pompeii’.
The question of how these Allied ‘grassroots’ explanations inter-
sected with the Italian civilian versions is a difficult one. Maiuri’s 
account, if accurate, suggests ‘Germans in the ruins’ stories were wide-
spread among local civilians by c.15 September, when he was wounded 
and hospitalised.
How did these stories develop? They may have owed their origins 
to the August Radio Londra broadcast, stretched and adapted to explain 
damage inflicted on Pompeii in September. Perhaps later Radio Londra 
broadcast other similar stories, although one might expect Maiuri to have 
heard of them. Alternatively, these stories may have been purely local, 
popular rationalisations of the intense Allied air activity around Pompei, 
of damage caused to the site and/or of the German presence in modern 
Pompei and the roads around the site. In turn, these local accounts may 
have influenced explanations of the damage recorded by Allied corre-
spondents and personnel, as guides, custodians and other local civilians 
shared their views. Certainly it is particularly striking to see Frederick 
Maxse, a British Army monuments officer, receiving and accepting the 
local staff’s ‘incorrect’ explanation of the damage.
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Reclaiming the past as a matter 
of social justice: African American 
heritage, representation and identity 
in the United States
Erin Linn-Tynen
The argument that the Confederate flag and other displays rep-
resent ‘heritage, not hate’ ignores the near-universal heritage of 
African Americans whose ancestors were enslaved by the millions 
in the South. It trivializes their pain, their history and their con-
cerns about racism – whether it’s the racism of the past or that of 
today. And it conceals the true history of the Confederate States 
of America and the seven decades of Jim Crow segregation and 
oppression that followed the Reconstruction era.
(Excerpt from Southern Poverty Law Center’s ‘Whose heritage? 
Public Symbols of the Confederacy’, 2019, p. 7)
In 2015 the despicable acts of a self-proclaimed white supremacist 
brought to the forefront the critical role that cultural heritage plays in the 
formation of identity, and the ways in which heritage can be used both to 
exclude or empower. On 17 June Dylann Roof entered the historic Ema-
nuel A.M.E. Church in Charleston, South Carolina and murdered nine 
African Americans (Epatko, 2015). Investigations by authorities found 
photographs of Roof holding a Confederate flag while displaying other 
symbols of white supremacy. Investigators identified a website belonging 
to Roof and described it as a ‘white supremacist broadside’. The website, 
in addition to outlining his racist manifesto, included a collection of 60 
photographs of Roof posing at dozens of different Confederate heritage 
sites or slavery museums across the country (Robles, 2015). As reported 
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by the Washington Post, Roof’s reason for targeting Charleston was 
‘because it is [the] most historic city in my state, and at one time had the 
highest ratio of blacks to whites in the country’ (Washington Post, 2015).
Over the past several years, communities have increasingly begun 
to speak out against the violence and racism that continue to be perpe-
trated against black Americans, spurring the formation of the Black Lives 
Matter movement and demonstrations across the country. As part of 
this process, people have begun to take note of and to question both the 
abundance and appropriateness of public symbols honouring the former 
Confederate States of America (the Confederacy).1 Confederate symbols 
and representations can be found across the United States in varying 
forms including monuments, national parks, historic sites, street names, 
school names and flags. Roof’s intentional use of cultural heritage asso-
ciated with the Confederacy, white supremacy and slavery galvanised 
communities to campaign for the removal of such symbols, particularly 
those found in public spaces. Some of these campaigns have been suc-
cessful, resulting in the removal of prominent public representations of 
the Confederacy. Other attempts to remove Confederate symbols from 
public spaces have been met with strong, sometimes violent opposition.
One of the more notable public displays celebrating the Confederacy – 
removed in response to the public outcry resulting from the Charleston 
murders – was the Confederate flag that had adorned the grounds of South 
Carolina’s statehouse for 54 years (McCrummen and Izadi, 2015). In 2015 
the New Orleans City Council voted to remove four monuments associated 
with the Confederacy. Three of the monuments venerated Civil War figures 
who had fought for the South during the Civil War. The fourth was a memo-
rial honouring the members of the White League who led an insurrection, 
known as the Battle of Liberty Place, against Reconstruction leadership after 
the end of the Civil War (Chadwick 2018). In both instances the campaigns 
to remove these symbols were met with opposition, legal battles and protests.
On 11 and 12 August 2017 opposition in Charlottesville, Virginia 
reached a tipping point, culminating in the largest demonstration of 
white nationalists in recent history. At the heart of the dispute was a 
statue memorialising General Robert E. Lee; it had stood since 1924 in 
the formerly named Robert E. Lee Park. In 2012 city council members 
raised questions regarding the appropriateness of the statue and debates 
over its presence ensued for the next four years. In February 2016 the 
monument’s fate appeared to have been finally decided when the city 
council voted for its removal. But the following month saw opponents of 
the proposed removal sue the city and the statue remain in place. In June 
the park in which the statue stands was renamed Emancipation Park.
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Tensions continued to rise, however, and in August 2017 white 
nationalists held a ‘Unite the Right’ rally to oppose the statue’s removal. 
The violence that unfolded left dozens injured and one counter-protester 
dead. Since the protests the city council voted to cover the statue with 
a black shroud, but several months later a judge ruled for the shroud’s 
removal. The park was renamed again, changing it from the short-lived 
Emancipation Park to Market Street Park. At the time of writing, the 
statue still remains in place (Fortin 2017).
Whose heritage, whose narrative? 
These circumstances have propelled ideas about cultural heritage into 
the public consciousness. People have begun to question the country’s 
‘authorized heritage’2 and to demand change. For generations, historic 
preservation in the United States has been governed by the dominant 
social and cultural group – white and predominantly male citizens. A 
2011 internal marketing survey, conducted by Edge Research on behalf of 
the National Trust for Historic Preservation (National Trust), determined 
that the demographics of its ‘preservation leaders’ were 93 per cent white, 
2 per cent black, 1 per cent Latino and 2 per cent Asian or Pacific Islander 
(National Trust 2011). Not surprisingly, the cultural heritage of the coun-
try overwhelming reflects the dominant culture (Kaufman 2009). In a 
2015 speech at The Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Nonviolent Social 
Change Stephanie Meeks, the President and Chief Executive Officer of the 
National Trust, confirmed that out of the 86,000 listings on the National 
Register of Historic Places only 8 per cent represent ‘women and racially 
and ethnically diverse places.’ Similarly, only 3 per cent of the country’s 
2500 National Landmarks represent these same groups (Meeks, 2015).
In 2016 the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) published results 
from a nationwide survey which identified and catalogued public sym-
bols of the Confederacy; this was followed by an updated version in 
June 2018. The 2018 survey identified 1740 Confederate monuments, 
place names and other symbols across the nation. These include 772 
monuments, 105 public schools named for Confederate icons, 80 coun-
ties and cities named for Confederate leaders, 9 observed state holidays 
in 5 states and 10 US military bases. Data for the report was collected 
from federal, state and private sources, including the National Register 
for Historic Places (National Register), the National Park Service, the 
Smithsonian Art Inventory, Sons of Confederate Veterans and Daughters 
of the Confederacy (SPLC 2016 and 2018).
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The study did not include local, state or nationally listed historic 
sites or parks. Further, the study deliberately excluded 2600 markers, 
battlefields, museums, cemeteries and other sites of historical signifi-
cance. It is important to note the distinction made in determining the 
kinds of symbols that were included in the results. The study specifically 
focused on Confederate symbols which were commemorative or honor-
ific in nature, rather than those which mark, represent or interpret actual 
historical events or places.
As the SPLC report demonstrates, symbols associated with the 
Confederacy are predominant in Southern states. Nonetheless, as the 
report revealed, Northern states such as Massachusetts, a state recognised 
as a stalwart of Union ideals and abolitionist sentiments, also have memo-
rials to the Confederacy.3 The vast majority, however, exist in 14 of the 50 
United States. All of these 14 states were former slave-holding states, and 11 
of them seceded to form the short-lived nation of the Confederate States.4
The most conspicuous of all of these sites is that of Stone Mountain. 
This enormous stone carving depicts three icons of the Confederacy: 
Confederate President Jefferson Davis, General Robert E. Lee and 
General Thomas ‘Stonewall’ Jackson. The relief is the key attraction of 
Stone Mountain Park, a 3200-acre state park on the outskirts of Atlanta, 
Georgia and the site of the re-founding of the Ku Klux Klan in 1915. 
The project, initially organised and funded by the United Daughters 
of the Confederacy, was begun in 1923 and completed in 1972 (Stone 
Mountain Park 2018).5 The resulting sculpture is 400 feet high and 
spans three acres of the mountain. It is larger than the famous depic-
tions of George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Theodore Roosevelt and 
Abraham Lincoln on Mount Rushmore National Memorial.
The sheer scale of representations that honour and revere the idea 
of the Confederacy serve to demonstrate who has controlled the heritage 
narrative in the United States. As stated in 2017 by the then-Mayor Mitch 
Landrieu, during the controversy over the removal of New Orlean’s con-
federate statues, the purpose of such heritage ‘had one goal – through 
monuments and through other means – to rewrite history to hide the 
truth, which is that the Confederacy was on the wrong side of humanity’ 
(Landrieu 2017).
Equally, the lack of representation of African American cultural her-
itage provides further evidence of how overwhelmingly imbalanced and 
skewed that narrative still is. As Hale and Chase point out in their 2015 
CNN article, ‘Where are America’s memorials to pain of slavery, black 
resistance?’, the United States as a nation has yet to account for or recon-
cile its difficult and painful history of slavery and oppression.
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Empty spaces, missing heritages 
Though memorials and historic sites related to the Confederacy abound, 
there are significantly fewer public spaces, historic sites, memorials or 
other forms of authorised heritage remembering slavery, Jim Crow, the 
Civil Rights movements or honouring significant achievements of black 
Americans – before or after the emancipation of slaves in 1863. As noted 
above, less than 8 per cent of the 86,000 sites included on the National 
Register of Historic Places represent African American and other minor-
ity heritage. This is true even in places where establishing a monument, 
memorial or historic site to represent African American history and her-
itage would seem self-evident.
Sullivan’s Island off the coast of Charleston, South Carolina is a prime 
example. It is estimated that 40 per cent of all slaves brought to America 
entered via Charleston. Prior to entering the City of Charleston, slave ships 
would dock at Sullivan’s Island and force their human cargo to disembark 
for a period of quarantine. Between 1707 and 1799 the island served as a 
quarantine station. Here slaves were forced to reside in the ‘pest houses’ 
until it was determined that those in captivity were well enough to be 
moved to Charleston and sold at auction (National Park Service, 2018b). 
For nearly 200 years not a single marker or plaque existed that indicated 
the island’s prominent role in the slave trade. Even today there is little 
present that denotes or communicates the dark and difficult history of 
the island. In 1990 the National Park Service posted a solitary sign which 
relates, in 223 words, the island’s link to the slave trade. Disturbed by this 
lack of acknowledgement, the Nobel Laureate Toni Morrison held a memo-
rial in 2008 to oversee the dedication of a bench on the island.
Given the historical significance of the island and the hundreds of 
thousands of lives and generations impacted by the place, this dearth 
of heritage representation is glaringly conspicuous. Perhaps even more 
striking is the abundance of ‘white’ heritage that is represented on 
Sullivan’s Island. The Fort Moultrie historic site and museum – an active 
military fort during the American Revolutionary and Civil Wars – are 
prominent features of the island. The National Park Service website 
provides detailed information about the fort, the museum and the mil-
itary history of the island. Conversely, not a single mention is made of 
the island’s association with the slave trade on the National Park Service 
website (National Park Service 2018c).
The lack of representation of African American heritage as part of 
America’s heritage landscape is a direct assault on the identity and col-
lective memory of African Americans, both as individuals and as part of 
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America’s history. Through heritage, people communicate the stories of 
their past in the present. When those representations are missing, this 
impacts the conceptions of self as well as that of personal and group iden-
tity. In an interview with the BBC (Gunter and Hughes, 9 August 2018) 
covering the anniversary of the Charlottesville riots Zyahna Bryant, the 
young activist who petitioned for the removal of the Robert E. Lee statue 
in Charlottesville, reflected that:
[F]or me, it’s hard because there are no statues in Charlottesville 
that depict African American heroes. And so for that reason alone, 
black people have nothing to look up to in our public spaces. We are 
not represented.
Not only does the omission of African American heritage have tremen-
dous consequences for African American citizens, but it equally impacts 
the collective memory of American society as a whole. At best it perpetu-
ates an incomplete and inaccurate depiction of the American historic nar-
rative. At worst it promotes destructive racist narratives, including a false 
mythology of the ‘lost cause’; it also perpetuates the hegemonic ‘white’ 
heritage which does not account for or represent the country’s myriad 
cultural and ethnic groups or its dynamic, and often times difficult, past.6
At the nexus of heritage and identity
Cultural heritage has the power to evoke intense emotions. As evidenced 
by ongoing disputes over representations of the Confederacy, cultural 
heritage can be contentious at best and deadly in the extreme. In order 
to understand why these forms of heritage are so controversial it is nec-
essary to acknowledge the fundamental link between cultural heritage 
and identity, and to appreciate the reflexive relationship between them.
Heritage is used as a means by which to confirm and communicate 
identity, just as one’s identity influences what is recognised as heritage. 
Heritage allows individuals in the present to connect with the past. This 
process contributes to understanding oneself and forming one’s identity. 
Historic sites, memorials and other forms of cultural heritage remind 
individuals and communities of who they are and where they have come 
from. If that heritage is missing, or is misrepresented, this can have pro-
found impacts on the collective memory and society in the present.
It is important to clarify here what is meant by heritage. The inter-
national definition of cultural heritage as put forth by United Nations 
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Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) defines cul-
tural heritage as ‘the legacy of physical artefacts and intangible attributes 
of a group or society that are inherited from past generations, maintained 
in the present and bestowed for the benefit of future generations’. The 
United States National Park Service describes heritage as the ‘physical 
heritage of living societies, including their buildings, structures, sites, and 
communities’. This includes landscapes shaped by societies and mate-
rial culture such as artefacts, archives and other tangible remains. It also 
includes intangible heritage, for example stories, songs and celebrations, 
and other cultural practices and traditions (National Park Service 2002). 
Such definitions of cultural heritage are useful, particularly in contexts 
concerning the identification and management of cultural heritage. They 
do not, however, strike at the conceptual essence of heritage and why 
some things are chosen to be recognised as heritage and others are not.
Cultural heritage, intangible and tangible, is a representation of the 
past. It consists of objects, buildings, statues or sites to which individ-
uals and communities in the present ascribe meaning and significance. 
The act of endowing these representations of the past with meaning is to 
impose present-day extant beliefs, ideologies or norms (socio-economic, 
political or cultural) onto them. Simply put, their meaning is determined 
by the concerns of the present. In most instances, those objects which 
are deemed to be heritage hold little or no intrinsic value in themselves. 
Value and meaning are ascribed to the heritage – object, site, or prac-
tice – by the individual or society in which it exists.
Each individual, then, views that heritage through a ‘series of 
lenses’ (Graham and Howard 2008). These lenses include aspects of self, 
such as nationality, religion, ethnicity, class, wealth, gender and personal 
history. Therefore, the selection of, and meaning attributed to, heritage 
is determined by the identity of those individuals bestowing that mean-
ing. A person or community chooses to recognise something as heritage – 
to protect it, interpret it, share its history – because of the narrative they 
wish to recognise and associate themselves with in the present. Whether 
this is a conscious or unconscious decision, heritage is only heritage 
because society chooses to acknowledge it as such. Heritage is therefore 
changeable – in form, interpretation, inclusion or exclusion – and it does 
alter, as society changes. Since heritage derives its meaning and signifi-
cance from the interpretation of the past in the present. The essence of 
heritage is thus dependent upon the identity of those who determine it to 
be heritage (Ashworth et al. 2007).
Identity is formed through a process of defining and differentiat-
ing oneself with and from others. It is expressed through establishing or 
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associating oneself with communal groups. Simultaneously, this process 
creates an awareness of ‘the other’ – those outside the communal group 
(Littler 2008). Language, religion, ethnicity, nationalism, place origins 
and interpretations of the past all contribute to the formulation of iden-
tity (Ashworth et al. 2007). One of the most powerful means by which 
to define or confirm identity is through cultural heritage. Indeed, herit-
age plays a key role in the formation of collective memory, sense of place 
and establishing a link to the past. By controlling the heritage narrative – 
what is recognised, and what is not recognised as heritage – it is possible 
to influence and even control the collective sense of identity and memory.
Through the process of heritagisation, therefore, one can assert 
power over others, exclude others and manipulate understandings of the 
past in the present. As Graham and Howard point out, ‘[h]eritage is used 
to construct narratives of inclusion and exclusion that define communi-
ties and the ways in which these latter are rendered specific and differen-
tiated’ (Graham and Howard 2008).
It is this intrinsic relationship between heritage and identity which 
ungirds the controversy over representations of Confederate heritage 
today. The celebration of the Confederacy, promulgation of the ‘lost 
cause’ and glossing over or even erasing of difficult histories serves as a 
means by which white identity and dominance can be consolidated and 
reinforced. This is particularly true in Southern states, where the mythol-
ogy of the ‘lost cause’ is accepted by many as historical fact and the effects 
of the institution of slavery and the loss of the Civil War still haunt the col-
lective memory. For generations the erection of Confederate monuments 
and the ongoing fight to ensure their existence has served as a key tool in 
the process of identity making for many. The removal of these symbols is 
therefore viewed, rightly or wrongly, as a challenge to that identity.
Equally, the lack of representation of African American heritage, 
and the omission of non-white heritage in the heritage landscape of 
the United States, serves to undermine the identity and power of mar-
ginalised groups. For generations, the authorised heritage in the United 
States has been governed by the dominant group and the heritage of the 
country’s non-white population has been overlooked or diminished. As 
Kaufman recognises, ‘[d]ominant groups have strong narratives and lots 
of historic sites to reinforce them. Marginalised groups have weak nar-
ratives – narratives of subjugation, of not belonging’ (Kaufman 2009). 
The dominance of white identity has ensured that the African American 
heritage has been underrepresented in –and, in some cases, completely 
absent from – the cultural heritage landscape of the United States.
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Heritage as social justice
As demonstrated above, the complex relationship between heritage and 
identity imbues heritage with profound power. Heritage can be used to 
exclude or oppress certain groups and to assert the identity of others. 
Concomitantly, heritage has the potential to empower. Changing how and 
what is recognised as heritage gives a voice to those previously ignored 
while creating a more inclusive and accurate representation of the past 
in the present. By including those previously excluded in the process of 
heritage making, and by diversifying the identities of those making those 
decisions, the heritage landscape will necessarily reflect that change. As 
Johnston and Marwood aptly state, ‘heritage can be both a condition of 
social action as well as a form of social action’ (Johnston and Marwood 
2017). Heritage can be used as a tool for social justice.
Across the country, communities and organisations are using herit-
age as a means by which to reclaim their historical narrative. In 2015 the 
Chief Executive Officer of the National Trust declared the need for a ‘more 
inclusive history, and a preservation movement that looks like America’ 
(National Trust 2011). In 2017 the National Trust announced the launch 
of the African American Cultural Heritage Action Fund (AACHAF), a $25 
million funding initiative to ‘transform our nation’s cultural landscape’. 
The fund is dedicated to identifying and promoting overlooked contri-
butions of African Americans by funding the protection and restoration 
of African American historical sites. Brent Leggs, the director for the 
AACHAF, has acknowledged the critical role of heritage in a new form 
of justice, equity and activism (Paynter 2018). With 830 proposals for 
funding received by the AACHAF in its first year, from 42 states, the rel-
evance of this initiative is clear. The AACHAF has the potential to instate 
the missing narratives and help to affirm the identity and collective mem-
ories of black Americans as well as other underrepresented and minority 
groups. The designation of cultural heritage sites can serve to strengthen 
the sense of belonging experienced by underrepresented communities 
and individuals, while also confirming and acknowledging their status 
as equal citizens.
Another major step towards righting the wrongs of the omission of 
African Americans from the historical narrative is by acknowledging the 
darker side of America’s story through recognising difficult heritage. In 
April 2018 the National Memorial for Peace and Justice and the Legacy 
Museum: From Enslavement to Mass Incarceration opened in Montgomery, 
Alabama. The Memorial and the Museum project are part of the efforts of 
the Equal Justice Initiative (EJI), an organisation dedicated to:
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… ending mass incarceration and excessive punishment in the 
United States, to challenging racial and economic injustice, and 
to protecting basic human rights for the most vulnerable people in 
American society. 
(EJI 2018)
The idea was born during an EJI initiative to document the number of 
racial terror lynchings in the American South. This initiative, which 
resulted in a publication, inspired the EJI to embark on a project to 
memorialise this history. The underlying motivation for both the Memo-
rial and Museum is based on the premise that ‘publicly confronting the 
truth about our history is the first step towards recovery and reconcili-
ation’. The EJI clearly identifies the link between racial inequality and 
injustice in the United States and the need for the country not only to 
acknowledge the legacy of slavery, lynching and racial segregation, but 
also the lack of physical representation through memorials.
Both the National Trust and the EJI are doing significant work at the 
national level to recognise and reconcile the omission of African American 
heritage. For effective change to take place, however, changes must also 
occur at the local level. For example, the city of New Orleans has extensive 
cultural heritage honouring its white forefathers, founders and Confederate 
‘heroes’, but only limited representations of the city’s historically majority 
black population. Over the past few years communities, organisations and 
businesses have been using heritage as a tool for social action to reinstate, 
acknowledge and preserve sites of African American heritage.
The Preservation Research Center of New Orleans (PRCNO) is 
working to empower underrepresented communities to become active 
stakeholders in the practice of heritage in their city. The mission of the 
PRCNO is ‘to promote the preservation, restoration, and revitalisation of 
New Orleans’ historic architecture and neighborhoods’. Under the cur-
rent leadership of Danielle Del Sol, the organisation is working to make 
preservation and heritage more accessible to those people who have tra-
ditionally been excluded from the process of heritage making, and whose 
heritage has been absent from the heritage landscape.
Through PRCNO’s publication Preservation in Print, the organisa-
tion promotes preservation initiatives being led by African Americans, 
Asian-Americans, women, the LGBT community and the many other 
groups that comprise New Orleans. According to Del Sol, ‘the magazine 
showcases the diversity of the preservation movement and affirms the 
value we place on all residents’ history, stories and self-directed futures’ 
(Del Sol 2017). For example, Straight University – one of the first of three 
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African American universities constructed after the Civil War between 
1866–71 – had all but disappeared from the collective memory. A dilap-
idated and unused building, the PRCNO identified the building and has 
been working to rehabilitate and preserve it. Also featured in Preservation 
in Print were several other projects including the Pythian Building, the 
Rosette Rochon House and Le Musee de Free People of Color.
Just outside New Orleans itself, a number of historic plantation 
houses are also taking steps towards presenting more accurate histo-
ries of the people who lived and worked in such places. Traditionally, 
such historic homes provide little to no interpretation or recognition of 
the slave populations who ran these estates, portraying only a white-
washed history of lost grandeur and gentility (Del Sol 2017). At Laura 
and Whitney Plantations researchers, museum professionals and the 
plantation owners have conducted extensive historic and archaeological 
research to uncover the pasts of the slaves who lived and worked on these 
properties. The house at Laura Plantation now includes a full exhibition 
on the history of slavery at the plantation, along with a restored slave 
cabin. At Whitney Plantation the owner has turned the historic buildings, 
artefacts and art into a museum that shows the history of slavery on the 
plantation (Maloney 2016).
Conclusion
Through heritage – historic sites, preservation efforts, memorials and 
museums – communities are fighting for social justice to establish their 
identity and secure acknowledgement of their relevance to the present. 
As Del Sol has observed, ‘By rebuilding cultural identities and strength-
ening the narratives that people are able to tell about themselves, their 
families and their communities, we shift from injustice to empowerment’ 
(Del Sol, 2017). As evidenced by the controversy over the removal of 
Confederate symbols, heritage is critical to the process of identity for-
mation. African American heritage has been overlooked or deliberately 
ignored as a way to assert dominance over non-white Americans.
The incompleteness and misrepresentation of America’s historical 
narrative through heritage must be challenged. To do so, it is crucial 
to question whose heritage has been – and is still being – represented 
and why. The institutions that determine what is, and is not, recognised 
as heritage have been, and continue to be, controlled by the dominant 
majority. However, this white bubble has been punctured, and commu-
nities and heritage professionals alike are calling for a democratisation 
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of heritage. And why should there not be? If heritage is representative of 
our collective identities, then it can no longer be restricted to the homog-
enous and hegemonic narratives of the past. Heritage must reflect the 
heterogeneity which is the essence of the modern United States.
Notes
1. The American Civil War (1861–65) was a war between the United States, the Union Army and 
11 Southern States that seceded from the Union to form the Confederate States of America. 
The war was the culmination of decades of controversy and friction over the existence and 
future of slavery in the United States (Weber and Hassler 2018a).
2. See Smith (2006) on terminology for ‘authorized heritage’.
3. In 1963 the now defunct chapter of the Daughters of the Confederacy erected a memorial 
honouring 13 confederate soldiers who died while being held as prisoners of war at Fort War-
ren on Georges Island, Boston Harbor Islands. In 2017 the memorial was removed from view 
(Reilly 2017).
4. Slave States as of 1861: Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, South 
Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia (and what is now West Virginia), Tennessee, Kentucky and Mis-
souri. The Confederacy included Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, 
Georgia, Florida, South Carolina, North Carolina and Virginia (National Park Service, 2018a).
5. The United Daughters of the Confederacy is a nonprofit, hereditary organisation established in 
1894 in Nashville Tennessee. Their mission ‘is dedicated to the purpose of honoring the mem-
ory of its Confederate ancestors; protecting, preserving and marking the places made historic 
by Confederate valor; collecting and preserving the material for a truthful history of the War 
Between the States … ’ They are acknowledged by most historians as promoting the myth of 
the ‘lost cause’ and inaccurate historical interpretations of the Confederacy and the Civil War 
(Cox 2003; United Daughters of the Confederacy 2018).
6. The ‘lost cause’ is the false historical interpretation of the American Civil War (1861–5) coined 
by Edward Pollard in 1866 and promulgated by white Southerners. It attributes the primary 
causes of the war to the fight for states’ rights and the constitutionality of secession. Further, 
this interpretation typically denies the idea that slavery was a key factor. It romanticises ideas 
of the ‘Old South’ and portrays Confederate soldiers as heroic and saintly. This interpretation 
has little academic support and is generally referred to as myth or legend by historians (see 
Janney 2016).
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Alternating cycles of the politics 
of forgetting and remembering 
the past in Taiwan
Nicolas Zorzin
Cultural heritage in East Asia
Cultural heritage in East Asia has been seen and often used as a factor 
of differentiation between people. A clear tendency has been shown 
towards simultaneously exoticising and essentialising the past, yet pre-
senting it as immutable (Matsuda and Mengoni 2016, 3):
When we talk about ‘East Asian Heritage’, we assume, naturally and 
uncritically, that differences between and across Japanese, Chinese 
and Korean heritage can somehow be subsumed under the notion 
of ‘East Asian heritage’. This of course can be a problematic and 
politically dangerous assumption, but is also unavoidable to a cer-
tain extent because the very nature of cultural heritage is not only 
to divide but also unite. Seeing cultural heritage only as a marker of 
difference is limiting in this sense.
(Matsuda and Mengoni 2016, 4)
In this chapter, we attempt diachronically to present the mechanisms of 
assimilation and differentiation that have operated in Taiwan’s heritage 
since the end of the nineteenth century. These have taken place under 
Japanese rules (1895–1945), then under Chinese (Kuomintang or KMT) 
rules (1945–1980s) and then, since the 1980s, under the growing influ-
ence of Taiwanese independence movements.
In the case of Taiwan, however, the dichotomy between cultural 
differentiation and assimilation has substantial limitations: it does not 
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include the internal and simultaneous oppositions and contradictions in 
terms of what is cultural heritage, memory and identity within Taiwan 
society today. For example, it is not uncommon to speak with a native of 
Taiwan who simultaneously claims his or her differentiated Taiwanese 
identity yet speaks Mandarin (often repressing his/her own mother 
tongue) to favour career development or simply for convenience, using 
Chinese as a lingua franca. Such an individual takes pride in Chinese her-
itage and being part of China’s major and millenary civilisation.
Others, though, will reject any references at all to the Chinese 
continent and Chinese heritage, preferring to embrace a mix of local 
Taiwanese specificities, local languages and Japanese, Aboriginal and 
European heritages. For them, these are the essence of Taiwanese iden-
tities. Finally, many would prefer to ignore this antagonism, seeking to 
embrace a so-called neutral and post-historical approach deeply embed-
ded in the neoliberal dogma. For them, the very notion of citizenship 
should be replaced with a simplistic definition of human existence as a 
consumerist one. Heritage is thus tolerated as soon as it is apolitical and 
as it becomes part of the sphere of consumption.
Today, these multiple perceptions, understandings and treatments 
of heritage in Taiwan continue to compete with one another in the per-
manent ‘global battlefields of cultural production and consumption’ 
(Hamilakis 1999, 74).
Taiwan’s heritage in context
The island of Taiwan still bears evidence of its previous inhabitants, dat-
ing back to early prehistory (up to 35,000 years BP or even more distant). 
However, these archaeological and architectural traces, especially those 
from the remote past, are elusive; their identification and preservation 
requires a strong commitment from elements of national, contempora-
neous communities. To preserve or destroy heritage is never an insignif-
icant decision, nor a neutral or apolitical choice. Some people in Taiwan 
place emphasis on the recovery of these various local places of identi-
ties, through different types of sites and across diverse periods. Yet since 
1949 a Chinese cultural and linguistic origin of Taiwan has been super-
imposed through education – and, notably, justified through the display 
of Chinese heritage, transferred from the mainland as a unique and mon-
olithic identity. As a result, and more obviously since the 1980s, a strug-
gle for political and cultural hegemony can be observed between those 
two antagonistic visions of Taiwanese identity. One perceives Taiwan as 
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culturally Chinese, while the other views Taiwan as a unique and inde-
pendent place of multiple identities. Cultural heritage and archaeology 
are now located at the core of these struggles.
Until the 1990s both the European and Japanese colonial past and 
the Austronesian past were often seen as ‘embarrassing’ by the Nationalist 
government (Chang and Chiang 2012, 29). The only exception occurred 
when Taiwan’s Austronesian past was embedded within the ‘theories of 
northern origin of the Taiwan’s Aboriginal Austronesian people’ developed 
by Lin Hui-Hsiang in the 1930s. This theory was reused and adapted in 
the early 1980s to serve the Chinese Nationalist idea of a unified history, 
and so to support the necessary and logical reunification of Taiwan with 
China (Stainton 1999, 35–7). At the beginning of the 1990s, by contrast, 
Taiwan’s cultural heritage was slowly re-interpreted and integrated into 
a more global Taiwanese narrative (Chang and Chiang 2012, 29) – espe-
cially the Austronesian cultural heritage and archaeological traces, notably 
through the ‘Taiwan as Austronesian Homeland’ theory (Stainton 1999, 
37). Now, even though this late cultural De-Sino-focalisation of the past 
began approximately three decades ago, the people of Taiwan’s under-
standing of their island’s multifaceted cultural heritage has not yet been 
clearly connected to archaeological remains. However, it has been much 
more strongly linked to linguistics and genetics (Stainton 1999, 37–41).
As a result, there still exists an odd relationship between Taiwan’s 
inhabitants and the land they inhabit (including its underground). This 
is clearly caused by a strong dissonance between the Chinese past, in 
which Taiwanese children were educated since 1949 – and still are par-
tially today1 – and the Austronesian non-monumental and transient past, 
uniquely revealed by archaeological and anthropological studies.
As underlined by Muyard (2015, 13), this situation could be com-
pared to that of the so-called ‘New World’. For example, the colonisation 
of Quebec (Canada) started four centuries ago in 1608 (only 16 years 
before the first Dutch settlement in Tainan). Yet nowadays the French-
speaking, demographically dominant population, which has attempted 
independence regularly since 1759, still has a common nationalist reflex 
to identify and/or look for the remains of the French Regime. In so doing 
it too often ignores the 14,000 years of traces of First Nations occupation, 
and often neglects or willingly defaces the heritage of two centuries of 
British domination (Auger and Moss 1999, 132–44). Some movements 
towards accepting an ‘indigenisation’ process exist: that is, the idea 
that the French stopped being French through the contact with Native 
Americans, and vice versa, creating a completely new, more complex 
mixed identity. However, it is still rare to hear a Francophone native of 
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Quebec being vocal about his or her First Nations ancestry and/or dis-
playing pride towards the (almost invisible) archaeological remains of 
the First Nations past. It would also, regrettably, be uncommon to see 
someone showing particular respect to the First Nations communities.
In Taiwan, by contrast, an increasing number of people are thinking of 
themselves as a multi-ethnic society. So at least the Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP) has presented Taiwan since its victory of 2016: ‘Tsai was 
emphatic through the proceedings of her inauguration on the multi-ethnic 
nature of Taiwanese society’ (Hioe 2016). As such not only immigration, 
but also far and foreign pasts (such as those of Aborigines) are more suscep-
tible to be integrated into national, familial or personal narratives.
Archaeology is at the core of this spatial and temporal mediation. 
However, in both cases, and as stated by Muyard, archaeology has suf-
fered from a chronic ‘lack of state support, or benign indifference’ since 
the end of the Second World War (Muyard 2015). This is mostly because 
of the difficulties inherent in connecting the prehistory of both Taiwan and 
Quebec within the present narrative of the demographic majority – that 
is, those of Han and French ancestry respectively (Muyard 2015, 9, Zorzin 
2011, 82–5). The dissonances in the past with each respective nationalist 
agenda (historically Parti Québécois and the KMT) have resulted, in both 
cases, in prehistory generally receiving ‘low public knowledge and inter-
est’ and in state support for cultural heritage being weak, both financially 
and legally (Muyard 2015, 9–14; Zorzin 2011, 31, 81, 108, 110, 123).
On the politics of the prehistory of Taiwan, and especially on its 
‘Aboriginal origins’, Stainton offered in 1999 a precious and detailed 
description of the evolution of various political exploitations of the 
Aboriginal origins question, according to the different interests of dom-
inant groups or minorities in building their identities. He divided this 
evolution into four different stages. Most overlap to some degree, with 
some being simultaneous and in direct opposition, but they have mainly 
followed one another since 1896:
Stage 1: the ‘Theory of Southern Origin’ (Stainton 1999, 29–32) 
During the Japanese colonial period (mainly during the 1920s and 
1930s), it was convenient for the colonisers to separate clearly the pre-
historic trajectories of Taiwanese Aboriginal people from the Han, and to 
position themselves as allies of the former (despite oppressing them at 
the same time). By locating the origins of Taiwanese Aboriginal people in 
the Malayan area – drawing on linguistics data as well as oral traditions 
from various Aboriginal groups (principally Amis) – the Japanese could 
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oppose a strong argument backing the legitimacy of Chinese claims to 
the island by demonstrating that Taiwan belonged exclusively to the Aus-
tronesian/Pacific sphere.
Stage 2: the ‘Theory of Northern Origin’ (Stainton 1999, 32–7)
In mainland China in the 1930s, a new idea emerged from the writing 
of the anthropologist Lin Hui-Hsiang (Amoy University, Xiamen, Fujian, 
China). At the time he presented this idea only as a conjecture. Yet it 
would be reused after the Second World War by both principal nation-
alist protagonists – The People’s Republic of China and the Republic of 
China (i.e. Kuomintang in Taiwan) – to reiterate that Taiwan is ‘a time-
less part of China’, with each acting as the only legitimate authority of 
China (Stainton 1999, 34). In fact, Lin’s intuition has been progressively 
confirmed by anthropological research from the 1980s and to the pres-
ent, establishing the region of Fukien as the place of origin of Neolithic 
Austronesian people. This discovery became a strong argument in the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) to promote reunification. However, this 
argument ignored not only the large gap between this prehistoric coloni-
sation, which occurred in 6500 BP, and the next principal contact with 
the continent in the seventeenth century AD, but also the crucial fact that 
in 6500 BP no such thing as ‘China’ existed. The first documented polit-
ical structure in the region, the Xia dynasty (夏朝), did not appear until 
around 4070 BP in the north of the continent.
Stage 3: ‘Taiwan as Austronesian homeland’ (Stainton 1999, 37–41)
Before the ‘theory’ described above was proved correct, another theory 
was developed in the 1960s by Isidore Dyen. Based on developments in 
linguistics studies, it demonstrated that the present Taiwanese languages 
possessed the richest diversity and complexity in the Austronesian 
South-East Asian world, placing them logically at the origin of the Aus-
tronesian language family. In the 1980s the ‘Theory of Northern Origin’ 
and that of ‘Taiwan as Austronesian Homeland’ were reconciled; anthro-
pologists emphasised that the origin was clearly the Fukien area, accord-
ing to archaeological discoveries, but that there were no remains of this 
linguistic family in the continent. This migration was then followed by 
independent development in Taiwan, and a spread across the Pacific and 
Indian Ocean.
This approach became extremely popular in Taiwan among the 
Aboriginal political movements in the 1980s and 1990s by supporting 
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a right of autonomy and land ownership (or restitution), a right to write 
history and a right of simply being recognised as the only real Taiwanese. 
Nevertheless, Taiwanese/Han nationalism (Hokkien and Haka – i.e. 
non-mainlanders and non-Austronesian) was also on the rise. Its pro-
ponents adopted a strategy of ‘indigenising’ themselves – ‘strategically 
essentialising’ their own culture by portraying their heritage as exotic to 
outsiders in order to gain more recognition (Spivak 1988, Sylvain 2005 
in Matsuda and Mengoni 2016, 3). This allowed the movement to append 
itself to Taiwan’s Austronesian Aboriginal aspiration to independence 
and definitive differentiation with China.
Stage 4: ‘Aboriginal Genes defining Taiwanese Identity’ 
At the end of the 1990s a new opening occurred in anthropology with 
genetic studies being carried out over a much wider scope. In 1997 it was 
claimed by a Taiwanese scientist that 60 per cent of the current Taiwanese 
population had an Aboriginal ancestry (Stainton 1999, 41–2). However, 
this conclusion appeared particularly weak since it was based upon spec-
ulations on only one characteristic of blood immune-types. Not only did 
these types of research provide weak conclusions, but also – as the Cana-
dian socio-anthropologist Mark Munsterhjelm has recently demonstrated 
(Munsterhjelm 2014) – the implications of such genetics studies could be 
ethically problematic, even highly detrimental to Aboriginal communities.
In his book, Munsterhjelm interrogated why genetic studies in Taiwan 
had mostly seemed to serve a double purpose since the 1990s. They did so, 
he claimed, by a) including Aboriginal genes in the national narratives of 
the past (whether these were Chinese nationalist or Taiwanese nationalist 
narratives, see above) to serve opposing political agendas but always to the 
benefit of Han populations, while b) excluding the Aboriginal genes of pres-
ent communities. Such communities were rendered ineligible by claims 
that their genetics reflected a ‘predisposition toward alcoholism and other 
health problems’ (Munsterhjelm 2014, 1). As such, he declared, ‘Aborigines 
and their genes were positively valued as connections to the past but nega-
tively valued as being predisposed to disorder in the present’ (ibid).
Munsterhjelm’s conclusions are particularly alarming as they reveal 
that Aboriginal genetics studies make these populations into a form of 
‘living dead’, dehumanised and disempowered. Considered as biopolitics, 
genetics studies do this in three different ways. Firstly they qualify them 
as ‘ancestral living dead’: ‘genetics researchers constitute Aborigines as 
isolated populations that provide linkages to ancient Austronesian dead 
ancestors and prehistoric migrations in the Pacific’ (Munsterhjelm 2014, 
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213–15). Secondly the ‘diverse living dead’ are presented as commod-
ified things: ‘Aboriginal peoples […] exist to serve scientists as sources 
for human variation’ (Munsterhjelm 2014, 215). Thirdly they are per-
ceived as ‘genetically predisposed living dead’: ‘Aborigines require spe-
cial restrictive forms of governance in order to manage the risks that their 
genes represent’ (Munsterhjelm 2014, 215). He concludes by stating:
Scientists […] assume that somehow the historical and social expe-
riences of Aborigines and settlers are equivalent, […] so that dif-
ferences in outcomes are, in part, seen as the result of cultural and 
genetic differences. […] This attribution of Aboriginal problems to 
genetic factors denies full considerations of their social problems, 
including poverty imposed through the expropriation of Aboriginal 
territories, unemployment, and racism. By using such a genetic attri-
bution, scientists avoid considering Aborigines’ own perspectives on 
their social problems. Dehumanizing Aborigines depends on attribut-
ing to Aboriginal peoples the evolutionary status of being genetically 
different. […] These genetic differentiations between settlers and 
Aborigines are foundational acts of racially configured epistemologi-
cal and ontological violence, which clearly demonstrate that genetics 
research is an important technology of sovereignty and biopolitics.
(Munsterhjelm 2014, 217)
Stage 5: a future Pan-Taiwanese identity? 
Finally and overall, with the majority of Minnan speakers in Taiwan 
being a linguistically distinct (now called ‘Taiwanese’ language) group 
from the Northern Han, and originating from the same location as the 
Austronesian migration, we can foresee the formation of a symbolic 
bridge with the distant past and the claim of a common and ‘primordial’ 
pan- Taiwanese identity. Dating back to the Neolithic era, a destiny of 
unity could be proposed as a pan-Minnan–Aboriginal identity in Taiwan, 
further justifying the resistance against Chinese unification (Fig.16.1). 
However, the ongoing and mostly unchallenged Sinicisation of the lan-
guage in Taiwan already seems to have reached a point of no return (Ang 
2018, map A4: ‘Mandarin Use in Taiwanese Families’). As this map shows, 
new generations are slowly but surely dropping their mother tongues in 
favour of Mandarin (See Lin, Li-chin 2011) – a situation that could con-
siderably blur the potential pan-Minnan–Aboriginal political agenda.
276 CRIT ICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURAL MEMORY AND HERITAGE
Figure 16.1 Protest during the investiture ceremony of President Tsai. 
Photograph by Nicolas Zorzin, 20 May 2016.  
Entering the neoliberal era: promoting identities while 
diluting and commodifying them 
Since the 1990s, and in concordance with the rise of neoliberal 
dogma across the world (Harvey 2005), the political struggles in the 
 identity-building of inhabitants of Taiwan described above were consid-
erably reduced (diverted, but not supressed). All Taiwanese inhabitants, 
and especially Aboriginal people, were ‘invited’ to participate in ‘main-
stream’ society (see the speech of the KMT President Lee from 1995, cited 
in Stainton 1999, 42). Despite the neutral or even progressive appear-
ance of such an invitation, this simply meant an invitation to blend into 
the consumerist, capitalist and so-called ‘modern’ society.
This is, in fact, a well-known and hackneyed ‘neoliberal’ technique. 
The strategy has been applied since the 1990s to discredit any form of 
socio-political struggle, especially those based on identity and, even 
more specifically, those of Aboriginal communities (Zorzin 2014). This 
was not an invitation to develop true autonomies, but rather a way to 
exacerbate the superficial and politically inoffensive characteristics of 
each group, and to blend them together. By dictating behaviours under 
the rules of consumerism, the strategy sought to dispossess people of the 
political legitimacy of their causes.
Such a mindset, in the long term, could support (re)connecting 
both sides of the strait under the promise of the common good through 
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business and profit. President Ma Ying-Jeou, elected to power in 2008, 
stated in 2012 that ‘The people of the two sides of the strait share com-
mon Chinese ethnic heritage. We share common blood lines, history 
and culture’ (cited in Munsterhjelm 2014, 87). This speech deliberately 
encompassed Aboriginal communities, suggesting that they can only 
exist under a Chinese cultural identity, as one of the many ‘Chinese’ 
minorities (Munsterhjelm 2014, 87).
The DPP, which has been in power since 2016, has shown no clear 
intention to govern using a different agenda than the one prioritising 
economics. On the day of the investiture of the new President Tsai, 20 
May 2016, the same neutral and unchallenging re-enactment of history 
and identities of Taiwan was displayed. Operating along the same lines 
as the KMT since the 1990s, the DPP seemed, that day, also to promote 
the multi-ethnic characteristic of Taiwan (Hioe 2016). Yet this was no 
longer under the Chinese cultural, historical and moral authority, but 
instead under the celebrated pseudo-equalitarian diversity of Taiwan 
democracy.
It seemed that diversity itself became the essence of the Taiwanese 
identity (while focusing on Aboriginal representations and individuals 
during the ceremony) – even though it is still not clear what this ‘diversity’ 
exactly encompasses. The reality is that Aboriginals represent only 2.5 
per cent of the Taiwanese population and are mostly socio- economically 
disenfranchised (Chou 2005, 8–13). That makes their presence during 
the investiture ceremony, even though essential, both a visual instrumen-
talisation seeking to create a differentiation from China and, through 
folklorisation, a denial of defining their own identity.
Related evolutions in the treatment and perception 
of cultural heritage in Taiwan
Since the 1960s, development and economic growth have become cen-
tral to Taiwan’s socio-political life. This policy has been accompanied by 
the disappearance of most of the built cultural heritage (of all periods), 
either simply abandoned or more actively destroyed to make space for 
new constructions (Kempf and Zheng 2000, 119). Development and 
infrastructural construction seem to have been particularly chaotic in 
their organisation (there has been no clear urban plan, nor do any visual 
harmonisation rules exist). Furthermore, the destruction of traditional 
Taiwanese buildings and – to an even greater degree – Japanese ones was 
presented by the authorities as a desirable sign of progress (Courmont 
278 CRIT ICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURAL MEMORY AND HERITAGE
2008, 65). From 1945 up until the 1980s no desire for systematic pres-
ervation of Taiwan’s cultural heritage was expressed by either national 
or local authorities. Only with the ‘Cultural Heritage Preservation Act’ 
(CHPA), implemented in 1982, did a legal policy to protect Cultural Her-
itage reappear under KMT rules after the Japanese occupation period.
In contrast, the heritage displayed and promoted since 1945 has 
been a Chinese heritage, following the take-over of the island by the 
Kuomintang between 1945 and 1949. The National Palace Museum 
was subsequently presented as the epicentre of the Chinese Dynasties 
Cultural diffusion in the world (Chan 2015, 175–98), as well as the 
Central National Library, the National Museum of History. All were con-
ceived as symbols of the legitimate ownership of the ‘true’ China by the 
KMT; they also supported the process of ‘re-Sinicisation’ of a de facto 
Japanese Taiwan.
Since the promulgation of the CHPA in 1982, the main categories of 
cultural heritage preserved were ‘monuments’ (about 800 forts, bridges, 
government offices, residences, temples, shrines, train stations and more, 
dealt with at the national level by the Council of Cultural Affairs, called 
the Ministry of Culture since 2005) and ‘historical buildings’ (about 1200 
diverse monuments designated by special municipalities or counties) 
(Her 2013). In addition, the logic of preservation reached a new level in 
2006, when a series of ‘management mechanisms’ were implemented. 
The aim of these was drastically to reduce the risks of damaging the 
2000 monuments of Taiwan, notably by reforming the electrical facilities 
which were often the source of fire disasters (Yen et al. 2015, 383–8).
Although approximately 3000 archaeological sites have been iden-
tified in Taiwan since 1896, only 43 have been recognised under the 
CHPA. Of these, 95 per cent are related to Han Chinese culture (Muyard 
2015, 11; Tsai 2012). This fact demonstrates the extremely problematic 
and significantly unbalanced state between the multiplicity of Taiwan’s 
cultural heritage and the distorted vision chosen to be presented to the 
public. ‘The public’ in this context includes both national and interna-
tional visitors, of whom the vast majority (38 per cent, according to the 
Tourism Bureau, ROC Taiwan, in 2018) are continental Chinese. The 
same source notes that 18 per cent are Japanese tourists and 22 per cent 
come from other countries in South-East Asia.
In the National Centre for Traditional Arts in Yilan County, for exam-
ple, a visual simulation of the Taiwanese past has been displayed with 
an almost entirely re-built (fake) Southern China architectural- ensemble 
(Fig.16.2). The construction has no patrimonial value, but is instead 
almost a caricature, unrelated to the past life of the location or to the past 
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lives of real people. The presentation is heavily Disneyfied, consumer- 
oriented and idealised. It features a remodelled urban setting (including 
a replica of a religious temple) and a rural landscape. Both emphasise the 
idea of a common Chinese cultural unity (Southern Chinese architecture 
and customs, and Confucianism).
It should be noted here that, depending on the narrative delivered 
during the visits, the exhibitions could be both used to focus on the similari-
ties between Taiwan and China, as much as on their differences. As such, the 
park can be consumed equally by Taiwanese and Chinese tourists without 
much friction. It should also be noted that no place has been made to dis-
play the Aboriginal past. This lack of acknowledgement has obliterated the 
simple possibility of facing dissonant and difficult narratives (Kisić 2016).
From the start of the twenty-first century there have been visible 
movements to change the status quo on cultural heritage. Increasing 
numbers of local heritage preservation projects are appearing around 
the island (Her 2013). These include numerous history and prehistory 
museums, often driven by local authorities aiming for tourism develop-
ment (Courmont 2008, 66). However, the actual tendencies towards 
‘tourism development’ have also brought a substantial commoditisa-
tion of cultural heritage. This phenomenon needs to be scrutinised 
and urgently criticised before it is developed further. As Hsia Chu-
Joe, a professor in the Graduate Institute of Building and Planning at 
Figure 16.2 The recreation of a fake ‘Han Street’, dedicated only to 
tourist shopping. National Centre for Traditional Arts, Yilan County. 
Photograph by Nicolas Zorzin, 18 May 2016. 
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National Taiwan University, has argued, ‘the real enemy of conservation 
efforts has been the prevalent developmentcentric mentality’ (cited in 
Tsai 2012). This has impacted, and continues to impact, in two oppo-
site ways: by facilitating a superficial conservation of heritage, aiming 
primarily to attract tourists and generate profits, and by facilitating the 
destruction of heritage to leave space for much more profitable building 
developments.
In the meantime, it should be underlined that despite the efforts 
of successive governments, and especially despite the actions of the 
Ministry of Culture and the bureaus of cultural affairs at both local 
and county levels, the major sites of Taiwanese heritage cannot be des-
ignated on the UNESCO World Heritage List because of the country’s 
ongoing and unresolved diplomatic conflict with China. Any attempts of 
Taiwan to gain international recognition, including that of its cultural 
heritage (Chang and Chiang 2012, 29, Chung 2003), have been vetoed 
by China. Because of the non-recognition of Taiwan as an independent 
nation by the international community, it is still not possible for the 
island to become a candidate for the recognition of World Heritage Sites 
(Ministry of Culture, Republic of China/Taiwan 2016) – a procedure 
that Blundell has judged as vital ‘in establishing a world heritage knowl-
edge system on prehistory and early history’ (Blundell 2001, 19). Nor is 
Taiwan able to receive support and advice on the protection and display 
of those sites for the public.
Furthermore, the Taiwanese identity that has been progressively 
emerging since the 1970s has been fundamentally active in integrating, 
re-interpreting and negotiating the multiple episodes of colonisations. 
In so doing, it has redirected the outcomes of site preservation towards 
the bonding with memories within local communities. As such, the post- 
colonial cultural heritage, instead of being seen as an adverse memory 
against a specific coloniser, has been redirected towards more general 
preoccupations concerning social welfare, global ecological issues and 
economic improvement. It has also been, on some rare occasions, a direct 
criticism of capitalism and over-exploitation of resources – for example, 
the 2015/16 exhibition ‘Musensemble City – An Experiencing Project for 
Modernity’ held in the Japanese building of what is now the National 
Taiwan Museum in Taipei.
The complex and often controversial colonial past of Taiwan was 
not removed or cleaned entirely, as has been the case in many other coun-
tries where processes of identity construction were once in progress. An 
example of this is the newly independent Greece at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century (Hamilakis 2007, 85–99). Instead, mostly since the 
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1990s, increasing numbers of colonial period sites, notably Japanese, 
have been preserved. These places must address their ‘contested nature’, 
attempting to reveal and to engage locally with manifold narratives and 
memories, contradictory and controversial. This process might, in the 
end, be of a truly de-colonising nature (Chang and Chiang 2012, 29), 
unless it is absorbed by economic growth preoccupations alone. Such an 
outcome would replace the old colonial, coercive system of domination of 
men by men by the new so-called ‘free’ capitalist system, equally impos-
ing domination through heritage that is distorted, neutralised and to be 
consumed.
From a disappearing Japanese architectural heritage  
to a post-1990s rehabilitation process – heritagisation or 
commercialisation? 
After 1895 the prerequisite to the construction of a Japanese urban 
space in Taiwan was for the new occupant to eradicate, or at least 
reduce, the visual traces of previous political and cultural powers  – 
namely the Manchu dynasty of Qing China. Most notable among 
these were the tortuous and narrow alleys of the Manchu cities. This 
operation was quickly conducted between 1895 and 1900, mainly by 
destroying administrative and religious centres, as well as some strong 
landscape markers such as the wall of the city of Taipei (Kempf and 
Zheng 2000, 121). All ‘Chinese’ references were intentionally erased 
from these new urban spaces to make room for a monumental, func-
tional and efficient city. In fact, only a few public buildings or parks 
followed strict Japanese style standards, for example Shinto shrines. 
However, many private residencies around the island did emulate the 
Japanese architectural wooden traditions.
Today, traces of the Japanese occupation are visible everywhere in 
Taiwan. They are most unmistakable in Taipei City, built as a model of the 
colonial and modern Japan of the early twentieth century. This utopian city, 
built by the Japanese government, embraced both ‘modernity’ (large ave-
nues and a north–south/east–west grid) and a clear Western architectural 
style, called ‘grand style’ or shiyang jianzhu (Kempf and Zheng 2000, 122). 
This fact can partially explain the city’s preservation by the following KMT 
government, which was otherwise inclined towards annihilating all visible 
remains of Japanese culture on the island (Chang and Chiang 2012, 28).
By contrast, the Japanese traditional houses and Shinto shrines, 
mostly made of wood and thus requiring continual care, were simply 
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left to decay (even though often occupied by KMT military personnel) 
or defaced, for example, Tongxiao Shinto Shrine (通霄神社) in Miaoli 
County. Others were demolished to make space for new concrete con-
structions. One of the most obvious landscape markers to disappear was 
probably the main Shinto Grand Shrine of Taiwan (台湾神宮) in Taihoku 
(Taipei). This was partially destroyed by a plane crash in 1944; it was 
then replaced by the Old Grand Hotel, and finally by the ostentatious 
Grand Hotel (圓山大飯店) in 1973, as a showcase of Chinese architec-
ture and culture. In 1991 a bank became the first Japanese building to be 
officially designated as a protected historic ‘monument’. In the 2000s a 
vast number of Japanese monuments (such as the Qingxiu Yuan Temple 
in Hualien) were designated and restored (Chang and Chiang 2012, 28).
Furthermore, a recent preservation movement aims to renovate 
the remains of Japanese traditional housing in Taiwan. Interestingly, this 
process does not seem to have been inspired by a clear national, political 
or cultural preservation policy. It seems to be rather the choice of ordi-
nary people, eager to save and restore life to old but particularly attractive 
housing projects for artists and craftsmen (Her 2013). A similar situation 
has existed in Kyoto since the 1990s, where restoration has focused on tra-
ditional wooden merchants’ houses, or Machiya (Ryōichi 2003, 382–3).
Some examples of this form of restoration in Taiwan seem to have 
been fruitful collaborations between the government and various asso-
ciations, such as the ‘revitalisation’ of a traditional Japanese-style home 
in Yunlin County. The combination of the particular features of Japanese 
traditional architecture and the extremely rainy and hot climate of 
Taiwan make the preservation of buildings almost impossible if they are 
not inhabited and constantly taken care of. As a result, the use of the 
restored building by a storytelling and art association has made the struc-
ture appear viable in the long term, while also supporting an increasingly 
popular cultural activity among local populations (Her 2013).
However, the process of renovation of the traditional Japanese hous-
ing is also related to financial investment, speculation (based on district 
gentrification) and increasing profit mechanisms. Built heritage is being 
used as an added value in economic terms, notably in Taipei (Fig.16.3). 
Certainly some renovation projects, such as the Taipei’s Red House (built 
in 1908), have been judged as successful in becoming a ‘thriving centre 
for live performances and businesses in the cultural and creative indus-
try’ (Her 2013). Yet most of the restoration activities observable today 
are essentially commercial. The extent of the social role and cultural sup-
port offered by such a ‘cultural’ centre is arguable, even though it became 
a well-known cultural marker of Taipei’s gay nightlife.
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Figure 16.3 Traditional Japanese housing in Da’an district, around 
Jinhua Street, in different stages of rehabilitation. Photograph by 
Nicolas Zorzin, March–April 2016. 
Furthermore, in Taipei, two renowned ‘Cultural and Creative’ 
parks have been established using the remains of industrial buildings 
of the Japanese Taipei. They are Songshan Cultural and Creative Park 
(松山文創園區), opened in 2011 and formerly a tobacco factory, and 
Huashan 1914 Creative Park (華山1914文化創意產業園區), opened 
in 2005 (formerly a winery). In both cases, the concept of ‘adaptive 
reuse’ (Chen and Fu 2015) was adopted and implemented. The inten-
tion was to retain the building’s heritage significance while adding a 
modern touch, thus providing a value for its present and future use. The 
benefits claimed by such an approach are two-fold: it saves the built 
heritage while also making it relevant to the present, both socially and 
economically.
In the case of the Songshan Cultural and Creative Park, however, the 
project has largely failed to preserve its heritage value. No clear navigation 
signage is displayed inside or outside the buildings. A guided tour of the 
precinct is available, but only for groups of more than 15 people and only if 
booked a week in advance; most people do not know of its existence. Most of 
the original artefacts or industrial remains used to create an aura of authen-
ticity and rusticity are given very little or no context. The original Japanese 
environment thus becomes unreadable, with the new site mostly practical, 
cute and commercial (café, bookstore, expensive shops, etc.). Songshan 
Cultural and Creative Park has been turned into a space to be consumed, 
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rather than one that can be used to learn, create and reflect. As such, the 
buildings have not only been deprived of their historical context and made 
over-commercial, but the Park has failed to involve genuine public partici-
pation (replaced by consumption) or to develop any sense of community.
In the context of the old colonial mining industry in Jinguashi 
(close to the old port of Keelung), the Japanese built heritage was more 
systematically renovated or rebuilt with the aim of supporting tourism. 
A Japanese colonial landscape has been almost entirely rebuilt or main-
tained – a ‘feeling’ that has been reinforced by the extremely popular 
animation Spirited Away, from the Japanese animation director Hayao 
Miyazaki (Studio Ghibli). He, it is believed, had used the location (Jiufen 
and Jinguashi) to construct the visuals for his globally acclaimed ani-
mation in 2001 (Fig.16.4). In this case, despite the dark context of the 
gold mine development (a former prisoner of war camp and the site of 
exploitation, disease, early death, prostitution, etc.), the area has been 
heavily Disneyfied for recreational purposes. Very little space is given for 
critical reflection on the historical context of colonisation, or of the cap-
italist exploitation of resources and of people (apart from one panel in 
the museum of the ‘Gold Mining Town of Jinguashi’, which displays some 
pictures of British Commonwealth and Allied POWs).
Figure 16.4 Old Street with ‘Yubaaba’s House’, Jiufen (湯婆婆). 
Photograph by Nicolas Zorzin, 3 April 2016 
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Furthermore, Jiufen became a major cultural reference in Taiwan 
in 1989 when the film director Hsiao-Hsien Hou released the film City of 
Sadness. Set in Jiufen, it portrayed Taiwanese families struggling against 
the new KMT’s relentlessly repressive power between 1945 and 1949. 
This historical evocation of Hsiao-Hsien Hou and the renown it gave to 
Jiufen is hardly visible today. The town is now far more focused on both 
Japanese architectural cuteness and the old-fashioned, melancholic 
atmosphere of the area as means to attract tourism, rather than confront-
ing a dark part of Taiwan’s history.
From a different perspective and setting commodification aside, it 
is apparent that:
The transformation of Japanese colonial sites into Taiwanese cul-
tural heritage reflects the flourishing localism in which grassroots 
groups and activists endeavour to evoke civic awareness. […] Many 
Taiwanese people regard these heritages as intimate sites of mem-
ory that offer a new sense of place. The Japanese colonial sites have 
become an essential ingredient of a new Taiwanese identity and cul-
tural narrative during the burgeoning memory boom [of the 1990s].
(Chang and Chiang 2012, 28)
As such, the Japanese sites preservation movement was also supported 
by what has been defined as ‘nostalgia travellers’ coming from Japan. 
This is especially the case in Taipei and Tainan, where tourism has flour-
ished. Yet before becoming such touristic attractions, these colonial 
sites passed through a process of appropriation in three stages. Firstly, 
they were subjected to an open dialogue of multiple memories. Sec-
ondly, they were transformed into sites of locality and commemoration. 
Finally, they were no longer reinterpreted as the legacies of a predatory 
coloniser, but instead perceived as new symbols of localism and grass-
roots pacifist activism (Chang and Chiang 2012, 29).
Concluding remarks 
Taiwan’s cultural heritage, as Taiwan’s identity, has been and is still strug-
gling to exist as a whole, tossed between the injunctions of numerous 
and opposed political agendas. Yet even though these opposing forces are 
aiming for the annihilation (by active destruction) or neutralisation (by 
commodification) of the cultural memory of the supposed incompatible 
others still present in Taiwan today, there is also a deep-rooted trend now 
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seeking for an easing of tensions and working on the deployment of a 
more inclusive and plural cultural memory for the country.
Even if the significance of cultural heritage is still heavily influenced 
by the narrative of Taiwan as part of China, individuals and local com-
munities (self-identifying as Mainlander, ‘Taiwanese’, Hakka, Aboriginal 
or, increasingly, as an undistinguishable Taiwanese mix) are in a process 
of redefining what is important for them and what makes sense to the 
community. In so doing, they often successfully bypass limited and sim-
plistic nationalist antagonisms. Here the innovative,  community-based 
archaeological projects led by Professor Chung of National Cheng Kung 
University in Hualien (working with Sakizaya Aboriginal people) and 
Kaohsiung (working with a mix of populations in Zuoying, an old, his-
torical district that has mostly been destroyed) should be mentioned. 
Chung’s projects illustrate academic attempts to redefine heritage in 
Taiwan (Chung 2018). Yet the obligations to makes a profit and to demon-
strate the financial contribution of heritage to society (often requested by 
communities) still pose a major challenge. In this situation, how can the 
commodification of heritage be avoided in the long term?
Finally, in 2018, the hope expressed by many archaeologists to 
develop successful strategies of cultural heritage preservation in Taiwan 
involves a reinforcement of grassroots groups and increasing conscious-
ness within the entire population about the value and fragility of cultural 
heritage at large. To avoid both destructive or commodifying forces (both 
nationalistic and capitalist) taking the lead in cultural heritage manage-
ment, the support of inclusive forces within local communities must be 
secured to enable successful resistance to occur in Taiwan.
Note
1. See the recent ‘One-China ideology’ textbook imposed by the KMT and fought against by stu-
dents in 2015; Gold 2015.
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A glimpse into the crystal ball: how 
do we select the memory of the 
future?
Monique van den Dries and José Schreurs
One of the principal motives of heritage management is the bequest 
value – the value contemporary people place on resource as something 
to be handed on to future generations. Heritage professionals work on 
behalf of future generations, ‘who are expected to be grateful’ (Holtorf 
2008, 125). They consider this stewardship an important duty: the wish 
to bequeath is everywhere, from the UNESCO World Heritage Convention 
to national and local heritage policies. This volume is no exception, given 
the observation in its introduction that cultural heritage, and the memory 
it embodies, is considered vital for individuals, groups and communities, 
particularly in forming collective identities, both today and in the future.
Given this ambition, one would say that heritage professionals 
would do their utmost to enable the heritage they select for the future to 
play this role. But do we, and can we? How do we select the memory of 
the future? Despite the fact that we work on behalf of future generations 
and the bequest value is one of our prime motives, the authors’ experi-
ence relates that the future and those who will receive the bequest do not 
really play a role in our daily practice. They are not taken into account in 
decision-making processes, nor do they sit at the decision table: they are 
not empowered.
We believe that in a volume concerned with memory, identity, con-
flicts and destruction, we also need to reflect on our actions in terms of 
preventing and mitigating conflicts – not just now, but also in the future. 
The reason for doing so is that the heritage we protect today, the deci-
sions we make in the present, can become a potential source of conflict 
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in the future. Back in 2003, Cooke already warned that the inexorable 
expansion of the heritage burden does not have to be ‘gratefully accepted 
by future generations as a precious, unalterable and inalienable bequest’ 
(Cooke 2003, 77). We therefore use the invitation to contribute to this 
volume as an opportunity to reflect upon our practice of selecting archae-
ological monuments and its possible impact on future generations. In our 
opinion the archaeological sector in the Netherlands should give this 
more thought than it has hitherto done.
To start with, we could ask ourselves whether contemporary herit-
age managers can actually decide about the memory and identity of the 
future. However, such a philosophical debate would go beyond the scope 
of this volume. Alternatively, we may approach the question from our 
experience as heritage professionals, expected to act as stewards and to 
teach students to take on this role. We wonder how durable the choices 
we make in contemporary heritage management actually are. What 
strategy is deemed successful, and for whom: for us, for the heritage, for 
future generations, or for all three?
If we want to take this moral duty – working in the service of the 
future – seriously, rather than merely accepting it as a rather meaningless 
buzz-word (see Van den Dries 2015), we have to think of ways critically 
to assess this inter-generational sustainability. But so far it does not seem 
to be a serious field of study. We do not know what the bequest value 
really means. How do we see those who will receive the heritage bequest, 
and how can the stakes of the future be incorporated in our practice? 
With the exception of the critical volume by Cooke mentioned above 
(Cooke 2003), which reflects on the growth of heritage in Ireland and 
the burden it would put on future generations, there is little literature 
on the issue. While it is more widely present in environmental studies, 
a literature search yielded little in relation to heritage management. 
Only Högberg et al. re-opened a discussion on the matter (Högberg et al. 
2017). Their interviews with heritage professionals in various countries 
across the globe confirmed that the future is not thought about a lot – 
mostly because it is considered difficult to conceive of ways in which to 
address issues relating to the future (Högberg et al. 2017).
The authors of this chapter believe that we can address such mat-
ters and take a look into the crystal ball, or at least try to do so. We will 
illustrate this by following the value-based approach to heritage. It pro-
vides us with arguments into why we should take the future recipients of 
our bequest into account, enabling us to consider them as a stakeholder 
group whose perspective we may assume. Our stage will be the designa-
tion of national monuments, our most precious gifts to the future.
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Theoretical context: the values-based approach
Much of our heritage management practice is grounded in the 
 values-based approach. It departs from the idea that in our Western 
 society, heritage – be it tangible or intangible – only exists if people care, 
if anyone values it. Values give things significance (Avrami et al. 2000, 7). 
Or, to cite Howard: ‘people and their motivations define heritage’ (How-
ard 2003, 7). Most heritage therefore is the result of the fact that people 
care, and want to keep and safeguard it.
It is from this perspective that we acknowledge that the reasons why 
people care can vary strongly from one individual to another, and usually 
differ from one object, site or historic event to the other. Consequently 
the values associated with heritage can be of all sorts and more than one 
at a time. As values may differ from one stakeholder or rights holder to 
another, they are often dissonant. As a consequence, heritage can be 
strongly contested. It may provoke local, national and even international 
conflicts, of which this volume shows some painful examples. Conflicts 
may be expressed as local protests over planning decisions, but they can 
also lead to intentional destruction of cultural heritage, disrupting rela-
tionships between communities or nation-states.
In the hope of avoiding or mitigating conflicts, many scholars have 
stressed in the past couple of decades the importance of including mul-
tiple stakeholders in defining heritage values (see, for instance, Smith et 
al. 2010 for an overview). This need for democratisation, social inclusion 
and empowering those who will be affected by heritage decisions is a 
widely accepted principle that is echoed in (international) policy docu-
ments on cultural heritage – even though our day-to-day practice is often 
not yet fully tuned to it.
A second point of departure is that all of this applies not only to 
present-day society but probably also to societies of the future. According 
to Howard, ‘things actually inherited do not become heritage until they 
are recognized as such’ (Howard 2003, 6). As heritage is continually 
recreated (Avrami et al. 2000, 14), identification plays a vital role in its 
construction. This suggests that unless societies cease to value heritage 
at all, future generations will also be making choices concerning what 
they consider their heritage. In fact, they may have even more heritage 
to choose from than we do, as they will have a longer past. As such, we 
have no reason to believe there will be no conflicts over heritage in the 
future, nor that heritage destruction will cease to occur. However, today’s 
heritage managers seem to assume that not much will change (see again 
Högberg et al. 2017), perhaps because they implicitly think of a not so 
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very distant future (idem). Yet this is an unrealistic assumption. It is actu-
ally very likely that the values which future generations may attach to 
heritage will change (see also Holtorf 2011). However, we do not antici-
pate such a development.
Support for the expectation that concepts of value are very likely to 
change can be found in the fact that ‘our generation’ attributes already 
different values to heritage (either buildings, sites, landscapes, objects 
or intangible heritage) than former generations did. This becomes 
apparent when we compare, for example, the 1964 ICOMOS Venice 
Charter – which considered preserving and revealing the aesthetic and 
historic values of a monument a principle aim of heritage work – with the 
2005 Faro Convention of the Council for Europe, which encourages us 
to recognise that objects and places are important not for their intrinsic 
value, but because of the meanings and uses that people attach to them, 
and consequently the values they represent. Such changes suggest that 
what present-day society considers important with regard to selecting 
heritage, along with the values we apply and prioritise, may not be the 
same for upcoming generations, in the same way that we do not value 
everything, and for the same reasons, as previous generations.
Survey results among the public also suggest interest in heritage 
may differ between generations (Kajda et al. 2018; Van den Dries and 
Boom 2017). Among the Dutch respondents, for instance, we saw sig-
nificant deviations in the level of appreciation for archaeology between 
older and younger age groups; 77 per cent of young people (18–24) were 
convinced that archaeology is useful, against 93 per cent of those aged 
60 years and more. Moreover, 81 per cent of older people (60 and older) 
indicated that they valued having local archaeological remains, com-
pared to a much lower percentage of 65 per cent for the 18–24 age group 
(Van den Dries and Boom 2017).
A third indication that things change over generations is the fact 
that contemporary heritage managers, governments, organisations and 
owners responsible for taking care of the heritage legacy they inherited 
from the past are not always pleased with all of it. We will discuss this 
later in this chapter. It is even likely for the procedures of heritage selec-
tion and designation to transform into more democratic processes in the 
future. For example, in cultural heritage management politics and pol-
icies strong tendencies can be seen towards empowering stakeholders, 
public consultation and participatory governance.
From the perspective of a values-based approach to heritage, we 
would expect attention for those the heritage sector wishes to bequeath 
material to. However, in practice heritage managers like us try to serve 
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the future and to influence the memory of the past for the future, without 
showing much regard for what this future may be. Up until now, democ-
ratisation attempts are usually primarily motivated by avoiding conflicts 
in the present. We do not yet think in terms of democratisation of future 
generations, although they are among our prime target audiences and the 
ones most affected by our current actions. We do not consider them as 
stakeholders. Nor do we pay much attention to the idea that things may 
change in the future. We hardly pause to consider whether future gener-
ations will accept what we designate as heritage to be their legacy too. As 
such, paying attention to the effectiveness of our policies in the long run, 
and how we may serve the future recipients in the best way we can, is not 
high on our priority list. To demonstrate our lack of empathy for these 
recipients further, and to illustrate how such attitudes may annihilate our 
present-day efforts, we will call in our imaginary ‘future friend’.
The imaginary future friend
Imagine a future friend. This is an individual whom you do not know 
and will never get to know. It will be impossible for you ever to meet this 
person, as s/he will be born long after we have left the planet. Yet you are 
determined to buy this person a present, to offer her or him a legacy from 
the past (both ‘our past’ and ‘their past’). One factor that may complicate 
your choice is that this person will be responsible for the costs of main-
taining your gift during his/her entire life, as s/he is also expected to pass 
it on to his/her (unborn) descendants.
The principal question is what could motivate this individual 
to respect the values underlying your purchase, and to keep and even 
maintain your present? Or, to put it differently, what could you do – 
right now – to ensure that your intentions will be respected and you will 
succeed? Would the best strategy be merely to select what you like best 
yourself, to choose whatever you value most, and simply hope this future 
friend will like it too – and will be willing to spend part of his or her (pre-
sumably limited) financial resources on it in order to pass it on? Or are 
there perhaps alternative strategies to consider – ones that may increase 
the chances that we will succeed in our efforts?
Obviously we cannot know what our future friend will consider the 
best option. If ‘the past is a foreign country’, to refer to Lowenthal’s well-
known book (a title that in turn quotes L. P. Hartley’s novel of 1953, The 
Go-Between), we may consider the future an extra-terrestrial planet. In fact, 
we cannot even know whether our imaginary friend will turn out to be a 
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friend. However, we can use our own common sense, experience, imagi-
nation and creativity to figure out scenarios that are least likely to help us 
reach our goals. If we are required to buy a present for someone we know, 
someone acquainted with our culture, our common sense would probably 
tell us the scenario described above is the least likely to have the most suc-
cessful outcome, both for ourselves and for the legacy that we want to pass 
on. This is simply because it fails to take any interests of the person receiving 
the gift into account. One would probably not opt for this strategy.
By imagining what we would prefer, we may think of reasons for our 
imaginary friend to keep and maintain our gift. If we were to be bequeathed 
something, it is quite likely that we would take care of the gift if a) we knew 
that there is a very special story attached to it; b) we were aware of the buy-
er’s strong emotional attachment to it; c) we knew that it would be valued 
by a large group of people (a representative group of society); and d) if 
there was something in it for us as well, for instance if the value of the gift 
would increase instead of primarily becoming a burden.
In the context of our fictitious narrative, the self-centred attitude (‘you 
are expected to like what I like’) could be perceived as rather arrogant. Yet 
in the practice of heritage selection, of choosing archaeological sites to 
become monuments, which most of us consider our most precious gifts to 
future generations, we usually apply precisely this strategy. The experts 
decide, on the basis of non-emotional, objective (usually scientific) criteria. 
They do this for good reasons, of course, but these reasons are first of all fed 
by our own stakes. They lie in the here and now, in part because we have 
to convince authorities, planners or developers of the need for protection 
measures. But we hardly explain why we prioritise these over other values, 
or why we value the scientific potential of a site, for instance, more highly 
than the social value it may have for society. The process has also little to 
do with emotions: it is all about the rationale behind the selection and the 
objective, scientific story. This means that an emotional attachment to it by 
large groups in society is often not considered. And what about the added 
value of our gifts for those who receive them? How does it gain value for 
them? We may presume that the scientific potential will bring an increase 
of value, but it is also acknowledged that precisely scientific value highly 
depends on changeable trends in research (for example, Groenewoudt and 
Bloemers 1997, 133) and may suffer the most from devaluation.
In the next section we will look at the practical context of the main-
stream selection process of archaeological monuments and see how the 
stakes of the future recipients of our ‘gifts’ fit in. The example is taken 
from the Netherlands, but we assume that most of what we describe 
applies in essence to many other nation-states.
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Selection and designation of national monuments
In the Netherlands, as in many other countries across the world, desig-
nation of national archaeological monuments is the exclusive task of the 
national authorities. In our case the Cultural Heritage Agency (Rijksdi-
enst voor het Cultureel Erfgoed, or RCE) designates archaeological sites as 
national listed monuments on behalf of our Minister of Education, Culture 
and Science. A site with such a monument status will be legally protected 
from demolition, at least for some time. The legal mandate for designation 
decisions is the Heritage Act (9 December 2015), which says in Section 3.1:
Our Minister, acting ex officio, may designate a monument or archae-
ological monument which is of general interest because of its beauty, 
scholarly significance, or cultural-historical value as a national 
monument. 
(Ministry of Education, Culture and Science 2016)
The selection of a site, and its designation as a monument, is based on 
objective criteria. The basis for this was laid down in the 1990s, when 
objective criteria became essential to negotiate and argue for protection, 
either in situ or ex situ (Willems 1997; Groenewoudt and Bloemers 1997). 
The criteria for valuing sites are described – and as such imposed – by the 
Dutch Quality Standard. These are:
a)  the intrinsic quality of a site: that is, its rarity, research potential, 
group or context value and its representativeness;
b)  the physical quality of a site: that is, its integrity and degree of 
conservation;
c) the aesthetic value and/or historical value of a site.
The last criterion only concerns sites that are actually visible in the land-
scape. This is hardly the case with newly discovered sites, as these are 
found by means of excavation or other, less destructive techniques. Next 
to these criteria, it is furthermore required that the local circumstances 
are suitable for the long-term preservation of a site. This means that sup-
port by local authorities is needed; support by landowners is preferred, 
but is not strictly necessary.
Over time, the principles underneath the conservation ethos have 
changed considerably. When the listing of archaeological monuments 
started, in the 1960s, there was a strong emphasis on protecting archae-
ological remains that were visible in the landscape, such as burial monu-
ments and dwelling mounts (Van Haaff 2006). As a result of a very active 
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protection policy in the 1970s and 1980s, many of those were listed. In 
the 90s the focus shifted towards protecting and designating sites with 
invisible archaeological remains, and to gaining insight into the cache of 
sites available in the ground (Deeben 2015). The most recent objective of 
the national preservation policy has been to protect a representative sam-
ple of our past as monuments for future generations (Smit et al. 2014).
The result of over 50 years of designating national archaeological 
monuments is a collection of around 1500 protected archaeological sites. 
This is at present our principal legacy for future generations. For some 
years the Cultural Heritage Agency and the Minister of Culture have not 
been entirely satisfied with the composition of this monument list. The 
main issue was, and is, that it is not considered sufficiently representative 
of the past (Schut and Vossen 2009; Smit et al. 2014). Due to the selec-
tion legacy of the last couple of decades, which has favoured visible mon-
uments, these are represented best. In particular burial monuments and 
dwelling mounds dominate the list (Fig.17.1). Ritual places, sites for raw 
material procurement, sites relating to industry and craft and maritime 
sites are currently hardly represented (Zoetbrood et al. 2006).
In regard to the historical periods represented, the current list has 
also few monuments from the Palaeolithic and Mesolithic periods, the 
early Neolithic era, the Bronze Age (apart from Neolithic/Bronze Age 
burial mounds) or the early mediaeval and modern periods (Fig.17.2). 
The distribution of sites across the country is also considered unbalanced. 
Figure 17.1 The national archaeological monuments of the 
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The western provinces, with their Holocene geological deposits in which 
most of the archaeology lies deep beneath the surface, have far fewer 
monuments than do the eastern provinces, in which most of the visible 
monuments, such as burial sites, are located (Fig.17.3).
In the last couple of years the Cultural Heritage Agency has placed 
more emphasis on protecting monuments that are underrepresented. In 
2013 it composed a protection programme to designate 28 new monu-
ments (Smit et al. 2014). However, due to the fact that adding sites to the 
monument list is a long process, certain historic periods and complexes 
will remain underrepresented for many years to come.
If we look at this designation policy from the perspective of a future 
recipient, and consider his or her possible motives for respecting our 
choices, we can identify some additional issues. The first relates to its 
emotional value, the level of attachment shown to the gift by society. 
Even though the Dutch Heritage Act (2016) talks about monuments as 
places ‘of general interest’, the prime motivation for selection remains 
how sites are valued by professionals for their research potential they 
offer present-day scholars. Their intrinsic value is thus put first. There is 
very little emotional value attached to their selection – at least not in a 
form apparent to outsiders. This also applies to the monuments assigned 
to the tentative list through the 2013 protection programme – maybe 
even more so, as invisible monuments have hardly any aesthetic value.
Figure 17.2 The national archaeological monuments of the 
Netherlands, subdivided into historic periods (Source: RCE) 
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Figure 17.3 The national archaeological monuments of the 
Netherlands, as distributed across the country (Source: RCE) 
Moreover, selections to date have primarily been made in a top-
down manner. Even though heritage managers act on behalf of society, 
this does not help to foster emotional attachment to monuments among 
large groups in society. The lack of emotional attachment to monuments 
shown by many ordinary people is illustrated by some recent studies. In 
Apeldoorn, for instance, it was found that a majority of respondents to 
a small survey sample had not consciously noticed the archaeological 
monuments (burial mounds) abundantly present near where they lived 
(Van Vuuren 2014). Another survey found that if stakeholders think 
their interests are neglected in the process of constructing archaeological 
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monuments, they may believe that a historic identity is being imposed on 
them (Amsing 2015, 100).
Another issue with the current designation policy concerns the 
objective of representativeness and its disconnection with the motive of 
added value. The authors consider ‘representativeness’ to be a conserva-
tive concept, because present-day heritage managers can only be repre-
sentative in relation to their own state of knowledge. It is, however, very 
likely that we have so far missed lots of traces from the past. These may 
be discovered in the future using innovative methods not yet invented – 
even as we have discovered new things with modern DNA analyses, geo-
archaeology and high-tech, non-intrusive instruments. Thinking in terms 
of representativeness implies we do not select potential heritage sites as 
protected areas – a site we know nothing about, but which may have a 
good research potential, for example because it has ideal preservation 
conditions. By failing to preserve and protect such unknown sites, we 
make it less likely that future generations will be able to discover this 
unknown. The concept of representativeness, therefore, does not take 
the interests of future stakeholders, such as the next generation of aca-
demics, into account.
If we seek to take the interests of future generations more seriously, 
we ought to be altruistic and ensure they are also given opportunities for 
discovery. From a scientific point of view, it could therefore be argued that 
we should also protect locations with a potential heritage value for future 
generations, and so instal parks of undisturbed areas as ‘playgrounds’ for 
future academics. This may be an example of a heritage asset that has the 
potential to gain value for the recipients of our gift. Even the promise of 
an increase in value may serve to make such monuments worth keeping 
for generations in the near and distant future.
Experiments involving stakeholders 
The Cultural Heritage Agency is currently rethinking its policy on the 
designation of monuments and has started the project ‘Exploration 
into Archaeology’. Its new approach maintains that archaeological sites 
should not be protected for the sake of scientific research alone, but for 
the benefit of society as a whole. It therefore believes the lack of pub-
lic attachment to national monuments to be a serious issue that must 
be tackled. One of the Agency’s strategies is to look for the relevance of 
archaeological monuments to society, and explore how people can ben-
efit from the state’s protection of monuments of national significance. It 
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can, for example, transform invisible monuments into places for people 
to enjoy (Fig.17.4) and/or to generate a living (Fig.17.5).
Another idea is to involve the public in the designation of archae-
ological sites. The Agency recently experimented with a bottom-up 
approach involving Natuurmonumenten, the Dutch Natural Monuments 
Society. Normally, this society has no formal role in decision making and 
selection regarding the archaeological sites, but in the context of the lat-
est designation programme (Smit et al. 2014) it was asked to identify 
remains from the past that it would prefer to select as monuments.
The Natural Monuments Society is a main stakeholder. It is a 
non-governmental organisation with about 700,000 members and 
donors, responsible for protecting and managing about 107,000 ha. of 
nature reserves in the Netherlands. These parks include a wide variety 
of cultural heritage, such as fortresses, country estates and archaeolog-
ical sites. In total the Society manages over 300 sites, dating from the 
Palaeolithic era to modern times, of which 40 are national archaeological 
monuments.
In our opinion, this was an interesting experiment. It turned out 
that of all 27 sites this stakeholder nominated, only three date from early 
Figure 17.4 A previously invisible archaeological monument 
(a Roman fortress), now transformed into a leisure park in Leiden 
(Matilo). Photograph courtesy RCE. 
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prehistory and two from the Iron Age/Roman period. The majority of 
the sites the Society wished to nominate for gaining monument status 
(22) date from the mediaeval and modern period. With regard to the 
proposed categories of sites, it is striking that craft/industry and defence 
structures dominated the list of Natuurmonumenten, the very elements 
currently most lacking in the official monument list. Equally interesting 
is that the Society’s preference for these sites has turned out to be driven 
by economic motives rather than scientific values. The sites the Society 
selected require preservation measures; if they are awarded listed mon-
ument status, the national government provides financial support for 
their maintenance. As four of the nominated sites were actually included 
in the designation process, the experiment proved both interesting and 
successful.
To us, this pilot illustrates that by involving another stakeholder 
group in the selection process of archaeological monuments, different 
heritage values may be brought to the fore – complementing those that 
experts in archaeology would prioritise. It indicates that including these 
stakeholders more widely in the monument designation strategy would 
yield a greater variety of heritage sites to be considered for preservation. 
Figure 17.5 Another previously invisible archaeological monument 
(a Roman fortress), now transformed into a lively cultural community 
centre in Utrecht (Hoge Woerd). Photograph courtesy RCE. 
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It also implies that such a process would demonstrate to future genera-
tions how these monuments are valued by a large group in society, other 
than just heritage experts.
Another advantage of such a bottom-up involvement in the designa-
tion of the monuments which future recipients will have to care for is that 
it may foster an emotional commitment, both now and in the near future. 
As these monuments were not imposed on Natuurmonumenten by the 
state but self-imposed, its employees and members may get a feeling of 
ownership, responsibility and stewardship. Whether it indeed pays off in 
the long term remains to be evaluated, but it is more likely that the organ-
isation will respect its ‘own’ decision of protecting these monuments for 
many years to come. This seems a more future-proof strategy than impos-
ing decisions of which monuments they are expected to care for.
Apart from Natuurmonumenten, other stakeholders are not for-
mally involved in any heritage selection processes. The Cultural Heritage 
Agency is in the process of asking other professional stakeholders about 
their interest in getting involved; it seems that a majority has responded 
positively to the consultation (Vossen and Korf 2018). This corresponds 
with the findings of students of the Faculty of Archaeology when inter-
viewing stakeholders (for example, Van Vuuren 2014; Amsing 2015). 
Ordinary members of the public, however, have never been directly 
involved in any decision making concerning the archaeological heritage 
and its preservation. We thus lack empirical data on the values and selec-
tion criteria that community members would apply and prioritise, were 
they to be involved in selecting national monuments.
As a result, it is difficult to predict the possible effects of public 
involvement on the safeguarding of our heritage. We do know, however, 
that members of the public have sometimes had different interests in the 
past than professionals may assume. In the earlier mentioned public sur-
vey conducted by the NEARCH research group, for example, it was found 
that interests in archaeology among the public in Europe (Kajda et al. 
2018) and in the Netherlands are wide (Van den Dries and Boom 2017). 
They may not necessarily match the narrow foci local authorities some-
times apply in safeguarding archaeological remains. It demonstrates that 
without inquiring we cannot know whether our selection of the past rep-
resents what society values.
On the basis of the NEARCH survey results, it may also be assumed 
that, if the public were more aware of archaeological monuments, there 
might be a greater interest among ordinary people in getting involved in 
selection policies. Over 30 per cent of the Dutch respondents indicated 
an interest in being included in decision making regarding archaeology 
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(Van den Dries and Boom 2017). Although respondents replied to a ques-
tion concerning local ‘archaeological projects’, not specifically the selec-
tion of monuments, there would seem to be fertile ground for widening 
community engagement.
Studies on the effects of public participation in other disciplines of 
conservation management, for instance in National Park management, do 
show positive effects (for example, Parks and Wildlife Commission of the 
Northern Territory, 2002; Wouters et al. 2011). Apart from an improved 
quality of decision making by agencies, other effects among partici-
pants reported by researchers include a greater compliance through an 
increased feeling of ownership and a greater community advocacy for 
protection measures. This could well be the kind of emotional attachment 
that a next generation of stewards may respect. Involving more members 
of the public would in any case make our monument designation a more 
democratic process; this would also demonstrate that what we pass on 
was valued by the transmitting society.
Conclusion
In this chapter the authors aimed to discuss to what extent heritage pro-
fessionals take the interests of future generations into account while 
creating memories of the past for the future. We are stewards acting on 
behalf of the future recipients of our ‘gifts’, and we may believe we are 
doing the future a favour. Yet the heritage that we protect, and the deci-
sions we make today, could actually turn out to be a burden for those 
to whom we wish to bequeath heritage. It may even become a source of 
potential conflict. The fact that contemporary heritage managers are not 
always satisfied with what they have inherited from the past, nor with 
the selections from the past that they pass on, illustrates that we in turn 
may fail to satisfy future generations. Yet in ordinary practice we do not 
really acknowledge that circumstances may change over time, as may 
the values future generations may ascribe to heritage. We scarcely eval-
uate our policies and actions against our long-term objectives, nor do we 
anticipate changes that our crystal balls may foretell.
In assuming the perspective of the future recipients of heritage 
‘gifts’, the authors identified four motives that may be required for them 
to respect the choices of those who have granted them an inheritance 
and so to continue stewardship of the heritage we bequeath. This is only 
the beginning; if the heritage sector takes another look into a crystal ball, 
there may be several more factors to discover. We took these motives as 
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a viewpoint from which we could reflect upon the current Dutch practice 
of selecting our archaeological national monuments, our principal gifts 
to the future, and we noted that such motives do not yet play a role in 
this. We believe that failing to take the perspective of future recipients 
into consideration risks the loss of our efforts and investment of time, 
energy and resources – and eventually the heritage we protected as well. 
Should we therefore not try to be more ambitious in seeking to reach our 
goals for the future?
The authors believe that an attempt to incorporate at least the inter-
ests and potential values of future generations would make our selection 
of heritage more sustainable in the longer term. It would also comply 
with the values-based approach to cultural heritage in which most of our 
work is grounded.
We do not consider this to be a simple process. However, a fur-
ther democratisation of our practice would seem to offer a valuable step 
forward that may also address some of the potential motives of future 
recipients. We illustrated this by means of an experiment conducted by 
the state service in the Netherlands (RCE), which included an external 
(non-expert) stakeholder group in the selection process of national mon-
uments. The results reveal that such an approach has the potential to 
allow other heritage values to be taken into account and to widen herit-
age selections. It may also foster an emotional attachment and encourage 
a wider engagement of society. Ultimately, it serves to make our national 
memory rather more the memory of us all – and therefore maybe also of 
future generations.
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‘Cultural heritage is concerned 
with the future’: a critical epilogue
Cornelius Holtorf
After decades of research and debate in the field that today is known 
as heritage studies, it has become clear that cultural heritage is best 
understood as a set of social practices and processes, valued in specific 
circumstances for their implications and outcomes. In other words, the 
discussion has come a long way from earlier ways of understanding cul-
tural heritage in terms of monuments or traditions that have survived 
from the past and carry intrinsic values that ought to be preserved as 
such for the benefit of future generations. As a result, the most important 
question in studying cultural heritage is now not what it is, but what it 
does. In cultural heritage management and preservation – the sector in 
which many students graduating in our field find employment – we no 
longer consider cultural heritage in terms of what it was, but rather of 
what it could become. Consequently, the focus of those who understand 
and develop cultural heritage has shifted somewhat, from highlighting 
issues of conservation to highlighting issues of change.
This is the academic and societal context of the present volume 
that offers critical global perspectives on cultural memory, heritage and 
destruction. I note in particular, and with some intellectual satisfaction, 
that a number of authors do not demonise the destruction of cultural 
heritage, but consider the impact of destruction and even the possible 
benefits of loss – which is something I have argued for over many years. 
Among the important other topics addressed throughout the chapters 
are the values of cultural heritage, the relation of cultural heritage to col-
lective identities and contestations of dominant perspectives of cultural 
heritage. This is as it should be.
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Adopting a critical attitude myself, in this epilogue I would like to 
take the opportunity to throw light on a couple of problems associated 
with some recent debates on these issues in our field. To some extent, 
I have been inspired in my thinking by reading the contributions in the 
present volume. However, the argument is much larger, and my discus-
sion should not be interpreted as specifically directed at any one author 
or any specific chapter.
In promoting critical perspectives for understanding cultural herit-
age, I strongly believe that we should also see the need to adopt a similarly 
critical perspective towards our own strategies and practices. It is under-
standable, on one level, that many of us sometimes disagree with political 
decisions and economic practices in which cultural heritage is implicated. 
We may therefore, from time to time, wish to oppose and resist the pow-
ers that are in control. However, in some quarters of the field of heritage 
studies it has almost become a mantra to engage in every possible context 
in crusades against capitalism, neoliberalism and multinational corpora-
tions, occasionally evoking some kind of moral duty to join this movement.
As critical as academic research and good management always have 
to be, there is a slippery slope along which overtly politically motivated 
work risks taking the discussion down to the level of sectarian campaigns. 
If this occurs, joint flag-waving may replace open-minded analysis, and 
the commitment to a narrow political struggle threatens to overshadow 
academic originality and intellectual thoughtfulness. It is important to 
maintain the professionalism of those who participate in studying and 
managing cultural heritage. Their intellectual capacities are best used in 
advancing our understanding of the issues at hand, rather than seeking 
to undermine the political system and authorities in democratic states 
which we need to keep our complex societies together.
It is sometimes assumed – including in the present volume – that 
cultural heritage, as a symbol of collective identities, can contribute to 
uniting and thus strengthening cultural groups and communities. That 
value can motivate claims for the conservation of specific cultural herit-
age in the interest of associated groups or communities. It is often insuf-
ficiently considered, however, that one of the outcomes of enhancing 
collective identities through cultural heritage is that the common soci-
ety in which many groups and communities co-exist is increasingly torn 
apart and bereft of social cohesion. A significant risk of the widespread 
current appetite for letting identity politics inform the answers to sur-
prisingly many social and cultural questions is that the glue that binds all 
groups and communities together in a common state loses its adhesive 
power. Cultural heritage is often part of the processes that make us divide 
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people into different tribes, separating ‘us’ from ‘them’. Indeed, narra-
tives about cultural heritage make such divisions running right through 
the population even seem natural and inevitable, with no real alterna-
tive; they are effectively essentialising differences rather than fostering 
commonalities.
In reality, all societies are complex conglomerates in which people 
are part of multiple groups and communities. These in turn are divided 
across all sorts of permeable lines related to age, occupation, gender, 
place of residence, social background, genetic dispositions, individual 
preferences, habits, values and so on. By the same token, cultural mon-
uments and traditions represent heterogenous mixtures of all kinds of 
inventions and influences of diverse origin that have accumulated over 
long periods of time. Even though few would deny the existence of these 
complex, socio-cultural blends in which we all find ourselves, their impli-
cations are commonly ignored by those supporting the dominant view of 
why cultural heritage is important in society. It is nothing short of aston-
ishing that a large number of those studying and managing cultural her-
itage do their best to enforce strict, largely artificial divisions in the name 
of ‘cultural diversity’ or ‘social justice’ that threaten to rip the fragile joint 
assemblages of our societies apart.
If we are increasingly concerned with what cultural heritage and its 
management in present society do, and what they could become in a frame-
work of change, we are effectively more concerned in our work with the future 
than with the past. That is why the concept of heritage futures is so timely and 
important. Heritage futures are concerned with the roles of heritage in man-
aging the relations between present and future societies, for example through 
anticipation or planning. This is the context in which I worry about the best 
way in which our professional expertise and notions of cultural heritage in 
society can contribute to social development. There is a risk that certain ways 
of discussing, conceptualising and indeed managing cultural heritage could 
ultimately cause more harm than benefit for future societies. For that reason 
it is paramount to think carefully and critically about how what we are doing 
today could have significant impact on the future.
I expect that some of my comments will be seen as controversial and 
thus attract critique and indeed criticism. I welcome future discussion, and 
can see that the authors in the present volume will have much to contrib-
ute themselves. I have done my best – although I may possibly not have 
entirely succeeded (for which I apologise in advance) – to focus on specific 
issues while refraining from labelling; my aim is to avoid the impression 
of representing some kind of ‘thought police’. I hope that the critics in this 
important intellectual debate that was stimulated by the many interesting 
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